

# THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

OF

## PADMAPĀDA

(TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH)

BY

Rājasevāsakta

D. VENKATARAMIAH, B.A., L.T.

*Formerly Mysore Educational Service*

ORIENTAL INSTITUTE  
BARODA

1948



CENTRAL ASIAN LIBRARY  
NEW DELHI

Acc. No. 7984.....

Date... 12-12-58.....

Call No. Sa. 151.....  
Pa2/Ven

PRINTED AT THE BANGALORE PRESS, BANGALORE CITY,  
BY G. SRINIVASA RAO, SUPERINTENDENT, AND PUBLISHED  
ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA  
GAEKWAD OF BARODA  
BY BENOYTOSH BHATTACHARYYA, DIRECTOR, ORIENTAL INSTITUTE,  
AT THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE, BARODA

Price: Rs. 17

## FOREWORD

THE famous Vedānta polemical work, *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācārya in English translation is now presented to all lovers of Indian Philosophy as No. CVII of the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*. The publication of this work is a melancholy story since the esteemed translator, the late Rājasevāsakta Śrī. D. Venkataramiah, died as soon as arrangements were made to print his book at the Bangalore Press, Bangalore. Before his death he was very anxious to have the book printed, and always reminded us that delay might kill him. The work was first entrusted under Government orders to the Sadhana Press, Baroda, but this press, hardpressed with work, could not make any headway even after a lapse of full one year. Thereafter, Mr. Venkataramiah himself fixed the Bangalore Press for printing his work, and this printer within a short time set up nearly a hundred galleys in type. These galleys were sent to the editor without delay, but by that time Mr. Venkataramiah was too ill to revise the proofs. That illness proved to be his last illness and he expired on Friday, 13th June 1947, at the ripe old age of 81, and thus India lost a great scholar, a profound philosopher and above all, a gentleman of very high qualities and character. We were associated with Mr. Venkataramiah for the last ten years or more, and we shall ever remember with appreciation and admiration his great desire to help us in difficulties, his remarkable promptitude in disposing of business and the uniform courtesy that was inherent in him.

The late Mr. Venkataramiah was conscious that he was old and that he may collapse at any time. In order that the printing of the work may not suffer in any way, he requested his friend and associate, Mr. D. V. Gundappa, a well-known political, literary and social worker of Mysore, to examine the proofs of the *Pañcapādikā* in case anything happened to him. But alas ! the worst happened, and the author passed away leaving the heavy responsibility of printing this complicated work to others. Those were the days of intense political excitement and activity in the State of Mysore, as throughout the rest of India ; and Mr. Gundappa, being an old public worker, could not but go forward to take his share in the struggle. This necessarily meant the diversion of his attention from the unexciting pages of the

Pañcapādikā which asked rather for concentration of attention. After he had gone through the first 30 or 40 pages, Mr. Gundappa saw that he was in a situation likely to make for delay if he continued to retain the responsibility for proof-reading; and it was thereupon agreed that the General Editor should take over the responsibility.

The General Editor would assure the readers that he has performed his part to the best of his ability. His only regret is that the proofs of this great and standard philosophical work could not be examined either by the late author, Mr. Venkataramiah, or his nominee, Mr. D. V. Gundappa.

The late Mr. Venkataramiah spared no pains in making the translation perfect. He not only translated the most difficult Vedāntic text of Pañcapādikā but followed the subtle differentiation in elaborate notes from the Vivaraṇa at every step. Besides this in a detailed *conspectus* he gave exhaustive notes with original quotations from Vedāntic works and copious comparisons of topics and views of the greatest authorities on Vedānta. The material presented in this volume with the critical acumen exhibited by the translator at every step is bound to make the volume a standard work on the subject and an outstanding contribution to Vedānta Philosophy.

At our request Mr. D. V. Gundappa has contributed a biographical note on the late Rājasevāsakta Śrī. D. Venkataramiah, and this is printed as part of the preliminary pages, and for this act of courtesy, grateful thanks of the General Editor to Mr. Gundappa are recorded here.

It is not possible to close this Foreword without a reference to the author, Padmapāda, who is the founder of what is known as the Vivaraṇa school of Vedānta, as running parallel to the Bhāmati School started somewhat later by the famous scholar, Vācaspati Miśra. It is hardly necessary to state that Padmapāda was a direct disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, the founder of what is called the Advaita school of Vedānta. Śaṅkarācārya's teachings are incorporated in the Śārīraka Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, and subsequently Śaṅkara's original teachings were interpreted differently by two different schools of thought, one headed by our author, Pādmapāda, and the other by Vācaspati Miśra as already alluded to. A large literature grew round the works of these two authors, and they were known by the names of the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmati schools of Vedānta.

In the course of time, the Vivaraṇa school seems to have fallen into desuetude as compared with its rival; and for this, two reasons at least are clearly discernible: (1) The basic text of the Vivaraṇa school, namely, the Pañcapādikā, is available only in the form of a fragment while that of the other (Bhāmati) is in its complete form. The general student of Śaṅkara's philosophy would naturally prefer that Vyākhyāna which covers the Bhāṣya on all the 555 sūtras to that which is unfortunately found limited to just four of them. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Bhāṣyakāra's mind is more fully brought out in the Bhāmati which deals with the sūtra topics from A to Z than in the extant fraction of the Pañcapādikā, whatever be the relative merits of the two Vyākhyānas which it should be only for specialists to take into account. To the average student, both alike represent Śaṅkara's Advaita; and their interpretative distinctions are to him merely a technical matter. Unlike Padmapāda whose known achievement is only in the field of one Darśana, Vācaspati the author of Bhāmati has to his credit works of recognised authority in all the six Darśanas. His works in Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Pūrvamīmāṃsā have earned for him a prestige which naturally magnifies his stature in the realm of the Vedānta. This is an advantage not matched in the case of Padmapāda. In addition to these two facts, we may also note that some scholars hold the view that while Vācaspati (Bhāmati) scrupulously keeps close to the letter of the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, Padmapāda (Pañcapādikā) tries to supplement the original with something of his own thought in the process of clarification and argument. This impression of Bhāmati's greater literal approximation to the original may be another reason for Vivaraṇa's comparative lack of popularity.

On the other hand, thinkers and writers of no inferior standing mindful of the doctrinal possibilities of the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya have looked upon the Vivaraṇa (Pañcapādikā) literature as an invaluable source of light and guidance. This should be evident when it is recalled that among the contributors to this literature is the great Mādhava Vidyāraṇya, author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha as of the more popular Vedānta Pañcadaśī. The question of the place of the Vivaraṇa school in the history of Advaitic thought is one that awaits the attention of the researcher.

Padmapāda's work and all commentaries thereon are thus of academic and antiquarian interest, as they are undoubtedly of unique interest to the student of pure philosophy; and if proper

care is not taken to preserve this literature it is quite possible that the school will be relegated to the limbo of oblivion in the course of another century. Whether the Indian Paṇḍits and the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālās will make a renewed attempt to revive this forgotten school, time alone can say. But there is no doubt that Padmapāda's arguments are sound and have a strong appeal, and his painstaking interpretations with hair splitting differentiations will certainly excite the admiration of succeeding generations with unabated vigour. The hairline subtleties of his writings perhaps can only be compared with the critical analysis resorted to in the Navya Nyāya school of later times.

Being a direct disciple of the great saint Śaṅkarācārya there is hardly any difficulty in fixing Padmapāda's age. Śaṅkarācārya according to tradition lived for 32 years, and painstaking research has shown that this period was covered by the years 788-820 A.D. Thus Padmapāda's time can be precisely fixed at 820 A.D. and scholars have generally agreed on this point. Our author Padmapāda is reputed to have written two works both of which have fortunately survived. One of them is the Pañcapādikā which is a commentary on the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the first four sūtras of the Brahma Sūtras. The name Pañcapādikā however suggests that the original commentary was obviously on five sūtras, out of which one was lost subsequently.

In his introduction to the *Siddhānta Bindu* (G.O.S. No. LXIV) on p. xci the editor Mr. P. C. Divanji has recorded an interesting story explaining the circumstances under which part of Padmapāda's book was lost.

The legend goes on to say that when Padmapāda had finished his task of composing the full text of the Pañcapādikā he was seized with a desire to go out on a pilgrimage. Before he could put that idea into practice he went to his guru like an obedient disciple for permission to leave. Śaṅkara at first was not willing to let him go, but as he was insistent, he ultimately gave permission much against his wishes. Padmapāda started on his journey all the time carrying the Pañcapādikā along with him. On the way to Rāmeśvaram he halted at the house of his maternal uncle who was a follower of the Prābhākara School of Mīmāṃsā. To this uncle Padmapāda showed his Pañcapādikā wherein he had refuted Prabhākara and supported the Śaṅkara view-points. Thereafter he left for Rāmeśvaram leaving all his belongings with his uncle including his new book Pañcapādikā.

In his absence, the uncle thought that if Pañcapādikā gains publicity and popularity it will injure his master's doctrines which may ultimately go out of currency. Thinking thus he hit upon the trick of destroying the manuscript by setting fire to his own house. Padmapāda informed his master about this disaster on his return, and bitterly regretted having gone out on pilgrimage against his advice. The latter thereupon dictated to him the Catussūtrī portion of the work which he remembered. That accounts for the incompleteness of the present work if this legend can be trusted.

The second work attributed to Padmapāda is the Ātmabodhavyākhyāna, also called the Vedāntasāra. Although he had left us two works his reputation is based on the sure foundation of the Pañcapādikā.

According to Dr. Das Gupta this Pañcapādikā is one of the most important of the Vedānta works known to us. It was commented upon by Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) in his Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa, which was later further commented upon by Akhaṇḍānanda (A.D. 1350) in his Tattvadīpana. Ānandapūrṇa (A.D. 1600), another famous author, wrote a commentary on the Pañcapādikā. Dr. Das Gupta informs us that Nṛsiṃhāsrama wrote a commentary on the Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa entitled Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā while another old author Śrīkṛṣṇa composed a further commentary on the Pañcapādikā. Among other writers on Vivaraṇa may be mentioned the names of Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, the author of Vivaraṇopanyāsa, and of Vidyāraṇya author of Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha. In this long line of Vivaraṇa authors Rāmānanda is perhaps the last great scholar. Dr. Das Gupta places him in the early part of the 17th century on arguments which appear to be sound.<sup>1</sup>

GENERAL EDITOR.

---

<sup>1</sup> For further details and elaborate discussion on the subtle differentiations existing between the two schools Vivaraṇa and Bhāmati, see remarks of Dr. S. N. Das Gupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Volume II, p. 102 ff. (Padmapāda) and 106 ff. (Vācaspati Miśra). It is unnecessary to dilate on them here.

A study of the contribution of the Vivaraṇa School to Advaita theory is contained in *The Philosophy of Advaita: with Special Reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya*, by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan of Madras.

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year, and the second section deals with the specific results of the work.

2. The second part of the report deals with the specific results of the work. It is divided into three main sections: the first section deals with the results of the work in the field of agriculture, the second section deals with the results of the work in the field of industry, and the third section deals with the results of the work in the field of commerce.

3. The third part of the report deals with the financial results of the work. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the income of the work, and the second section deals with the expenditure of the work.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the general conclusions of the work. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the general conclusions of the work, and the second section deals with the specific conclusions of the work.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the general recommendations of the work. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the general recommendations of the work, and the second section deals with the specific recommendations of the work.

## A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ON THE LATE RĀJASEVĀSAKTA ŚRĪ. D. VENKATARAMIAH

MR. D. VENKATARAMIAH, author of the English version of the *Pañcapādikā* herein offered to the public, was born in October 26, 1867. He came of an orthodox Brahmin family of Mysore and grew amidst living traditions of devotion to the disciplines of religion and learning. The struggle he had to put up so as to keep himself at school and college was another factor that contributed to his strength of character. Soon after taking the B.A. degree he joined service under the Government of Mysore in 1893, and the next year saw him in the position of Assistant Master in the Normal School at Mysore. It is illustrative of the seriousness with which he always regarded the duties of his office that he sought to qualify himself the better for the teaching profession by taking the L.T. course at the Training College at Saidapet (Madras). It was there that he met the late Rt.-Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sāstri as a fellow-student. The friendship they formed there grew with years and proved a source of comfort and strength to both alike in days of old age. In 1896 Mr. Venkataramiah was transferred to the Maharani's College where classes had to be taken in English literature; and with characteristic zeal he prepared himself by equipping himself with a library of standard works on Shakespeare and Wordsworth and other great poets and studying them with conscientious diligence. He was promoted to the headmastership of the Normal School in 1913, and then to the principalship of the Training College in 1916. He was made Circle Inspector of Education in 1919 and Deputy Inspector-General (Director) of Education in 1922. He retired from service in June 1923. In appreciation of his manifold services to the public in the fields of education and learning, the title of *Rājasevāsakta* was conferred on Mr. Venkataramiah by His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore at a Durbar in June 1944. He died on Friday, the 13th of June 1947, in his 81st year, in his house in Basavangudi, Bangalore City. The first sheaf of the press-proofs of this work (*Pañcapādikā*) reached Mr. Venkataramiah's hands 4 or 5 days prior to his passing. He was then too ill to go through them. But he eagerly ran his eyes over them and expressed appreciation of the typography and format of the pages, and said



(in Kannada): "May this be for Śrī Rāma's acceptance ! (Śrī Rāma-arpita)." These were practically his very last words.

Even when pressed for time in the midst of his onerous and multifarious duties as an administrative officer, he always made it a point to find time for his studies in Sanskrit and English literature and in philosophy. He sought the company of Paṇḍits and took delight in their discourses on topics of religion and philosophy.

As teacher and professor, as Inspector and Principal, he won the respect and gratitude of all by his conscientious devotion to duty and his unfailing gifts of sympathy and understanding. A keen student of literature and philosophy, he had no difficulty in finding work for his hands in days of retirement. He continued to serve the cause of education as a member of the Text-Book Committee, as the Chairman of the Local Education Board and as an influential member of many such public bodies, besides giving his services as honorary professor to a local College. He continued to find delight in the pages of the Bible and Shakespeare as well as of Vālmīki and Vyāsa. For some 12 years he was the President of the Association of Paṇḍits which was founded and built up largely through his effort. He was also one of the founders of the Sanskrit Academy of Bangalore, to which institution he has made a gift of his collection of Sanskrit books. The most enduring monument to his learning and love of service to fellow-men is in his insightful and well-phrased English renderings of some of the principal *Upaniṣads* and other celebrated Sanskrit philosophical treatises. His translation of Pārthasārathi Miśra's "Śāstra-Dīpikā" into English was published in the *Gaekwad Oriental Series* eight years ago. These works testify to his conscientious care as well as to the deftness of his workmanship in clarifying the intricacies of Vedāntic polemics and suiting the vehicle of a foreign tongue to convey the subtleties of Sanskrit philosophical thought. Clean from every point of view throughout his career, gentle and forbearing, free from vanity and ostentation, with a temperament trained to equanimity and calm, Mr. D. Venkataramiah lived the twofold Dharma of self-culture (Svādhyāya) and teaching (Pravacana) prescribed to a Brāhmaṇa.

March 8, 1948.

D. V. GUNDAPPA.

## INTRODUCTION

यस्तन्न वेद किमुचा करिष्यति  
य इत्तद्विदुस्त इमे समासते ॥

—R.V., I. 164. 39.

What gain to him is all this Vedic lore  
That comprehendeth not the That-The Lord?  
But they that Him do comprehend for sure  
Shall tranquil rest in Him for evermore.

### I

The Pañcapādikā is a gloss on Śamkara's Sūtra-Bhāṣya (I. i. 1-4). Padmapāda, its author, was one of the favourite disciples of Śamkara, the others being Sureśvara, Hastāmalaka and Tṛṣṭaka. The names well known to posterity are only those of Padmapāda and Sureśvara. The main source of information from which we could get to know the circumstances under which the Pañcapādikā was written is the Śamkara-digvijaya attributed to Vidyāraṇya and though we may not place implicit faith on its authenticity, we need not altogether discredit the account.

It is stated that at the request of Sureśvara, Śamkara gave him permission to write a commentary on his Bhāṣya. The friends of Padmapāda pleaded before Śamkara that Maṇḍana<sup>1</sup> (the pre-ascetic appellation of Sureśvara) should not be entrusted with the task of writing an authoritative commentary on the Bhāṣya. They argued that having been an ardent upholder of the teaching of the Karma Kāṇḍa which attaches ultimate value to ritualistic practice, he would minimise if not altogether suppress the importance of jñāna as the only means of liberation. They feared that he would pervert the pure Vedāntic doctrine and accordingly recommended Padmapāda as best fitted to be entrusted with the work of expounding the Bhāṣya since his absolute faith in the Guru had been evidenced when, as the tradition goes,

<sup>1</sup> The identity of Maṇḍanamīśra with Sureśvara has been of late questioned.—See Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri's *Introduction to Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana*.

in obedience to the master's call he stepped across the Ganges on whose bosom miraculously sprang up lotuses to serve as his foothold; (hence the name Padmapāda).

Śamkara though he was convinced of the competency of Sureśvara to interpret the Advaitic doctrine in its purity, yielded to the importunities of those who discredited Sureśvara. He consequently commissioned Sanandana (the ascetic name of Padmapāda) to write the sub-commentary (Nibandhana) but assigned to Sureśvara the composition of Vārtikas on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Taittirīya Upaniṣads bringing out in full the essentials of the Advaita system. From these Vārtikas and also from his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, an independent work with its powerful advocacy of knowledge dissociated from ritual as the only means of freedom, we see how groundless was the charge of those fellow-disciples who suspected Sureśvara's bias to the Karma doctrine.

Padmapāda's commentary on the Bhāṣya is known as the Tīkā,<sup>1</sup> the first part being styled the Pañcapādikā, the rest Vṛtti. From internal evidence it is perceived that Padmapāda in all probability wrote his gloss on the entire Bhāṣya but what is left to us is only the Tīkā relating to the Bhāṣya on Bādarāyaṇa-Sūtras, I. i. 1-4.<sup>2</sup>

After completing his work Padmapāda sought permission from the master, it is said, to travel south on a pilgrimage to Rāmeśvaram and though warned against the dangers incidental to such a long journey, he wrested Śamkara's consent and proceeded on his travels taking his work with him. On his way he reached his uncle's house. This uncle of his who was a staunch follower of Prabhākara—the famous exponent of the ritualistic doctrine of one school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā—naturally felt aggrieved at the attack made in the Pañcapādikā on the Prabhākara teaching but without revealing his mind complimented his nephew on his

<sup>1</sup> Rāmānanda in his commentary on Śamkara-bhāṣya—Sri Venkateswara Press, Bombay—p. 13, quotes the passage from p. 4 of PP.—आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वमिति—which he calls the Tīkā.

<sup>2</sup> References to the Vṛtti found in Pañcapādikā are:—

P. 29—सावसर एवैतत्सुगतमतपरीक्षायां निपुणतरं प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः

V. S. II. ii. 18-32.

„ 30—यथाकाशस्य अक्षव्यापारमन्तरेणापि अपरोक्षता तथा दर्शयिष्यामः.

„ 75—वाक्याभासतां तु तत्र तत्र अधिकरणे सिद्धांतयिष्यामः प्रदर्शयिष्यामः

„ 88—तथापि सिध्यति वक्ष्यमाणेन देवताविग्रहत्यायेन—V. S. I. iii, 26 ff.

erudition. Padmapāda left his work with him exhorting him to keep it safe till his return from Rāmesvaram. The uncle knew, he could not controvert the Pañcapādikā view by arguments and resolved therefore to destroy the work as otherwise he felt sure that his school of thought would stand discredited. To escape censure he set fire to his own house and with it perished the Pañcapādikā.<sup>1</sup>

Returning to his master who had by then travelled south to Keraḷa, Padmapāda in great distress related how his work had been destroyed by fire in his uncle's house. Śamkara consoled him by dictating the Ṭikā on the first five pādas (*i.e.*, four sections of the first chapter and the fifth section of the second chapter)—verbatim as he had heard that portion read to him while they were in Śringeri (S.D., p. 505). Since the Ṭikā on the first five pādas was restored and the work still bears the name Pañcapādikā it is difficult to account for the loss of all but the gloss on I. 1-4. Vidyāraṇya is silent on the point and even so early as the time of Prakāśātman (950 A.D.) the author of the Vivaraṇa, the work appears to have suffered this further mutilation.

Being the earliest commentary on Śamkara-bhāṣya the Pañcapādikā even in its abridged form deserves a careful study by every student of Advaita philosophy. It sets forth the fundamental doctrines of the system, in particular that bearing on superimposition or adhyāsa which is pivotal to the Vedāntic non-dualism as taught by Śamkara. We have in it an epistemological discussion of high value to students of modern philosophy. Śamkara's exposition of adhyāsa is brief, though lucid, as all his writings are but the elaboration and the rebuttal of other schools were left to Padmapāda. The rival doctrines of the Naiyāyikas, the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras, the Vijñānavādins and the Mādhyamikas of the Budhistic school are all subjected to a searching examination and refuted with great argumentative skill. This exposition of adhyāsa-bhāṣya occupies nearly half the present work. We shall give below a brief outline of this and other allied problems discussed in the Pañcapādikā.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vidyāraṇya says that he is not quite sure of the authenticity of this incident but that he is relying only on report.—S.D., p. 495, Sl. 116.

<sup>2</sup> The first four Sūtras, on the Bhāṣya of which, Padmapāda has commented may be regarded as embracing the essentials of the philosophy of Advaita. I have accordingly thought fit to include a brief discussion of the more fundamental doctrines of the system.

Śamkara, it is well known, prefaces the Bhāṣya on the first aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa with an exposition of illusory knowledge. Though the subject of illusion seems at first sight to stand outside the purview of the Vedānta Sūtras, in the Bhāṣya it is shown that the idea is not an adventitious element but is implicit in the Sūtra itself. According to the Sūtra—‘athāto Brahmajijñāsā’, jñāna as implied in the word jijñāsā, is the means to the attainment of Brahman or mokṣa which is no other than freedom from bondage. If however, the bondage were real jñāna would not be efficacious. Its only function in this respect is to remove ajñāna or ignorance. Hence bondage must be illusory—mithyā; in other words it is on the supposition that bondage is not real but mithyā that Bādarāyaṇa should have composed the first sūtra.

The Pañcapādikā as already stated is expository of Śamkara-bhāṣya and as such it gives at the outset a detailed account of superimposition—adhyāsa, which is the very crux of the Vedānta philosophy.

It is within common experience that knowledge as given by the senses is at times erroneous and does not correspond to the object from which it has arisen. To mention only a far palpable instances of false knowledge or misapprehension, a piece of shell is taken for silver, a pollard at a distance for a man, a sinuous bit of rope for a serpent. Now the problem is how to distinguish between truth and error. There is a sharp distinction among thinkers—whether Realists or Idealists, in their exposition of error. Each of these views is riddled with difficulties. Let us take the shell-silver illustration. How could silver appear as being out there if it were unreal? The unreal like a barren woman's son or sky-flower never comes within our experience. If to avoid this difficulty we assume that the silver as seen in the nacre is real how could it be altogether sublated later? No real thing in our experience vanishes without leaving something of it behind. Hence in the error-situation we have been considering we can neither deny the silver completely nor affirm it completely. The truth must lie, it is clear, between these two extreme positions, in a *tertium quid*. There are only two ways then of explaining the object of error. It should be real as well as unreal, or neither. The former explanation must be ruled out as involving self-contradiction since we cannot predicate both reality and unreality

—sat and asat, of one and the same thing. We are therefore forced to adopt the second view, *viz.*, that it is neither sat nor asat and this is the Advaitic position—the object of error is an appearance only.

Now an appearance must be an appearance of something, *i.e.*, objects of error must point to a ground of which they are the appearance as does the silver to the shell or the serpent to the rope. It is on this analogy and on the authority of the scriptural texts like ‘neha nānāsti kiñcana’—variety here is none—*Kaṭha Up.*, II. i. 11, that the advaitin arrives at the conclusion that Brahman is the sole reality and that the object-world is its appearance. It is clear from the above that the world is not held to be absolutely lacking in reality—asat, as the critics often assert. Even the dream-state, however, short its duration is real in its own sphere, and the empirical life—samsāra, does not forego its claim to reality till the final release from bondage.

Śamkara however establishes the theory of superimposition by analysing the concept of the ego—‘aham’. The ego is a complex entity involving the sentient as well as the non-sentient element—the self and the not-self, *i.e.*, of the Witness (Sākṣin) and the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa). According to one school of thought, *viz.*, that of Kumārila, self-consciousness is literally true—mām aham jānāmi—The ego can be both subject and object in the same knowledge. He holds that the self can actually know itself. The criticism against this theory is that ātman in that case is both sentient and non-sentient and as such would consist of parts—sāvayava—and therefore would be non-eternal. According to Prabhākara the ego itself is the integral self and that in every cognition there are three elements, ‘tripuṭi’—the knower, the knowing and the known, where the act of knowing reveals not only the known (*i.e.*, the object) but also the knower.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> आत्मा जडोपि सर्वार्थज्ञानेषु भासमानोपि कर्तैव न कर्म—p. 34 ff., Nirṇayasāgara Press.—Though ātman is inert, says Prabhākara it is kartā and not karma as held by the Bhāṭṭas.

Vācaspati refutes the Prabhākara view that the object and the self are both inert and that the light of consciousness (Samvit) having the self (ātman) as its locus illumines the object. He points out that it is not inevitable that the self and the object should be illuminated merely on the ground that consciousness is self-luminous. The argument that consciousness being occasioned by the presence of the self and the object (प्रमाता and प्रमेय) must illumine them is met by the

Others like the Sāmkyas hold that it cannot and that whatever is known or knowable is *ipso facto* different from the self. The advaitin's analysis is the same except for the fact that he explains the not-self element as an appearance of or superimposed on the self. The reason for declaring the not-self as illusory—'mithyā' is that it is in every respect opposed to the self and that two such contrary things cannot be in actual association with each other, and in consequence their coming together which is a fact of experience must be illusory. But error as exemplified by the rope-serpent has as a necessary precondition of it, ignorance of the true nature of its ground. A person who knows for certain that what lies before him is a rope will never mistake it for a serpent. Hence it is concluded that the objective world (dṛśya) which on the above reasoning is mithyā, must have as its source ignorance, of its ground, viz., Brahman—this is the congenital source of error.

Now the doctrine of adhyāsa is opposed by the Naiyāyikas including the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhya (with whom the Mīmāṃsist Prābhākaras agree) on the ground that the silver appearing in the shell is real and is not sublated when the knowledge of the locus, viz., shell, arises. The Vijñānavādins of the Buddhist persuasion hold that adhyāsa is nothing more than consciousness taking shape outside of one's self even when such shape does not correspond to an object, while the Mādhyamika Buddhist regards the so-called external world which includes cases coming under adhyāsa as blank or śūnya. These explanations of error the object of which is somehow to show the untenability of adhyāsa are known respectively as anyathākhyāti or viparītakhyāti of (Kumārila), akhyāti, ātmakhyāti, and asatkhyāti. They

---

facetious remark that this reasoning is as cogent as the inference that because the son is learned the father should also be learned. He finally comes to the conclusion that consciousness is not something distinct from the self, but that the self itself (ātman) is of the nature of consciousness. No difference exists between the self, the substrate of consciousness and consciousness itself.

To the objection that the impartite ātman cannot be the substrate of the superimposed object since in all cases of superimposition the substrate is partly known and partly unknown, the answer is that the manifestation of unit-consciousness, say 'this is silver' is possible when there is non-difference between the insentient object and samvit and this non-difference can be explained only on the basis of superimposition of the object (दृश्य) on the pure consciousness (संवित्).



are discussed in detail and their defects exposed in the *Pañcapādikā*. There is no need therefore to restate the arguments by which the opposing theories have been met. The reader may be referred to the conspectus prefixed to the translation. Residually it is pointed out that *adhyāsa* is inexplicable—either as real or unreal—*sadasadanirvacanīya*. What it means is that the silver in the shell is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. It belongs to a different order of being. Its existence is conterminous with illusion and it takes its exit with the rise of right knowledge. None of the solutions offered by other schools accounts satisfactorily for the presentation of silver in the nacre. Perhaps it may be desirable to refer to the theories formulated since the time of *Padmapāda* with a view to point out whether they are more tenable.

The later exponents of the *Vedāntasūtras* like *Rāmānuja* and *Madhva* who are also opposed to the doctrine of *adhyāsa* explain the erroneous cognition under consideration each in his own way. *Rāmānuja* maintains that all perceptions are true and that consequently there is no reason to question the reality of their contents. On the basis of quintuplication (*Pañcikaraṇa*) he argues that every thing in the world possesses the characteristics of every other thing. His doctrine of error is known as *sat-vāda* the essence of which is that every cognition in any situation has its objective counterpart and that it is meaningless to hold that any cognition could arise in the absence of a corresponding object. What we should notice here is that the explanation of illusion is applicable to normal presentation of objects as well as of the supposed illusory cognitions. If it be asked how in that case the well-known distinction between truth and error (*pramā* and *bhrama*) is to be accounted for *Rāmānuja*'s answer is that that knowledge is *bhrama*, the object of which is for one reason or another not serviceable for purposes of life, e.g., the knowledge of shell-silver passes for a *bhrama*, not because it does not point to actual silver but because the silver element apprehended in it is too small to be of practical use, say in the making of a bangle. Even though the object of cognition here is real as in the sphere of normal perception, it fails to satisfy a pragmatic test. The point however is whether silver at all exists in the shell even as its infinitesimal fraction. This account of error also contradicts experience since it is assumed that when the sight is blurred by some defect one perceives the minute constituents of an object but when it is sound one perceives the grosser constituents,



As regards dream-cognitions where objects are private Rāmānuja true to his realistic bias offers an explanation which while it may satisfy the faithful appears to be far from cogent. He says that God actually creates dream-objects for enabling one to reap the fruit one's karma just as he creates sensible objects for enjoyment in the waking state. The dream-experience as it were, supplements the waking experience. Explanations of other cases of illusory cognitions like 'yellow conch', etc., partake of the same unscientific character.

The Dvaita which is equally realistic as the Viśiṣṭādvaita explains error more or less like the Nyāya. The Naiyāyika holds that though the serpent is not where it is seen, is somewhere else. Madhva however is of opinion that it is neither here nor anywhere else so that the non-existent appears as the existent. This is the misconception (anyathākhyāti) involved in error according to him. The explanation stops there and does not proceed as in the anyathā-khyāti of the Naiyāyikas to account for sense-contact by what is known as 'alaukika-sannikarṣa' or super-normal relation. It is a new kind of anyathā-khyāti and is termed 'abhinava anyathā-khyāti'. The central point in Madhva's explanation is that the non-existent is apprehensible. This is a position hardly intelligible unless we suppose that the meaning of the word (concept) is mistaken for the corresponding thing. We cannot say that we know the non-existent simply because we understand the meaning of the word 'asat'.

Rāmānuja has tried to maintain that the silver experienced in illusory knowledge is real (sat) but we have shown that he has not succeeded in doing so. Madhva has similarly failed to establish that the silver in the shell-silver cognition is *asat*. These theories result in the advaitic view that the silver is neither *sat* nor *asat*. Why silver is presented to sense where there is only a bit of shell is left unexplained. It is evident that none of the theories can cogently account for the unitary cognition that arises in an error-situation and its subsequent conative activity. We must therefore admit that the serpent in the rope or the silver in the nacre comes under a unique category. It is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. It is *anirvacanīya*, *i.e.*, non-determinable.

In conformity with his doctrine of error the advaitin recognises three orders of existence—*pāramārthika*, absolutely real, *vyāvahārika*—real for practical life, and *prātibhāṣika*—real only

till the illusion lasts. Brahman the sole reality, pure consciousness, pure bliss, relationless, timeless, or the presupposition of all our thoughts and the ground of the objective world comes under the first order, the every-day world of our experience under the second and illusions like the rope-serpent under the third.

From its self-discrepant character the empirical world, it must be noted, is analogous to the dream-world wherein the residual impressions of the waking-life generate cognitions of such amazing variety. How, it may be asked, is the world self-discrepant. It comes about this way—no object in our experience admits of a finally satisfactory explanation. If for *e.g.*, we take a rose and try to explain how it is related to the redness which is predicated of it we at once meet with embarrassment, for we can neither say that the two are identical (a substance not being a quality) nor can the two be said to be different since it is inconceivable that the redness should exist apart from the rose. Granting that a relation like inherence (*samavāya*) can be postulated between them which is different from identity as well as difference, we shall be at a loss to determine the relation between such relation and either term. This kind of inexplicability may be illustrated by other instances like milk (*kṣīra*) transformed into sour milk (*dadhi*) or cotton threads constituted into a piece of cloth. Such inexplicable and therefore self-discrepant character of empirical objects has led to the postulation of *mithyātva*. This conclusion the Advaitins support on the one hand by pointing to the nature of illusions which present almost the same difficulty and on the other to the explicit authority of the Veda in statements like “*neha nānāsti kiñcana*—the manifold is non-existent. Then the question is how do we come to possess the knowledge of the empirical world? Here again there exist conflicting views. The Naiyāyikas of one school and other realists hold that the senses come into contact with objects which are existent in their own right and generate the knowledge of those objects. But the need for sense-contact in all cases is questioned not only by the Advaitins but by other thinkers also. Though this view may be accepted by the Advaitins so far as external perception goes, it does not hold good in the case of internal perception when we look at it from the Vivaraṇa point of view. In the experience of pleasure and pain the Vivaraṇa which by the way does not admit *antaḥkaraṇa* to be the internal sense-organ rejects the view that there is sense-contact. Pain and pleasure are but the states

or psychoses of the internal organ and as such are inevitably manifested by the Sākṣin, the Witnessing Self as defined by the particular antaḥkaraṇa; pain and pleasure are therefore said to be sāksāt-sākṣibhāsyā as distinguished from the knowledge of the external world which we get from sense-contact through a vṛtti. The discussion of other Indian theories of perception does not appear to be pertinent here. We may however just estimate the value of the advaitic theory of perception to which exception is taken characterising it as crude and unscientific. The Advaita account of say, visual perception, to state briefly, is as follows: When the sense of sight for example comes into contact with a chair that is out there in space a certain modification takes place in the internal organ and this modally transformed antaḥkaraṇa, termed vṛtti, flows towards the object (chair) and assumes its shape, just as when irrigating a garden from a canal the water takes the shape whatever it be of the trench around each tree. Caitanya or consciousness, it must be remembered, is all-pervading and as such the chair-defined consciousness when the veiling ajñāna is removed by the vṛtti, becomes one with the vṛtti-defined consciousness and we have the manifestation of the chair.<sup>1</sup> We may notice here the contrast between this theory and its Western counterpart. Here in a sense it is the subject that goes to the object in order to apprehend it but the reverse is the process as maintained by Western psychologists. The activity is from the object side. When an object is perceived say a pot, the light-waves proceeding from it impinge on the eye and an image is formed on the retina followed by the stimulation of certain brain centres and we perceive the prototype, viz., the pot. But the incompleteness of the theory becomes evident when we try to understand how the inverted image of the object that is formed on the retina enables us to perceive the tangible upright object out in the open. The inadequacy of this explanation has been realised in the west and several theories have been advanced to solve the riddle. We have the representative or copy theory

<sup>1</sup> बुद्धेरुपाधिलक्षणायाः चक्षुषादिद्वारैः विषयाकारेण परिणामिन्याः ये शब्दाद्याकारा-  
वभासाः ते आत्मविज्ञानस्य विषयभूताः उत्पद्यमाना एव आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता  
उत्पद्यन्ते—*S. Bh. Tait. Up.* II. 1.

The mental psychoses passing through the eye and other sense-organs assume the form of sense-objects and these manifestations are objects of ātman's consciousness.

(photo theory) of the School of Locke according to which material things are not perceived as such but only their representations which are mental pictures. Berkeley going beyond this empiricist doctrine torpedoed the existence of material things altogether and maintained that there exist only ideas since one has direct apprehension only of them. Existence is perceiving—*esse is percipi*. Only as mental experience a thing can be viewed as possessing existence. This subjective-idealism as contrasted with the Representationism of Locke and others borders on solipsism and is allied to the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhist according to which consciousness alone assumes external shapes of objects there being no material objects as such. The objection to this theory is that we cannot account for the public character of percepts since they are individual mental creations and as such private.<sup>1</sup> Leibniz with his theory of windowless monads advanced the view that the relation between the mental and physical series of events becomes possible on the basis of harmony pre-established by God.<sup>2</sup> Another recent theory is based on the analogy of the radio-set. W. A. Sinclair (see his brochure, 'An Introduction to Philosophy', Oxford Pamphlet) says that different electromagnetic wave-lengths impinge on the retina, and we get a picture of the world that is real; similarly with other sense perceptions. But he is careful to add that this theory of knowledge that he has advanced must be taken only as a suggestion and that the argument by which the theory is supported is not a proof. Another significant observation of his is that we should not forget that the sense-organs are inert like the objects of perception. The

<sup>1</sup> The difficulty is met by the observation that in Berkeley's view it is not the individual minds that create the world. It is God's mind that creates, man's mind passively receiving an objective order as given to it by God.—See p. 116, *The Idea of Nature*, by R. G. Collingwood, The Clarendon Press, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> Wildon Carr who upholds the monadology of Leibniz in a somewhat modified form explains perception thus—"The immediate reality in the form of sense-image is not self-existent but an appearance whose ground is the reality. It is the idea of a reality outside the mind and independent of it which manifests itself to the mind by a stimulus which compels the mind to infer it."—*A Theory of Monads*, p. 61.

Why the mind is compelled to infer the object which is outside when only its image is formed on the retina is left unexplained.

last remark disposes of the claim that perception could be explained on purely physiological and psychological grounds.<sup>1</sup> In every one of the above theories there is a big gap, a hiatus. The gulf which exists between the disturbance in the visual mechanism and the mental sensation of the object is not easily bridged over. No mental activity whether of the perceptive variety or other can ignore the subjective side or in other words the ātman-basis. Hence the advaitic analysis of the process of perception, it must be admitted, has merits of its own. Its strong point further lies in its conformity to the doctrine of the sole reality of Brahman. Its metaphysical importance cannot be exaggerated.

When in the light of what has been said before three orders of reality—Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika, and Prātibhāṣika—are admitted the test of truth or right cognition must be whether it relates to objects which belong to a particular sphere. This criterion of truth however does not apply to the Pāramārthika sattā, for the ultimate reality is the relationless Brahman and no question of relation is admissible. As regards the Vyāvahārika or empirical truth two conditions are laid down in the Advaita to ensure validity—it must be uncontradicted (abādhitā) and must also possess an element of novelty (anadhigata). In the view of some the first condition alone is sufficient. The Naiyāyikas on the other hand maintain that truth is correspondence. When a thing possesses any specific feature that feature must be presented in knowledge. For instance, in 'blue pot' blueness is the quality (viśeṣaṇa) possessed by the pot and if in our knowledge of the pot blueness appears as qualifying it then that is valid knowledge (tadvati tatprakāraṇam pramā.)<sup>2</sup> No doubt may arise in the case of any particular knowledge, say 'this is water'—'idam jalam'. We cannot here ascertain *directly* whether 'water' is given actually. Hence unlike the Advaitin the Naiyāyika resorts to a pragmatic test (samvādipravṛtti—leading to fruitful activity), viz.,

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller account of the theory of perception the chapter on 'Perceptual Thinking' in Macdougall's work, *An Outline of Psychology* may with advantage be consulted. He approves of what he calls the 'psychic stimulus' theory according to which the crude sensations are considered as goods to the mind put forth as stimulating powers. It is admitted he says, that the mind supplies from its own resources something very essential over and above the sensory qualities with which it responds to sense-stimulations.

<sup>2</sup> *Advaita Paribhāṣā*, p. 291, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press, Bombay.

whether the presented object quenches thirst. If it does it is *pramā*, otherwise *bhramā*. This is the instrumental value of truth. We may add by the way that this conception of truth much resembles the one held by some western thinkers. The Advaitin as we have noted above adopts a different course. Whether a particular knowledge is contradicted or not is the test for determining the logical character of that knowledge. If it is not contradicted by the rest of relevant experience it has truth-value, otherwise it is false. Thus coherence or non-contradiction which expresses the nature of truth, also serves as the test of truth.

According to the Naiyāyikas every cognition should stand the test of another after-cognition, *vyavasāya* should be followed by *anuvyavasāya*. But what guarantee that the after-cognition is valid? It must be testified to by another, and that again by another and so on *ad infinitum*. The more acceptable theory is that of coherence according to which truth consists in harmony of experience (*Samvāda*). In any particular climate of experience an object has its truth-value so long as it is not contradicted. Even a dream-object does not lose its claim to reality till it is sublated by the waking state and as regards objects of normal experience they continue to be valid and stimulate man to action till the fetters of metempsychosis are snapped.<sup>1</sup> Even the theory of coherence or consilience is relative in character. On the basis of this theory we can explain only parts of the Universe (*prāti-bhāṣika*, or *vyāvahārika*) and not the Universe in its entirety. In one sense however, the theory may be justified as subserving one grand pattern—the Absolute as the sole reality, the individual as the absolute obscured and the universe as but the shadow of the absolute. This is the transcendental coherence.

### III

We are now confronted with the question—What is the nature of Brahman, the absolute reality? The answer is furnished in the second aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa—‘That from which the

---

<sup>1</sup> Śamkara, it is to be noted, is positive about the objective character of our experience. His epistemological realism is unmistakable. He argues that it is irrational to deny the reality (of whatever degree) of what any knowledge actually presents. It is as he aptly puts it, like denying the feeling of satisfaction after one has had a square meal.—*V.S.*, II. ii. 28.

world originates, by which it is sustained and in which it dissolves, is Brahman'. This aphorism is formulated on the creation-śruti, "From which all these beings are born, by which being born, they live, and in which they merge when departing."—*Tait. Up.* III. 8. But this definition is incompatible with a being that is beyond any determination (Yato vāco niyartante aprāpya manasā saha—*Tait. Up.* II. 4). Brahman being an attributeless being defies all description. Hence it is necessary to understand in which sense the aphorist has used the definition. Now a definition may be of two kinds—definition *per accidens* (or indicative definition) and definition by essence, respectively known as 'taṣasthalakṣaṇa' and 'svarūpalakṣaṇa'. The first defines a thing without the implication of the differentiation entering into its constitution, e.g., in the statement 'the person wearing a hat is our guest,' the hat while it distinguishes the guest from those wearing turbans does not form an integral part of him; in a 'peacock is a bird having a tail of variegated colours' the qualification is integral to the peacock. The definition of Brahman as stated in the second aphorism must be the definition *per accidens* since Brahman as the ultimate and undifferentiated reality is void of all attributes and is non-relational. The definition or description therefore, viz., that it is the source of the origin, etc., of the world merely points to Brahman without suggesting any attributive characterisation, i.e., that the attribute is factual. We may say that Brahman's causality is analogous to that of shell when it gives rise to the illusory appearance of silver. The shell no doubt is the ground of silver, for without the shell the apprehension of silver is impossible but the effect, viz., 'silver' is illusory and vanishes with the knowledge of the shell. Similarly the universe has Brahman as its ground or cause but it disappears with the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, the Ultimate Reality. The attribution of causality to Brahman is for the purpose of distinguishing It from those like Prakṛti which other doctrines take to be the source of the world and is not meant to describe It. This, in fact, is the real purpose of the definition *per accidens*. It enables one to identify the thing defined without in any way suggesting that the qualities are in intimate association with it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> तदस्थलक्षणं नाम यावद्वक्ष्यकालं अनवस्थितत्वे सति तद्व्यावर्तकत्वं तदेव ।



Now the point to be considered is whether the definition *per accidens* alone is adequate for knowing Brahman. It is not. The definition by essence (svarūpalakṣaṇa) is also necessary as otherwise one's desire to understand the full nature of Brahman cannot be satisfied. In its own nature Brahman is bliss absolute (Ānando Brahmeti Vyajānat—*Tait. Up.* III). But bliss is not the attribute of Brahman but it is Its very essence. It is to be observed, however, that Brahman as noted above baffles all description, neither speech nor mind being competent to compass its essence, (Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha—*Tait. Up.* II. 4). Lakṣaṇa or definition is a unique quality pertaining exclusively to the object defined—asādhāraṇadharmā. Brahman is void of attributes and as such the term *ānanda* found in the present Śruti cannot directly express the nature of Brahman. It can do so only indirectly (lakṣaṇayā), but by assuming<sup>2</sup> for the moment bliss (ānanda) to be an attribute of Brahman we may define Brahman as an entity qualified by ānanda (ānandaviśiṣṭa) which definition is adequate enough to differentiate Brahman from entities which are generally conceived as the source of the world such as pradhāna and atoms which are inert. This is definition by essence. What is to be understood from this definition therefore is not what it explicitly states but what it indirectly means, viz., the infinite bliss which is the necessary ground according to the Advaita, of what we commonly term pleasure, happiness and so forth. The indirectness of the definition is necessitated by the circumstance that no direct reference to It is possible, Brahman being unitary and indistinguishable from its essence. The other svarūpalakṣaṇas found in the śruti as 'Satyam Brahma', 'Prajñānam Brahma' are to be understood analogously. The śruti text—'Satyam, Jñānam, Ānandam Brahma', is meant to define Brahman negatively—that Brahman is the opposite of what is false, insentient, or afflicted (asad, jaḍa, duḥkha, vilakṣaṇa). But this negative definition ought not to be so regarded as leading to the conception of Brahman as a mere blank, a nullity—śūnya. The terms

It is tāsthalakṣaṇa where the attributes differentiate the thing though their existence is not conterminous with it.

That the mark is something exterior to thing defined is made clear, in the definition of tāsthalakṣaṇa as given in *Siddhāntaleśa Samgraha*, p. 53, Kumbhakonam Ed.—तदस्थत्वं च लक्षणस्वरूपं बहिर्भूतत्वम्.

<sup>2</sup> सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिव अवभासन्ते—p. 44.



satyam, etc., being defining adjuncts, must define something positive and not a mere void—*śūnya*. They do not stop with mere negation but point to the ground, *i.e.*, the entity which is other than the unreal, the insentient and the afflicted (*cf. Tait. Up. Ś. Bhā. on II. i.*)<sup>1</sup> The main object of the second aphorism is to point to the Reality as such through the indicative definition.

Before passing on to the next factor, *viz.*, the ascertainment of the valid means by which the sole reality of Brahman is determined we have to note what constitutes the operative cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) and what the substantive cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) in the world-creation. In the Advaita doctrine Brahman constitutes both the causes.<sup>2</sup> The world with its extraordinary variety can have only an intelligent being as its cause and not something that is insentient like the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṃkhyas* or the *Paramāṇu* of the *Naiyāyikas*. Brahman's agency in the world-creation can be accepted, since Brahman is of the very nature of knowledge and the only reality. The *Śruti* text confirms this view, 'He desired, may I become many'—*Tait. II. vi.* Desire and volition can be attributed only to a conscious being. *Īśvara*, (Brahman in its active phase) creates the world in order that the individual souls may reap the fruit of their past Karma and also find opportunity for spiritual advancement. His impartiality cannot be impugned on the ground of the existence of conflict and affliction in the world. The material causality of Brahman in respect of the universe is intelligible since Brahman is the substrate of the illusory manifold or the substrate of *Māyā* which has evolved in the form of the universe. Having the material causality in view, we may equate Brahman with the world. To say that Brahman is the material cause of the universe suggests their identity. They are indeed identical in a sense. But this identification of cause and effect does not mean, as some have

---

<sup>1</sup> In the second aphorism what is intended to impress is the essential nature of Brahman by its definition *per accidens*. The basic text for the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* is यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते etc., and Brahman's essential nature, स्वरूपलक्षण is substantiated by आनन्दाद्भवेव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति, आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति,

*Tait. Up.*, II. vi. 1.

This as the *Bhāṣya* says is the determinative statement.—*V.S.*, I. ii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See *V.S.*, I. iv. 23, where the double causality of Brahman is elaborated.

supposed, that the effect (*viz.*, the world) is real like the cause (*viz.*, Brahman). Such an interpretation is opposed to the very fundamental doctrine of Advaita. A superimposed object (snake) may be viewed as one with its substrate (rope) inasmuch as the latter is the sustaining factor of the former. The cause is no more than its substratum (*V.S.* II. i. 16). If as Bradley maintains the phenomena without committing suicide, as he would put it, should find asylum in the absolute, the charge would be that they would inquninate the absolute with all their defects. Hence to meet this charge Bradley adds that in the final stage of absorption the phenomena undergo a thorough transmutation and become sublimated. How is this effected? To this question his only answer is 'somehow'. The advaitic view is that the appearances do not affect Brahman at all. They only exist for a jīva and when any jīva attains freedom they cease to exist for him.<sup>1</sup>

Thus far it has been shown in what sense Brahman is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe. Of the several ancient Indian theories of causation we may mention the 'satkārya vāda' of the Sāmkhya realists who maintain that Prakṛti or Pradhāna evolves into the world-spectacle. No intelligent cause in its commonly accepted sense is admitted of world-creation in the system. What is only implicit in the primal cause—Prakṛti, becomes explicit through the elaborate process of evolution. It may be mentioned that the satkāryavāda is also adhered to by the Advaitin but then it should be remembered that māyā and not Brahman is the source of the universe. The world which emerges from māyā is as real as that māyā. Hence it can be represented as the pariṇāma of māyā or as it is sometimes described as prākṛti. The point to be carefully noted is that it is a provisional and not an ultimate explanation of the universe. Ultimately the world is neither the evolute of Prakṛti nor is it absolutely real as held by the Sāmkhyas. The opposite view is held by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas according to whom the effect comes into existence *de novo* (asatkārya). While the Sāmkhya (with whom the Advaitin is in agreement upto a point)

---

<sup>1</sup> After examining the several objections raised against the doctrine of creation Śamkara points out that the main object of the Vedānta is not the elaboration of the theory of creation but the teaching of the identity of the Supreme Self and the individual self—Brahmātmaikya.—*V.S.*, I. iv. 14; *Gauḍapādakārikā*, III. 15; *Chānd. Up.*, VI. viii. 4.

maintains that the effect is pre-existent in the cause, the Naiyāyika says it is non-existent before it is produced. Now the problem for the Naiyāyika is to establish causal relation between, say, clay and pot when the latter is totally different from clay. On the *asatkāryavāda* the previous existence of the agent (clay) in which action implied in the effect takes place would be rendered unnecessary and the effect would lose its claim to its very being. Further if the effect is wholly new having had no existence before, its emergence would be similar to the birth of a son to a barren woman. If it be argued that no causal agency need function in the production of effect if the effect is identical with the cause we say that agency is needed to bring about a mere rearrangement in the cause and the effect is no more than such a causal rearrangement.<sup>1</sup> Another well-known theory is that, of the ancient writer, Bhartṛprapañca who upholds what is known as the '*bhedābheda*vāda'—according to which reality may be regarded as identity-in-difference. Not only is this principle applicable to the relation between Brahman and jīva but also to the physical world. Bhartṛprapañca favours the evolution theory of creation, the heterogeneous mass of the objects of sense being regarded as the transformation of the homogeneous Brahman. This view very much resembles the Sāmkhya *satkāryavāda* except for the fact that Brahman and not Prakṛti is the primal cause. This question of causal order involved in our understanding of the objective world has given rise to different schools of thought in the west, a discussion of which seems uncalled for here. So acute a thinker as Bradley in the third chapter of his celebrated work—*Appearance and Reality*—has shown the untenability of relations such as are ordinarily understood to exist between cause and effect, thing and attribute, and so on. In his collected *Essays*, Vol. II, this is what he observes, "Relational thinking is and remains a method which is legitimate and is necessary for our understanding of the world. But it pays for every advance by an inconsistency which is irremovable so long as we insist on its ultimate truth and reality". How near Śaṅkara Bradley approaches may be seen in his statement that "relational experience has to fall back on a non-relational form of unity, and is therefore not ultimate." The problem turns mainly upon the

---

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed refutation of the *asatkārya* theory see *Ś. Bhā.*, II. 1. 18.

postulation of a theory that will satisfactorily explain the relation between cause and effect, a problem the inherent difficulties of which can be surmounted only on the Advaita postulate of the world-phenomenality. The world is only an appearance (vivarta) having as its substrate Brahman, the sole ontological reality.

#### IV

It has been stated that both definition and proof are indispensable in the determination of an object. Brahman being the object of inquiry, its nature can be ascertained by the adduction of lakṣaṇa and pramāṇa. We have shown that the second Vedānta aphorism points to the definition *per accidens* (taṭasthalakṣaṇa) as well as to the *definition proprium* (svarūpalakṣaṇa) of Brahman. We have now to make sure of the pramāṇa on which the existence of Brahman as defined above is based. It is on the authority of Scripture (Śruti) that the existence of Īśvara (Brahman) who creates the world, sustains it and finally ends it, is adduced. The third Vedānta Sūtra (Śāstrayonitvāt) is explained as bearing two senses (VI and VII sections of the Pañcapādikā). The first brings home the omniscience of Īśvara since He is the author of the all-comprehensive Veda. This interpretation merely amplifies the idea already contained in the statement that Brahman is the source of the universe. Without therefore dwelling on it further we pass on to the seventh Varṇaka which refers to the point we propose to discuss in this section. What is emphasised here is the view that the Upaniṣads are the only valid means (pramāṇa) by which the Supreme Reality could be established and by no other pramāṇa.<sup>1</sup> Brahman is to be known only from the Vedānta. A question pertinent to the topic under consideration may well arise here—is there no room then for reasoning and is the teaching entirely dogmatic? No doubt it is from the discussion of the Scriptural texts that Brahman as the Creator, etc., of the world is established. In the Karmakāṇḍa, however, the authoritarian character of the Veda is absolute. Obligatory and prohibitive injunctions laid down therein demand implicit acceptance and

<sup>1</sup> स यस्मात्पुरुषाच्चिरह्य प्रत्युद्वात्यकामत् तं त्वौपनिषद् पुरुषं पृच्छामि ।

Brh. Up., III. IX. 26.

I ask you about the Person who is to be known only from the Upaniṣads, who having set the universe of beings in motion, withdraws and transcends it.

unquestioned obedience. But reasoning, though by itself is not absolutely dependable, is indispensable if the scriptural teaching is to be properly assimilated by the pupil. Full weight is given to logic also. That reasoning is necessary is corroborated by the śruti, "Ātman is to be seen, heard about, reasoned about, and meditated upon."<sup>1</sup> A Vedic statement gains immensely from the standpoint of the disciple if it is buttressed by reasoning. In the Vedānta, logic no doubt should be conformable to the truths as revealed in the Scriptures, yet the method of approach to reality bears out the fact that the teaching is not dogmatic. We are told in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad that Bhṛgu sought the knowledge of Brahman from his father Varuṇa who instead of straight-away explaining the nature of Brahman just indicated the general features of Brahman, and set him thinking as to its real essence. The hint given by Varuṇa, viz., that the entity from which the world derives its being and in which it lives and ends, is Brahman, was the starting point in the boy's quest of Brahman-knowledge. He flounders on the way, lands first in materialism when he concludes that matter (food—anna) satisfies the definition, then successively in vitalism (Prāṇa), mentalism (manas), subjectivism or rather self-consciousness (Vijñāna) till at last he arrives at the final truth, that bliss supreme is Brahman—the highest reality. At every intermediate stage, dissatisfied with himself he seeks his father for enlightenment but the father advises him to think further and find out the solution for himself. What is to be noted here is that the seeker is not asked to take things on trust. He is enjoined to exercise his own independent judgment in arriving at the truth. There is no *ipse dixit*. Bhṛgu by hard thinking rejects the intermediate solutions and arrives at the correct knowledge of Brahman, viz., that bliss unalloyed is Its very essence.<sup>2</sup>

As pertinent to this topic we have to consider whether Śabda takes rank with other pramāṇas and serves as a valid means of Knowledge and whether the Knowledge so given is direct. The Vedānta is an assemblage of words and when it is said that Brahman is to be known from that source only we have to make

<sup>1</sup> आत्मा वाङ्मे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः

*Brh. Up.*, II. iv. 5.

Here manana or reasoning is insisted upon as indispensable for the realisation of Brahman.

<sup>2</sup> "Ānando Brahmeti Vyajānāt."—*Tait. Up.*, III. 6.; Bhṛguvalli.

sure whether śabda (word) is a pramāṇa at all. Even among the orthodox philosophers, the Vaiśeṣikas reject verbal testimony as an independent pramāṇa and bring it under *inference*. As regards the second point, perception, it is contended, gives us direct knowledge (aparokṣa) but śabda can convey only indirect knowledge (parokṣa). But we know that the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality must be direct as otherwise it cannot annul our empirical conviction of the truth of duality (dvaita). To avoid this impasse some among them postulate the need for 'dhyāna' or meditation on the ultimate truth as mediately known through the Scriptures. It is thus they maintain, that the indirect knowledge is transformed into the direct knowledge which alone can dispel ignorance. Two criticisms, however, may be advanced against this view. The first is that the direct knowledge that may result from 'Dhyāna' need not necessarily be valid, for 'Dhyāna' is not counted as a pramāṇa and cannot of certainty lead to pramā or truth. The second criticism is that it is not right to lay down as a general rule that verbal testimony can convey only mediate knowledge. That is its usual character no doubt, but there are clear exceptions to it; e.g., the statement 'Thou art the tenth' (Daśamastvamasi).<sup>1</sup> Further to lay down such a rule would be to assume that even entities which by their very nature are inward (pratyagvastu) are known mediately—that is obviously impossible. Hence the position of the Advaitin (except Vācaspati and his followers), that the immediacy of the knowledge of an object depends not upon the kind of pramāṇa by which it is attained but on the nature of the object that is known. Now the Ultimate Reality itself, being the inmost self and supersensuous, Vedic testimony alone as in 'That Thou art' is competent to bring about immediate experience provided one is qualified otherwise. The characteristics of the validity of knowledge are that it should relate to something not previously known and that it should not be contradicted later (anadhigata and abādhita). Brahman which is the viśaya of the knowledge (jñāna) arising from the text 'That Thou art' stands both these tests. The validity of such knowledge

---

<sup>1</sup> In the illustration the boy is counting the number of those that crossed the river omits himself and thereby is under the delusion that out of ten one is missing. The verbal assurance of a by-stander that he himself is the tenth—दशमस्तमसि at once reveals the fact to him. His ignorance is dispelled and immediate knowledge is generated.

is intrinsic to it (svatastva) but this is not accepted by other thinkers. According to the Naiyāyikas the validity of jñāna arises and also is known from ingredients distinct from those which generate such knowledge. This is (paratastva). According to the Advaita and Mīmāṃsā, validity is intrinsic and non-validity is extrinsic.<sup>1</sup>

## V

All systems of Indian philosophy admit that the highest human endeavour finds its culmination in the attainment of immortality-mokṣa. But what is mokṣa? It is freedom from bondage. If ignorance—avidyā (or māyā) is responsible for man's separation from God, if it veils from him his identity with the sole reality and presents the spectacle of a universe in which he

---

<sup>1</sup> The normal characteristic of jñāna as such is validity (Pramāṭva). It is intrinsic to it, not extrinsic. In 'this is pot' (अयं घटः) the knowledge is perceptive. The elements required for its generation (Utpatti) are, sense-contact, presence of light and so forth. These very elements give rise to its validity also. This is svatastva of prāmāṇya in regard to utpatti (उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वं). Now to consider the question of validity in respect of apprehension (jñāpti), say, from the Advaita point of view: that which reveals knowledge is the witnessing self (Sākṣin) and that itself also reveals the validity of the knowledge. This is svatastva in the apprehension of validity (ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वं). The Naiyāyikas also lay down the same causes and conditions for the origination of knowledge and they maintain that these are not by themselves adequate for the origination of validity in knowledge and that extra circumstances are demanded. Such extra circumstances are the excellence (guṇa) of the causes and conditions of the generation of knowledge, e.g., the light that is required for perceiving a pot should be of a certain degree of intensity for the knowledge (jñāna) being right. It is this intensity that is taken to constitute its excellence. Again as to the apprehension (jñāpti) also of the validity of knowledge the Naiyāyikas hold that an extra factor is necessary. In the case of 'this is pot' the knowledge that such a jñāna has arisen is here ascribed to what is termed 'anuvyavasāya'. Though anuvyavasāya may thus reveal knowledge it does not reveal its validity; for its revelation a fresh means (hetu) such as samvādapravṛtti is needed. In fine the means to comprehend the validity of a jñāna is other than (parataḥ) the means to know that jñāna. It must stand a pragmatic test. It may be noted that samvādapravṛtti implies an action such as will correspond to the knowledge in question.



plays his part taking it to be absolutely real when it is but a shadow of reality, it is the removal of that ignorance which constitutes liberation. The individual soul (jīva) is in its essence ever free, but under the sway of primordial nescience it wanders in worlds of sorrow and transience having forgotten its home of bliss. Man has slipped from his high estate and must work his way up to regain it. The destiny of man is the goal of perfection and the attainment of Brahmahood. Freedom (mokṣa) is eternal and is therefore not a thing to be accomplished; *i.e.*, it is not sādhyā but siddhā. Hence all action is for removing that which obscures it, *viz.*, nescience.

The theories of mokṣa as held by any school of Vedāntic thinkers are coloured by their metaphysical prepossessions. The doctrine of a personal God and of the reality of individual souls must naturally alter the conception of mokṣa. The theistic view is that the liberated soul does not lose its individuality even in release<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Bheda or difference is fundamental to Dvaita. Each thing is unique having its difference from the rest as its 'very characteristic' (Svarūpa). The conception of 'pot' involves its difference from every thing other than pot. It comes to this that the difference of pot from, say cloth is identical with pot. Then the question may be raised, why should we know cloth as we must, to know pot's difference from it? The Dvaitin answers that in knowing the essence of the thing, say, pot, the pratiyogijñāna is present. Two points however are to be noted, *viz.*, that the pratiyogijñāna is general, *i.e.*, of all things besides pot, not specific and that the means (indriya) to it (*viz.*, the general pratiyogijñāna) is the Sākṣin—the Witness. If the essence of pot and its difference from cloth—to select one thing among the rest are identical how comes it that we talk of the difference of the pot? It is sanctioned by usage. It is a special kind of identity says the Dvaitin known as 'saviśeṣābheda'. The viśeṣa assumed here is also pressed into service in explaining passages really importing complete identity as between Brahman and its attributes when the latter are spoken of as being distinct from one another and from Brahman. Let us take the two texts—'Brahmaṇa ānandaḥ' and 'ānandam Brahma'. The second text denotes identity between Brahman and ānanda which is admitted to be a fact; but the first denotes difference. The two scriptural texts cannot conflict with each other. Hence the identity here is of the unique variety—saviśeṣābheda which reconciles such usage.

It is evident that the postulation of the viśeṣa category is merely to escape from a dilemma. There is no need to posit the viśeṣa category since the appositional use of the genitive case is common.



but freed from metempsychosis it attains the presence of God where it dwells in bliss everlasting. But however eminent that state of happiness, it can never approach that of the Supreme. The followers of Madhva believe that some souls are doomed to eternal perdition, some bound down to the wheel of samsāra for ever, and others bound but fit for freedom and that among the freed the bliss of Heaven is unequally shared.<sup>1</sup> The Rāmānujīyas on the other hand though refusing to admit the elimination of singularity in release recognise no difference in the enjoyment of bliss not only among the emancipated souls but even between their bliss and that of Īśvara. The affinity of the freed soul with Īśvara both in point of knowledge and bliss is complete except in respect of Īśvara's creatorship.

The Vedāntic view of immortality according to Śamkara and his school is not merely cessation of rebirth but becoming identical with the immortal Being. If release should mean the attainment of some state in a different region it ceases to be eternal for, according to the general rule connection (samyoga) must end in disconnection (viprayoga).<sup>2</sup> It has been pointed out that

---

<sup>1</sup> In the Dualistic metaphysics liberation or mukti is of four kinds: (i) Sāyujya (union), (ii) Sārūpya (similarity in appearance), (iii) Sālōkya (residence in the same region), (iv) Sāmīpya (nearness of the Lord). By (i) is meant the being clothed as it were, by Īśvara, so that the liberated soul moves with Īśvara's feet, gives with Īśvara's hands and so on; by (ii) the liberated soul becomes four-armed (caturbhūja), wears the conch and disc (Śamkha and Cakra); by (iii) the liberated soul dwells with the Lord in the same region which embraces both heaven and earth—it is said that there are such souls, only they are not visible; by (iv) remaining always near God, like Brahma. Lakṣmī alone, besides Viṣṇu, is ever liberated—Nityamuktā. Among human beings there are muktīyogya—those who are fit for liberation, nityasamsārīns—those fated to dwell always in the world of mixed joy and sorrow, tamoyogya—those fated to dwell in joyless regions. The world consists of all the three. The Gods are duplicate-dwelling, here and in heaven. While those who come under the first category have hopes of redemption, the other two have none. Their lot indeed is cheerless. It is difficult to understand how the all-merciful Lord could relegate a section of humanity (tamoyogya) to eternal perdition.

<sup>2</sup> संयोगा विप्रयोगान्ता इति न्यायेन

See Com. on *Upadeśaśāhāsrī*, XVI, 62.

the only existential Being is Brahman and that all human ills are caused by the primal nescience positing the world of variety. As such the eradication of nescience alone constitutes mokṣa which is ever present though obscured by the encircling gloom. The realisation of the ātman's identity with the Absolute is the highest human end—paramapuruṣārtha. This is the *ne plus ultra* of the Vedāntic teaching. No doubt the different states achieved through means other than jñāna though quite desirable in themselves possess an instrumental value only subserving the highest value, *viz.*, the Supreme Reality. Karma, for example, *i.e.*, the performance of obligatory duties and avoidance of interdicted duties ensures the purification of the heart; bhakti, *i.e.*, devotion and self-surrender to God, serves as the means of securing divine grace, and dhyāna or meditation brings on mental equipoise by shutting out all distractions—all these are but stepping stones to the attainment of the identity—knowledge which alone is the solvent of ignorance.

Jñāna being of such prime importance in the scheme of Advaita the question is raised as to the means by which it is secured. All valid knowledge or pramā as is evident, is the outcome of a right means of knowledge—pramāṇa. Now of the six means of knowledge, scriptural testimony is alone recognised by most of the Indian thinkers as the source from which the nature of the Ultimate Reality is known, which Reality according to the Advaita is no other than the unity of the individual and the universal self or to express it more accurately, the non-duality of the self. The scriptural text which is the bed-rock of the unity-doctrine is the one reiterated nine times in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*—VI. 3. 6, to press home the great metaphysical truth of the sole reality of Brahman. "That Thou art—Tat Tvam asi" points to the non-difference between the individual self (Thou) and the universal self (That). From the context we know that here the identity of jīva and Īśvara is meant to be inculcated but then such identity seems impossible since the finite jīva can never be the same as the infinite Īśvara. But in understanding the text under consideration we must bear in mind that the meanings of words "That" and "Thou" when divested of their adventitious attributes like finitude and limited cognition in regard to jīva and absolute detachment, possession of unlimited cognition and causality in respect of the whole Universe, in regard to Īśvara point to an identical object. The words "That" and "Thou"

thus finally point to one and the same entity. Hence it is that Sureśvara in his *Naīṣkarmya Siddhi* III. 2, construes the Vedic text “Tat tvam asi” as word-sense, padārtha—and strictly not as propositional import—vākyārtha.<sup>1</sup> The illustrations given in the Śruti in the elucidation of the Mahāvākya all go to show that the basic cause alone is the reality, the so-called effects are but names and forms (*Chānd. Up.* VI). Now this text is variously interpreted, by the rival schools of Vedānta in conformity with their conceptions of reality, a discussion of which however appears out of place in this short introduction. The tenor of this and other scriptural texts bears unmistakable testimony to the Advaitic truth as propounded by Śamkara and elaborated by Padmapāda. Any other explanation necessitates the setting aside the text as it stands and forcing it to yield a sense not intrinsic to it.

A question of vital importance crops up here. If the sole reality is Brahman, what is the status of the world we live in? More than once has Śamkara called attention to the fact that there are different degrees of reality—the reality of Brahman which is absolute (pāramārthikasattā), of the world, which is empirical (Vyāvahārikasattā), and of the dream-state, which is illusory (Prātibhāsikasattā). The world is real in the empirical sense, *i.e.*, its reality is not absolute like that of Brahman. It vanishes with the knowledge of Brahman. But its value is not to be underrated for it is the vale, so to speak, through which the self has to work its way up to the shining heights of beatitude. The destiny of man is the goal of perfection and it could be attained only by the attainment of moral and spiritual perfection on earth. It is only to a diseased mind that the world appears as no more than ‘a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury, signifying nothing’. This life is replete with significance to man. It is here and not anywhere else that regeneration is possible.<sup>2</sup> The charge is baseless therefore that the Advaitic conception of

<sup>1</sup> The propositional import is a judgment which is either an affirmation or negation of relation. But the knowledge of Brahman is supra-relational and is of the nature of intuition.

<sup>2</sup> In commenting on *Kaṭha Up.*, II. iii. 5, Śamkara points out that at best one can get only a blurred view of Reality in worlds other than our own and that for a clear insight one has to endeavour while yet on earth—तस्मादात्मदर्शनाय इहैव यत्नः कर्तव्यः.

freedom takes away all stimulus to moral endeavour and empties ethics of its content. No doubt this life is compared to a dream but that is only to emphasise its relative and phenomenal character. In fact all the three states—waking, dream and deep slumber, are designated as dream in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*.<sup>1</sup> Śamkara in commenting on this justifies the appellation of 'dream' even to the waking state (jāgrat) on the ground that the world-spectacle is as illusory as the dream world the consciousness of the Ultimate Reality not having arisen. It is only in this sense that the dream analogy has to be understood. There is no thought of reducing man's life on earth to a vacuum.<sup>2</sup>

## VI

We will conclude this resumé of Advaitic monism propounded by Padmapāda, with a brief description of Jīvanmukti or freedom in the embodied state, a doctrine which is cardinal to the Advaita. The Śruti is explicit that the knowledge of Brahman enables one to attain freedom from the bonds of saṃsāra here and now—'atra Brahma samaśnute'—(*Kaṭha Up.* II. iii. 14). The Pañcapādikā also is clear on the point (see IX. Vārṇaka) as it maintains that the liberated person has to wait only till the fall of his physical body to be merged in the Supreme.<sup>3</sup> We find a large number of

<sup>1</sup> तस्य त्रय आवसथान्त्रयः स्वप्ना अयमावसथोऽयमावसथोऽयमावसथ इति.

—*Ait. Up.*, Chap. III.

For him three states there are, and three are the dreams; this is the seat (see the present writer's translation of *Ait. Up.*—The Bangalore Press).

<sup>2</sup> While controverting the Buddhistic view of an objectless world, Śamkara emphatically asserts that the work-a-day world stands unassailed, for all practical ends.—*V.S.*, II. ii. 31; cf. *PP.*, end of the IXth Vārṇaka.

<sup>3</sup> तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये ।

*Chānd. Up.*, VI. XIV. 2.

The redeemed individual has only to wait the dissolution of his body to be lost in the Eternal. Commenting on this passage Śamkara leaves no room for doubt that the jīvanmukta has to stay on earth only till the dissolution of the present body to realise his oneness with the Supreme. The word 'atha' says Śamkara excludes the notion of intermission, between the fall of the body and the attainment of mokṣa—नहि देहमोक्षस्य सत्संपत्तेश्च कालविलंबोस्ति. See also *Bh. Gītā*, IX. 28,

passages in Śamkara which indicate that the released soul attains at the very moment of release its oneness with the Universal Spirit. There exist however conflicting views regarding the true import of 'Jīvanmukti'. Some of the commentators like Rāmānuja refuse to take the word in its literal sense and regard it as but a figurative expression. Among the modern scholars again the conception of 'jīvanmukti' is not countenanced by some on other grounds. In an interesting symposium (cf. *Proceedings of the Eighth Philosophical Congress*, Mysore Session, 1932) Sir Radhakrishnan strongly animadverts against this doctrine and advocates what is known as 'sarvamukti'—salvation for all, i.e., that no one is saved till all are saved.<sup>1</sup> The released soul in this view takes on recurring births and continues to labour for the spiritual good of man till the time of final world-redemption. It is pointed out that it is not easy to reconcile Videhamukti, i.e., jīvanmukta's attaining freedom from metempsychosis after the death of the present body, with what is stated in the Bhāṣya on V.S. III. iii. 32. In the Bhāṣya referred to it is related that muktaś like Apāntaratamas and Vasiṣṭha entered on mundane existence at the bidding of the Lord to help suffering humanity.

We may in support of the jīvanmukti doctrine call in the witness of Vidyāraṇya who in his 'Jīvanmuktiviveka' has exhaustively dealt with the subject. As he rightly points out what is assured to a jīvanmukta is the stoppage of renascence.<sup>2</sup>

---

In explaining this stanza Śamkara refers to jīvanmukta as attaining mokṣa after the demise of the present body—

त्वं सन्न्यासयोगयुक्तात्मा सन्निमुक्तः कर्मबन्धनैः जीवन्नेव, पतिते च अस्मिन् शरीरे  
मामुपैष्यसि ।

<sup>1</sup> Appayadīkṣita in his *Siddhāntaleśa Samgraha* (p. 453, Kumbhakonam Edn.) argues in favour of Sarvamukti and basing his view on Pratibimbavāda (i.e., Īśvara as prototype and jīva as reflection) concludes that a liberated jīva attains the state of Īśvara and waits for final absorption into the Absolute till the moment of universal emancipation. But even in this doctrine there is no warrant for the contention that jīvanmuktas are subject to recurrent births.

<sup>2</sup> See *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, Ānandāśrama Edn., pp. 30-32; according to Vidyāraṇya videhamukti is the immediate result of the rise of jñāna. He takes 'deha' in 'videhamukti' to mean the body that the jīva assumes at the onset of a fresh prārabdha karma and that, he says, is interdicted so soon as one attains illumination. The jīvanmukta

The case of Apāntaratamas and others is not against the doctrine of jīvanmukti. They were, as the Bhāṣya explains, commissioned for a specific purpose and even while sojourning on earth never lost sight of the fact that they were emancipated souls. Śamkara concludes his Bhāṣya on the Śūtra in question by referring to the experience of Vāmadeva who is said to have attained realisation while yet in his mother's womb (cf. *Brh. Up.* I. iv. 10). He clinches the matter by emphasising that the fruit of universal ātma-hood eventuates at the very moment of Brahma Jñāna.<sup>1</sup> As regards the objection that absolute contentment and joy are unthinkable so long as there remains a single unredeemed soul, it may be remarked that the contention would hold if in the state of release the soul is the enjoyer—bhoktā—but the true doctrine is that the soul in that state is bliss itself being merged in the Supreme. It seems only right to accept the view that a jīvanmukta is one who is absolutely rid of all notions of duality by the knowledge of the Supreme and that the actual Brahma-hood ensues on the fall of the body. If he continues to work till life lasts<sup>2</sup> he does so out of the plenitude of his love for his love is now

---

is virtually 'videhamukta' and his embodied state for a while is only to liquidate his prārabdha karma.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *V.S.*, III. ii. 21—where Śamkara explicitly states that Sarva-mukti which involves the final dissolution of the world is not what the scriptures teach. The jīvanmukta foretastes the Supreme bliss while yet in the flesh and becomes one with the Absolute on his discarnation. That jīvanmukti has been attained by some choice spirits is confirmed by the remark that the dissolution of the entire world would, on the contention of the opponent, have been brought about by the first emancipated person.

एकेन च आदिमुक्तेन पृथिव्यादिप्रविलयः कृतः, इदानीं पृथिव्यादिशून्ये जगदभविष्यत्.

No doubt this passage occurs in a different context. Śamkara is there answering the critic who holds the view that the world which is real comes to an end with the rise of the knowledge of Brahman which is enjoined. Still the point to be noticed is that the phenomenal world continues to exist for the unredeemed souls and not for a jīvanmukta.

<sup>2</sup> The Bhāṣya on *Chānd. Up.*, VI. xiv. 2, makes it clear that corporeality does not cease at the very moment of the rise of knowledge (सद्योमुक्ति) and that a jīvanmukta alone is competent to instruct one in Brahmajñāna.

universalised and not from self-interest or at the call of duty even. A jīvanmukta stands beyond the pale of ordinary judgment.<sup>1</sup> It is no argument that corporeality which still clings to him acts as an impediment to his self-realisation. It is a question of attitude. Ripeness is all.

---

<sup>1</sup> नैवात्र विवदितव्यं ब्रह्मविदा कंचित्कालं शरीरं ध्रियते इति ; कथं हि एकस्य स्वहृदय-प्रत्ययं ब्रह्मवेदनं देहधारणं च अपरेण प्रविशेष्टुं शक्येत.

V.S., IV. i. 15.


The question is irrelevant whether the knower of Brahman remains embodied or not for a time. How can one person dispute the fact of another person's deep conviction of his attainment of the Knowledge of Brahman and at the same time existing in the embodied state?

"It is interesting in this connection to refer to Śamkara's statement at the end of his commentary on V.S., IV. i. 15 which tradition views as an allusion to his own direct experience of the ultimate truth."—*O.I.P.*—Foot-note 2 on p. 381,



# CONTENTS

<i>Sūtra</i>	<i>Varṇaka- Section</i>	<i>Topic</i>	<i>PAGE</i>
		Foreword by the General Editor .. ..	v
		A Biographical Note on the Late Rājasevā- sakta Śrī. D. Venkataramiah .. ..	xi
		Introduction .. ..	xiii
		Abbreviations .. ..	xl
		Invocatory Verses .. ..	xlvi
First	1	Superimposition .. ..	1
	2	Vedānta—Not Anticipated by Jaimini ..	142
	3	The Qualifications of the Agent .. ..	179
	4	Is Brahman a Known Entity ? .. ..	229
Second	5	Definition of Brahman .. ..	258
Third	6	The Omniscience of Brahman .. ..	277
	7	Brahman—Established on the Authority of Vedānta .. ..	279
Fourth	8	Vedānta—Intimates an Existent Entity ..	281
	9	Is Brahman the Object of the Injunction of Meditation ? .. ..	295
		Conspectus .. ..	333
		Index .. ..	409



## ABBREVIATIONS

1. *Ar.S.* .. Arthasamgraha.
2. *A.S.* .. Advaita Siddhi of Madhusūdana Saraswati.
3. *Brh.Up.* .. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.
4. *G.O.S.* .. Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
5. *I.S.* .. Iṣṭasiddhi—Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
6. *N.S.* .. Naiṣkarmya Siddhi—Bombay Sanskrit Series VIII.
7. *O.I.P.* .. Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Prof. Hirianna.
8. *PP.* .. Pañcapādikā—Viziagnagaram Sanskrit Series.
9. *S.* .. English Translation of Vivaraṇaprameya Samgraha, by Suryanarayana Sastri and Kileswaran—Andhra University Series.
10. *S.B.* .. Śābara Bhāṣya—Ānandāsrama Edition.
11. *S.D.* .. Śāstra Dīpikā—English Translation—Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
12. *S.L.S.* .. Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, by Appayya Dīkshita—Kumbhakonam Edition.
13. *SV.* .. Svetāśvataropaniṣad.
14. *TD.* .. Tatvadīpana—Anantakrishna Sastri's Edition, Calcutta.
15. *T.S.A.* .. Tarka Samgraha by Athale.
16. *V.* .. Vivaraṇa—Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
17. *V.P.S.* .. Vivaraṇaprameya Samgraha—Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
18. *V.S.* .. Vedānta Śāstra of Bādarāyaṇa—Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay.
19. *VU.* .. Vivaraṇopanyāsa by Sri Ānandasaraswati—Benares Sanskrit Series.

# PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

## INVOCATORY VERSES

- I. Prostration to Brahman, the beginningless, blissful, the changeless, of the nature of knowledge, eternity and existence; (the ground of) the non-existent multiplex of duality, the Witness.
- II. Prostration to the sage of the name Bādarāyaṇa, the abode of peace, who is (as it were) the embodiment of the Sun to the cluster of Lotuses (*viz.*, the Upaniṣads) standing at the head of (*i.e.*, the inflorescence of) the Śrutis.
- III. I bow to the unique Śamkara rich in the possession of an entourage of ascetics ('bhogi' in the sense of serpents as applied to Lord Śamkara), bereft of wealth ('bhūti'—sacred ashes covering the body of Śiva), who attaches equal value to reasoning (anumā = reasoning which, equally with śruti, supports the body of Śamkara's doctrine; Umā, Śiva's consort forms half his body), of mild aspect (unlike Ugra, *i.e.*, Śiva who as the name implies, is of fierce aspect), who has eradicated all traces of Kāla (Kāla-Māyā, also poison; Śiva is Viṣa-kaṇṭha, having the mark of poison on his throat), rid of Vināyaka (a Buddhist teacher whom Śamkara silenced; Śiva has Vināyaka, his son by his side).
- IV. I bow my head before the teachers, renowned for their knowledge (Lit. Wealth) of the Bhāṣya,—those who drink the nectar flowing from the Bhāṣya-lotus, which owes its birth to the Mānasa-lake of his (Bhāṣyakāra's = Śamkara's) mouth,—the loving disciples who, like the bees, are eagerly lifting up their faces from all quarters.
- V. I now begin in all earnestness the exposition of the Bhāṣya which bears the weight rendered heavy with the cluster of words, etc., and which is limpid yet profound.

## VARṆAKA I SUPERIMPOSITION

I.1. [Page 1] (Śamkara's) Comment—beginning with “the notions comprised in the object (yuṣmat) and the ego (asmāt)” and ending with “I am this, this is mine: such is how men behave” having the very purport conveyed in the comment “with the object of getting rid of this (erroneous idea) which is the cause of misery, and thereby arriving at the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Absolute, the study of the whole of the Vedānta is begun”,—explains that both the viśaya (subject-matter) and the prayojana (purpose), of the śāstra (viz., the Vedānta sūtras) are suggested by implication in the first sūtra (viz., athāto Brahmajijñāsā).<sup>1</sup> And this (i.e., how the subject-matter viśaya, and the fruit resulting from its study are indicated in the first sūtra), we will state more clearly when commenting upon the bhāṣya—“Therefore is Brahman to be inquired into (*vide* Varṇaka III, p. 66).

<sup>1</sup> The Bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtras beginning with शुष्मदस्सत्—‘the notions of the object and the subject’ and ending with नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहार —‘it is on the part of man a natural procedure’, explicitly states the objection against the view of the illusory character of the entire world of sense and the answer thereto. There is no reference here to the subject-matter and the purpose of Vedāntic study as stated in the first sūtra. But yet as the Bhāṣyakāra concludes this section on illusion, with the statement that the study of the Vedānta texts is begun with a view to getting rid of all the ills of life, and to acquiring the knowledge of the identity of the individual self with Brahman अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते, it becomes evident that the exposition of illusion, अध्यासमाध्य, has its affinity with the first aphorism and is not discordant with it. Padmapāda makes this point clear. The first aphorism serving as the introduction to the Vedānta śāstra sets forth the subject-matter (विषय) and the purpose (प्रयोजन) and this topic receives adequate treatment in the third Varṇaka. It must be noted that the subject-matter and the purpose are only implied (arthāt) and not explicit in the first sūtra. The word इति in प्रथमसूत्रेण सूत्रिते इति may be construed in two ways: (i) because the first sūtra suggests both the subject-matter and the fruit, the prefatory comment being its elucidation also mentions them; (ii) the prefatory comment itself explains that the first sūtra is intended to denote both viśaya and prayojana.

2. Here this objection is taken: If it be so, let the bhāṣya be thus much only—"With the object of getting rid of this (erroneous idea) which is the cause of misery, and thereby arriving at the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Absolute, the study of the whole of the Vedānta is begun". There, by the phrase, "with the object of getting rid of this which is the cause of misery" the fruit (prayojana) is indicated, and by the phrase, "for arriving at the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Absolute" the subject-matter (viṣaya) is rendered explicit. As that is so, what is the purpose of the Bhāṣya beginning with 'yuṣmadasmāt' (and ending with 'sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ') by which it is intended to show the error-begotten nature of men's doings (*i.e.*, their modes of thought and conduct) characterized by egoity as evidenced in the expression 'aham manuṣyaḥ'—'I am man', where the self is identified with the body or the senses, 'ahamidam'—I am this (*i.e.*, the body, etc.), 'mamedam'—mine is this (children, wealth, etc., belonging to me and so on).<sup>2</sup>

3. This will be said in answer: The knowledge of Brahman as the solvent of the root-cause of the ills of life (anartha) is suggested in the sūtra, and anartha is constituted by (the notion that one is) an agent and an enjoyer which again presupposes (the belief that one is) a cogniser. If that (anartha) be genuinely real, it cannot be annihilated by jñāna (knowledge), for jñāna can remove only ajñāna (nescience). [Page 2.] If on the other hand agency and enjoyment are grounded in nescience, then what is going to be stated (by the Sūtrakāra, *viz.*, that the knowledge of Brahman is the solvent of the cause of anartha) would be appropriate. Hence (*i.e.*, since knowledge is powerless to destroy the notions of kartṛtva, etc., unless the latter are rooted in nescience), it comes to this—that agency and enjoyment as the outcome of nescience have been clearly indicated by the aphorist

---

<sup>2</sup> The objection is as to the need for the commentary elucidating illusion—adhyāsa bhāṣya. It has been shown that the first sūtra itself points out, though by implication, the subject-matter of the śāstra and the purpose of its study; and these are the identity of the individual with the universal self and the riddance of the miseries of life. When viṣaya and prayojana are indicated in the sūtra and rendered explicit in the bhāṣya, there is little justification for elaborating the nature of illusion and its effects.

himself, when he suggests that Brahmajñāna is the solvent of anartha.<sup>3</sup>

Hence, in order that it may serve to establish the meaning conveyed by the sūtra, (the explanation of the nature of illusion has to be undertaken) by pointing out the error-begotten character of bondage (tatpradarśanadvāreṇa), and as such this prefatory commentary has the purpose of serving as the introduction to the entire śāstra (*viz.*, Vedānta).<sup>4</sup>

4. And therefore, what this Śāstra in substance expounds is that all the Vedānta texts culminate in showing that the ultimate nature of the individual soul (ātman) alleged to be saṁsārīn (transmigratory being) is one uniform bliss, the very essence of existence, non-mutable and consciousness entire. And that teaching (*viz.*, what is commonly regarded as the migratory soul is in reality the Absolute) conflicts with the notion 'I am the doer', 'I am happy' and 'I am miserable'—notions which, to all appearances, are uncontradicted. Hence, for the removal of this conflict, as long as it is not elucidated that the nature of the individual soul, in so far as it appears different from Brahman, is

<sup>3</sup> When it is known that liberation is the prayojana of the viçāra-śāstra (*i.e.*, Vedānta sūtras), it is also known by implication that the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajñāna resulting from viçāra) is the dispeller of the ills of life (anartha). Then the doubt arises how Brahmajñāna could dispel anartha, for the nature of jñāna is only to remove ajñāna and not anartha. To remove such a doubt and to substantiate that anartha, which expresses itself as egoity, agency, enjoyment, etc., is destroyed by the saving knowledge, it has to be proved that such notions as egoity, etc., are the outcome of avidyā or ajñāna and this is what the Bhāṣyakāra does in the prefatory bhāṣya beginning with 'the notions comprised in yuṣmat, asmat, etc.' It has been shown that the illusory nature of egoity, etc., is indicated in the sūtra itself and as such it must be understood that the bhāṣya merely elucidates it.

<sup>4</sup> अतः तत्प्रदर्शनद्वारेण—This is to meet the objection that the concluding comment अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकस्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते sufficiently brings out the purpose of the Vedānta śāstra and that it does not require further elucidation. The idea of the opponent here is that the oneness of the individual soul with Brahman might be admitted and not the unreality of the world. Such a view was held by many Vedāntins like Bhartṛprapañca, (and though later than Śaṁkara) Bhāskara and Yādava who were all Brahma-pariṇāma-vādins, but not Brahma-vivarta-vādins.



the creation of avidyā, so long, the mahāvākya—tat tvam asi—[that thou art] will appear as meaningless as the vākya (statement)] beginning with 'jaradgava'.<sup>5</sup> As it is so, in order to eradicate it (*viz.*, the notion that the world is real) the non-Brahman nature of the individual self has to be shown as being due to the play of avidyā. And this the aphorist does when elucidating the nature of the individual self, in the chapter styled 'non-contradiction' with the words 'tadguṇasāratvāt', etc.<sup>6</sup>

5. If that be so, why not this (V.S. II. iii. 29) be the first (śūtra)? Not that why. Because of (the need for indicating) the particular import. It is only when this particular import, *viz.*, that all the Vedānta texts are congruent in the elucidation of the secondless Brahman (samanvaya), is brought to light (will its correctness be challenged); and then its refutation will be appropriate. (Hence V.S. II. iii. 29, which points the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, comes after, and not before 'athāto Brahmajijñāsā'). If however this special significance is not brought to light, objection to its validity as well as its refutation will be irrelevant. As for the Bhāṣyakāra, he elucidates what in fact is established there (*i.e.*, II. iii-29) and what the first śūtra suggests by implication,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> If the finite nature or the individuation of the soul is not proved to be the product of nescience, the Upaniṣadic statements तत्त्वमसि, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, 'That thou art', and 'I am Brahman', which unmistakably point to unity, would be as meaningless as the following nonsense verse:—

जरद्वजः कम्बलपादुकाभ्याम् । द्वारि स्थितो गायति मद्रकाणि ॥  
तं पृच्छति ब्राह्मणी पुत्रकामा । राजन्, रुमायां लशुनस्य कोऽर्थः ॥

This is the English version:—

An old bull wearing blankets and sandals  
Standing at the passage sings madrakā songs;  
Him, asks a Brāhman lady desirous of a son

"O King, what is the price of garlic in the land of Rumā".

The incoherence of the sentences is obvious.

<sup>6</sup> V.S. II. iii. 29.—The śūtra in full is तदुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः, प्राज्ञवत् where it is shown that finitude, etc., belong to the intellect and not to the individual soul. According to a well-known canon of mimāṃsā interpretation, where Scripture contradicts common experience, the Śruti has to be interpreted in a secondary way, as in 'ādityo yūpah'—the sun is the sacrificial post. Here the Śruti can be literally understood if the conflict can be shown to be only apparent.

<sup>7</sup> सामर्थ्यबलेन—On the strength of arthāpatti pramāṇa—implication or postulation. Because of the fact that bondage can be eradicated

in order that it (the teaching) may be easily understood. As such there can be no blemish.

II.6. *Objection.*—When beginning to write a treatise, those who adhere to hoary tradition first propitiate the deity of their choice by worship and prostration, as befitting the work they have undertaken, and start with such benedictory words as they may remember, e.g., 'atha', 'vṛddhi', etc.,<sup>8</sup> or after meeting with (an auspicious) sight like a pot of curds, etc. The practice of wise men is also our authority. And it is well known that the removal of obstacles is the result of such prayer. Great many are the impediments to one undertaking a work relating to a subject of such a high purpose (as liberation). And the saying goes—many are the impediments in the way of one's attaining the good. (The Śruti) also reminds us—'Therefore to them (Gods) it is distasteful, viz., men becoming enlightened';<sup>9</sup> and it is common knowledge that those, to whom a thing is distasteful, create obstacles in its way. Then how did the commentator (Śamkara) confidently proceed with his work, having discarded the ancient tradition by not prefacing it with a benediction?

7. [Page 3] The objection is thus met:—The comment beginning with "the notions of the 'Thou' and the 'I' etc.", and ending with "the mutual identity of their attributes also is absolutely untenable" (amounts to māṅgalācaraṇa—benediction). Its meaning is that the entity which is free from all evil and is one homogeneous sentience is what constitutes the inner Self; and the comment is intended to show that the manifestation of something different in an entity which in reality is as described, is anyway illusory (mithyā). As such, to one who in that comment, though it is explicative of a different topic (i.e., intended for a different purpose, viz., elucidation of adhyāsa), is contemplating ātman as that in which all perturbations have been eradicated and as the sole essence of consciousness,

---

by knowledge on the only alternative that it is the product of nescience, adhyāsa—nescience, has to be expounded.

<sup>8</sup> The words 'atha, vṛddhi', etc., are regarded as indicating auspiciousness.

<sup>9</sup> The word 'vijñāyate' is used in ancient literature when the authority cited is the Veda, particularly the Brāhmaṇa portion. In the present case, the quotation is from the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I. iv. 10) which is a portion of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of the Śukla Yajurveda,

whence could arise accidents causing obstruction?<sup>10</sup> Hence the revered Bhāṣyakāra (is to be regarded as) the foremost in the maintenance of the orthodox tradition.

III.8. (Now follows the bhāṣya text)—[“ It is evident that the mutual identity of the object (viṣaya) and the subject (viṣayī), which are as opposite in character as darkness and light, is what is impossible to support] ”. (Here these questions appear pertinent:) Which is this opposition? Of what nature is the mutual identity (indistinguishability) held to be? On account of the untenability of which is the comparison—‘ like darkness and light ’ adduced? If opposition (virodha) is defined as mutual exclusion (lit. non-residence in the same locus), then the presence of light would not warrant the presence of darkness. But this is not true. It is common knowledge that in a dimly-lit room objects (lit. colour or shape) are perceived not clearly but elsewhere (i.e., where well-lit) clearly.<sup>11</sup> From this it is obvious that in a room having a dim light, darkness also exists in some degree. Similarly, even in shade, warmth experienced in varying degrees indicates the presence of sunshine therein. From this it must be understood that com-presence of heat and cold may be taken to have been established.

9. We say (in answer) that opposition is characterized by the absence of mutual identity (tādātmya).<sup>12</sup> This means that no actual relation is possible as in the case of the universal and the particular (jāti and vyakti). Hence the identity of the one with the other, that is, their mutual identification is indefensible.

<sup>10</sup> Though there is no explicit offer of prayer and the bhāṣya starts with the topic of superimposition, Śamkara, it is clear, has in mind the pure Consciousness, the sole Reality. As such, it cannot be said that he has not sought divine benediction.

<sup>11</sup> The point is that in one and the same place, contrary to the definition given above, there is light as well as darkness. In a dimly-lit room, unlike in a well-lit place, things are dimly seen. In so far as they are seen, they indicate the presence of light, but in so far as they are dimly seen, they indicate the presence of darkness.

<sup>12</sup> The analogy of light and darkness, says the Siddhāntin, is adduced to mark mutual opposition not on the ground of residence in a common locus सहावस्थान, but on that of identity तादात्म्य. There is no tādātmya relation between light and darkness as we find, say, in jāti and vyakti, i.e., between the universal and the particular,

How (is it that there can be no identity) ?<sup>13</sup> In so far as its nature is concerned (*i.e.*, in itself—*svatastāvat*), the *viṣayī* or the self can have (in reality) no identity of being with the *viṣaya* or the non-self, because it (the self) is wholly of the essence of consciousness (*cidekarasa*); nor through the other (*viṣaya*) because it is incapable of transformation (*pariṇāma*) and is unattached. The object also cannot by its own nature attain identity of being with the self by transforming itself into consciousness (*cit*), for then it will lose its characteristic as object by attaining equal status with consciousness. Nor through the other (the self by drawing the non-self into itself) can the non-self partake of the nature of the self, for the self is actionless (*niṣkriya*).<sup>14</sup>

IV.10. [As regards their qualities even, there is absolutely (no question of identity).] When it is so (*i.e.*, when it is proved that there can be no identity of being), their attributes cannot, having dissociated themselves from their substrates, exist elsewhere (*i.e.*, the attributes of the self in the non-self and *vice-versa*); and this is (pointed out to be) a well-known fact. The word 'iti' (in "sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattiriti") denotes reason. Because of the reason adduced, there arises no notion of identity. Therefore (*ataḥ*) (we have the *bhāṣya* text),—[the subject which is denoted by the notion 'I' and is of the nature of intelligence]. That which in that notion is the 'not-this' is pure consciousness. With that (pure consciousness) there is identity (relation) as it were, of that which is denoted by the 'thou', as is evident in the notion 'I am a man'—'thou' in the sense (*lakṣaṇataḥ*) of being manifested by virtue of the 'that' (*viz.*, the aforesaid sentient). That alone is superimposition.<sup>15</sup>

[And of its properties also—*taddharmāṇāṅca*]:—When however there occurs the superimposition of objects (*viṣaya*), the

<sup>13</sup> The question is raised why illusory identity relation should not exist between the self and the not-self as in the case of mother-of-pearl and silver though real identity may be barred. The p.p. answer begins with "स्वतस्त्वात्".

<sup>14</sup> चित्तेः अप्रतिसङ्क्रमत्वात्. For this expression cf. *Pātañjala Yoga-sūtra*, IV. 22.

<sup>15</sup> What the *pūrvapakṣin* wishes to show is that there is no transference—*adhyāsa*, even in the notion 'I am a man'. The identity between the 'I' and the 'Thou' notions is only apparent due to the fact that the latter manifests itself through the *cit* or consciousness,

superimposition of their properties results by implication; still even without the superimposition of objects, the superimposition of their properties is perceived, as in the case of the property of hearing, etc., of deaf persons.<sup>16</sup> Hence the separate mention (of the superimposition of properties).

11. [Page 4] (The bhāṣya further makes the statement)—[‘In contrast to it (*i.e.*, conversely), of the subject and its properties—*viśayiṇaḥ taddharmāṇāṃ*’]. This means—of consciousness (*cetana*) and of its properties (there can be no superimposition on the object).

Well, since the subject is of the essence of consciousness, whence could it possess properties which might be conceived as being superimposed on the object?

This is our reply: Joy, experience of sense-objects and eternity, these are the properties. Though non-distinct they appear as distinct from the *cit* (pure consciousness).<sup>17</sup> Hence (there is) no blemish (in the above argument).

12. Superimposition (*adhyāsa*) means the manifestation of the nature of something in another which is not of that nature. That (manifestation), it is reasonable to hold, is false (*mithyā*). The word ‘*mithyā*’ is of double signification—it is denotative of negation as well as of inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatā*). Here it is an expression of negation. (The above statement) “*mithyēti bhavitum yuktam*” means that it is reasonable to ascribe non-existence alone to superimposition (*adhyāsa*).

V.13. Though it is so (*i.e.*, though superimposition is not warranted), yet it is seen to be congenital, or a constant accompaniment of the mere being (*mātra*) of the inner self.<sup>18</sup> This means

<sup>16</sup> When a deaf man says ‘I cannot hear’ there is no *tādātmya* between the self and the sense of hearing, but there is *tādātmya* between the self and hearing which is the property of the auditory sense.

<sup>17</sup> *Ātman* in its pristine state is attributeless, but in the empirical sphere, attributes like existence, consciousness and bliss are spoken of as belonging to *ātman*. It is in the different psychoses that *ātman* appears as endowed with different attributes; cf. *Bhāmatī*, p. 156; also *V.P.S.*, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> *Lokavyavahāra* is explained as superimposition in the form of ‘I’ and ‘mine’. Superimposition is beginningless (*naisargikaḥ*) judged from its character as a continuous stream; but in its individual character

the mutual superimposition of the 'thou' and the 'I' as exemplified in the worlds (loka) usage (vyavahāra)—['I am this' and 'mine is this'].<sup>19</sup>

Hence (because it is established by experience), just as the existence of the 'I' notion cannot be negated (being indubitable), even so that of superimposition; (the ego-concept necessarily involves the notion of superimposition). By the word 'loka' is meant the whole class of beings permeated by the conceit, 'I am a man' (*i.e.*, ego-conscious). Vyavahāra is usage. (How)? Superimposition as is evident in 'I' and 'mine' means egoity in the form of 'I am a man'. (Hence the sentence means that the conceit 'I am a man,' is a matter of common experience and is beginningless.)

14. [Satyāṁte mithunīkṛtya—coupling together truth and error.] 'Satyam' means, 'not this' (*i.e.*, other than the world of perception; intelligence—caitanya). 'Anṛtam,' that which is connoted by the 'thou' (*i.e.*, the insentient world), because even in itself (svarūpatopi) it is illusory knowledge.<sup>20</sup> In the phrase "having made an erroneous transfer", as also in "having coupled" (adhyāsa, mithunīkṛtya) the suffix 'ktvā' is not used on the admission that it denotes a time prior to and an action different from 'lokavyavahāra' (egoism taking the form 'I am a man', etc.), as in the statement, 'having eaten he goes';

(vyaktirūpeṇa) it has a beginning as each act of superimposition presupposes a previous one as its cause. Such usage as 'I am this', 'this is mine' involving mutual superimposition is found naturally (*i.e.*, universally) wherever the internal self as such is felt. 'Mātra' excludes the phenomenal phase of caitanya.

<sup>19</sup> व्यवहार is used in different senses: knowing—ज्ञान, expression—अभिवादन, getting—उपादान, procedure—अर्थक्रिया. Here it is used in the first two senses—अध्यासात्मकं ज्ञानं तदनन्तरं शब्दप्रयोगः first arises the illusory knowledge and then is expression given to it. Both are beginningless.

<sup>20</sup> Caitanya or Brahman on the contrary has its adhyāsa through its association with the limiting conditions—upādhi. Hence the adhyāsa in the case of Brahman is spoken of as saṁsṛṣṭādhyāsa or sopādhika. In itself Brahman is uncontaminated. It is only as conditioned that Brahman is superimposed, while the 'thou' category is directly superimposed being mithyā by nature. The question arises when and how Brahman became associated with limitations. The answer is—anādi—beginningless and अनिर्वचनीय inexplicable.

because there is no reference to a different act. The phrases 'adhyāśya', and 'naisargikoyam lokavyavahārah,' both, in substance point to the act of erroneous transference (adhyāśa kriyā, and not to priority in time or to a distinct act).<sup>21</sup> Further in the concluding part (of this section on superimposition, the Bhāṣyakāra) has only this as the final statement: "In the matter aforesaid this superimposition is beginningless and endless (till the rise of knowledge)", because, it is naisargika (continuous like a stream).<sup>22</sup> Hence like the phrase—"the Self's nature is intelligence" (the termination 'ktvā') should be understood as used in a figurative sense only (vyapadeśamātram).

15. ["Mithyājñāna nimitta iti"]<sup>23</sup>—that which is mithyā (erroneous) and at the same time, ajñāna (nescience) is mithyājñāna.] The word 'mithyā' means 'inexpressible' (anirvacanīya), and by the word 'ajñāna' is meant the potency of avidyā which is of the nature of insentience and is the negation of jñāna. And 'tannimitta' means 'having that (viz., mithyājñāna) as the material cause.'

---

<sup>21</sup> स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसानात्-क्रियास्वरूप एव पर्यवसानात्. Because it ends in referring to one and the same act, viz., the act of superimposition.

<sup>22</sup> What the author says is that the contextual meaning is to be ascertained from the paragraph as a whole—the thesis with which it starts and the conclusion arrived at (upakrama and upasamhāra). Here the conclusion makes no mention of temporal succession or of distinction of one act from another. Hence the termination 'ktvā' should be regarded as an expletive; and merely in order to give it significance, the sentence-unity (vākyārtha) ought not to be sacrificed.

<sup>23</sup> (a) मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः....तत्र भ्रान्तिज्ञाननिरासायः, 'मिथ्या च तव अज्ञानं च' इति विग्रहमकरोत् T.D.

The resolution of the compound mithyājñāna into 'mithyā' and 'ajñāna' is to oppose the view that superimposition is the outcome of illusory knowledge (bhrāntijñāna).

(b) तत्र अज्ञानमित्युक्ते ज्ञानाभावमात्रमुक्तं स्यात्; मिथ्येत्युक्ते भ्रान्तिज्ञानमिति स्यात्....॥ V.P., 11.

The mention of 'mithyā' would mean illusory knowledge, and the mention of 'ajñāna' would mean absence of knowledge. It is to reject both absence of knowledge and illusory knowledge that the compound is split up into 'mithyā' and 'ajñāna'. Something other than these, viz., primal ignorance—mulāvidyā, constitutes the material cause of the world-spectacle,



VI.16. When superimposition is proved to be the product of (mithyājñāna), how could it be said to be beginningless (naisargika)? Here is the answer:—It cannot but be admitted that there exists this potency of nescience in things external, as well as internal, its existence being a constant accompaniment of their inner nature.<sup>24</sup> Otherwise (*i.e.*, if nescience is not admitted) the appearance of illusory objects becomes inexplicable.<sup>25</sup> And that nescience does not cause any impediment to the manifestation of the real nature of insentient objects since their non-cognition is caused merely by the absence of the (necessary) means of valid knowledge.<sup>26</sup> [Page 5] Prior to the manifestation of 'silver' and after (its manifestation also), even though it (avidyā) exists, its real nature (*i.e.*, of silver) is apprehended.<sup>27</sup> Hence it (avidyā) is but the cause of the manifestation

---

<sup>24</sup> What the author means is that avidyā in its nature as primal cause is beginningless, but as a specific adhyāsa it is a product of precedent illusory knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction in the statements naimittika and naisargika. Hence, says V, that positive nescience भावरूपाज्ञान has ātman as its locus. That nescience exists is proved both by inference as indicated by the word 'avaśyam' and by perception as indicated by the word 'this' eṣā. And this avidyā is present wherever there is caitanya.

<sup>25</sup> But as a matter of fact 'shell-silver' and 'rope-serpent' are apprehended. Hence presumption, (अर्थोपपत्ति) also establishes nescience. The superimposition of ego on pure consciousness or of silver on nacre comprising false object—arthādhyāsā, and false knowledge—jñānādhyāsā, necessitates the postulation of some material cause therefor, which must also be erroneous—mithyā.

<sup>26</sup> Having postulated a single primary nescience which has ātman as its ground—āśraya, it is pointed out that its objects (viśaya) are not insentient objects like pot, etc. Otherwise with the knowledge of pot, etc., the primal nescience must disappear, but it does not till the final release—mokṣa. Then how is the non-cognition of pot to be accounted for? It is because of the absence of vṛtti or psychosis (pramāṇavaikalyāt) that there arises no perceptive knowledge of the same.

<sup>27</sup> What is sought to be proved is that nescience does not veil things other than ātman. In case avidyā which has its ground in ātman veils non-sentient objects, then, since objects cannot manifest themselves without the destruction of the obscuring veil, the primal ignorance relating to ātman would disappear with the rise of the knowledge of objects. Even though avidyā exists in ātman at all times—past, present

of something different (from the original, the real; e.g., appearance of silver in shell—rūpāntara. This is due to the vikṣepa-śakti of avidyā). In the inner self however which is of the nature of (pure) intelligence and as such self-lucent, since the non-manifestation of Brahman cannot be accounted for by anything else, its non-manifestation (it must be admitted) is due to the obstruction caused by the potency of nescience which is existent therein (in Brahman) and is beginningless.<sup>28</sup> Hence it (primal nescience) obstructs the manifestation of the real nature of Brahman in the inner self (jīva) and it becomes the cause of the appearance of something other than its nature, like the ego notion, etc.; and in deep slumber, etc., having remained in the residual state of mere impressions of ego-notion, etc., which are the outcome of its projective power, it revives again (on waking). Hence though the superimposition as evidenced in the notions of men such as 'I' and 'mine' is beginningless (because the hetu, viz., avidyā is beginningless) it is spoken of as having mithyājñāna as its cause, but not as adventitious.<sup>29</sup> Therefore its beginninglessness is not in conflict with its coming into existence as the result of a cause.<sup>30</sup>

---

and future, because objects in their nature are perceived, ajñāna or avidyā, it must be admitted, does not draw the veil on things other than the self.

<sup>28</sup> In its pristine condition, one's inner self is characterised by existence and luminosity and as such it must manifest itself and yet one characterises it as 'It is not', 'It does not manifest itself'. So the presumption is that there must be some positive entity obscuring the self and that entity is avidyā or primal ignorance. Again, without first obscuring the ground (adhiṣṭhāna, viz., the Brahman—this is the āvaraṇa-śakti), avidyā cannot bring about the world-spectacle (the phenomenal world) which is due to its vikṣepa-śakti, i.e., making reality appear as something different. And because this obscuration as well as projection is the outcome of ignorance, nescience must be positive. This is a case of inferring the cause from the effect.—V.P., 15-16.

<sup>29</sup> न पुनरायन्तुकेन—When it is said that superimposition is caused by mithyājñāna, it should not be supposed that it comes into being *de novo*. It only means that it requires avidyā as its logical precedent if it should be properly explained.

<sup>30</sup> Paradoxical as it may seem, superimposition may be described both as beginningless and produced from an antecedent cause, viz., mithyājñāna. It is not self-contradictory.

VII.17. ["And (erroneously transferring the attributes) of the one with those of the other—anyonyadharmāmsca"].] The reason why the attributes are taken separately is to show that in some cases superimposition of mere attributes (without reference to the substance) is perceived (as in 'I am deaf'. Deafness is the property of the organ of hearing and not of the self). ["Because of not discriminating the one from the other"—— itaretarāvivekena], which means confounding the one with the other (lit. regarding both as one; ekatāpatti). Of which dharmin, how and where is the adhyāsa? Again, where is the superimposition of attributes perceived? These (questions) the Bhāṣyakāra himself answers. He points to the form that superimposition takes in "This am I" and "This is mine". The ego notion so far is the first adhyāsa.<sup>31</sup>

Is it not that the integral (partless) cit alone manifests itself in the 'aham—ego' and that there is no additional part (seen in the ego-notion) either superimposed or not superimposed?<sup>32</sup>

We will show; (when explicating the 'ego') how the superimposed part (*viz.*, the insentient) is involved therein.

18. Well, in the notion—'this' (referring to one's body), the body—the aggregate of cause and effect which is the means of the enjoyment (of the agent denoted by the ego—'aham kartā') is manifest to view (*i.e.*, is seen as the object of perception); and in 'this is mine', (the body) is related to the agent as his property (*i.e.*, as a thing distinct from him). There (in consequence) nothing appears to be superimposed.

Here is the answer: When the notion of ego as agent is (admitted to be) a case of superimposition, then alone is it evident

<sup>31</sup> The aham-ego is a complex of cit and acit—sentience and insentience. Why the author regards the ego-superimposition अहङ्काराध्यास as the initiative adhyāsa, is because it is the starting point of all the kāryādhyāsas, the effect-series (V, p. 17). Though the superimposition of nescience on consciousness which is pure, integral, bliss entire, and witness of ajñāna (*i.e.*, it reveals ignorance) is beginningless, the aham-kārādhyāsa is spoken of as the beginning in the effect-series—kāryādhyāsa.

<sup>32</sup> In all cases of superimposition, two apprehensions are involved; but in the ego-concept, the opponent says, there is only one and hence superimposition is absent. The answer is that even in this concept two notions are present, the one real, the other transferred, similar to 'this' and the 'silver' in 'This is silver'.

that its auxiliary also is an erroneous notion; (when the notion of self—jīva as manifested in the 'I' is error-ridden, the body which is intended for its service is likewise an erroneous notion, *i.e.*, of like nature, when spoken of as 'this is mine'). Of one who has been crowned king in a dream, or of a king who is a creation of mighty magic,<sup>33</sup> the paraphernalia of royalty cannot have any real existence. It is thus that all worldly activities beginning with the ego-agency (I am doer, etc.), and embracing action, means and results (phala) are superimposed on ātman which is by nature eternal, pure, enlightened and free. Hence it is by such knowledge as culminates in the experience of the identity of ātman with Brahman, thus characterised, that freedom from the evil-causing adhyāsa (superimposition) results, so that the beginning of a study of the Vedānta philosophy having such (knowledge) as its content becomes appropriate.<sup>34</sup>

VIII.19. The Bhāṣya beginning with ["well, what is it that superimposition means?" (up to 'sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ') is intended to substantiate (the doctrine of) 'superimposition' (adhyāsa). In that again, what precedes the passage—'How again (can perception, etc., which are the means of right knowledge) have reference to that which is error-contaminated?'—is intended to delineate the nature of superimposition and to prove its probability (sambhāvana). Beginning with that (*viz.*, how again, etc., and ending in 'sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ') the Bhāṣya is meant for demonstrating its existence (by pramāṇa)—thus (is the Bhāṣya) to be split up (while construing).

20. [Page 6] If that be so, there is no need for a separate exposition of its definition and its probability. What cannot be defined and is improbable cannot be established by any instrument of knowledge. And when its existence is specifically assured by perceptive knowledge, there arises no need for a specific mention (of definition and probability)<sup>35</sup> (lit. indefinability and

<sup>33</sup> महेन्द्रजलनिर्मितस्य वा. Omitted in A.K.S. Edition, p. 135.

<sup>34</sup> Why the study of the Vedānta śāstra should be undertaken is stated. The knowledge one gets from such study destroys the ills of life as a result of the intuitive perception of identity.—V, p. 18.

<sup>35</sup> What the objector means is that when superimposition is proved to be a matter of experience (*cf.* नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः) questions regarding its knowability and probability do not arise at all. Hence he argues that the bhāṣya relating to the definition of superimposition

improbability cannot be predicated of what is actually given in perception).

(The objection) is thus met: It is not merely by showing (the agency in knowing), in the case of that man only who is under the conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in respect of the body and the senses, etc. (*i.e.*, of the man who confounds his self with his body and who thinks that the self possesses the senses) that its erroneous nature can be established. What is the cause of it? (*i.e.*, what is the reason of its not being possible to determine that such a conceit is due to nescience?) Ordinarily, experience of nescience is *non est* unlike that of shell-silver or double-moon. It is only when the apprehension is sublated that it becomes evident (*i.e.*, that the apprehension was erroneous); but here (in the conceit of 'I' and 'Thou') it (sublation) is not perceived. Hence the definition of adhyāsa (superimposition), having (first) been stated the nature of the notions (of 'I' and 'mine') has to be described as falling under that definition.<sup>36</sup>

21. Well, even then what is pertinent to the present context is the proof of the existence of an object illustrative of that definition and nothing more. Where the reality of a thing is not vouched for by a valid means of knowledge, there alone can doubt as to its existence arise. If it did, there would then be the necessity of a distinct statement of probability for its (doubt's) removal.<sup>37</sup>

22. True, it is even so. Though a particular object becomes manifest to knowledge (in the origination of which knowledge) no blemish of any kind is perceived even if attempted to be sought, it is within one's experience that the knowledge of that object is discredited as being improbable on the basis of a precedent

---

and its probability is purposeless. The word anubhava or experience is used to denote knowledge, other than recollection (*smṛti*), such as perception, inference, verbal testimony, etc.

<sup>36</sup> The 'I' and the 'mine' conceits no doubt point to a 'knower' but they need not on that account be erroneous notions. Hence to prove that they are erroneous we must first define what superimposition is and show that these conceits are subsumed under that definition.

<sup>37</sup> That superimposition is to be defined is admitted, but doubt is cast on the necessity of showing the probability of superimposition. What is said in answer is that it is only where there is probability that determination by definition is possible. When *prima facie* a thing is improbable, no attempt need be made to determine its nature. That adhyāsa is probable should therefore be brought home.

pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) which is of universal acceptance and of unquestioned validity; for instance, the sun-spots portending calamity, or the (phantom of) swallowing of a mansion by one expert in magic. In like manner, the superimposition on the self which is not comprehended as the object, which is void of all relation, which exhibits none of the properties which constitute the reason for superimposition and which, because of its intrinsic nature as pure intelligence, is potent to dispel even the error with which an external object is encompassed, (in such ātman, the notion of superimposition), when no defect in the sense-organs is perceived to exist, might be supposed to be unreal.<sup>38</sup>

Thus would one entertain a doubt regarding the possibility of superimposition. In order that there may be no room for such a doubt, it is essential that as distinct from the proof of the existence of superimposition, its probability also must be set forth. Now, that (*viz.*, the triad consisting of definition, probability and valid reason) will be stated (in order).

IX.23. [What is it that is meant by the term *adhyāsa* (superimposition)? asks (the opponent).] The word 'what—kim' is, as is well known, used to denote a question as well as an objection and both are possible here; hence a statement comprehending both is (*tantrēṇa*—by design) made.<sup>39</sup> And there again

<sup>38</sup> What the opponent wishes to emphasise is that the so-called superimposition as illustrated in the 'I' and 'mine' notions is no superimposition at all. Just as we perceive the spots in sun owing to some defect in our eye though they are unreal, even so the 'I' and 'mine' are regarded as erroneous notions due to some defect in the means of apprehension. The *vedāntin* however regards such notions not as *bhrama* or unreal, but as *pramā*—real in the empirical sphere. To the opponent the *adhyāsa* of *anātman*, the inert, on *ātman* does not exist. It is a case of *bhrānti*. His main point is that the ingredients necessary for *adhyāsa* are lacking. *Ātman* is not perceived as identical (*तादात्म्य*) with what is superimposed, like the shell-silver. It cannot be an object, being self-luminous. *Ātman* is relationless. The notion of superimposition is due to some defect in the perceiver, but *ātman* is free from any defect; and as such superimposition, says the opponent, is impossible. *केन चिदपि*—Superimposition presupposes that the substrate should resemble the object superimposed in its attributes and in the parts composing it; but *ātman* resembles the superimposed in neither. Hence no room for superimposition.

<sup>39</sup> *तन्त्रेण*—Tantra is a single statement with a double import. It is a technical term.—*Vide S.D., Eng. Trans. G.O.S., p. 227.*

having first stated the definition (of superimposition) in answer to the question (presuming it to be such), and again anticipating the objection to the probability of that very thing (superimposition), (the *siddhāntin*) meets it. In regard to a topic of this nature (*i.e.*, where the subject under discussion is difficult of comprehension) the writers, for the easy understanding of the learners, proceed as if a questioner were in their very presence and meet his criticism supposing that he has raised that criticism with a particular object; and again postulating an objection on the ground that he is making his own meaning explicit (*i.e.*, that he meant something else) endeavour to satisfy him. This is the method of exposition in all such contexts in the work.

24. [It (superimposition) is “the manifestation, in some other object, of that which is of the nature of recollection of what had been observed before]—thus is enunciated the definition of the term ‘superimposition’ (*adhyāsa*) found in the question (*viz.*, ‘what is it that is meant by *adhyāsa*?’). Here, when it is said ‘*paratra*’ (‘in some other object’) it becomes evident by implication that the manifestation is of something other (than the presented object). (The phrase) ‘being of the nature of recollection’ is its (manifested object—*parasya*) attribute. What is recollected—that is ‘recollection’. This construction is justified on the ground of usage, for the termination ‘*ghañ*’, etc., is sometimes used in *kāraka* which is not denotative of subject though its sense is derivative.<sup>40</sup> [Page 7]. The manifested object only resembles the object remembered (*i.e.*, the appearance, *i.e.*, *rūpa* of the superimposed object, is only similar to the appearance of the recollected object), but is not the thing (actually) recollected; and this is clear from the fact that what is presented to the sense (and not what is remembered) is (what is) manifested. That it (*adhyāsa*) resembles recollection is corroborated

---

<sup>40</sup> स्मृतिरूपः—Here the word ‘*smṛti*’ is taken in the sense of what is recollected, being its derivative meaning, स्मर्यत इति स्मृतिः. Now grammar requires that ‘*ktin*’ termination (in स्मृतिः) which is included in the ‘*ghañ*’ group should be affixed to roots to form derivatives in all cases except the nominative and only when their sense is conventional—*ruḍhi*, संज्ञायां (अकर्तरि च कारके संज्ञायाम्—Pāṇini, III. 3-19). But the word ‘*smṛti*’ is construed here against common convention and yet the termination ‘*ktin*’ is affixed. The justification is that it follows usage, प्रयोगदर्शनात्.



by the explanation that it is the manifestation of what was perceived in the past. There can be no manifestation of silver to one in direct sense-contact with the shell, who has not seen silver before.<sup>41</sup>

And since, on the strength (of this sentence—*vākya-sāmarthyāt*), it is clear that this definition is also the definition of the knowledge (*avabhāsa*) of the illusory object. (There is no need for a separate definition of illusory knowledge as apart from illusory object).<sup>42</sup>

How? (Yes), it will be answered. Of this (*i.e.*, of the illusory knowledge) the manifestation is similar to the manifestation of recollection (*i.e.*, recollective knowledge); but not recollection itself, since the knowledge of the particular object (say, silver in the mart) given in past *pramāṇa* (Perception, etc.), does not manifest itself as such (*i.e.*, as the object of past experience. If it did, the silver in illusion should have assumed the form 'that silver—*tadrajatam*', but it appears as 'this silver—*idam rajatam*'). Then how do you account for its similarity (*rūpa*) with recollection? Because it arises through having the past *pramāṇa* as its origin. The origination of the knowledge which illumines an object (*viz.*, the presented silver) with which there is no sense-contact is impossible unless that origination be through that (*i.e.*, *samskāra*) arising from the *pramāṇa* which in the past occasioned the knowledge relating to that object, *viz.*, silver.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> The persistence of past impressions—*samskāras*, is essential both for memory-recall and for illusory perception. Hence the use of the phrase—*pūrvadr̥ṣṭa*, which implies that unless past impressions are revived, neither memory nor illusion is possible. But in the case of illusion it is not the very object of past experience that manifests itself but one belonging to that *jāti*.

<sup>42</sup> The point is that in shell-silver not only is the object silver illusory, but also its knowledge; we have both *arthādhyāsa* or *viṣayādhyāsa* and *jñānādhyāsa*. The former is defined as, 'superimposition is that thing similar to the remembered thing which appears as the self of a distinct object'. The latter is defined as, 'superimposition is that cognition similar to memory'.—*Vide V.P.S.*, p. 26.

<sup>43</sup> In reality there is no contact between the eye and the silver. The eye perceives only the shell—*idam*, but owing to past impressions—*samskāras* aided by imperfect vision, silver manifests itself afresh. This is the Vedāntic doctrine of *adhyāsa*.

X.25. Some one (who is opposed to this view) says: When the eye is in contact with a particular object and the knowledge is of some other object, is that not recollection only?<sup>44</sup> But the knowledge that it is recollection—(smṛtirityanubhavaḥ) is lacking. Owing to some special affection of the sense-organs, etc., which are the means of knowledge, some particular object (say silver) is revived in memory (and not some other nacre though there is very close affinity with the 'this'). Further, owing to that affection the instrumentality (capacity) of the sense-organ to manifest the special feature of the object (*viz.*, nacreness or distinctness from silver) with which it has come into contact is destroyed. Hence, because of the failure to mark the distinction, due only to this sense-defect, between the perceived and the remembered which arise without intermission, a unitary cognition is spoken of as if arisen when actually there is none, very like the use of the expression "(I perceive) a single tree" when two trees which are at a distance (are seen).<sup>45</sup>

26. How could (one may urge) it be recollection (when there is absence of memory-reviving impressions—samskāra) in the case of a boy who has never tasted (anything) bitter, but who owing to bilious disorder feels the bitter taste in that which is sweet?

Here is the answer:—because of its (*i.e.*, of bitter) experience in some other birth. If it were not so, the fact of not having previously experienced being on a par (with what is experienced) would (naturally) lead to the question—why should not an absolutely non-existent seventh taste be felt?<sup>46</sup> Hence the bile itself

<sup>44</sup> Prabhākara, in advocating the akhyātivāda, is relying upon the law of the excluded middle; for he says that knowledge must be either recollective or anubhava which latter includes perception, inference, etc., and that there is no other kind in between these two. The idealists (particularly of the school of Śaṅkara), relying on experience, maintain that there is another variety of knowledge, *viz.*, illusory. The superimposed silver is not the recollected silver, nor is the superimposed knowledge the same as recollective knowledge.

<sup>45</sup> The akhyātivādin's point is that the non-discrimination between the perceived and the revived is the cause of pravṛtti, *i.e.*, activity as evidenced in one's going to take the silver. In a 'bhrama' situation, there are four elements—jñāna, icchā, kṛti, śabda. Prabhākara maintains that the first is always valid while the other three are false.

<sup>46</sup> Only six kinds of taste are admitted—śadrasa: pungent—कटु, sour—आम्ल, saline—लवण, bitter—तिक्त, sweet—मधुर, astringent—कषाय.

(which is the doṣa) is the cause of the inability to feel the sweet taste, of the recollection of the bitter taste, and of the obscuratation of that recollection. (How is it known that the doṣa has such potency?) The nature of the cause is ascertained from the effect. (We must infer that a doṣa causes only this and not that on the evidence of the result—kārya). Hence it must be understood that, in all cases where the cognition of something different from the one with which the sense is in contact arises, the explanation is that there has been a revival of memory and its obscuratation.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> The akhyātivāda or the doctrine of non-apprehension is criticised in the Vivaraṇa in some detail (*vide* p. 23 ff.). It has been argued that akhyāti is illusion (भ्रम) and that anyathākhyāti, anirvacanīya khyāti, etc., are untenable in an illusory context. Now the negative particle in the akhyāti must mean either negation (अभाव) or something other (अन्य) or something opposite (विरुद्ध), *vide* T.D. Jñānābhāva or absence of knowledge is negation, but illusion is admitted to be knowledge and not absence of knowledge; further in deep sleep there is total absence of knowledge and we would be obliged to extend the scope of the term 'akhyāti' to that state (अतिप्रसङ्ग). Next, if it should mean some peculiar knowledge (विलक्षण), it will then amount to cognition leading to action (व्यवहार) in relation to a false object, or cognition of several undifferentiated objects (अद्विविक्तानेकपदार्थज्ञान); the first alternative is faulty because in the case of those who have no desire to possess 'the silver' there is illusion, but since it is not the hetu to prompt action it would not be akhyāti. The second alternative also fails. The word 'undifferentiated' (अद्विविक्त) cannot mean identity, for when we use an expression 'this is silver' (इदं रजतम्) two distinct words are uttered and the objects 'idam' and 'rajatam' appear as distinct; and as such the cognition—'this is silver' will not be then cognition of things undifferentiated. Hence the definition of akhyāti fails. Again difference (भेद) may mean the object itself or its quality (धर्म); e.g., पदभेद may be either पद itself or a quality of पद. It cannot be the first, for then the cognition 'this is silver' will cease to be a case of akhyāti; for the 'bheda' say, of silver, is perceived along with the object, *viz.*, 'idam'.

Now the third alternative, *viz.*, that akhyāti means 'what is opposed to khyāti (विरुद्ध), is combated (*vide* T.D.). The cognition of cloth is opposed to the cognition of pot and one may arise after the other, but that is not regarded as akhyāti though one cognition is opposed to the other. Again the antecedent negation of cognition (ज्ञानप्रागभाव) being the opposite of cognition would fall under akhyāti,

XI. 27. *Siddhāntin*: But it may be asked—what is it that is meant by ‘smaraṇābhimāna’?<sup>48</sup> It is not, however, presentation (*i.e.*, perception, say, of silver) as associated with (the past) knowledge (jñānānuvidhatayā).<sup>49</sup> It cannot be that past experience (because it is past), will, as the attribute of what is presented (silver), become the object (viṣaya) of recollection (smṛti).

but it is not. How could it be asserted that there is akhyāti when there is total absence of jñāna?

The Vivaraṇa further points out that on the view that the cognition of several objects as undifferentiated constitutes akhyāti, even right cognition would acquire the character of illusion. ‘Spotted cow’ (खण्डो गौः) would be illusory cognition while it is not; here jāti and vyakti appear as non-distinct.

<sup>48</sup> T.D.: Does ‘Smaraṇābhimāna’ mean (a) recollective cognition, (b) cognition different from it, or (c) both? It cannot be (a) for when that is obscured, recollection itself would disappear; it cannot be (b) for if a different cognition is obscured, why should the distinctive character of the recollected and the presented object be obscured? Recollection will then point to the distinction between इदम् ‘this’ and रजतम् ‘silver’; (c) it is not for it admits of no possibility. The term ‘स्मृतिप्रमोष’ does not precisely connote what is meant. If it is literally understood it should mean lack of memory. What is however meant is not the denial of memory, but the lack of the knowledge that it is memory. Hence स्मरणाभिमानस्य प्रमोषः is used here for the usual स्मृतिप्रमोषः.

<sup>49</sup> न तावत्, etc. Smaraṇābhimāna may mean (a) some property belonging to the recollected object, cf. स घटः where सः indicates the relation of past experience, locality, or time; or (b) the cognition in the form स्मरामि, *i.e.*, स्मरणत्वेन अभिमानः and this property is found in the recollective cognition. Now (a) fails in the illusory cognition of ‘this is that Devadatta’, *i.e.*, when by mistake one might think that he is perceiving Devadatta whom in fact he had met before. For here is स्मरणाभिमान and not its obscuration. Hence it would not be अख्याति. This is an additional example given in the V. The PP. urges that the relation of past experience with the remembered object is absent altogether. For even in the past experience what forms the object is only the pot (in ‘this is pot’) and not itself (experience) as conjoined with the ‘pot’. No doubt in the view of Prabhākara, the advocate of अख्यातिवाद, at the very time of anubhava, cognition along with the object (say, pot) manifests itself (for he maintains त्रिपुटी), but the objection against it is that the same cognition cannot both be subject and object,

Hence memory manifests the object pure and simple and not as associated with the (past) knowledge.<sup>50</sup>

In like manner, in the recall of meanings from words, the association of (past) cognition is not perceived, for then cognition also would be regarded as word-meaning (*i.e.*, a word instead of denoting an object would also denote knowledge which on the face of it is absurd).<sup>51</sup>

Likewise the recollection having a desired spot as its content takes the form 'that is to be resorted to;' and that recollection compasses only what was presented (*viz.*, the pleasant object of

<sup>50</sup> The akhyātivādin again urges that the remembered object—घटः is evidently associated with the recollection—'the pot that was cognised' (ज्ञातो घटः) and as such it could not be said that the recollected object is devoid of association with past experience. The answer is that the recollection taking the form 'ज्ञातो घटः' does arise, but that does not mean that the recollected object is associated with past experience. For the recollection 'ज्ञातो घटः' is inferential cognition derived from *prākāṭya* arising in the object when first perceived. The recollection associated with past cognition is therefore distinct, having arisen from impressions caused by *anumiti* which again is derived from *prākāṭya-liṅga*. (This argument is taken from the *Bhāṭṭa* armoury.)

<sup>51</sup> तथा च पदार्थस्मृतौ,—A question may be raised here—why should the recollection of meanings only and not meanings in conjunction with past cognition arise from words? Is it not that words are used in order that they may denote the sense of the sentence as a whole? And even when meanings are cognised why should they be admitted as recollective? The *Vivaraṇa* answers thus:—No doubt words are used in order that they may subserve the construing of the sentence. Still as they are uttered successively and not all at once, their individual meanings are inevitably recalled, which in combination signify the import of the sentence of which they form part.

Those who maintain that the meanings of words cohere to bring out the import of a proposition (*vākya*) are known as 'Abhihitānvaya-vādins'. The *Bhāṭṭa* school of *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Advaitins* of the *Bhāmati* persuasion belong to this section. Those who maintain that words only in association with other congruent words bring out the import of a proposition are called 'Anvitābhidhānavādins'. This is the *Vivaraṇa* view; while the *Prābhākaras* though advocating *Anvitābhidhānavāda* insist on *kriyānvita*, action-associated—*cf.* *Varaṇaka IX*. For a detailed account of these views *vide Sāstradīpikā*, *Tarkapāda*, G.O.S.

previous knowledge) and it makes no reference to the past cognition (anubhavajñāna).

28. [Page 8] And as a matter of fact, nearly all recollections do occur without any cognitive reference. Nor is (recollective) cognition seen to possess in itself a special form that may be regarded as smaraṇābhimāna. Indeed cognition which is ever an object of inference (as *e.g.*, according to the Bhāṭṭas) is not in itself seen to be associated with any special form like any other object<sup>52</sup> (whose existence is always to be inferred; *e.g.*, virtue, Dharma or ākāśa). Therefore it is said—"We *infer* 'jñāna' which is indeed devoid of form". The word 'anākāra' means that which is of indefinable form or has no particularity of its own (svalakṣaṇa). Hence the quality of smaraṇābhimāna (smaraṇābhimānadharma) is not perceived in itself (*i.e.*, in recollective cognition) distinct (from the) object (of anubhava).

29. Nor can smaraṇābhimāna be inferred from some object of cognition serving as its probans (līṅga), because recollection gives us neither more nor less than what the (past) pramāṇa (say, perception) actually did convey. Nor does any distinct (specific) phala (not given in cognition, say, fetching a pot, or avoiding a road—hānopādāna) serve as the mark (līṅga, of smaraṇābhimāna) since the phala is (always) limited to the object of (the past) pramāṇa (see *T.D.*).

30. No doubt in some cases and on certain occasions the cognitive relation as expressed in 'I remember' with the recollection of a past experienced object, does arise, and that relation is the result of the apprehension of the phrase denotative of recollection; it is like relating the perceptive cognition of the form 'cow' with 'an animal having a dew-lap' (caused by the apprehension of the word 'cow'). Hence, (*i.e.*, there being no smaraṇābhimāna), revival consists only in the manifestation of the object as brought to mind through impressions left by the past pramāṇa (*i.e.*, by previous experience). And neither cognitively nor existentially is there any additional element, whose obscuration, through some defect, could have been supposed. Moreover, here (in the case of shell-silver) is no manifestation of an object of a past pramāṇa (perception, etc.), because it is the manifestation of an object that is actually present before one's eye—this point has already been noticed. Hence, the cognition of some-

<sup>52</sup> 'वा' शब्दः इवार्थः, *T.D.*, *vide S.B.*, p. 35.



thing (silver) when the contact (of the eye) is with something other (shell) is not to be classed under memory; but it is illusion.

XII.31. If that is so, it would be abnormal: the knowledge is of silver, but its substrate is shell. This view appeals to none who set any value by experience.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup> The akhyātivādin observes that if his view, viz., the silver of recollection and the presented object are distinct, is not accepted, it means that the silver manifests itself as being identical with the presented object. Then these questions have to be answered—(1) Is it that the silver elsewhere remaining, manifests itself here? or (2) Is the manifested silver but a transformation of the internal consciousness? or (3) Is the silver in question inexplicable? Again, as regards (1) it has to be asked:

- (i) is the distant silver perceived by the eye, or
- (ii) by something else?

It cannot be (i) for there is no contact between the sense of sight and the object in a different locality; it cannot be (ii) for unaided by the senses the mind does not travel outside.

*Anyathākhyātivādin*: We maintain that the eye through supernatural relation has the capacity to perceive even an object that is out of its purview.

*Akhyātivādin*: In that case the cognition should be only of 'the silver in a different region', देशान्तररूप्यम् and not the silver here—अत्र रूप्यम्.

*Anyathākhyātivādin*: No; the eye, due to the defect (doṣa), is competent to perceive the distant silver as identical with the shell.

*Akhyātivādin*: Then the defect helps the eye to perceive something that has not been within one's experience.

*Anyathākhyātivādin*: No, the mental impression of the previously cognised object, viz., silver, is also necessary.

*Akhyātivādin*: Then why not everything of past experience be perceived and why 'silver' in special?

*Anyathākhyātivādin*: For memory-revival, similarity, di similarity, etc., are also the necessary elements.

*Akhyātivādin*: What do you mean by anyathākhyāti? (i) Is it that the manifestation is of one object and the substrate (ground) is of another? or (ii) Does one thing manifest itself as another? or (iii) Does the cognition relate to an object that has transformed itself into another (the shell changing its nature to silver)? It cannot be the first for it is opposed to experience. (Note the PP. text नन्वेवं सति on page 8.) Moreover, the silver-cognition must have only silver as its ground (ālambana) and not shell,



(Anyathākhyātivādin): Well, even where the shell appears in its real nature (*i.e.*, shell as shell), the ālambanatva (ground) means only fitness for (initiating) activity promoted by the apprehension (samvit). The same (shell) here (*i.e.*, in 'shell-silver' apprehension) manifests itself as being fit for activity in relation to silver. Hence why should it not serve as the ground? (The substratum is the same in both cases.)

32. (*Akhyātivādin*): Is the manifestation of the shell as of the form of that (*viz.*, silver) absolutely true or not? If absolutely true, there should be no sublation of the form—'This is not silver' just as (the notion) 'this is not shell' (does not arise when we perceive a real shell). But there is the sublation. Hence this view is unsupported by any valid reason.<sup>54</sup>

33. If it be argued that the appearance of silver caused by some ocular defect is but the shell so transformed, even that (argument) is jejune. When milk changes into curds, sublation in the form 'this is not curds' does not occur; nor is there the notion, 'this is milk'. But here both these are perceived (*viz.*, 'this is not silver', 'this is shell'). Again if the shell has

*Anyathākhyātivādin*: Since manifestation and ground are different this doubt need not be entertained.

*Akhyātivādin*: Then what does ālambanatva mean? (i) Is it a transference of form? or (ii) Is it something relating to activity consequent on apprehension? or (iii) Is it dependence on atisāya produced by apprehension? Not the (i), the shell cannot transfer its own form to the silver; not the (ii): when we come across a serpent, activity in the form of taking up a cudgel ensues, but that activity is not the ground of the serpent-cognition. (This answer is supplied in the Vivaraṇa; the PP. merely raises the question with the words ननु शुक्तेः स्वरूपेणापि अवभासने, etc., p. 8); not the (iii), for we should cease to have the cognition of absent objects. This criticism applies to the prākāṣya theory of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. According to them it is the prākāṣya or the jñātātā that serves as the hetu for the cognition. This jñātātā arises only in the case of the presented object.

<sup>54</sup> The second alternative—that it is not absolutely true though stated, is not discussed in PP. The Vivaraṇa makes the point clear. If the manifestation is not real, then the relation between the 'this' and the 'silver' must be false; but then there could be no manifestation of what does not exist. Even the cognition—'spotted cow' would be a case of illusion since the Naiyāyikas admit no relation of any kind between the class and the particular—jāti and vyakti,

transformed itself into silver just as milk into curds, then even after the disappearance of (ocular or other) defect, it should remain as such only (*i.e.*, unchanged).

34. (*Anyathākhyātivādin*): Well, is it not seen that the lotus-bud changes into the blossom and remains as such so long as its cause—the light of the sun, remains and with its disappearance returns to the state of the bud? The same may happen here.

(*Akhyātivādin*): [Page 9] No (this cannot be accepted). If it were so, just as in the case of the other (*viz.*, the resumption of the bud form), let the after-cognition arise in the form ' (the shell which hitherto was silver) has resumed its former state' and let there be no notion of the sublation (of silver).

35. (*Ātmakhyātivādin*): It may again be thought that the (illusory) silver is the product of the apprehension (*pratīti*) begotten of some vitiated cause.<sup>55</sup> Even that does not stand to reason. How? (It may be asked.) Whatever cognition (*pratīti*) it be from which that (the silver manifestation) arises, that cognition anyhow will not have that (silver) as its object, because of the difference in time, owing to the cognition being prior and

---

<sup>55</sup> The *vijñānavādin* who upholds the doctrine of *Ātmakhyāti* avers that the silver manifesting in the shell has no external existence, but is a form of *vijñāna* or inner consciousness. He may, however, be asked whether consciousness appearing as silver is due to its very nature (*svābhāvika*) or caused by something else. It cannot be the former for in his view there is no other entity but *vijñāna*, and this excludes the possibility of the latter. But the *ātmakhyātivādin* defends his position by asserting that the silver-cognition is an infinite series and that itself or the precedent cognition is the *samskāra* which gives rise at some time or other to a particular silver-cognition so that the silver being only a form of consciousness appears as though existing outside. The *Akhyātivādin* rejoins—is that silver, which is no more than consciousness manifesting itself as silver, a product? If so, is it produced from itself or from another? Not the first alternative for the same thing would be both the producer and the product; not the second alternative, for it must either be from an object or from another *jñāna*. That it is a product of an object is vetoed on the ground that objective existence is altogether derived in *vijñānavāda*. It must then have been generated from another *jñāna*. The PP. takes up this question with the words अथ पुनः दुष्टकारणजन्याः, etc. For further elucidation of *ātmakhyāti*—*vide VPS.*, p. 34 and *SD.*, p. XV.

the other (silver-manifestation) subsequent. It cannot be maintained that the silver-manifestation is due to some other cognition (*i.e.*, not the one generated by defective cause) for then the (right cognition of some other person also would manifest this (error-contaminated) silver.

36. How could it be argued that the cognition of another person also would have that (*i.e.*, the silver as its object)? It is in fact the cognition resulting from vitiated causes only that has that (the silver) as its object (and not the right cognition—*samīcīnaññāna*).

*Akhyātivādin*: Not so. Even a separate cognition, if it is of the same character (*i.e.*, generated by *duṣṭakaraṇa*), has its function fulfilled in creating a distinct 'silver (manifestation)' just like the first cognition (*i.e.*, it cannot have the silver in question as its object). Hence (it all comes to this that) the silver is as good as not having come into existence. As such what is left (*i.e.*, the right conclusion) is (that the illusory knowledge is caused by) the obscuration of memory.

XIII.37. *Objection*: Has it not been said that obscuration of memory cannot occur? (The *Akhyātivādin* is reminded by *Anyathākhyātivādin*). This is also what the followers of other schools of thought aver. 'Memory is that which recalls the object of past experience and is free from the obscuration (of the cognition that it was an object of past experience)'.<sup>56</sup>

*Akhyātivādin*: Then what is the solution of the manifestation of silver when the sense-contact is (only) with the shell?<sup>57</sup>

38. *Anīrvacanīyakhyātivādin*: This is the solution—It is not that the memory, caused by the mental impressions (*samskāra*) and divested of the knowledge that it is memory (*smaraṇābhimānaśūnya*), arises distinct from the cognition arising from sense-contact (*viz.*, of the 'this'). On the contrary it is a unit cognition only, (arising) from the sense allied with the mental impressions.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Pātañjala Yoga Sūtra*, I. i-ii. It cannot be said that it is memory and at the same time obscured.

<sup>57</sup> Which are the ingredients (सामग्री) in the production of shell-silver? The answer is that the impression left on the mind by the past experience of silver, together with the vitiated sense, constitutes the instrument. The sense-aberration not only revives the past impression but it is the cause of the illusory silver also.

*Akhyātivādin*: How could it be so?

*Anirvaṇānīyākhyātivādin*: Well, thus it is: the vitiated cause having inhibited its (sense) potency to produce the proper result (i.e., to give rise to correct knowledge) revives at the same time the particular mental impression (causing illusory apprehension). It is from the effect that the potency of the vitiated cause is inferred. Hence the impression as associated with the vitiated cause is the single instrument. And that produces a single cognition and a single phala (practical end).<sup>58</sup>

39. And of that cognition which has arisen through the instrumentality of the particular impression revived by some perverted cause, the erroneous silver-in-the-shell manifests itself

<sup>58</sup> *Akhyātivādin*: The sense-contact is with the 'this' so that a single cognition relating to the 'this' alone should arise and not that relating to the 'silver'. We know the sense cannot establish its contact either with unreal silver or silver out of its ken. In your doctrine (referring to the *anirvaṇānīyākhyāti*) the silver-cognition is not due to the force of impression, for you admit only *similarity* to memory (स्मृतिसदृश) and not memory itself; nor is doṣa competent to bring about any result of its own accord. Again the explanation offered by the *anyathākhyātivādin* also is void, for if it be held that the 'silver-in-the-mart' is seen here, it may be questioned, why not the intervening objects also manifest themselves in the presented object?

*Anirvaṇānīyākhyātivādin*: The correct explanation is what follows: first, from the contact of the vitiated sight with the object in one's vicinity arises the cognition of the 'this' only; then does avidyā pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the 'this' stirs itself into being; lastly this avidyā ministered to by the mental impression revived by similarity, desire, etc., transforms itself into the 'silver' (arthādhyāsa). Likewise avidyā pertaining to consciousness mirrored in the vṛtti (mental mode) appearing as the 'this' transforms itself into the 'silver-cognition' (jñānādhyāsa).

*Akhyātivādin*: Well, since the mental modes, viz., that relating to the 'this' and that relating to the 'silver' are distinct, the consciousness as limited by the one must be different from the one limited by the other. There can therefore be no single consciousness.

*Anirvaṇānīyākhyātivādin*: No, it is a unit consciousness—एकं ज्ञानं. It means this:—though there is difference between the mental modes, as the real (this) and the unreal (silver) are undifferentiated (अन्योन्यात्मकतया एकत्वापत्तेः), the consciousness delimited by these modes is one only, and as the two cognitions are identical, the mental modes also of which the one is real and the other is not, are imagined to be single.

as the appropriate object (ālambana). Hence that cognition which has something unreal as its object is unreal cognition, for unreality cannot be attributed to cognition as such, since its sublation does not take place.

40. (*Akhyātivādin*): How is it pertinent (it may be questioned) that a single cognition is produced by ingredients which serve as the cause of disparate cognitions? There is nothing wrong. It is well known that the apprehension of the probans and the mental impression (of the concomitance between the probans and the probandum—*vyāpti*) conjointly produce the inference. Recognition also arises from sense (contact) and mental impression (*samskāra*). In both cases (inference and recognition) there is only a single valid cognition having intimate relation with memory.<sup>59</sup> For without the revival of the impressions it is impossible that it (*i.e.*, either inference or recognition) could arise. Hence it must be said that it is only the perception of the probans that, having recalled the impression of *vyāpti-jñāna* (*i.e.*, the *samskāra* left by the former experience of the concomitance between the probans and probandum) generates in association with it, the inferential cognition.

41. [Page 10] The same reasoning holds good even as regards recognition. And there is no valid means by which to prove (here) the (origination of) two cognitions, (*viz.*, recollection and perception). Even so is to be exemplified the unit cognition of a portrait drawn from (a variety of colours) like blue, (red, green, etc.) which serve as causes of separate cognitions. There is this difference however: cognitions of the nature of inference, recognition and cognition of complex colours (*i.e.*, a portrait) manifest themselves as being true to reality (*vyāvahārika*) because they have originated from non-vitiated causes.

42. Here (in the case of 'shell-silver', 'rope-serpent', etc.), owing to vitiated causes, the cognitions are not true to reality.

<sup>59</sup> स्मृतिगर्भ—Coming under the category of memory partly. This phrase is used to point out that mental impressions which are the special ingredients in memory-revival are also found to operate both in inference and recognition. In 'the hill is fiery—पर्वतो वह्निमान्', we have memory-revival in regard to fire—वह्नि and perception in regard to hill—पर्वत. Again in 'this is that Devadatta', सोऽयं देवदत्तः, we have memory-revival in regard to तत्त्वांश, and perception in regard to Devadatta. But they are not distinct cognitions.

Hence (in the light of what has been said) since the manifested silver is the object of cognition (illusory), there is no going counter to experience.<sup>60</sup> Hence the 'silver' is the product (*i.e.*, transformation) of māyā.<sup>61</sup> Were it real it would have been apprehended by all, since the real silver (relatively pāramārthika) does

<sup>60</sup> नानुभवविरोधः—The doctrine of illusory cognition as expounded here does not offend experience. According to the Akhyātivādins, two cognitions are posited—perceptive and recollective (silver). If the cognition of 'silver' is recollective, its experience as presented becomes inexplicable. According to the Anyathākhyātivādins, the relation between the 'this' and the 'silver-in-the-shop' is false, but this is against experience since in the perception of silver on the spot the relation is actual. According to the ātmakhyātivādins of the Yogācāra school, it is not possible to account for the external manifestation of silver when it is but a transformation of internal consciousness.

*Objection:* Well; how, on your (referring to the siddhāntin) own theory either, can you avoid inconsistency when it is argued that the false silver appears as real?

*Answer:* Though the 'silver' is distinct from the real silver, it is related to the reality of the shell; as such we perceive the 'shell-silver'. Hence the experience 'इदं रजतं' is not contradicted.

*Objection:* Well; is that relation of 'sattā', real or unreal or both? It cannot be the first for then it cannot be negated, nor the second, for it is against experience, nor the third, for no experience of a thing that is both real and unreal is possible.

*Answer:* Your objection is not valid. We admit three grades of reality: the ultimate (पारमार्थिक) reality of Brahman, the empirical (व्यावहारिक) reality of the world of space, time and cause, and the illusory (प्रातिभासिक) reality of the shell-silver variety. Now in the case of the 'shell-silver', what is conceded is not that the reality inherent in the shell manifests itself as related to silver; but we admit that the illusory reality existing in it only does appear. It is on the basis of this kind of reality that the notion 'sadjatam'—'here is the silver' arises.

*Objection:* But then when you admit illusory reality, why do you characterise it as anirvacanīya—inexplicable?

*Answer:* As contrasted with the pre-eminent reality of Brahman, the reality assigned to the sensible world and illusion is inexplicable since neither existence nor non-existence can be attributed to either.

<sup>61</sup> अतः—Because of the unsatisfactory character of the explanations offered by other systems. In the akhyāti doctrine, we have to premise two cognitions, memory as regards the silver-cognition and



not presuppose a vitiated cause in the origination of its cognition. If it (real silver) did require (the aberration) in the origination of its cognition, then where it is absent there its cognition will not arise, as when the light is absent, the form (of a thing) is not perceived.

43. If on the contrary (the shell-silver is admitted to be) the product of *māyā*, it would be right to conclude that only those whose knowledge-giving senses have been rendered morbid, perceive (the illusory silver), very like the person whose sight has been assailed by incantations, etc. Moreover sublation also

non-presentation; obscuration of the fact that it is memory and its cause, viz., non-discrimination and as a result, activity in relation to the object perceived, and the experience of past births in special cases.

In the *anyathākhyāti* doctrine, we have to presume the existence elsewhere of an object apprehended on the spot, the competency of the senses to grasp things existing elsewhere beyond their ken, extraordinary potency to aberrations, and perceptibility of a relation that is false, viz., that between the 'this' and the 'silver'.

In the *ātmakhyāti* doctrine, we have to presume the internality of that which manifests itself as out there, the sublation of the 'this' which experience points to as really existing, and the non-sublation of 'silver' which really suffers sublation.

मायामयं रजतम्—The silver in the shell-silver is verily the product of *māyā*; it is *anirvacanīya* or inexplicable. *Anirvacanīya* and *māyā-maya* convey the same sense; otherwise it would be illogical to conclude that the 'shell-silver' is the product of *māyā*, having set out with the object of proving that it is *anirvacanīya*.

A question of some importance is raised here. Can we equate *māyā* with *avidyā*? Some hold the view that the two are different. *Māyā* is dependent on the agent and as such cannot delude him whereas *avidyā* deludes the person wilfully. They, therefore, urge that the shell-silver cognition is the product of *avidyā* and not of *māyā* as stated in the PP. This view is contradicted on the ground that the definition of the one identical with that of the other. The note of inexplicability is common to both, as well as the potency to obscure reality and project the unreal. Further, these words are used as of identical import in the Scriptures and in later authoritative works, *vide V*, p. 31, beginning with—अविद्यामयमिति वक्तव्यम्; न मायामयमिति. Where however *vikṣepa* (or manifestation of a thing as other than itself) is emphasised, the term *māyā* is used; but where the potency to conceal reality is emphasised, the term *avidyā* is used (*vide SLS*, p. 56).



which takes the form 'this is not silver' points to its being only the product of māyā. How? (it may be asked). It is indeed from that (*i.e.*, the cognition of sublation) that its (shell-silver) māyā-origin is brought to mind preceded by the negation of its (silver) very essence.<sup>62</sup> Witness the nature of the cognition that arises after sublation, *viz.*, 'this is not silver; what manifested itself was false only'.<sup>63</sup> And such cognition would be inappropriate if (the shell-silver) is admitted to exist in its real nature in some form (as the mart-silver) such as it would be (inappropriate) to negate the shell with which the sense is in contact and (as it would be inappropriate to negate) cognition where its object is regarded as a nullity, (the Buddhist idealists admit jñāna alone as real, but regard its content as *non est*).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> In addition to the evidence of arthāpatti pramāṇa by which it was shown that the illusoriness of the 'shell-silver' could be accounted for in no other way than by ascribing the māyā-origin to it, perceptive evidence is here adduced in its support. In the negative cognition 'this is not silver', māyā-mayatva is perceptive for the silver manifests itself in the substratum (the 'this') as the counter-correlate of abhāva (negation). Where the silver manifests itself but does not actually exist it must be the off-spring of māyā.

निरुपाख्यतापादनपूर्वकम्—The sublating knowledge removes, to begin with, the notion of the silver in the substratum, *viz.*, the shell, and such removal must lead to the conclusion that the apprehended silver was the product of nescience. 'How?' it may be asked. The definition of māyā or mithyātva is nothing other than the counter-correlatedness of negation in a known substratum. Here the shell is the known substratum; the negation of silver is revealed in it by the sublating cognition, नेदं रजतम् and the silver is the counter-correlate of the negation, अभावः.

<sup>63</sup> नेदं रजतम्, मिथ्यैवाभासिष्ठ—should be taken as a separate sentence. The sublation is expressed in the words 'नेदं रजतम्'. The use of the word मिथ्यैव immediately following is to emphasise that erroneousness.

<sup>64</sup> After sublation, the awakened consciousness takes the form 'what I saw was not silver, but was only a product of māyā'; but it should not be so to the Naiyāyika who, maintaining anyathākhyāti, has to say 'this is not silver', but, it is 'that silver' referring to what exists in the shop; as also to the Buddhist Vijñānavādin who has to say "the external 'this' in which the silver appears is a false substratum; the silver is only a form of internal consciousness"; and so on. But common experience is otherwise and expresses itself thus—"this is not silver, it is magic, it is neither here, nor there". The sublation

XIV. 44. Well, is not this definition (fallacious inasmuch as it is) of partial applicability (navyāpakam) since (illusions of) dream, sorrow, etc., cannot come within its scope?<sup>65</sup> In one's

would be quite otherwise on the theory of error held either by the Naiyāyikas or by the Vijnānavādins.

A question pertinent to the present topic is, 'what is sublation (bādha)?' It may mean (i) the turning away of one from an object when in reality one is seeking another (say, silver) or (ii) the destruction of its (false object) *capacity* to provoke action; or (iii) the discrimination of what was not previously discriminated; or (iv) cognition of mutual negation, *i.e.*, cognition that this is not the 'silver' and *vice versa*; or (v) the cognition in the known-substratum (say the shell) that the silver is the counter-correlate of the negation; or (vi) eradication of ignorance (ajñāna). The first five are objections; the sixth is the siddhānta. (i) is untenable; in the case of an ascetic there is no action and hence no dissuasion from it though he too gets the knowledge of the non-existence of the silver. (ii) is untenable, for the bādha, when once it arises, does not guarantee the disappearance of illusion for all time; the shell-silver cognition may arise more than once. (iii) is also untenable, for what was first observed as one undifferentiated object, like a heap of clothes, may be subsequently differentiated as white, red, etc., but there is no bādha here though discriminative knowledge arises. (iv) is unsound. Whiteness which appears as pot in 'the pot is white' is again spoken of as "quality and not as substance", *e.g.*, घटस्य शैक्ल्यं न द्रव्यम्. But there is no bādha here. (v) again does not stand. If it be argued that sublation (bhāva) means the cognition of the counter-correlatedness of the abhāva (*i.e.*, cognition of the absence of the silver in the 'this') in the presented substratum, the question will be whether the sublation is of the knowledge (jñāna) of silver or of the silver (jñeya). The first alternative does not stand, because one cognition does not require another for its elimination, since cognitions are momentary; the second also is untenable because the viśaya (silver) is not effaced by either its own cognition or by that of the 'shell'.

The rejoinder for the criticisms thus advanced is that sublation stands on a different basis altogether. Sublation is the eradication for all time of ignorance (ajñāna) together with its effects (*cf.* V., p. 33, and V.P.S., pp. 38-39).

<sup>65</sup> ननु न व्यापकमिदं लक्षणम्—The anirvacanīyākhyāti's opponent argues thus: One characteristic of illusion—adhyāsa, is that it is the outcome of three factors: sense-contact, defective vision and revived impressions. This is the indirect or indicative definition (taṣṭhalakṣaṇa) of

experience of dream, sorrow, etc., there is no sense-contact with anything (*i.e.*, some substratum) by which one object could be regarded as manifesting itself in another. Hence there being no cause other than the mental traces we must conclude (that the dream-experiences, etc.), are outright memory-pictures and not memory-like (*smṛtirūpa*).

This will be said (in answer) here—It is not in reality of the nature of recollection, for the manifestation is of a presented object.

Nor is it memory-like either (says the opponent), since the cognition has arisen only through the mental-impressions left by a past valid means of knowledge (say, perception).

45. Here we reply thus:<sup>66</sup> It has been stated that what constitutes recollection is the mere manifestation of the object

---

*adhyāsa* or illusion. Another characteristic is that it is the manifestation of one thing as another (*cf.* अतस्मिन् तद्बुद्धिः—*Bhāṣya*). This is the direct definition (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*, *i.e.*, of the very essence) of *adhyāsa*. In dream-illusion, as the senses are quiescent, there can be no sense-contact so that the first definition fails. The absence of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) rules out the second definition; if *ātman* is construed as *adhiṣṭhāna*, the dream-experience of say 'elephant' should take the form 'I am elephant', and everything other than *ātman* comes under the category of superimposition and so it cannot serve as the substratum. Hence he concludes that dream-objects as arising from past impressions must be classed as recollective.

<sup>66</sup> The *Siddhāntin* proceeds thus: It is evident that the dream-cognition is neither memory nor perception. All disputants have to admit that it is a unique experience. Hence we call it *adhyāsa* or superimposition. Here the causes essential for its origination do exist and they are the cognition of the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the blurring effect of sleep (*doṣa*), and the mental traces (*vāsanā*). The sense-contact is not indispensable. It is the cognition of *adhiṣṭhāna* with *doṣa* and *samskāra*, whose offspring the dream is. Here the *adhiṣṭhāna* is the *caitanya* (consciousness) delimited by egoity (*ahamkāra*) or the non-delimited *caitanya*. The PP. supports the latter view. And because it is self-luminous, it does not need the senses for its illumination.

Hence the requirements of both the definitions (*viz.*, *taṣastha* and *svarūpalakṣaṇa*) are satisfied. It is *avidyā* that constitutes the evolutionary cause of dream-objects and their cognition; and because *caitanya* is the substratum of that *avidyā*, it (*i.e.*, *caitanya*) is the *vivar-topādānakāraṇa* (for it manifests itself as the dream-spectacle). Even

of a past valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). And here the mind disturbed by sleep (which in itself is a doṣa) and in association with such impressions as are revived by one's adṛṣṭa (unseen principle) etc., gives rise to a cognition which has something unreal for its object.

And of this cognition, the potency of avidyā resident in the immediate consciousness delimited by the inner sense (tadavacchinna) evolves into (vivartate) its content (*viz.*, the illusory object, say—elephant).

46. Well, in that case the appearance of the dream-object would be internal only (antaḥ).

Whoever says that it is not internal?

But is it not one's experience that the locus of dream-objects is distinct (from and outside the subject) as in the waking state? And that (experience) if its locus is internal, cannot account for the dream-object.<sup>67</sup>

Well, the space also (where the dream-object appears—prthaktvābhabhāsa) is like it (*i.e.*, internal only); how then could relation with such space make (the object) appear outside? Then this also is an additional blemish. (If internal, the cognition would take the form—aham deśaḥ).

47. No, there is no blemish. [Page 11] Even in the waking state by no valid means of knowledge could it (in reality) be proved that the internal consciousness (caitanya) is different from the external consciousness (in other words there is no difference between internal consciousness and object-consciousness); for the manifestation (in both) is identical. Hence an object even in the waking state is perceived as intimately associated with the internal consciousness (*i.e.*, the inner witness); otherwise the manifestation of the insentient (object-world) would be unintelligible.<sup>68</sup> For instance a pot shrouded in

---

in the waking state, mere 'shell' is not the adhiṣṭhāna in shell-silver-cognition, but it is the caitanya delimited by the 'shell'. Adṛṣṭa or unseen potency accounts for the dream being private.

<sup>67</sup> The dream-object is out there and therefore to say that it is internal is indefensible.

<sup>68</sup> अन्यथा, etc.—If the intimate relation with the pure unconditioned consciousness is not admitted, the world would remain a blank. Consciousness delimited by the ego is internal and so cannot discover the outside world, nor the object-limited consciousness, for if it were

darkness does not become visible except in contact with the light of a lamp—so here.

48. As for the appearance of objectivity (of objects in dreams) as distinct (from the ego) even in the waking state, it must be (regarded as but) the display of *māyā*.<sup>69</sup> Because the whole of the universe stands on the single basis of consciousness and because that consciousness is void of parts and as such there could be no distinction of space (as internal and external loci), it is the world-diversity (and that is *anādi*) which superimposes limitations on that (*viz.*, the *cit*, the one reality), which then manifests itself as if conditioned, as if external, as if internal. Or 'diś' (quarter) and *ākāśa* (space) which the mind alone can apprehend, do serve as the substratum of superimposition everywhere (in dream and waking) and as such (the insertion of) 'paratra—elsewhere' (in the definition of *adhyāsa*, *viz.*, *paratra parāvabhāsaḥ*) is unexceptionable.<sup>70</sup>

XV. 49. Then how is the superimposition of Brahman on names, etc., to be accounted for?<sup>71</sup>

distinct from the internal consciousness, the experience 'that the pot is perceived by me' would be untenable. All knowledge is for the self: the cognition arises as 'the pot is seen by me'. Hence both in dream and waking it is the *sākṣicaitanya*—the inner witness, that is the substratum of all cognitions.

<sup>69</sup> मायाविजृम्भितः—How, it may be asked, if all objects have the same consciousness—substratum, could the dream cognitions which take both the forms as 'I am king' and 'this is a mansion' be explained. The explanation is to be sought in the manner in which the dormant mental impressions are revived. That we should have the experience—अहं मनुष्यः as also अयं गजः is to be attributed to the *samskāras* which repeat themselves so that when once the form of a cognition is determined it appears again and again unchanged.

<sup>70</sup> As a matter of fact, though the mind is capable of grasping 'diś' and 'ākāśa' in dreams, it cannot without the agency of the senses grasp either of these in the external world so that these cannot serve as the substratum of superimposition. Hence this alternative suggested in the text is only by way of concession—अङ्गीकरणवादः. V, p.35. All space is internally perceived, for mind cannot comprehend anything outside without the aid of the external senses—परतन्त्रे बहिर्मेनः.

<sup>71</sup> नामब्रह्मेत्युपासीत—Meditate on names as Brahman—*cf. Chānd. Up.*, VII. i. 5. So far the objection that the definition of superimposition is non-pervasive—अव्याप्ति has been met. Now the opponent urges

What is it that is meant here by 'how' (katham, *i.e.*, by what reason has superimposition been denied here) ?

There (in the superimposition of Brahman on names) neither a defective cause nor even the manifestation of an illusory object is perceived. (Hence this is no case of superimposition.)

It is true.<sup>72</sup> Therefore only, since it is undertaken voluntarily on the authority of an injunction, this (the superimposition of Brahman on names) is (to be regarded as) a mental act and it is not cognition (jñāna). Knowledge generated by a defective cause has indeed for its object one that is erroneous. By one's will it is not possible either to create knowledge or negate it; because it (cognition) is dependent solely on definite causes, there is no just scope for will.

50. Is it not an observed fact that recollective knowledge is generated by one's will (ābhoga = icchā—T.D.) and suppressed also by inhibiting the mind ?

Yes, it is so; but they (*i.e.*, will and inhibition) are inoperative in originating or suppressing (recollective knowledge); they however either stimulate or obstruct the causes (which generate recollective knowledge) as witness the cognitive function which is limited to the opening or shutting the eye and has no part in the origination of knowledge.

51. Hence the ascription of Brahman-nature to names is merely an act of superimposition and it is done with a view to secure some guerdon and is effected by voluntary effort as the result of (Scriptural) injunction (*vide*, Chānd. Up., VII. 5), very like regarding another man's wife as one's mother, in order to inhibit (carnal) desire. Therefore the conclusion is that the definition of adhyāsa, *viz.*, the manifestation in some other place (or thing) of what was seen before (elsewhere) which is similar to memory, is faultless.

---

that the definition is liable to the charge of being over-pervasive—अतिव्याप्ति. The superimposition of Brahman on names is neither mithyā, nor bhrānti, nor avidyā and yet it satisfies the definition, *viz.*, one thing appearing as another. In other words, there is no superimposition though the definition holds good.

<sup>72</sup> लक्ष्यत्वाभावमङ्गीकरोति; किन्तु लक्षणसत्त्वं नाङ्गीकरोति. The siddhāntin admits that the lakṣya, *viz.*, superimposition is absent and not that the superimposition of Brahman on names conforms to the definition,

XVI. 52. By the phrase—[‘ tam ke cit ’], “some (define it),” etc.,<sup>73</sup> he (the Bhāṣyakāra) discusses the doctrines of other schools with a view to clarifying his own doctrine. How? They maintain that superimposition means the ascription to nacre, etc., of the qualities of something which is quite distinct from it, *viz.*, either silver which is but a form of jñāna (as held by the Vijñānavādins) or silver which exists elsewhere (say, in the shop as held by the Naiyāyikas).<sup>74</sup>

53. Others (referring to the Prābhākaras) hold [that where one thing is imposed on another, the Bhrama (confusion) is due to the non-discrimination (of the two factors involved, *viz.*, the perceptive cognition of the shell and the recollective cognition of silver)]. The sentence has to be construed thus—the illusion that it is a single cognition (which it is not) is caused, they say, by the failure to comprehend the distinction between the two things of which one is superimposed on the other.

54. [Others again (referring to the nihilist Mādhyamika and a particular school of Naiyāyikas) maintain that where one thing is superimposed on another, the (false) ascription of a totally opposed quality to that (another) alone constitutes illusion]. (The sentence is explained thus):—yatra= in the shell,

---

<sup>73</sup> The controversy ranges round the locus (अधिष्ठान) and the illusory object (अध्यस्तपदार्थ), but none regarding the definition—‘the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another’—*cf.* Bhāṣya—सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्माविभासतां न व्यभिचरति. For example, regarding the locus, the Naiyāyika, the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa maintain the reality of the locus as well as of the superimposed object. The Mādhyamika denies reality to both. The Naiyāyika regards the locus as insentient—जड, but the Vedāntin regards it as sentient since according to him it is the nacre-defined intelligence that is the locus. As regards the superimposed object, it is void—शून्य to the Mādhyamika, māyā to the Advaitin, mere consciousness—jñāna to the other Buddhists and a real thing having another abode to the Naiyāyika and Prābhākara. From this it is clear that differences of opinion exist only regarding the substratum and the object of delusion.

<sup>74</sup> Anyatra = in the shell, etc., anyadharmasya = of silver which is a different object, *i.e.*, different from the shell, Jñānākārasya = of the appearance of knowledge; or bahisthasya = of that which is outside; adhyāsaḥ = superimposition; iti vadanti = so they say. Here the ātmakhyāti of the Buddhistic Vijñānavāda and the anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas are respectively referred to.



etc., *yasya* = of silver, etc., *adhyāsaḥ* = superimposition, *tasyaiva* = of the bit of shell, etc., *viparītaḥ* = of the form of silver, etc., *kalpanām* = the manifestation of what does not exist, *ācakṣate* = they say.<sup>75</sup>

55. [Page 12] By the phrase [*sarvathāpi tu*]—‘taken in whatever sense—he (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) points out that all the different (conflicting) explanations (of *adhyāsa*) are in conformity with his own doctrine. Because the mention of the word ‘*paratra*’ (in something or place) necessarily implies ‘*parāvabhāsa*’ (manifestation of some other thing), we stated that the manifestation of a quality belonging to one object in another object is what constitutes the definition (of *adhyāsa*) and that does not go astray (*i.e.*, the definition holds good for all schools). How? According to the first view the definition does not stray since the silver of the form of consciousness or the silver existing outside appears as of the essence of nacre. Even according to the second view, (it does not fail) since, to be consistent (it must be conceded that) the two real distincts—shell and silver—appear as non-distinct through illusion. Again (it holds good) as regards the third view, since the shell manifests itself in the form of silver.<sup>76</sup>

As regards the prior perception and the similarity of recollection (the other components of the definition), what (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) means is that since these are found in all (definitions), there is no room for controversy.

---

<sup>75</sup> अन्ये तु . . . आचक्षते. Here *विपरीतधर्म* means *अभावरूपधर्म*. That the negation of nacre is ‘the silver’ is admitted by the upholder of the void-doctrine as well as by a particular school of logicians. But the latter does not regard non-existence as void शून्य as does the *Mādhyaṃika*. The generality of the logicians aver that the silver is the one existing elsewhere—*देशान्तरस्थ*, but not non-existence—*अभाव*.

<sup>76</sup> पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पे आत्मख्याति पक्षे, अन्यथाख्याति पक्षे च—According to the position maintained by the Buddhist idealists and the Logicians generally. The former hold that the ‘silver’ a form of *jñāna*—appears as nacre; the latter that the silver-in-the-shop appears as the quality of nacre. द्वितीयेऽपि—अख्यातिपक्षे, the doctrine of non-discrimination as maintained by *Prābhākara*. When activity connected with the getting of the presented silver is admitted as fruitless, अयतार्थप्रवृत्ति, the cognition leading to it must be single and illusory. तृतीयेऽपि—शून्यवादिपक्षे—the doctrine of void. The *Mādhyaṃika*, with a section of *Naiyāyikas*, admits the manifestation of unreal silver in a piece of shell. Hence it is as good as admitting the definition.

XVII.56. If it (adhyāsa) were defined only by the terms 'what resembles recollection' and 'the manifestation of what was experienced before', the scope of the definition would even extend to the irrational view of the Nihilist that superimposition has no locus (adhiṣṭhāna). To obviate it therefore the word 'paratra' is used.

57. How is this view irrational?

Because indeed there has been no experience of adhyāsa devoid of a locus, nor is it likely to occur hereafter.

Well, is it not within one's experience that one perceives a dark mass of hair having no locus?

No, even that has the locus constituted by the light-particles (for such dark mass appears only in the light—*vide* VPS., p. 41).

Well, (we maintain that) like the seed and sprout (series), knowledge—samvit, (having its substratum) in the 'silver', and 'the silver' in knowledge manifest themselves each serving as the locus of the other.

This is jejune. There (in the seed-sprout series) the sprout is produced from a particular seed, but that seed is not produced from that very sprout; (on the contrary) from a different sprout. Here, however, we have a particular knowledge in which a particular 'silver' manifests itself; between these two only, there is mutual superimposition. Hence this (mutual superimposition) is hard to reconcile. Even as regards the seed and sprout what is aimed at (*viz.*, that the seed is the material cause) is not established merely because the seed and sprout form an infinite series, for neither on grounds of apprehension nor of reason will the ākāṅkṣā (the longing to find what the material cause is) be dispelled. On this again, if it be questioned how (it could be proved that of the two—seed and sprout—the one is instrumental in producing the other), the answer is that it is proved by actual experience (*i.e.*, by perception) and there enquiry should stop however far it may have gone. Otherwise, (*i.e.*, if he does not accept empirical truth) the enquiry, relying on the infinite cause-series, will find no resting-place (anavasthā) and cannot extricate itself from the fallacy of infinite regress (*i.e.*, regress of the unverified type—'andhaparamparā').

58. Again, nowhere does the knowledge of negation arise in the form of mere 'No' without reference to some terminus.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> अपि च . . . . Another reason that illusion cannot be void of a locus. No negative statement can be made without reference to a locus.

Where the knowledge of the mere absence of the serpent (in the form 'not serpent') arises either from inference or from the word of a trustworthy person, there again the desire to know what it is, is seen to arise (which desire is expressed thus—'what then is this?'): and because it is so, only the object that is before one's eye remains as (*i.e.*, to be regarded as) the terminus. Even in the case of 'pradhāna' (which is regarded by the Sāmkhyas as the cause of the Universe), etc., the negation of (the existence of) the triad of the guṇās, etc., in the cause of the universe has indeed a known terminus.<sup>78</sup>

59. Or (it may be stated that) this (illusory knowledge) has as its locus the universal witness (*i.e.*, the Eternal Seer). And in the case of the illusory knowledge of the dark hairy mass, when that (hairy mass) is negated it is only the (intimate) relation that it has with knowledge (bodha) that is negated and not knowledge (as such). Hence the negation of all things has that (the Witness) as its terminus. Therefore since negation so far as it (the Witness) is concerned is *non est*, and since in itself no attributes are perceived (the Sākṣin in its nature, is pure, but it is the upādhis or limiting adjuncts that confer qualities on it), all negation must

---

If the illusory knowledge had no locus, then only could negation be expressed by mere 'no'. As it is, we can only say 'in this locus (अधिकरण) it (the illusory object) does not exist'.

<sup>78</sup> What is meant by the negation of Pradhāna is only that the possession of the triad of qualities is absent in that which is held by the Sāmkhyas to be the cause of the universe; so also when atoms are denied, what it means is that atomicity is absent in that which is held by the Naiyāyikas to be the cause of the universe; so also when Brahman is denied it means that infinitude—अपरिच्छिन्नत्व—is absent in the cause of the universe. The वस्तु—reality, cannot be negated; it is only the determinations—प्रकाराः. For the Sāmkhyas the 'pradhāna' is the ultimate reality, the atom for the Naiyāyikas and Brahman is the ultimate reality to the Vedāntin and when these are negated it does not mean that no substratum is left behind. The substratum, *viz.*, the cause of the universe is there, but only its determinations are negated. *VPS.*, p. 42 remarks thus: यत्रापि मायाविनिर्मितहस्त्यश्वरथादौ अन्यत्र वा निरधिष्ठानभ्रमं निरवधिकबाधं च त्वं शङ्कसे, तत्रापि भ्रमबाधयोः साधकं साक्षिचैतन्यमेव अधिष्ठानमवधिश्च स्यात्—What is sought to be established is that in no case, not even in magic creations, is a substratum lacking for negation. Superimposition demands a locus and negation or bādha must stop short of the witnessing consciousness.

stop with the immutable, immediate and integral consciousness. Nor is the superimposed (object) a mere nullity. If it were so (*i.e.*, if the object of illusion were absolutely non-existent) it would not be directly perceptive.<sup>79</sup>

XVIII. 60. [Page 13.] *Bauddha*: Well, is it not your doctrine that all this (the whole universe) is non-existent?

*Siddhāntin*: Who said so? We have proclaimed that all this is error-ridden, which error is inexplicable and beginning-less.<sup>80</sup> If, however, admitting that the total effacement of ignorance (*avidyā* or error) on the rise of knowledge (*vidyā*) you postulate the non-existence (of the world), you are at liberty to do so.<sup>81</sup> As such (*i.e.*, when it is established that *avidyā* ceases after the rise of *vidyā*) the knowledge of negation as in 'This is not silver' arises only by negating the silver associated with some specific region or time and it does not bring about (*i.e.*, point to) its (silver) relation with some different region, for it is not so experienced.<sup>82</sup> Again one who mistakes a rope that is at a distance to be a serpent, when told by a trustworthy person who is near him that it is not a serpent, gets knowledge of only the absence of the serpent and not of its existence in a different place, for the sentence (*viz.*, 'nāyam sarpaḥ'—this is not serpent) is incapable of generating that knowledge (*viz.*, that the serpent exists elsewhere).

---

<sup>79</sup> Here by प्रतिभास is meant अपरोक्षप्रतिभास, immediate perception. What is absolutely non-existent does not manifest itself. A non-existent object like sky-lotus may be परोक्षप्रतिभास for some *vṛtti* or mental modification is generated on hearing the word sky-lotus—गगनारविन्द.

<sup>80</sup> The world of appearance is not a mere blank—*śūnya*; but is an inexplicable entity capable of being postulated neither as existent nor as non-existent.

<sup>81</sup> The question is irrelevant since all schools of thought have to admit that things cease to exist after they are destroyed. There is therefore nothing incongruous in the view that a thing existing in the realm of ignorance disappears altogether with the dawn of knowledge.

<sup>82</sup> This is in answer to a possible objection that an object of illusory knowledge, when negated, does not become extinct altogether but is found elsewhere, as held by the Naiyāyikas. The objector admits that all things, when destroyed, cease to exist altogether (*śūnya*); but the object of illusion, he thinks, is a real one and that through some perversity of the sense, etc., it appears in a wrong place and as such its claim to reality is not lost when negated.

61. Nor is it to be proved by arthāpatti (presumptive evidence) like the negation of 'pot-that-is-destroyed-here' (iha bhagnaghaṭaḥ).<sup>83</sup> From that alone it (negation) is established.<sup>8</sup> Where again a positive cognition of existence (vidhi)—'this is rope', arises, preceded by a negative cognition—'this is not a serpent',—either by direct perception or by a corresponding verbal statement, even there the same reasoning (per force) holds good. For it is not so experienced (i.e., the negation of a superimposed object does not bring to mind its existence elsewhere). From all this we conclude that illusory knowledge can nowhere arise without a substratum. Hence the appositeness of the word '*paratra*' (in the definition of adhyāsa).

XIX. 62. If it be so let merely the words—'the manifestation somewhere else of what was seen before'<sup>84</sup> (*paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāva-bhāsaḥ*)—suffice for the definition (of adhyāsa); for when thus defined its recollective character does not stray.<sup>85</sup>

Yes, it is true; but then what is implied (by the word *pūrvadṛṣṭa*) would be pure remembrance and not that which is *similar* to remembrance (*smṛtirūpa*). And it has already been

<sup>83</sup> The objection may be raised on the ground that the negation of an apprehensible object, in a particular spot, becomes cogent only when its existence elsewhere is postulated. But as a matter of fact when a pot is destroyed in any place, there arises no need to presume its existence in some other place. The Vivaraṇa (page 39) points out that the Naiyāyikas also do not admit the existence elsewhere of the negated false relation which false relation according to them produces the illusory knowledge. The negative knowledge causes the total extinction of the relation. Similarly with the other schools.

<sup>84</sup> तावन्मात्रेण तत्सिद्धः—This should be taken as a separate statement and in answer to the objection that the negation of silver in the nacre—the 'this', as also elsewhere, say, the shop, etc., must result in the total negation of silver and that its apprehension is impossible in the 'nacre—silver' context. The answer is that the apprehension is intelligible on the ground that the silver even as a false object inexplicably exists in the nacre.

<sup>85</sup> The epithet स्मृतिरूपः (*smṛtirūpaḥ*) might be justified on the ground that, in all cases of illusion, there exists a recollective element; but that the illusion is partly the offspring of memory-revival, becomes evident from the use of the word—*pūrvadṛṣṭa*—so that, says the *pūrvapakṣin*, the word '*smṛtirūpaḥ*' may be dropped.

stated that what constitutes the object of recollection cannot be characterised as illusory.<sup>86</sup>

63. If it be so, let these words alone—‘the manifestation elsewhere of what is similar to the object of memory’—‘paratra smṛtirūpāvabhāsaḥ’—suffice for the definition (of ‘adhyāsa’). There in that (definition) the mention of the word ‘paratra’ suggests, by implication, the manifestation of a different object (parāvabhāsa) and ‘smṛtirūpatva’ is its qualifying adjunct. It is clear that ‘similarity with the recollected’ (smṛtirūpatva) is not possible of a distinct entity (parasya, *i.e.*, of the silver) which is not in conjunction (with the eye), in the absence of past perception (pūrvadṛṣṭatva).

It is true. The use of the phrase—pūrvadṛṣṭa is however for the better clarification (of the nature of adhyāsa).<sup>87</sup> Hence let the definition stand in the manner set forth (*viz.*, smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ).

XX. 64. [Even so is one’s experience in the world.] (Tathā ca loke anubhavaḥ) So that, by the adduction of two instances, the nature of illusion (*i.e.*, the manifestation of the relation of the false and the true) as attested by ordinary experience alone, is indicated by the definition. What is the use of reasoning here? As to this he (Śamkara) says, “it is the shell indeed that manifests itself as the silver”.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>86</sup> It is to exclude cases of genuine recollection that ‘smṛtirūpa’—merely resembling memory, and not actual memory—is used. The object that is brought to mind by the revival of past impressions is not illusory as already shown. अर्थलभ्यस्य derived from अर्थापत्तिप्रमाण or presumptive evidence.

<sup>87</sup> In recollection we perceive the object *as associated with* past experience, but in illusion we are aware only of the object—say, the silver of past experience. The word ‘smṛtirūpa’ suggests both, and it is to exclude the former that ‘pūrvadṛṣṭa’ is used. It may in passing be noted that the illusory silver is not even the very silver of previous experience; it only belongs to the jāti or the universal of the silver seen before, for in an illusory situation the Advaita maintain that some indefinable silver—anirvacanīya rajata—newly comes into being—*vide* V, p. 39.

<sup>88</sup> What is meant is that reasoning is of little consequence in establishing illusion when every-day experience amply testifies to it. The other instance given in the Bhāṣya is that of the single moon appearing double.

65. Well, (in the illusion of 'shell-silver') the shell does not manifest itself, the silver alone manifests itself; hence the use of both the terms—'the shell'—'śuktikā', and 'like the silver'—'rajatavat' (śuktikā hi rajatavat avabhāṣate) is inappropriate.

This is our answer—The use of the word 'śuktikā' is justified on the ground that what is ascertained by the subsequent valid knowledge is (none other than) the final reality of the shell; and the use of (the termination) 'vat' (in rajatavat) is justified on the ground that the non-silver (*viz.*, shell or mother of pearl) with which there is sense-contact, manifests itself as if inseparably related to the illusory silver.<sup>89</sup> We speak of even the illusoriness of the silver, because it is produced by adventitious defects and because it is immediately negated (in the empirical sphere itself), and not on the ground of its distinctness from silver which is accepted as ultimately real.<sup>90</sup> [Page 14.] There, (in shell-silver apprehension) since no contact exists (between the eye and) the silver, the manifestation of the 'thisness' (idantā) cannot belong to it—(the silver; in other words, the silver cannot be the āśraya of idantā), but it belongs only to that with which the eye is in contact (*viz.*, the shell).<sup>91</sup> As for the direct manifestation of silver), even though its apprehension is produced by the revival of memory-impressions, it must be understood as being due to the potency of defects and to its intimate association with what the sensory knowledge gives (*viz.*, the 'this').

---

<sup>89</sup> After the negative knowledge arises, there is no other way of explaining the object of this knowledge (*viz.*, the silver) except by regarding it as illusory. It is in illustration of this that Śamkara gives these two examples—'it is the shell only that manifests itself as silver', 'it is the single moon that appears as if having a second'. The shell-silver points to the definition—'paratra parāvabhāṣaḥ', and 'vati' termination points to what is defined—the false superimposition.

<sup>90</sup> आगन्तुकदोष—Accidental defect as distinguished from अनादिदोष—beginningless defect, which produces the आपणस्थरजत—the silver found in the mart; but this is due to occasional sensory and other defects. In other words, this is not regarded as illusory, because it is different from the silver that is absolutely real, for there is none such.

<sup>91</sup> If the silver is illusory, its property, *viz.*, the 'thisness'—इदंता will also be illusory so that illusion would have no real substratum. To this objection PP. answers तत्र असंप्रयुक्तत्वात्, etc.



66. There (in the Bhāṣya) by adducing the instance of the 'shell', it is pointed out that the 'silver' is not of the nature of (*i.e.*, is something other than) that which is in sense-contact; and the purpose (of this illustration) is to show that the egoity (ahamkāra), because it is lit up (manifested) by it (cit), comes under the category of the 'thou-notion' (yuṣmadartha),<sup>92</sup> and that as such, it is superimposed on the pure sentience (cit) which is unattached (nirañjana) and is the 'not—this' element in the 'I-notion' (asmadartha). By adducing the instance of the double-moon, what is pointed out is that the manifestation of difference between jīva (individual soul) and Īśvara and between soul and soul is not of the nature (of cit).<sup>93</sup> (Like the single moon, there is only one caitanya; and yet ignorance creates difference as does the doṣa in the former).

XXI. 67. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, in the case of an object outside oneself, the defect of the cause, such as similarity, etc. existing in the object (substratum, the shell) and morbid affection (timira) etc., existing in the sense of sight (and desire, etc., existing in the deluded seer) is perceived (to exist) and as due to that (defect), the substratum being constituted of parts, it is perhaps intelligible that though one part (the 'this') is apprehended, the other part (the 'shell') remains obscured. But here (in ahamkāradhyāsa) it is not from any extraneous cause that it

---

<sup>92</sup> The ego-notion (ahampratyaya) contains two elements—the sentient and the insentient—a complex of the self and the not-self—citacidgranthi. The illustration of the shell-silver is to bring home the superimposition of acit on the cit. On the shell is superimposed what is not-shell; so also what is not-ātman is superimposed on ātman. The term 'yuṣmatpratyaya' has as its object what is not 'asmatpratyayaviṣaya'. The egoity comes under the category of the 'thou-notion' since, for its manifestation, it is dependent on cit—intelligence, and as such it is not identical with cit which is the 'not—this' entity in the ego-notion. Hence it (egoity) is to be regarded as superimposed on the cit.

<sup>93</sup> The shell-silver illusion is known as 'nirupādhikādhyaśa' and the double-moon illusion as 'sopādhikādhyaśa'. The first disappears the moment the right knowledge comes; but the second, in spite of knowledge to the contrary persists as long as the adventitious cause (upādhī) lasts. The superimposition of the ego on cit is an instance of nirupādhikādhyaśa and the superimposition of duality on cit is sopādhikādhyaśa.

(substratum, viz., the sākṣin) is avouched; for if it had been so, its obscuration would have been possible as due to any defect in it (i.e., the cause). But that (i.e., specific feature, viz., having corners, etc., as in the case of the shell), can by no means exist in the self-luminous and partless caitanya.<sup>94</sup>

68. *Siddhāntin*: Well, the fact is there that the real nature of Brahman remains unknown.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: From the non-manifestation of that (Brahman), neither non-manifestation nor illusion would occur in regard to the individual soul. Because the 'shell' is unapprehended, it does not follow that non-manifestedness and superimposition would result in the case of a pollard.<sup>95</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: Well, the individual soul is not different from Brahman, as witness the Scriptural text—"With this soul which is my very self, etc." (Chānd. Up., VI. iii-2). Hence its (Brahman's) non-apprehension is verily the non-apprehension of the soul.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: If that be so, there exists no possibility whatever for avidyā to arise there since Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, as witness the Scripture—"From its refulgence all this (the world) stands revealed" (Muṇḍ. Up., II. ii-2; Kaṭha Up., II. ii-15), and since it is from the pure sentience itself that the revelation of all this is made possible.

69. *Siddhāntin*: This is to be said (in reply) that even here (i.e., in Brahman) there exists the doṣa (perversion) constituted by avidyā (beginningless ignorance), which is hostile to knowledge, and which veils the luminosity (of Brahman).<sup>96</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*: How is this known? (i.e., from which pramāṇa?)

*Siddhāntin*: From the Scriptures (śabda) and from the Śrutārthāpatti (verbal presumption). As for Śruti we have,

<sup>94</sup> The sākṣin is self-proven—'svataḥsiddha' and its knowledge is therefore dependent upon no external cause; but in the case of the shell its 'thisness' is vouched for by the sense of sight.

<sup>95</sup> There is no point, says the opponent, in asserting that Brahman remains unknown. Adhyāsa is on the Jīva which is the substratum and not on Brahman; and jīva is ever manifest.

<sup>96</sup> The epithet 'agrahaṇa' means 'grahaṇavirodhī.' Avidyā, though obscuring the Absolute is dissolvable by the non-discursive cognition—अवच्छेदकारवृत्तिज्ञान. That avidyā exists has been established on the evidence of perception, inference and perceptive-presumption—dṛṣṭārthāpatti. Now the evidence of Śruti and of Śrutārthāpatti is adduced in support.

“ Wholly immersed in ignorance (anṛta) (Chānd. Up., VIII. iii-2); ‘ without cognising his identity with Īśvara he sorrows, lost in delusion ’ (Muṇḍ. Up., III. i-2), and the rest. Likewise Śrutārthāpatti also exists (as evidence of avidyā). In all the Śrutis it is the vidyā (knowledge) of Brahman that is set forth as the means of release. Hence by presumptive evidence this becomes clear—that the bondage of ignorance, which is of the nature of non-comprehension of the individual’s identity with Brahman, exists congenitally.<sup>97</sup>

70. Well, was it not said that Jīva is non-distinct from Brahman ?

True, it is for that very reason that avidyā, which conceals in Jīva the luminous nature of Brahman, is posited by implication (arthāt). Otherwise (if the individual soul is admitted to be, distinct from the Absolute, insentient, or of finite intelligence, avidyā, a positive entity having the capacity of concealment cannot be maintained),<sup>98</sup> when the Jīva is in reality (of the nature of) Brahman, if the knowledge of identity also were eternally established, then the teaching of identity (tādātmyopadeśa) would be purposeless. [Page 15] As such it must be admitted by those

<sup>97</sup> The ‘bandha’ or bondage, if it should be removed by knowledge as enjoined in the Veda, must be of the nature of avidyā. Hence Śrutārthāpatti. The ‘śravaṇavidhi’—आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः also confirms avidyā, for the study of the Scriptures is an aid to the removal of avidyā and not for the elucidation of the nature of Brahman which is self-luminous. Now ajñāna is vouched for by the inner witness—sākṣin, and not either by the śruti or arthāpatti. The function of the latter is to show that avidyā which is manifested by the Sākṣin is an entity distinct from non-existence—अभाववैलक्षण्यम्; cf. अविद्या नाम काचिदनिर्वचनीयमावरूपा, नास्ति इति वादिनः पक्षं निराकर्तुमेव प्रमाणोपन्यासात्. अविद्या-स्वरूपन्तु साक्षिचैतन्यादेव सिध्यति.—VPS., p. 45. The pramāṇa is mentioned only to refute the position of those who contend that there is nothing called nescience, which is indeterminable and of the nature of an existent. As for the existence of nescience, it is established only by the witnessing intelligence.

<sup>98</sup> ‘अन्यथा’ (Otherwise), is not syntactically related to what follows. The sense has to be completed by supplying the enclosed words. Incomprehensibility (ग्रहणाभाव) of the Reality would be obvious if Jīva differed radically from Brahman. But since Jīva is identical with Brahman and yet Brahman is not apprehended, avidyā must be presumed to exist.

learned in the Śruti, Smṛti and Nyāya that Brahman which is homogeneous consciousness is the substratum of the illusion of the endless souls which are conditioned by the beginningless nescience.

71. We have the Smṛti (in support of this view)—‘ You had better know that Prakṛti (avidyā) and Puruṣa (Īśvara) are both beginningless ’ (Gīta, XIII-19); *i.e.*, Avidyā which serves as the cause of the distinction between kṣetra (body) and kṣetrajña (the individual soul) and which is there from eternity, is expressed by the word ‘ prakṛti ’. The Śruti has ‘ As for māyā, know that it is prakṛti ’ (Śv. Up., IV-10). Hence, conditioned as it is by māyā, (the soul) though non-distinct, fails to perceive its own (identity with Brahman) nature. So it is said: “ When the Jīva is awakened from the sleep of the beginningless māyā, then it understands (itself to be) the unborn, the ever-awake, the dreamless, the secondless ”—Gauḍapāda’s kārīkā 16 on VII. Mānd. Up.).

72. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, when invalidated by some other pramāṇa, neither Śruti nor implication from words (śrutārthāpatti) is competent to prove (that) avidyā (has Brahman as its viśaya).<sup>99</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: Which is that pramāṇa by which this (Brahman’s being the object of nescience) is invalidated ?

*Pūrvapakṣin*: (What you say is appropriate to things having parts). It does not stand to reason that an entity which is devoid of parts and self-luminous remains unrevealed (lit. its nature unlit up).

*Siddhāntin*: Well, the separateness (distinguishability) of the enjoyer (bhoktā, the inner self) from the bodily aggregate (kārya-karaṇasamghāta) does not become manifest even though the

<sup>99</sup> That Brahman is the substratum (āśraya) of avidyā has been stated; now objection is taken to the view that the self-luminous Brahman is the object (viśaya) of avidyā. How can an entity which by its nature is all radiance be the object of ignorance (darkness) ? This is met by an appeal to experience. In shell-silver cognition, reason ought to exclude the possibility of cognising ‘silver’, but experience is otherwise. Again when we say ‘I do not know what you mean’ (त्वदुक्तार्थं न जानामि) we have a case where what is apprehended is spoken of as being unapprehended—ज्ञातस्य अज्ञातत्वम्. It is not that what does not stand the test of reason does not come within the purview of experience. It comes to this—that even though a thing is self-luminous, it can be the object of ignorance. As such, ātman may be the viśaya of ajñāna.

bhoktā is self-luminous. (The otherness from the body is not distinct from the self-luminous ātman, and hence it is immediate, and is also not manifest as distinct from the body. As such even what is self-luminous may be the content of ajñāna.)

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, the bhoktā is not self-luminous; on the contrary, he is revealed by the notion of ego (ahampratyayaṣaya).

*Siddhāntin*: How ātman is self-luminous and how ahamkāra is not jñāna (pratyaya—which illumines ātman) will be explained in the sequel (*vide* PP. p. 18).

XXII. 73. *Pūrvapakṣin*: How then is it that the self-luminous enjoyer (the inner self) is not revealed as distinct from the aggregate (of the body and the senses)?<sup>100</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: It is due to the erroneous apprehension of unity as in 'I am man'.<sup>101</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*: This is only a metaphorical usage and not illusory.<sup>102</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: How this is not a case of metaphor the Bhāṣya-kāra (Śamkara) himself will explain (in the sequel).

74. *Pūrvapakṣin*: If the ego-cognition (ahampratyaya) has the same substrate as the body, then the existence of ātman as independent of the body becomes untenable, since there is no other notion having as its objet (ātman as apart from the body) and since even Scriptures and inference if opposed to it (*i.e.*, the

<sup>100</sup> This is a fresh objection raised by the Mīmāṃsakas, and it is stated thus: In your doctrine, ātman is self-luminous; and the distinction of the aggregate in ātman is ātman itself (as paṭabheda which is in ghaṭa is ghaṭa only) so that the manifestation of ātman (in aham) is as good as the manifestation of the distinction. And yet you say ātman is revealed, but not the distinction.

<sup>101</sup> The rule is where one object is mistaken for another, the distinction of this other from the first is not perceived. In 'I am man'—अहं मनुष्यः—because there is the superimposition of the aggregate on ātman, the distinction of the aggregate is not perceived. The distinction is not manifest because of the illusion of unity between the body and ātman.

<sup>102</sup> In the instance—'the boy is a lion'—सिंहो माणवकः—the distinction between the boy and the lion is known (भेदग्रह), so that it is only figuratively we say—सिंहो माणवकः—the boy is a lion, and there is no error. Similarly, the opponent contends that the usage, 'I am man' is figurative, for both the aggregate and the soul (aham) are distinctly apprehended.

perceptive ego-cognition) lose their claim to validity as means of right knowledge (pramāṇatva).<sup>103</sup> If it be argued that the ego-cognition (where the bodily aggregate and ātman are perceived in intimate relation) is illusory and as such there is no opposition (between the perceptive ego-notion on the one hand and inference and Scriptures on the other), on what basis do you presume this illusoriness? (we ask). Because (it may be answered) what is understood from the testimony of the Scriptures or of inference is otherwise.<sup>104</sup> (But) it is not so, for then it will result in the fallacy of mutual dependence—if Scripture and inference are valid means of cognition (with reference to ātman being independent) perception will be invalid; and if perception is invalid Scriptures and inference will be valid. Hence the fact that the ego-cognition (ahampratyaṃ) denotes ātman as its content, as distinct from the body, etc., has to be admitted by those who uphold the doctrine of ātman (*viz.*, that it is a distinct entity).<sup>105</sup> Otherwise there would be no valid means to prove the existence of ātman. Therefore the ascription of 'manuṣyatva' (*i.e.*, identifying 'ego' with 'man', etc., as in 'I am man') is to be understood in a figurative sense.

---

<sup>103</sup> The opponent rejects the view that āgama and inference might establish an independent ātman even though perceptive evidence is absent, since perception is the fundamental pramāṇa and any other pramāṇa going counter to it is valueless.

<sup>104</sup> Ātman is pure consciousness as denoted by अहं, and मनुष्यत्व is an erroneous ascription. Hence the cognition 'I am man' is not pramā, but bhramā. And the illusory perception is not hostile to inference and Scriptures which enjoin distinction between the body and the soul. Where perception is non-illusory, there alone neither inference nor Scripture can brush it aside. Now inference to the effect that ātman is an entity distinct from the body is based on the invariable concomitance that objects in general have a cognisor distinct from themselves. As regards the Śruti, we have texts like अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्, etc., *Kaṭha Up.*, I. iii. 15 also I. iii. 10.

<sup>105</sup> All those who differ from the materialist Cārvāka and maintain the independent existence of ātman will find, says the pūrvapakṣin, that the ego-cognition reveals ātman dissociated from the aggregate and that such revelation needs the support neither of inference nor of Scriptures. The usage therefore of 'manuṣyoham'—I am man, etc., is one of gaṇa—metaphor, and not of adhyāsa—illusion (as held by the Siddhāntin).

75. *Siddhāntin*: Here is the answer. It is no doubt true that (in reality) this ego-notion has the bhoktā (enjoyer) distinct from the body, etc., as its object; but still there being no certain knowledge as such (tathā), there occurs the erroneous superimposition of its qualities (i.e., the bodily attributes) on ātman. And it is a well-known fact that a thing, though revealing its true nature, is seen as manifesting itself in intimate relation with another thing for lack of the definite knowledge that this other is distinct, as when short (and long) sounds are found intimately related to the 'akāra' (the 'a'), single though it is.<sup>106</sup>

76. [Page 16] If again ātman (ahamkartā) reveals itself invariably as distinct from the body, etc., as does say, scent from taste, then no controversy will arise regarding its existence (as a distinct entity) so that no inquiry for establishing it would be undertaken.

77. *Pūrvapakṣin*: If after the inquiry (jijñāsā) it is ascertained that ātman is distinct from the body, then it is only right to admit that (the apprehension of identity as in 'I am man' which recurs) is figurative (and not illusory). How? (it may be asked). Inquiry means the thinking out of a reason, and reason is incompetent to produce a distinct piece of knowledge but it only explicates what was implicit already there, viz., the object of the ego-notion (viz., ātman). Hence it is but right to hold that ahamkāra after careful inquiry denoting a distinct object (i.e., distinct from the body) ends only in bringing prominently to one's knowledge the distinguishability of ātman.

78. *Siddhāntin*: It is not right (to conclude that reasoning establishes its figurative nature). It is like the illusion of 'hrasvatva' (short vowel-length) in 'a' varṇa.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Will, even there (i.e., in 'a' sound) how (is the illusion tenable)?

*Siddhāntin*: It is experience only (that points to superimposition in the notion of shortness in 'a'). Similar is the reasoning in regard to the ego-notion.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, aided by reasoning one gets the experience (of identity—adhyāsa) in 'akāra' which is of that nature

<sup>106</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the varṇa<sup>s</sup> अकारादि are constant, unique and all-pervading—विमु. They have no real association with vowel-lengths—short or long, but appear in intimate relation (तदात्म्यसंबन्ध) with them through adhyāsa. Even so is the view of the Siddhāntins.



(i.e., distinct from 'hrasva'), since, though in reality 'hrasva' is distinct from 'akāra', it is not understood as such.<sup>107</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: It is not so; because the distinctness of the one, by implication, establishes the distinctness of the other. (The exclusion is mutual.)

79. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, it is extraordinary jugglery to maintain that the knowledge of identity between two things which manifest themselves, each in its distinctive nature on the basis of pramāṇa (perceptive) strengthened by reasoning, is not metaphorical (but illusory).<sup>108</sup>

80. *Siddhāntin*: Yes, surely; it is really legerdemain as it is the work of avidyā. To explain: the ego-notion assuredly related to its object (viz., ātman distinct from the body) is also observed to point to the body, etc., owing to the operation of the beginningless avidyā which obstructs it (ego-notion) from revealing ātman only as its object. Hence, that the ego-notion has its own object, (viz., ātman) is non-hostile to the object constituted by the body, etc.<sup>109</sup> Hence by reasoning though the distinction of the objects (viz., soul and body) is clarified, it only shows its object (i.e., ātman undifferentiated from the body); and as such, reason has merely emphasised what the object of the ego-notion is—viz., ātman along with the body, and has not brought to light anything in addition. And it has been stated that its (ego-notion) terminating in (revealing) its object, (viz., ātman as undifferentiated from the body-aggregate) does not conflict with the ascription of the notions

<sup>107</sup> The opponent concedes illusion in the case of short and long sounds of 'a' since in his view, perceptive cognition—*anubhava* (i.e., what is directly apprehended by the inner Witness—*sākṣin*), when assisted by reasoning, brings home merely that *akāra* is distinct from 'hrasva' and not that 'hrasva' is distinct from 'akāra'. But in the ego-notion both elements (body and ātman) are distinctly perceived. Hence there is no room for superimposition.

<sup>108</sup> The apparent non-difference between things which are actually known to be different must be taken only in a figurative sense, and to say that it is to be understood otherwise is nothing but sophistry, says the antagonist.

<sup>109</sup> The ego not only embraces the soul, but owing to the beginningless nescience takes the body also within its compass. When it is perceived that the ego-notion has corporeality as its object through nescience, there can be no conflict with its having ātman also as its content. What is produced by nescience is not opposed to reality.

of 'I' and 'Mine' to the body, etc. Hence even after the differentiation of objects is effected by reasoning, the ego-notion does not in any way differ from its previous state. Therefore the notion 'I am man' is at no time to be regarded as 'gauṇa' (figurative) but is illusion only).<sup>110</sup>

81. Such being the case, the individual soul (Jīva) which is self-luminous and distinct from the bodily aggregate is not seen to manifest itself as such, so that there arises the illusory cognition as evidenced in the expression 'I am man'. And the cause (of this illusion) which obscures the nature of the Jīva which in reality is one with Brahman, is the avidyā (lit. darkness) which has no starting point in the past (*i.e.*, beginningless) and which envelopes the luminosity (of ātman). That this is so is vouched for by the Scriptures and verbal presumption (śrūtārthāpatti—implication from words). And it is on that basis that the illusory conception of the ego (ahamkārahya) becomes explicable. And since this superimposition is beginningless, its being a past cognition—pūrvadṛṣṭatva, and its being similar to recollection—smṛtirūpatva, are also explicable. Because the enjoyer (which is the substrate) is not the content (viśaya) of a cognition as distinct from the non-ātman-cognition, and because there is the unit-cognition arising from the association of the enjoyer-consciousness (with the non-ātman) there results the apparent manifestation of something previously observed in some other thing,—that is, their intimate mutual relation and as such it stands to reason that the definition of superimposition applies here also (*i.e.*, in the ego—superimposition).<sup>111</sup>

<sup>110</sup> If the ego-notion is scrutinised, the distinction between ātman and the bodily aggregate which together constitute its content—viśaya, becomes clear. The pūrvapakṣin therefore urges that the knowledge of their identity must be regarded as figurative. But the Siddhāntin points out that illusion is immediate to perceptive cognition and it cannot be sublated by the mediate cognition (parokṣa) which alone is given in inference (yukti).

<sup>111</sup> This presupposes an objection. In all cases of superimposition the substrate—अधिष्ठान as well as the thing superimposed forms the content—विषय of the illusory cognition. There should be three causes to produce the cognition of the superimposed and the substrate—कारणत्रितय, and the cognition in such a situation should be single. But these conditions do not obtain in the ego-superimposition—अहङ्काराध्यास. Ātman (substrate) is by nature non-objective—अविषय and

XXIII. 82. [Page 17] ["What is it that is meant by 'adhyāsa' ?"]

Since the word ('vṛttasya', the term vṛtti is applied to a word having either primary or figurative significance) 'kim' is equally significative of both question and objection, (the Siddhāntin), not knowing which in particular was meant, (by the opponent when he put the question 'koyamadhyāso nāma') expounded the nature of adhyāsa under the impression that the question (relating to the definition of adhyāsa) only was put. Then the opponent

because the ego—अहङ्कार is revealed by the Witness, unlike the perceptive cognition, say of pot, the cognition of the ego is of the nature of the Witness itself. The Witness is eternal and not a product therefore of the triad of causes. Hence the objector avers that the 'I' notion—अहन्ता is not a case of superimposition.

It is answered thus—what the unit-cognition embracing two contents means is that the substrate should not be the content of a cognition distinct from that which has the superimposed as its content. Here in the ahamkāradhyāsa the cognition of the superimposed is the content of the witnessing consciousness. Superimposition having been established we must see how far the definition of superimposition is satisfied. Of ātman we know the general feature—सामान्यांश, viz., सत् and चित् but the specific feature—विशेषांश remains unknown, i.e., its supreme bliss—पूर्णानन्द. Hence ātman serves as the substrate—अधिष्ठान. As such the svarūpalakṣaṇa, the essential nature, viz., परत्र परावभास is established. Even as regards तदस्थलक्षण —qualification per accident, of the three necessary elements—doṣa and adhiṣṭhānajñāna have been disposed of. Now by the phrase, अनादित्वादि it will be shown that saṃskāra, the residual impression, is the third cause of the ego-superimposition—अहङ्काराध्यास पूर्वदृष्ट....पूर्वदर्शनजन्य-संस्कारजन्यत्वम् स्मृतिरूपत्वम्....स्मृतिसदृशत्वं च ; both these are established since superimposition is beginningless. Hence the definition, स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः, 'the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing applies to the ego-superimposition, and it is not the content of any other cognition. Again, though in its nature it is not a product it becomes a product because of its association with the insentient object . . .उपाधिः जन्यत्वे उपहितस्यापि जन्यत्वम् (i.e., of the Witness). भोक्तृवैतन्यसंबलित—association with the enjoyer—intelligence; this is put in to obviate tuccha (what is empty of content) like hare's horn, being regarded as the substrate. But because tuccha is not related in any way with bhokṭṛcāitanyā as the unit cognition is, it cannot become adhiṣṭhāna.

says,<sup>112</sup> "objection (to ātmādhyaśa) was also raised by me". This latter view is expressed in the following words—[How then could there be the superimposition of the (inert) object and its qualities on the inner self (pratyagātmā) which is non-objective ?]

83. It may be admitted that the (adhyāśa) is as thus defined, but that will not fit in here. 'How' (it may be asked) ? Because [it is indeed on the object that is present before one's eyes that every one superimposes a distinct object. And you (referring to the Siddhāntin) predicate non-objectivity to the inner self which is unfit to be brought under the 'thou-notion' (yuṣmatpratyaya)]; and in what is not an object, superimposition was not observed in the past nor will it be observed in the future.

84. *Siddhāntin*: [This is the answer.) It is not that it (ātman) is absolutely a non-object (aviśaya), because it is the object of the 'ego-notion ')].<sup>113</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*; Well, how can the subject (viśayī—self) which is of the nature of pure intelligence become an object (viśaya—non-self) ? That indeed becomes viśaya which being external becomes obvious in the 'this-notion'. Opposed to this is the subject which constitutes the inner-self, which is not the 'this' and which is self-luminous. Then how could these two properties (viśayatva and viśayitva) which are mutually hostile co-exist in ātman which is one and devoid of parts ?

*Siddhāntin*: Here, this will be said in answer: The word 'ego-notion' (asmatpratyaya in the Bhāṣya) means the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇa). And that (ahamitipratyaya—the notion, viz., 'I') embraces both the 'this' and the 'not this' elements is a matter of universal experience. Let those worthy critics say whether the ego-notion (asmatpratyaya) is as defined here or not,

<sup>112</sup> A new topic begins from here. So far the definition of superimposition has been discussed and its cogency pointed out. Now is taken up the Bhāṣya dealing with the probability of superimposition—संभावनाभाष्य.

<sup>113</sup> Ātman though not the object in a primary sense is so in a secondary sense—गौण or औपचारिक. There must be two requisites in a thing that is an object—विषय, viz., its being something other than luminosity and the dispelling of doubt regarding its existence brought about by luminosity. Now ātman possesses the second, for no one doubts his own self, and not the first, for ātman is self-luminous. Hence it is viśaya in a secondary sense. It may therefore become the substrate for superimposition.

after intelligently analysing it (*i.e.*, the *ahampratyaya*) with concentrated mind like a connoisseur of coins and without concealing their own experience.<sup>114</sup>

XXIV. 85. *Prabhākara*: Well, what is there to be said here except that the ego-notion (*ahamityanubhavaḥ*) is one that is evidently disparate from the 'this' notion? It may be asked 'How'? The knower (*pramātā*), the known (*prameya*—object), and knowing (*pramiti-jñāna*) are all immediately perceptive (*i.e.*, of direct experience). The *prameya* is perceptive (in its nature) as objectivity. As for *pramātṛ* and *pramiti*, they are altogether perceptive only (*i.e.*, directly experienced) but not as object. *Pramiti* is experience (*anubhava*), self-luminous and is the result of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). Through its (*pramiti*) instrumentality the other (*pramātṛ* as well as *prameya*) manifests itself. *Pramāṇa* however represents the function (or activity) of the *pramātā* and is always something inferred on the basis of the result (*i.e.*, with the *phala* serving as the middle term). Hence in the statement—'I know this (*ahamidam jñāmi*)', the cognitive function of the *pramātā* relates to the object and not to *ātman*. *Ātman* however reveals itself as 'aham' (ego) both in the *phala* (*jñāna*) and *viśaya* (pot, cot, etc.), by the sole reason of the cognition of the object (*viśaya*).

86. *Bhāṭṭa*: It should not be supposed that the ego-notion arises because of the object perceived, on the other hand the ego-notion is indeed different, having *ātman* only as its *viśaya*. And in that (ego-notion), objectivity (*prameyatva*) of *ātman* is secured in its feature as substance (*dravya*) and subjectivity (*pramātṛtva*) in its feature as knower (*jñārttva*). Thus, because the ego-notion reveals the subject and the object, *ātman* is both the cogniser and the cognised. Hence it (*ātman*) combines both the features—'the this' and the 'not this'—the object-part since it comes under

<sup>114</sup> The *Bhāṣyakāra* uses the word '*asmatpratyaya*' in the sense of *antaḥkaraṇa*. *Ātman* mirroring in it becomes *vyavahārayogya*, *i.e.*, it manifests itself indubitably. This is all what is meant when we attribute objectivity (*viśayatva*) to *ātman* and not that it is the object of *jñāna*. In order that a thing may become a *viśaya* it is enough if it manifests itself, thereby dispelling the doubt regarding its existence, there being no absolute necessity for sense-contact. Now *ātman* being of the nature of *jñāna* is self-luminous and needs no other *jñāna* for its revelation.

‘the this’ notion and the subject-part, since it comes under the ‘not-this’ notion.

87. *Prābhākara*: This does not stand to reason because ātman is devoid of parts and is not subject to evolution. [Page 18] And the object being indicated by the ‘this’ is of the nature of parāk (outward as opposed to pratyak—inward) and non-ātman (and as such ātman loses its claim to be either the knower or the known).<sup>115</sup> Hence, anubhava is the result of the perception of blue, etc., and this anubhava being self-luminous reveals the object (the cognised) as the ‘this’ and the subject (the cogniser) as the ‘not-this’ and leads to the inference of pramāṇa (grahṇa). This is the right view to take. Therefore ātman (ahamkāra) cannot assume ‘the this’ aspect.<sup>116</sup>

XXV. 88. *Siddhāntin*: This is to be urged—concerning the view you have expressed (tatra), your worthiness has to be questioned whether (i) of the two, ātman and anubhava, the former manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness and the latter manifests itself being of the nature of insentience, or (ii) whether

<sup>115</sup> If ātman as grāhaka—knower, is regarded as prameya—object, then falling under the category of the ‘this notion’ it becomes non-ātman but if it is not regarded as prameya it loses its self-revelatory character and it cannot be proved to be the substratum—āśraya of jñāna.

<sup>116</sup> The factors involved in any empirical cognitive situation are the cogniser—pramātā or ātman, the cognised—prameya, the cognition—pramiti, and the valid means of cognition—pramāṇa. Now the Prābhākaras maintain that the first three are always perceptively cognised (नित्यपरोक्षः). The Sāmkhyas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the cogniser is always inferred (V., p. 49). The Sautrāntika Buddhists on the other hand hold the cognised to be always inferred. The subjectivist Buddhists, viz., Vijñānavādins deny the externality of objects so that for them objects are perceptively cognised not as objects as such, but as being indistinguishable from cognitions (विज्ञानाभिन्नतया). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas have their own theory. They agree with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that ātman (pramātā) is inferred but the process is different. They say that when an object is cognised there arises in that object what is styled ‘prākṛtya’ or knownness, from which serving as the hetu, ātman is inferred, whereas for the Naiyāyikas the cognition (vyavasāya) leads to after cognition (anuvya-vasāya) in which ātman is presented. It must also be noted that ātman of the Bhāṭṭas is part-sentient and part-insentient.



that also (*i.e.*, anubhava together with ātman) manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness, or (iii) whether that only (*i.e.*, anubhava) manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness while ātman is of the nature of insentience. The first alternative is untenable for it (experience, *i.e.*, jñāna) resulting from pramāṇa were insentient it would result in the world remaining totally unrevealed.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: It is not so. The pramātā (the cogniser, ātman) being of the nature of consciousness manifests, with its aid (*i.e.*, of anubhava), the object as the 'this' and itself (ātmānam) as the 'not-this' like light (which illumines objects as well as its own self) so that there occurs no non-revelation of the world.

*Siddhāntin*: That cannot be. It does not appear to be reasonable to hold that (ātman) being itself of the nature of consciousness illumines (others and its own self) through the benevolent instrumentality of anubhava (viśayānubhava—the experience of the object) which is inert (jaḍa). Moreover, if ātman is said to manifest like light, both the object and its own self with the help of pramāṇaphala (*i.e.*, anubhava) then the act of manifestation (cetanakriyā) will be interminable.<sup>117</sup>

89. As regards the second alternative ātman also (like anubhava) would of its own accord manifest itself ; and why should it need the aid of the object-experience ? If it be urged that in spite of its partaking of the nature of consciousness ātman is not self-revealing, a reason must be adduced for this discrimination (*i.e.*, for conceding the right of self-revelation to anubhava only. The implication is, there is no hetu). It is not intelligible that (ātman) being of the nature of intelligence is in itself mediately perceptible and immediately perceptible with the aid of another. Again since there is parity between them (both the ātman and anubhava are cetanarūpa) like two lights, the one need not require the help of the other.

90. Even as regards the third alternative (*viz.*, ātman is jaḍa and anubhava is citiprakāśa) in spite of one's will it will lead to

---

<sup>117</sup> The point is that if anubhava through whose co-operation the manifestation takes place should produce the prakāśanakriyā (*i.e.*, anubhava before manifesting), this also being the inert product of the inert anubhava would produce another prakāśanakriyā as the first one did, and so on without end, leading to infinite regress.



the inevitable conclusion that ātman alone is the luminous consciousness.<sup>118</sup> No valid reason could be adduced to substantiate the existence of such an anubhava (*i.e.*, self-luminous like ātman) distinct from it (ātman).

How? If it be argued that anubhava (which is self-luminous) is established by pramāṇa then by the differentia (bhedaśādhakadharmā) inhering in it (anubhava), it would reveal each object as distinct from the other (and not by the fact of there being distinct objects), and it would reveal in addition the anubhavatva (the universal concept) the common characteristic of all anubhavas like gotva (*i.e.*, the cowhood common to all cows). But the particularity (viśeṣa) inherent in itself (anubhava) is not seen to manifest itself as blue-experience, and yellow-experience to the exclusion of any reference to the particularity existing in the object.<sup>119</sup>

<sup>118</sup> The third view, *viz.*, that ātman is jaḍa and anubhava is consciousness is the one held by the Prābhākaras. Its acceptance, it is pointed out, will force one to take refuge in the Vedāntic doctrine that ātman is consciousness and self-luminous. Anubhava (jñāna) must be either dravya—substance (Śāmkhya) or karma (Bhāṭṭa) or guṇa—quality (Prābhākara and Nyāyavaiśeṣika). If it is substance its dimension must be either minute=anu or middling madhyama or infinite=ananta. If jñāna is minute it can like a glow-worm light up just a spot on an object, say, a pot. But in 'ghatajñāna' the whole pot is revealed. If middling, jñāna composed of parts would have to depend on the parts for its generation as a pot depends upon the kapālas. But jñāna is partless. If infinite—mahatparimāṇa, then it would reveal everywhere its substratum, *viz.*, the ātman but it does not. Jñāna cannot be karma since it ill-assorts with what is of the nature of luminosity (*viz.*, apprehension). Jñāna then must be admitted to be guṇa=quality. Since it is self-luminous its āśraya or substratum, *viz.*, ātman must also be self-luminous like light, *i.e.*, not depending on any extraneous aid for its luminosity. Being its very quality jñāna cannot be said to originate in its substratum. Hence if ātman possesses the property of luminosity, it amounts to ātman itself being self-luminous.

<sup>119</sup> In the cognitions—this is blue, this is yellow, the distinctions are due to the distinctness of objects blue and yellow. Jñāna is integral and one jñāna differs from the other only because the object which is cognised is different. In jñāna as such there is no internal plurality of distinctions.

Well, the differentiation (*i.e.*, *viśeṣa*—distinction in knowledge) can be maintained on the ground of the destruction and non-destruction (of *jñāna*).<sup>120</sup>

Yes, this could be maintained if the destruction and non-destruction could be established. If (*jñāna* is something) that is born, then (destruction as well as non-destruction) will result; if that (destruction as well as non-destruction) is established then the origination (of *jñāna* will result).<sup>121</sup> Hence owing to such mutual dependence neither (*janyatā* nor *nāśa*) will become tenable. For this very reason the argument (of the *Vijñānavādins*) that owing to extreme similarity the cognitive distinctions (*i.e.*, differences in *anubhava* itself), are not perceived, stands refuted, for the view (that distinction is due to *jñāna*) is lacking in proof. [Page 19] Nor is it grounded in reason to aver that the distinctness pertaining to the luminosity of consciousness is not revealed; for only if that (*bheda*) remained obscured could we regard that the *bhrama* (*viz.*, the apprehension of a single *jñāna*) as due to similarity. The analogy of the individual soul (not revealing its Brahman-nature), though it is self-luminous and of the same essence (as Brahman), does not hold good. As for its (Brahman's) non-manifestation, the reason (*viz.*, the operation of *avidyā*) has already been stated; here no such reason exists (*i.e.*, there is no obstructive cause for the apprehension of the differentia inhering in *jñāna*). Nor indeed can the '*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*' inference step in (to prove the cognitive distinctions), being opposed to both experience and reason,<sup>122</sup> and attention has already been drawn

<sup>120</sup> What is meant is that the destruction and non-destruction of knowledge (*e.g.*, when there is pot-cognition, the cloth-cognition is absent) are determinants of cognition-distinctions and not the *viśayas*; this is to refute the *siddhānta*-position that barring distinctions in objects there are no distinctions in *jñāna*.

<sup>121</sup> It is only the destruction of the adjunct—उपाधिनाश that is erroneously attributed to *jñāna*—*jñāna* being eternal is subject neither to origination nor destruction—*cf.* जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युः—destruction is inevitable only of a thing that is born—*Gītā*, II. 27.

<sup>122</sup> One way of classifying inference is to bring it under three heads:—(i) reasoning from cause to effect—पूर्ववत्, *e.g.*, from the appearance of clouds we infer that rain will fall; (ii) reasoning from effect to the cause—शेषवत्, *e.g.*, from the inundation of a river we infer that rain must have fallen in the higher reaches; (iii) all inferences that do not fall under the above two are *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*—सामान्यतोद्दिष्ट.

to both experience and reason (in this behalf). Hence ātman being of the nature of consciousness only, gets the appellation of anubhava when conditioned by the differing objects of knowledge, but when the limiting adjuncts are out of purview it is described by the terms ātman, etc., just as the trees lose the appellation of forest when the fact of their standing together in one spot (which was the justification for the appellation), is ignored and are described as trees, etc.; that analogy should be admitted (here also).

91. *Prābhākara*: Well, let it be as you say (*i.e.*, let ātman be self-luminous and anubhavarūpa); therefore only ahamkāra, which the object-cognition (viṣayānubhava) gives rise to, is described (by us) as being of the nature of the 'not this'.<sup>123</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: So far right (*i.e.*, that the ego-consciousness is dependent on object-cognition). But (we do not admit that the ego itself is ātman). If ahamkāra is admitted to be ātman even in deep sleep ahamkāra, 'the I-cognition' would manifest itself (lit. would reach the consciousness level).

*Prābhākara*: How? (It is wrong to urge that the 'I-notion' should be manifest in sleep. The object-consciousness being absent there, the 'I-notion' is absent.)

*Siddhāntin*: The contact of the self-luminous consciousness (caitanya) with 'blue' (*i.e.*, objects like blue)—that is blue-manifestation (*i.e.*, such contact only, reveals the object) and that (viṣayānubhava however) is not competent to reveal the ego. (Now) ātman manifests itself as 'aham' (for Prābhākara, aham and ātman are one and ātman, it has been shown, is self-luminous). If, when one is asleep owing to the absence of contact with objects,

The sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāna that the pūrvapakṣin may rely upon is stated in the *V.* thus:—संविदः सादृश्यप्रतिबद्धभेदावभासाः, obstructed by similarity, cognitions do not reveal differences; स्थायिप्रकाशबुद्धिवेद्यत्वात्, because of the (false) apprehension of luminosity as lasting—not momentary, ज्वालावत्—like a flame. The sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāna is defined as a variety of inference the distinguishing feature of which is that we are arguing from one sort of activity which we have experienced to another sort of activity of which we have no experience—vide *Śāstradīpikā*, Tarkapāda, English Translation, G.O.S., p. 231.

<sup>123</sup> The 'not-this' is the inner self. For Prābhākara ahamkāra is ātman—draṣṭā, as revealed in object-consciousness. He argues that the ego is ātman because in 'I know this' the ego is the seer and the seer is ātman.

there is no reference to the object and its experience as is evidenced in 'I cognise this', let them not be (revealed); but why should not there be the revelation of the bare 'aham' (which is no other than ātman and which is admitted to be self-luminous)?

92. *Prābhākara*: Well, the 'I' signifying enjoyment (bhokṛtva) is (as a matter of fact) experienced (in sleep). (But) when that (object-cognition) is absent how could the manifestation be like that (*i.e.*, as aham)?<sup>124</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: There is no substance in it. The word 'aham' means consciousness (caitanya) divested of all limiting adjuncts, and as such it should always (even in sleep) reveal itself as 'aham'. And it is not possible to hold that caitanya has to depend upon the (mental) recall of the limiting adjunct (upādhi) to reveal itself as 'aham'; (in other words the object-consciousness cannot serve as the cause of 'ahamulekha'—becoming explicit as 'aham'). Its (of upādhi) recall indeed substantiates that (*viz.*, viṣaya only) and is not the means by which the real nature (of ātman disassociated from all objects) is substantiated. The substantiation of its true nature, however, is effected by its own potency (self-luminosity). And hence in its own true nature devoid of all experience resulting from contact with objects it (ātman) would reveal itself as 'aham' even in sleep because of the fact that it is not different from the intelligence principle (*i.e.*, the luminous caitanya or inner witness). If you should concede that it is so (*i.e.*, that aham is manifest in sleep) we say it cannot be. For then one would remember (on waking, his consciousness of the ego) just as one remembers to-day one's yesterday's ego-consciousness. If it be argued that it is not remembered because of the absence of mental impressions (samskāra) due to the 'aham' being indestructible, then yesterday's ego-consciousness also would not be remembered.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>124</sup> *Prābhākara*'s contention is that in deep sleep there does exist the 'ahamkāra' which is the bhoktā, but its non-manifestation as ego is owing to the lack of external objects. The latter part of the sentence—*tadabhāva*, etc., is in answer to the query that if the existence of 'aham' in sleep is conceded why it does not appear as such.

<sup>125</sup> *अविनाशिनः संस्कारस्य अभावात्*—Remembrance (*smṛti*) is dependent on the revival of impressions left on the mind by an experienced event which has disappeared, but says the opponent, that since the ego-consciousness is eternal there can be no mental impressions and in

93. *Pūrvapakṣin*: There does exist the consciousness of 'aham' in deep sleep, since it is perceived that a person waking from sleep has the recollection of the happiness he enjoyed when he slept as when he says—'I slept happily'; and there (*i.e.*, in sleep) no experience other than that of ātman occurs.<sup>126</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: True, it does exist (*viz.*, the recollection in the form 'I slept happily'); but that recollection is not produced from the mental impressions of the pleasure experienced in sleep. What else then? Because of the absence of pain in (sleep) we get the recollection of pleasure. How? (you may ask). In the dream state indeed there certainly is the experience of pain. But in sleep because it is absent we express it (*i.e.*, the absence of pain) by the term 'pleasure'. And its absence (*i.e.*, of the pain) is due to the quiescence of sense-activity. [Page 20] If on the other hand there should be the recollection of having experienced happiness, then it would be recollected as associated with some object (*i.e.*, specifically), but there is no such (specific recollection). Indeed even the expression is seen to take these forms—'slept happily', 'nothing was cognised by me'.<sup>127</sup>

94. If again it be said that the experience of pleasure can be inferred from the lightness of limbs and the composure of the senses in one, after waking from sleep, (we say) that is not right. If happiness had been experienced it would be remembered and no purpose is served therein by a probans (*i.e.*, when a thing could be an object of recollection where is the need to call in the aid of a hetu to prove it inferentially)?

*Pūrvapakṣin*: If it be so, how is it that when awake from sleep one person feels the lightness of limbs, while another not?

*Siddhāntin*: Here is the answer: The actively engaged senses get tired in the waking state and quiescence of activity

consequence no recollection. The *Siddhāntin* rejoins that the same reasoning ought to apply to ego-consciousness of yesterday resulting in its non-recollection, but as a matter of fact we do have the revival of past cognitions of the waking state as associated with the ego.

<sup>126</sup> The happiness that one experiences in sleep must have an āśraya—substratum and it is no other than the ātman—'aham'. The 'aham', according to Prābhākara manifests itself as the āśraya of jñāna or anubhava and not as its viśaya.

<sup>127</sup> It means, I slept without pain. न किञ्चिन्मया वेदितम्—There was the experience of the absence of jñāna. But note the *Siddhānta* view that in sleep there exists happiness together with the positive nescience.

for its (fatigue) removal is sleep and there (*i.e.*, in sleep) if the cessation of activity is complete lightness of limbs ensues, otherwise heaviness.<sup>128</sup> Hence in the light of the above, this ego-

<sup>128</sup> It is to be noted here that Padmapāda in refuting the doctrine of Prābhākara, *viz.*, that ahamkāra itself is ātman, has advanced the view that in sleep there is neither sukhānubhava—experience of pleasure, nor ajñānānubhava—experience of nescience, but that one has only the experience of duḥkhābhāva—absence of pain and of jñānābhāva—absence of knowledge; this, however, should not be mistaken for the siddhānta-view. Padmapāda's object is merely to point out that this conclusion is inevitable from the opponent's viewpoint, for Prābhākara in reality is wholly opposed to the view that in sleep happiness exists; but here he posits a view which is directly hostile to his doctrine (*VPS.*, p. 59). In *suṣupti* there cannot be the experience of the absence of pain or of knowledge, for every negation—abhāva presupposes the knowledge of a counter-correlate—prati-yogin, but what one really experiences is the happiness of one's nature—svarūpasukha and the positive nescience. The unshrouded witnessing consciousness itself constitutes that experience, *i.e.*, immediate perception. Even in the waking state such experience (of pleasure) does exist but like a light exposed to wind it is neither steady nor constant owing to illusory distractions. No doubt on waking one may say—'without pain I slept, nothing was cognised by me'. But then it is not from memory that absence of pain and absence of knowledge are recalled; it is only by presumptive reasoning—arthāpatti, because we cannot account for the recollection of the sleep-experience of happiness and ajñāna, except by presuming the absence of pain and to jñāna in sleep.

The recollection of ajñāna, happiness, and witnessing-consciousness, the three elements rendered explicit when one says—'sukhamaham asvāpsam nakiñcidavediṣam—I slept happily, I knew nothing', is rendered possible by the fact that in sleep the experience of nescience, etc., is not through pure consciousness but through the sākṣin delimited by avidyāvṛtti and this vṛtti after its disappearance leaves impressions behind it. Even when risen from sleep it is the consciousness delimited by avidyā and not by antaḥkaraṇa that has the recollection. Otherwise, if recollection is attributed to consciousness delimited by the internal organ, the substratum of experience—अनुभव, would be different from the substratum of recollection, for in sleep the internal organ is absent. In other words, the man who recalls the happiness of sleep would not be the same man as actually experienced it. Hence to avoid such a contingency it is stated that even after waking the recollecting entity is the consciousness delimited by nescience only.



consciousness (ahampratyaya) is not that which being quite distinct from the cognition of blue, etc., has ātman as its object, or is aham (ahampratyaya) rendered manifest only through the object-cognition; (nor is ātman to be identified with ahamkāra.<sup>129</sup> Therefore the doctrine enunciated by the revered commentator (Bhāṣyakāra, viz., Śamkara) who is alone, the supreme among the knowers of Brahman,<sup>130</sup> who put on the bodily vesture, moved by the one desire to help mankind and with the object of disseminating true knowledge, is to be accepted.<sup>131</sup>

XXVI.95. Here, (i.e., when the query regarding the material cause, etc., of ahamkāra is raised) the answer is given.<sup>132</sup> That

But the 'aham' appearing in सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् is to be regarded as having been superimposed on nescience—delimited consciousness. It is a harmless intrusion. Hence it is that the sleep-experience and its remembrance relate to the same individual—the anubhavitā is the smartā.

<sup>129</sup> नीलादिप्रत्ययादन्य एव आत्मविषयो अहंप्रत्ययः.—According to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas the object of the 'I' notion is the soul or ātman which is inert—jaḍa and is cognised by the inner or mental perception—mānasapratyakṣa, while the cognition of objects is external—bāhya, and is the outcome of sense-contact. विषयानुभवादेव अहमुल्लेखः. The Prābhākaras reject the view that ātman is the content of mental perception but maintain that it manifests itself in every cognition as its substratum—āśraya. Both these views are refuted by the Vedāntin. Residually ātman is for him, self-luminous.

<sup>130</sup> पुण्डरीक means a tiger, here it denotes superiority. It also means a white-lotus.

<sup>131</sup> आगमयितव्यम् is also explained as 'having the scriptural authority'—cf. *Chānd. Up.*, VII. 25. i. 2.

<sup>132</sup> तदुच्यते, etc.,—What follows is in answer to the following questions:—

- (i) Which is the material cause of ahamkāra ?
- (ii) Which is its efficient cause ?
- (iii) What is its nature ?
- (iv) What is its function ?
- (v) From which valid means of knowledge is it proved to exist ? and
- (vi) Why is it not manifest in sleep ?

The text येयं . . . अनादिरविद्या is in answer to (i) ; तस्याः . . .

विशेषः to (ii) ; विज्ञानक्रिया . . . आश्रयः to (iii) ; कर्तृत्व . . .

आधारः . . . यत्संभेदात् . . . प्रसिद्धिमुपगतः to (iv) ; कूटस्थः . . .

अपरोक्षः to (v) ; and स च सुषुप्ते . . . कुतस्त्यः to (vi).



which is variously described in Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa (history), and Purāṇa in different contexts as nāmarūpa,<sup>133</sup> avyākṛta, avidyā, māyā, prakṛti, āgrahaṇa, avyakta, tamas, karaṇa, laya, śakti, mahāsuṣṭi, nidrā, akṣara, ākāśa; that which having prevented caitanya from manifesting itself as of the nature of Brahman which is its essential characteristic, brings about its individuation (jīvatva); that which serves as the wall on which are picture-illusion, action, and residual impressions of past cognitions; that which exists in deep slumber enveloping (āvaraṇa) the light (of ātman) and remaining only as mental traces of the world-projection (vikṣepa)—that is the beginningless avidyā.

96. And of this avidyā, the ahamkāra is a particular transformation (evolute) resulting from its having Parameśvara as

<sup>133</sup> नामरूप—Names and forms; both are anirvacanīya—indefinable, hence avidyā is so designated.

अव्याकृत—Undifferentiated—avidyā remains in pralaya but not name and form which are its differentiations.

अविद्या—Removable by vidyā—knowledge; not found in mukti.

माया—Because it causes like a magician the manifestations of names and forms in that which is secondless—the Absolute.

प्रकृति—This is to ward off the atomic theory of creation held by the Naiyāyikas.

अग्रहण—Because it veils the supreme Bliss.

अव्यक्त—Because it is not perceived by the senses.

तमः—It hides its substratum, viz., Brahman.

कारण—Because other than itself it needs no material cause for world-creation.

लय—In suṣṭi and pralaya the world of duality finds its dissolution in it.

शक्ति—It is Īśvara's might and so controlled by him, unlike the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas which is independent of Puruṣa.

महासुप्ति—Because like sleep it is the cause of the emergence of the world even after the world-dissolution.

निद्रा—Dream; because it is the cause of plurality as in dream.

अक्षर—Indestructible, because it cannot be effaced except by jñāna.

आकाश—Because it is the cause of ākāśa. From this the non-eternality of the elemental ether—bhūtākāśa is indicated.

substratum; it (*viz.*, ahamkāra) is the substratum of jñānaśakti (thought-energy) and kriyāśakti (kinetic energy); it is the sole basis of agency and enjoyment (*i.e.*, it gives rise to notions of doer and enjoyer); it is a light generated by its association with the unchanging intelligence (caitanya); it is self-luminous (for it manifests itself as long as it exists, unlike pot, etc.,—T.D.) and it is immediate cognition, (not inferred as held by the Naiyāyikas. And due to its intimate relation with it (ahamkāra) the unchanging Intelligence (kūṭastha caitanya) has acquired erroneously indeed the vogue of enjoyer, though it is of the nature of the 'not-this' and is the ātman-entity. And whence could it (the 'I' notion) arise in suṣupti where all the transformations (evolutes) of avidyā have been rooted out?—(*i.e.*, ahamkāra has no existence in deep sleep).

97. It should not be thought thus (as the Sāmkhyas do) *i.e.*, since it is only one of the evolutes of its ground (*viz.*, Pradhāna) and not implicit in the sākṣin which manifests the ahamkāra; it (ahamkāra) has that only (*viz.*, pradhāna) as its originator (*i.e.*, material cause).<sup>134</sup> For if it were so, then enjoyment (bhokṛtva) which is its (ahamkāra) essential property, deprived of all relation to the sākṣin would manifest itself only as 'the this' only.<sup>135</sup> But it is not so. And that particular evolute (*viz.*, of avidyā) having been thoughtfully abstracted from ātman which is of the nature

<sup>134</sup> The Sāmkhyas take exception to the Siddhānta-view that ahamkāra is a transformation of avidyā which has consciousness as its substratum. In the Sāmkhya-system the prakṛti or pradhāna independently of puruṣa, the conscious subject, evolves itself into mahat or buddhi which in turn posits ahamkāra as its evolute.

<sup>135</sup> अपाकृताहङ्कृतिसंसर्गः—Here 'ahamkṛti' is used in the sense of sākṣin; अहमिति कृतिः करणं यस्मिन् स साक्षी अहङ्कृतिः—it is in relation to the inner witness that the word 'aham' is used. Hence the phrase means, divested of all association with the inner witness. Avidyā may be regarded either as the śakti (prowess) of the sākṣin, *i.e.*, its property or as that which is superimposed on it (कल्पित). The Sāmkhya countenances neither of these views.

इदं तयैवावभासेत—If the inert pradhāna independently of caitanya is admitted as evolving ahamkāra then the appropriate expression would be 'this is bhoktā—enjoyer' and not 'I am bhoktā'. The latter is possible only on the basis of the relatedness of ahamkāra with the witness.

of the 'not-this' and consciousness, is termed by the Vedānta-philosophers, *antaḥkaraṇa*, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahampratyaayatvaṃ* (i.e., the ground of the 'I-notion') in so far as its cognitive power is concerned, and *prāṇa* in so far as its movement (is concerned). Hence the ego-agency (*ahamkartṛtva*) that is attributed to *ātman* because of its intimate relation with the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is illusory only like the red colour of the crystal stone, due to the superimposition (of the red in the *japākusuma*).

XXVII. 98. [Page 21] How could it be maintained (says the *akhyātivādin*) that the redness of the crystal is illusory?

This is the explanation: If the ocular rays impinging on the crystal were deflected and reached the *japākusuma* (China-rose) then they would encompass (reveal) that red only which inheres in the *japākusuma* (*viśiṣṭa*). But visual apprehension pertaining to colour exclusively, has not hitherto been within one's experience.<sup>136</sup> Nor again has the cognition of the reflected colour alone with no reference to its substratum (*japākusuma*) been ever experienced before.<sup>137</sup>

99. But (it may be argued) just like a pure ruby gem the *japākusuma* also has its lustre and because it is similarly pervasive<sup>138</sup> the crystal also shines as if it were red. Even then it would come to this that what is not red in itself (*viz.*, crystal) appears

<sup>136</sup> The cognition of the bare quality dissociated from the object of which it is the quality is impossible. The quality red is related to the *japākusuma* by *samavāya* (inherence) and there is the relation of conjunction (*samyoga*) between the eye and *japākusuma*, so that when the red is perceived by the *samyukta-samavāya-sambandha*, the *japākusuma*, the substance which is in conjunctive relation must necessarily be perceived.

<sup>137</sup> This is the view held by the *Naiyāyika* and the *Bhāṭṭa*—the red only of *japākusuma* is reflected in the crystal; because we fail to note the distinction between the crystal and the red, the red is cognised as identical with the crystal. The identity cognition is illusory.

<sup>138</sup> *व्याप्तत्वात्-प्रतिबिम्बितत्वात्*—The *Naiyāyika*-view is that the illusion is caused by the *samsarga* being erroneous; the redness—*lohita*, is real but its relation with the crystal is erroneous. The *Siddhāntin* argues that since the relation is admitted to be false the cognition of red must be illusory, the definition of *adhyāsa* being—अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यासः व्याप्तत्वात् would mean—अगृह्यमाणभेदकत्वात् according to the *Akhyātivādin*,

erroneously as red. (Hence the relation of red with the crystal is illusory.)

It may be argued that it is the lustre only (of japākusuma) that shines red and not that the crystal (appears red).

*Siddhāntin*: Then whiteness also would shine in the crystal (because the crystal is not seen as red). But if it be said that it is obstructed (apasāritam—lit. driven out) by the lustre then how could it being colourless, become an object of sight? And the ocular perception of the crystal (as red) cannot be attributed to its relation with a coloured substance (*viz.*, prabhā). For then the same thing would have to be said of air (when it is in conjunction with a coloured substance); nor again could it be averred that due to the lustre, redness is (actually) produced in it (crystal) for then the crystal would continue to shine red even subsequent (to the removal of japākusuma).

100. It has been argued so far assuming the lustre (of japākusuma). The lustre of the ruby, etc., shines before us even without its substratum—(*i.e.*, the lustre is perceived though the ruby is not within sight); the same is not the case with the japākusuma. This being so, just as in the crystal there exists the illusory relation of the upādhi (*viz.*, japākusuma), in ātman there exists the illusory relation of ahamkāra; hence on account of the (erroneous) relation of these dual forms (cit and acit—the intelligence and the inert) it becomes as it were a knot (granthi) so that ahamkāra is spoken of as granthi (*i.e.*, a tangle of the conscious and unconscious elements).

XXVIII.101. There (*i.e.*, in the crystal-red cognition) because the crystal (which is covered by upādhi) is an inert substance the perception of the superimposed (*viz.*, the redness) is not dependent on it (crystal).<sup>139</sup> On the contrary the relation of cit (*i.e.*, between cit and antaḥkaraṇa) though in the absence of any mental

---

<sup>139</sup> We must presume an objection here; the crystal cannot reveal what is erroneously imposed upon it, so also ātman cannot reveal the 'ahamkāra' which is imposed on it. The answer is that in the case of the crystal there is inertness (jaḍatva) and so it has no power to manifest the redness, whereas the relation of cit (with ahamkāra) manifests itself even in the absence of the cognitive activity required for revealing ahamkāra and its properties. The reason is that ahamkāra is in relation with cit which not only reveals itself but also the object in association with it.

activity,<sup>140</sup> (*i.e.*, of the psychosis of the internal organ) relating to it, manifests itself by its potency. Hence (because its manifestation depends on cit), it (ahamkāra) is stated to be of 'the this' aspect considered in its real nature and not according to usage.<sup>141</sup> In the sphere of ordinary experience however, that by whose association the agency of that which is of the essence of the 'not this' is illusory (is the ahamkāra); the self, only as identifying itself with ahamkāra and intimately associated with its activity has its experience through the vṛtti of that (*viz.*, of the external world such as the body, senses, etc.), and that alone (*viz.*, the ahamkāra) is the object of the nature of the 'this'.

102. It is on account of this that some people are under the delusion that the notion of ego (aham) manifests itself as disconnected altogether with what is characterised as the 'this'.<sup>142</sup> It is indeed seen that though on the strength of its real nature (lakṣaṇataḥ) it is fit to be so expressed (*i.e.*, as the 'this') it does not fall under the 'that' category. For instance, from the sprout up to the fruit all the changes of the tree are product of the gradual transformation of the earth substance, as it is the case with 'pot' and 'ant-hill' but yet usage is different, (the tree is

<sup>140</sup> The Naiyāyikas regard ātman as unconscious and maintain that consciousness is induced in it by the action of the external world on it—this is jñānavyāpāra constituted by the objects coming into contact with the senses, the latter with the mind and the mind in turn with ātman. Then only does ātman reveal the objects. The Siddhānta-view is that ātman being self-luminous does not always require cognitive activity for revealing objects; where there is immediate relation between the luminous self and the object there the object is revealed at once as in the case of ahamkāra. In the perception of external objects like pot, however, there is a gap and to bridge it the vṛttirūpavyāpāra is required.

<sup>141</sup> In ordinary usage (vyavahārataḥ) no doubt (*e.g.*, in aham bhoktā) the ahamkāra points to the 'not-this' but in its essential feature (lakṣaṇataḥ) it points to the 'this'. Because ahamkāra is the viśaya of cit, it is jaḍa—inert.

<sup>142</sup> अत एव—अज्ञानमात्रव्यवधानादेव; वृत्त्यादिव्यवधानाभावादेव. The contrast between the cognition of ahamkāra and of the objective world is this that while ajñāna intervenes as regards the former the vṛtti intervenes as regards the latter. Because the mediacy of the vṛtti is absent and only ajñāna intervenes some people conclude that ahamkāra denotes ātman and as such is not to be characterised as the 'this'.

not spoken of as composed of earth though the other two are); as for thoughtful men, they do not consider that usage even (*viz.*, the non-inclusion of ahamkāra under the 'this' element) as a matter of much seriousness. Hence, it has already been stated that for those who, like the scrutiniser of coins, examine and decide the nature of the ego-notion with more than ordinary skill, the ahamkāra is (apparently) mixed up with the 'this' aspect.

103. Now as regards the illustration of the reflection of the face in the mirror as well as of the moon in water, what is intended to bring home is the fact that the 'not-this' (ātman) as evidenced in the expression 'I am doer' is an entity not distinct from Brahman but on the contrary that only, just as the reflected image is not distinct from the object. [Page 22] It is to point out that (in the mirror-instance) the only elements to be regarded as illusory are their (*viz.*, object and reflection) appearance as distincts (the one as different from the other), and appearance as contrawise (*i.e.*, the object and the reflection appearing opposite to each other).<sup>143</sup>

XXIX.104. How is (one to know) that it is the same as that? Because of the cognition of the essentially identical object. For instance, with whatsoever individual trait Devadatta is found when he is outside (the house) with the same trait he will be found even when he has entered the house; in the same manner (Devadatta) even when (reflected) in the mirror (is identical with Devadatta that is outside). And that (cognition of identity, *i.e.*, recognition) would not be intelligible if it (the object reflected) were different. Again if it were a different object it should be stated on the basis of presumptive evidence that the mirror itself when in the vicinity of the object transforms itself into the features of the object-as-contained-within-it.<sup>144</sup> It cannot be argued that

<sup>143</sup> It might be objected that the example from the mirror, etc., is unnecessary since the superimposition of the self and the not-self could be adduced from the example of the crystal-China-rose. The answer is that in the latter redness similar to the redness of the China-rose is imposed on the crystal and not that the two are identical. What is made clear in the former is the identity of the individual soul and the Absolute.

<sup>144</sup> If the reflected image is distinct it must then be a product and the mirror its material cause. What the Siddhāntin wants to show is that if identity is not admitted it would amount to regarding the image as a transformation—*pariṇāma* of the mirror.



it (reflection) is of the nature of a mark left by the object (bimba) similar to the impress of a seal, because of the incompatibility of size and of the absence of contact.<sup>145</sup> If it be so the mirror whose transformation was brought about by the vicinity of the object would remain in the same state (*i.e.*, the reflection would persist) even when the object is removed.

105-6. And it ought not to be thought that the analogy of the rolled-up mat getting spread out by some (nimitta) kārāṇa (say, stretching with the hands) and rolling itself up (assuming its previous state) the moment the cause disappears, applies here. For there, the cause of the mat again turning over upon itself is the samskāra, produced by its having been kept rolled up for a considerable time (and not the removal of the nimittakārāṇa). As such, until the destruction of this capacity (samskāra) there occurs the self-folding as soon as the cause of spreading out (*i.e.*, keeping it stretched with one's hands) is removed. Hence the mirror which has changed into the shape of the object owing to the fact that the object has been in its neighbourhood for long, would remain till one's life-time in the same state even when that (object) has disappeared; but it is not perceived as such. If,—another analogy may be brought to the fore—however it is pointed out that the lotus bud whose transformation into a blossom is effected by the sun's light, closes again into the form of the bud at the same time as the light vanishes even though that light has remained with it long, (it should be borne in mind) that what constituted the cause of the earliest bud (*i.e.*, the very first bud as it shoots forth), *viz.*, the activity (active process) of the earth-and-water-components of the lotus operates also when again reverting to the bud-state. When that ceases, the faded-flower is not seen to again close into the bud. In the case of the mirror on the other hand there exists no such cause as brought about its former state (purvarūpa).<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> The seal-analogy is inappropriate because the size of the seal and that of impress are the same, but the sizes of the object and the image may vary. Again there is no contact here as in the case of the seal and the material on which it is imprinted.

<sup>146</sup> As it existed before changing into the reflected image; there is not present the activity of the mechanic who made the mirror for it to assume its former even state as in the case of the lotus-bud.



107. Here (the opponent of the doctrine that the object and the image are identical) says—let it be conceded that there is no distinct object, but the assertion, ‘that alone is that’ (*i.e.*, that pratibimba is nothing but bimba) cannot be tolerated, for it is perceived that the silver (appearing) in the nacre though unreal, manifests itself as identical in nature with the real silver.<sup>147</sup>

It is not so. There (in the shell-silver cognition) because of the sublation it is regarded as illusory. Here no sublation of the image as such is in evidence. The disappearance of that (*i.e.*, the image on the removal of the mirror is not a case of sublation; for then it (sublation) would overtake the mirror also.<sup>148</sup>

108. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, is not sublation evident from the sentence ‘That thou art’?

*Siddhāntin.*—Not so; there (in the sentence) ‘that thou (art)’ what is intimated is that the individual soul (jīva) which is in the position of the image (pratibimba) is of the nature of Brahman occupying the position of the object (bimba). Otherwise the sentence would not be (of the form)—‘that thou art’ but would be ‘thou art not’ like ‘silver is not’.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>147</sup> What the pūrvapakṣin means is that though the image may not be a separate object it is an erroneous cognition like that of the silver in the shell. The Pañcapādika on the contrary maintains that the image is real since it does not differ in essence from its proto-type.

<sup>148</sup> The contention is that the shell-silver analogy does not hold good in the case of the object-reflection-cognition. In the case of shell-silver, silver as such is negated and ‘this is not silver’ is the form in which the negation is expressed. The particular spot in which the ‘silver’ appears is not alone negated. If it had been, we could have had recognition, expressed thus—‘here silver is not’. Here however the sublation is not of the object (fact) as such. The judgment does not take the form—this is not my face, but here (in the mirror) the face is not, thus negating only the particular spot—deśa. After the negation of the locus we get the recognition—‘the face is mine only’, and that recognition is not negated. The being in the mirror is alone illusory. The object and the image are one and the same. If the mere fact of the disappearance of the image is construed as a case of sublation then since the mirror has been removed we would be forced to say that it also has been sublated—a view which is palpably wrong.

<sup>149</sup> The opponent contends that when the right knowledge arises the reflection should be sublated altogether as is evident from the

109. [Page 23] Moreover the śāstraic usage also confirms the view that the reflection is in reality identical with the object. "At no time, should one see the sun when he is just rising, when he is setting, when he is eclipsed, when he is reflected in water, and when he has reached the mid-sky."<sup>150</sup>

110. He who thinks that it is not the original (bimba) alone, that as existing outside itself is revealed by the visual rays which have turned back from the reflector but that the original remaining in its own place (*viz.*, the neck) is revealed by the rays which having impinged upon the mirror turn back and proceed in the opposite direction—him, experience itself condemns; as such his view is not controverted.<sup>151</sup>

111. *Prābhākara*.—How could, that which is circumscribed, singles, of the nature of being one (*ekasvabhāva*) and which manifests itself in its wholeness in two separate regions, be absolutely in both?<sup>152</sup>

*mahāvākya*—'That thou art'. Unless the 'thou', *viz.*, the individual soul is sublated there is no liberation. Hence, he maintains that the *mahāvākya* is a case of बाधायं सामानाधिकरण्यम्. The *Siddhānta*-view is that it is a case of ऐक्ये सामानाधिकरण्यम् as exemplified in सोऽयं देवदत्तः. It is a case of recognition; as such the reflection is not sublated. With the rise of right knowledge, the individual self is not sublated but is recognised as one with the universal self. The absolute is the original—बिम्ब and the world is the reflection—प्रतिबिम्ब. *Brh.*, *Up.*, II. iv. 12; *Bhāṣya*, S.L.S., pp. 75 ff.; *N.S.*, II. 29.

<sup>150</sup> In the illustration quoted from *Dharmaśāstra*, among the adjectives which all relate to the real sun we have *vāristham*—reflected in water. Hence the reflection is also real.

<sup>151</sup> This view is advocated by *Prabhākara* who does not admit illusion of any kind. The appearance of the face in the mirror—भिन्नदेशस्थत्व is for him a case of non-discrimination. There is no reflection at all; the proto-type alone is apprehended. The *Siddhānta*-view is that the appearance in the mirror is illusion.

<sup>152</sup> कथं पुनः—The *Siddhānta*-view that the reflection is as real as the original is objected to on the ground that the face—a single object cannot have two loci at the same time. The epithets used are significant:—परिच्छिन्न; that is to exclude ether which though single is all-pervading; नक—integral, unlike distinct objects like pot and mat which may occupy different places; एकस्वभाव by its very nature it is one, unlike the relation of conjunction (संयोग) which presupposes a double loci; सर्वात्मना—if it had parts we could understand certain

*Siddhāntin.*—We do not say that the manifestation (of a single object) in separate spots (at the same time) is absolutely real, but (we maintain) *ekatva* (oneness). The appearance (of the object) as distinct is the display of *māyā* and as is well-known there is nothing incongruous to *māyā*. That (*Māyā*) indeed is adept in creating improbabilities.

XXX.112. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Even when the identity of the reflection with the original is cognised there (still) exists the erroneous manifestation of separateness, etc., pertaining to it (*i.e.*, the reflection); similarly even when the identity of the individual soul with Brahman is cognised (through study and reflection), there does exist the erroneous manifestation of separation, etc. (between the *jīva* and Brahman) which cannot be got rid of (*i.e.*, even though one is cognizant of the oneness with the Absolute one cannot get rid of the notion of one's separation from the Absolute).

*Siddhāntin.*—This is how it is met. The reason is that what is reflected is only Devadatta's insentient part. Even admitting that what is reflected is insentient (we say) that just as the duskiness of the mirror—the cause of reflection—(affects the reflected image) even so being pervaded (*lit.* assailed) by the inertness of the mirror that reflection (of Devadatta's face) does not cognise its identity with the proto-type (*bimba*). Because it is inert (it is not sentient as held by the *Cārvāka*). And such is experience (*i.e.*, experience corroborates that reflection is insentient); without the movement of the *bimba* the *pratibimba* does not move.<sup>153</sup>

113. Indeed when illusion arises in a person whether in relation to himself (*e.g.*, as in 'I am enjoyer', etc.) or in something extrinsic (as in 'shell-silver') that illusion is sublated by

---

parts being in one place and certain others elsewhere, but the face though not such is supposed to occupy a double loci.

<sup>153</sup> The objection may be stated thus: Just as in our experience the reflection of Devadatta's face in water cannot cognise its identity with the proto-type, even so the *jīva* cannot cognise its identity with Brahman. The answer is that the analogy does not hold good, for Devadatta's face is inert while *jīva* is not. Even supposing that Devadatta's reflection is sentient—the view held by the *Cārvākas*, the reflection, it must be pointed out, is sullied by the inertness of the mirror and as such it cannot cognise its identity, with the face. But as a matter of fact Devadatta's body that is reflected is inert only.

the right knowledge appertaining only to him.<sup>154</sup> Devadatta who understands his identity (lit. non-separateness) with the reflection is untouched by the defects belonging to it.<sup>155</sup> And neither is the reflection sublated merely by the right knowledge, because the cause of reflection, *viz.*, mirror is real (*i.e.*, in a relative sense—laukikapāramāṛthika).<sup>156</sup>

The jīva on the other hand which may be likened to reflection is of the nature of cit (sentience) as is within the cognizance of us all and is not pervaded by the inertness pertaining to the inner sense. And that (jīva) entertains the notion of self-agency (*i.e.*, of itself as of the nature of active agent) but not of its oneness with Brahman which resembles the original (bimba).<sup>157</sup> Hence

---

<sup>154</sup> यस्य हि भ्रान्तिः—This is in answer to the objection that the knowledge dispelling ignorance has to arise in Brahman as it does in the case of, say, Devadatta, since both stand in the position of bimba. The illusion, the Siddhāntin urges, belongs to jīva and not to Brahman. Error pertains to jīva and as such it can be eradicated only by the right knowledge of jīva. But Brahman is free from ignorance.

<sup>155</sup> यस्तु जानीते, etc.—The question is raised whether Brahman cognises its identity with the reflection, *viz.*, jīva or not. In the former alternative Brahman would be subject to transmigration like jīva, in the latter it ceases to be omniscient. The reply is that though Devadatta is convinced of his identity with the reflection he knows that the characteristics of the reflection do not belong to him, even so Brahman though aware of its identity with jīva is untouched by its transmigratory character; for Brahman is eternally free and being omniscient knows that samsāra is illusory.

<sup>156</sup> As regards the reflection in the mirror though the knowledge of its identity with the original arises the reflection is not sublated; hence doubt arises whether illusion will be destroyed even after the rise of the knowledge of unity. But there is a fundamental difference between the ordinary relational knowledge which has no power to destroy the upādhi—the mirror; and the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman with ātman, which when it destroys the mist covering Brahman destroys all upādhis, internal sense included, root and branch. This is in answer to the objection raised to start with—*vide* ननु सत्येव, etc., above.

<sup>157</sup> If jīva is of the essence of consciousness—चिद्रूपत्वे, where is the need, it may be asked, for study and reflection. But though jīva is in reality consciousness itself like Brahman, since it is under the blinding darkness of ignorance, study and contemplation are

it is reasonable that the illusion should disappear with the knowledge of its nature (as Brahman, because of the disappearance of upādhi, viz., the inner sense, etc.).

114. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Is it not a fact that there (i.e., in the cognition of reflection and crystal-red) a real thing which constitutes the cause of illusion, such as the mirror or the China-rose, is in close proximity of the person who is deluded? Here (in ātman) in every case of the superimposition of non-sentence (including egoity, etc.), when a person is attracted by illusory diversions no such real object exists in the vicinity?

*Siddhāntin*.—That such a doubt may not arise they (Scriptures) give the rope-serpent example.<sup>158</sup>

XXXI. 115. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, even there (i.e., in the rope-serpent) if indeed the serpent is not in the vicinity now (at the present moment) still the saṃskāra (impression) of the experience which must have arisen in the past certainly does exist; (this saṃskāra is itself the upādhi).

*Siddhāntin*.—It is true (that there exists the cause afforded by the persistent impressions). Even here the notion of the agency of the Self and its residual impression are beginningless like the seed-sprout (series) and since their relation as cause and effect will be later demonstrated (*vide*, S. Bh. I. 4 and II. 1) there exists the saṃskāra as the ground of illusion.<sup>159</sup>

116. [Page 24] There (in the red-crystal) the non-relation of the red colour with the crystal becomes evident on the basis of anirvacanīyatā (the principle of inexplicability, or on that of sublation by jñāna) though the crystal, etc., possessing parts are

necessary as means to generate the final psychosis which dispels that ignorance. The agency of jīva is only māyic—illusory.

<sup>158</sup> In the two examples intended to illustrate superimposition there are tangible upādhis, viz., the mirror and the China-rose but in the case of the superimposition of ahaṃkāra on ātman there exists no such upādhi. The analogy in the latter is the rope-serpent and there is no upādhi. The first two come under 'sopādhika-bhrama'—conditioned-illusion; while the third comes under 'nirupādhika-bhrama'—unconditioned-illusion.

<sup>159</sup> Saṃskāra or residual impression is essential in all cases of superimposition, but in the superimposition of red—लौहिस्य on the crystal or of agency on ātman we have in addition the japākusuma and the internal sense as nimitta respectively. But in the rope-serpent and the ego अहन्ताध्यास saṃskāra alone serves as upādhi.

fit to be so related; still (the person under delusion) imagines as if (the redness which is) reflected in the crystal is related to it (crystal). In the rope on the other hand there arises only the serpent-notion and neither the idea of relation nor of non-relation.<sup>160</sup> From (examples such as) these, the non-relational character of ātman as vouched for in the Scriptural tests, viz., “Ātman is unattached, for it does not attach itself”, Brh. Up., 4-4, 22; “This person is unattached”, etc., is not clearly brought out. With this in view the example of ether-in-the-pot (is adduced). There (in the pot-ether) indeed, apart from reminding it (viz., the limitation constituted by the ‘pot’), difference, form, serviceability and name are not perceived as belonging to itself.<sup>161</sup>

117. And all this aggregate of examples is for the purpose of removing the doubt that may arise regarding what has been established by the Scriptures, conformatory logic and experience, and also for mental concord;<sup>162</sup> it is not for directly stabilising the thing itself (viz., ātman).

---

<sup>160</sup> In the rope-serpent no question of either relation or non-relation arises for the object of cognition is single, whereas in the case of crystal-red, etc., there are two cognitions and yet through nescience their non-identity is not perceived. None of the three examples given above brings out indubitably the non-relatedness (asaṅgatā) of ātman. Hence the jar-space (ghaṭākāśa) illustration, where it is obvious that the ākāśa confined within the jar has no connection with the jar. Only the non-relatedness of the individual soul is exemplified and not its nature.

<sup>161</sup> The space in the jar can acquire none of the following properties when disassociated from the limiting condition, viz., the jar:—bheda—distinction between jar-ether and cauldron-ether, say; rūpa—as of small contour; kārya—serving as a receptacle; samākhyā—having a name as jar-ether.

<sup>162</sup> One may well doubt the need for Scriptural evidence when the illustrations adduced here are adequate to bring home the real nature of ātman. The mirror-reflection illustration points to the singleness—ekatva; the crystal-red and the rope-serpent illustrations point to the unchangeability—avikāritva; and the jar-ether illustration is to show the detached character—asaṅgatva of ātman. The answer is that illustrations are meant only to corroborate what is established by a pramāṇa. Here of course the śabda-pramāṇa—verbal testimony is supreme in proof of the existence and nature of ātman.

118. That being so, no doubt (ātman) which is 'consciousness entire' cannot be an object since it is of the nature of the 'not this'; but still when (associated) with the ego-notion (asmatpratayaya) it becomes fit for vyavahāra, so that in a figurative sense it is spoken of as the ego-notion (asmatpratayaya); because the fitness of an object of cognition for vyavahāra never strays (the figurative use is tenable since ātman has vyavahāra-yogyatva).

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, if it be said that superimposition is (prerequisite) for vyavahāra and that fitness for practical purpose is dependent on the ego-notion which is the outcome of superimposition, does it not result in reciprocal dependence?

No, (this argument has been refuted on the ground of (the adhyāsā) being beginningless.

XXXII. 119. There the particular activity described by the term jñāna belonging to the 'this' aspect of what has thus become ahamkāra (*i.e.*, the notion 'I am doer'), because it is transitive in sense, conveys a reference to the object and produces some result in that which is its āśraya (*i.e.*, its abode),<sup>163</sup> for it is the nature of (all) action to effect a change in that in which it inheres. And that (avasthāviśeṣa) is described as the relation of the cogniser with the cognised and it is like the particular change (atiśaya, say, reaching the village) produced in the kartā (*i.e.*, the man who is proceeding to it) by the action (of going).<sup>164</sup> The inner

<sup>163</sup> तत्र—When ātman is proved to be the object in the ego-notion.

एवं भूतस्य—Of the cit which through superimposition of ajñāna has become identical with the antaḥkaraṇa.

इदमंशस्य—Of the 'this aspect', *viz.*, the antaḥkaraṇa involved in the ego-notion.

ज्ञान—The mental mode or psychosis.

व्यापारविशेषः—अन्तःकरणपरिणामविशेषः—The modal change of the internal organ, *i.e.*, vṛtti.

कर्मकारकाभिमुखम्—Pointing to the object.

स्वाश्रये-अन्तःकरणे—In the internal organ which is the seat of the vṛtti.

अवस्थाविशेषम्—ज्ञातृज्ञेयसंबन्धरूपम्—A certain result, *viz.*, the relation as between the cogniser and the object cognised. The vṛtti which is a mode of the internal organ brings about the relation between the internal organ and the object.

<sup>164</sup> The reading should be प्राप्नोति क्रियाहितकर्तृस्थकर्मविशेषसंबन्धवत्.



sense (antaḥkaraṇa) only as related to a particular object through that (*i.e.*, the vṛtti) particularises the caitanya (ghaṭāvacchinna-caitanya for instance).<sup>165</sup>

120. When the modal change—antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti, begins to function, that which is in the objective relation also (say, the jar) when impinged upon by the vṛtti, because it is the vivarta (transformation) of caitanya, manifests the consciousness (jar-caitanya) which is identical with the consciousness conditioned by the particular aspect (*viz.*, the relation of the cogniser and the cognised) constituted by agency, which aspect (again) is generated by the vṛtti (pradhānakriyā).<sup>166</sup> And then the particular aspect of

<sup>165</sup> The caitanya being everywhere shrouded by avidyā is incapable of revealing objects but whatever form the internal organ assumes by its contact with objects that very form the caitanya also takes. In other words the caitanya particularised by the internal organ which is in contact with an object, manifests that object—विषय संसृष्टान्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं तदाकारमवभासते.

It is like the fire assuming the form of a square when a four-cornered object is burning (*V.*, p. 70).

<sup>166</sup> Just as the internal organ which is the vivarta or appearance of caitanya manifests caitanya, so also does the object which is again the vivarta of caitanya; the conditioning vṛtti is vivarta, the conditioned also, *viz.*, the jar in our example, is vivarta; it too therefore becomes the manifestor of caitanya. The same caitanya is manifested by two indicators—vṛtti and viśaya. Hence the appositeness of the usage—‘the jar is cognised by me’ (मया घटो ज्ञातः). In the result consciousness manifests itself both as the cogniser and the cognised. In other words, there now arises the tādātmya-sambandha or identity-relation between the object-limited-consciousness and the internal-sense-limited-consciousness. This is how the perception of the external world becomes possible.

कर्मकारकमपि—घटादिस्वकर्मकारकमपि ; प्रधानक्रियासिद्धौ—अन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तिसिद्धौ which means that the vṛtti has reached the object, *viz.*, pot स्वव्यापाराविष्टम्—अन्तःकरणवृत्तिव्यापारेण सहितम् ; प्रधानक्रियाहित *etc.*, प्रधानक्रिय—वृत्त्या, आहितः= उत्पादित ; प्रमात्रवस्थाविशेषः-प्रमातु-ज्ञातुः, ज्ञेयेन साकं संबन्धरूपः अवस्थाविशेषः.

The relation of the knower with the object of cognition is its specific aspect.

तदवच्छिन्नापरोक्षता—संबन्धावच्छिन्नचैतन्यम् ; तदेकरूपम् चैतन्याभिन्नम् ; चैतन्यविवर्तत्वात्-घटस्यापि अन्तःकरणादिवत् चैतन्यविवर्तत्वात् ; स्वगताम्—अन्तःकरण एव स्वस्मिन्नपि विद्यमानाम् ; अपरोक्षताम्—चैतन्यम् ; अभिव्यनक्ति-चैतन्यच्छाया-मुद्गाहयति—बिभृत्तावरणं करोति.

ātman brought about by the particular modal change of the internal organ constitutes (its cognisership).<sup>167</sup> That is the phala (*i.e.*, the result of the cognitive process) which is none other than the immediate perception revealing the object and spoken of as the experience of the object—(viṣayānubhava).<sup>168</sup> so that the phala has the same object as the kriyā (*i.e.*, vṛtti).<sup>169</sup> When this is so, (*i.e.*, when the vṛtti, *i.e.*, kriyā and anubhava phala point to the same object and have the same locus, *viz.*, the jar and ātman is erroneously identified with the ego), the ego ('ahamkartā') assumes the role of cogniser both on the strength of its consciousness aspect and of its association with the vṛtti; and as such it is said that the puruṣa (the self) cognises the object presented in the intellect.<sup>170</sup>

<sup>167</sup> When the same consciousness is conditioned by the internal organ as well as by the object, how is it, it may be asked, that the term pramātā—cogniser, is restricted to the consciousness conditioned by the internal organ? The answer is that in the absence of vṛtti—psychosis, cognisability cannot be ascribed to ātman and vṛtti is the modal change of the internal organ. Hence the consciousness conditioned by the internal organ and functioning as vṛtti alone can become the pramātā, and not consciousness particularised by 'pot' for the latter is void of vṛtti.

<sup>168</sup> The objection may be raised that since the consciousness conditioned by the object and the consciousness conditioned by the internal organ are identical, the cognition of the object—viṣayānubhava need not be the phala. The answer is that there is no room for confusion since the upādhis are distinct. The phalatva results when the consciousness is conditioned by the object and pramāṭṛtva when the consciousness is conditioned by the internal organ.

<sup>169</sup> इति—फलस्य विषयस्यापरोक्षेकरसरूपत्वेन.—The phala is the cit as reflected in the jar through the agency of the vṛtti or kārya. The point is that in the cognition of an object the cit of the vṛtti and the cit of the jar become identical and hence both the vṛtti and anubhava have the same āśraya.

<sup>170</sup> In the system of Sāmkhya it is the intellect (buddhi) only that comes in contact with the object and undergoes modification. How the self cognises is accounted for by the postulation of akhyāti, *i.e.*, though puruṣa is in reality detached, through lack of discrimination, he imagines that he is cognising. This technique so far as the modification of the intellect on coming into contact with the object is concerned, is accepted by the Vedānta; but it goes further, and discarding the view that the insentient intellect can apprehend the object

121. And there, the anubhava of the self-luminous cogniser, an entity revealed from its contact with the object, though embracing all objects, because of its all-pervadingness (aparokṣa-tayā) is restricted only to that (*viz.*, the object) since along with the combination of other accessories (such as the senses, etc.), it brings about the activity of the pradhānakriyā (vṛtti); with whatever karmakāraka (a thing that is in the objective relation), the main activity in the form of vṛtti is in contact, that thing only (*i.e.*, the cit reflected in it) is the anubhava and none other. And with whatsoever person the karmakāraka jointly serves as the means (of the activity of the vṛtti), that person alone has the immediate cognition just as contact with the village is of the person (who has journeyed to reach the village).<sup>171</sup>

XXXIII. 122. *Objection:* [Page 25] If objects like blue (pot), etc., are of the nature of aparokṣa (*i.e.*, immediate cognition) it amounts to the same thing as saying that jñāna (samvit) is of the nature of blue. Hence it is as good as maintaining the Māhāyānika contention.<sup>172</sup>

*Answer:* It is not so; blue and yellow manifest themselves each excluding the other, but aparokṣatā (jñāna) on the other hand is not so; for it is comprehended as a single entity though the cognitions (of objects) manifest themselves as disparate. Hence (blue, etc.), are not of that nature (*i.e.*, of jñāna). If it had been so then jñāna would also manifest itself like that only (*i.e.*, like

---

affirms, that it must be informed by the cit before any such apprehension is possible—*V.*, p 71.

<sup>171</sup> The awareness of the object is restricted to the person whose mental modification in the form of vṛtti has impinged upon that very object. The sphere of experience therefore is limited to the particular self. This is 'puruṣānīyama'. The sphere of objectivity—viṣayānīyama is likewise limited. In neither case can the charge of overpervasiveness be maintained.

<sup>172</sup> It has been maintained that the identity of the cit as reflected in the internal organ and the cit as circumscribed by the object, say pot, brought about by the vṛtti is the cause of the object-cognition. If so, urges the critic, it is not different from the Buddhist doctrine, *viz.*, that the internal vijñāna externalises itself in the so-called object-cognition and that the object as such has no independent status. The idealist vijñānavādin and the nihilist mādhyaṃika are both comprised in the term 'mahāyānist'. But here the vijñānavādin is meant as he alone holds the view that objects are but thought-forms (jñānākāra).

the external object) one excluding the other. But it does not so (reveal itself).

Moreover, even by them (the Vijñānavādins) is it admitted that as distinct from the consciousness of the blue there is a separate cognitive entity (vikalpa) of the nature of internal consciousness (lit. that which is internally manifest as 'aham') which is turned away from (*i.e.*, unrelated to) the external (like pot, etc.), which is characterised by immediacy and which ends in its own self.<sup>173</sup> And the blue (object) it is evident is experienced as distinct from that which is pratyak (*i.e.*, the ego-consciousness), and as the 'this', which is of the nature of an object of cognition. Hence it is obvious that there are two entities which are of the nature of the apprehender and the apprehended and which are mutually exclusive.

123. *Vijñānavādin*.—No, it is not so; since both (*i.e.*, the ego-consciousness and the blue) are self-cognising how could there arise the distinction between the object and the subject (*i.e.*, the cogniser and the cognised)?

*Siddhāntin*: How then (do you account for) the distinct manifestation of the cogniser and cognised as evidenced in (the statement) 'I know this'—'ahamidam jānāmi'?

*Vijñānavādin*: This is not such manifestation (*i.e.*, of the cogniser and the cognised—grāhya-grāhaka), but as 'aham'

<sup>173</sup> तैरपि, etc.—The Yogācāra also admits determinate knowledge; in the proposition 'I perceive blue'—अहं नीले पश्यामि,—the blue manifests itself as object and the 'I-consciousness' (ālayavijñāna) manifests itself as subject and because the difference between the 'I-consciousness and object is unmistakable it is evident that the ālayavijñāna is distinct from the object 'blue'. No doubt the yogācāra avers that it is only the pravṛtti-vijñāna (like the cognition of jar, etc., as contrasted with ālayavijñāna which is 'aham') that is non-distinct from the blue, etc., and not ālayavijñāna, but in the commentary the distinction between aham and blue is sought to be proved. This statement therefore appears to be superfluous. Still it must be remembered that ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna are not distinct. They are different names of the ego according to its different modes of operation. When the distinction between ālayavijñāna and blue is proved, it is as good as proving the distinction between pravṛttivijñāna and blue.—*cf.* T.D., p.

The phrase नीलात्मकसंज्ञित् means नील only—*V.*, p. 73. The 'vikalpa' is the determinate cognition, *viz.*, 'aham'. स्वरूपमात्रे पर्यवस्यति points only to itself—self-regarding.

(the ego-consciousness), 'idam' ('this' consciousness), and 'jānāmi' (cognition of cognition,—jñānaviṣayaka-jñāna) they are mutually exclusive determinate cognitions.

*Siddhāntin*: How then (do you account for) this knowledge of the (prior-posterior) relation between them when there is not even so much as a mutual exchange of glances (*i.e.*, when not even a remote connection exists among these cognitions)?

*Vijñānavādin*: That is a distinct cognition, complex in character, generated by the immediate preceding cognition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) conjoined by the impressions (left behind by the isolated determinate cognitions of 'aham' and 'idam'); and here is no knowledge of relation.<sup>174</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: How is it that your worthiness (sarcastic) elaborates a technique such as would not conform to experience?

*Vijñānavādin*: Because entities which suffer instant destruction cannot subserve any practical purpose. It is only when what is denoted by 'aham' (*i.e.*, ātman or vijñāna) is of an enduring nature, there would arise the relation with the 'blue' which is also enduring, as the result of the activity (of vijñāna), and then there would be the immediate cognition also of 'blue', etc., dependent upon that activity; but they are not enduring.<sup>175</sup>

<sup>174</sup> The two past cognitions—'aham' and 'idam' are there as impressions—vāsanās and the cognition—'jānāmi' in conjunction with the vāsanās produces a distinct unit-cognition which assumes the form 'I know this—ahamidam jānāmi'. Hence without the necessity of any relation a single cognition does arise. This is the yogācāra-answer to the abjection that in the absence of relation the cognition—'ahamidam jānāmi', is inexplicable. The yogācāra 'does not admit any relation outside the terms'.

<sup>175</sup> The identity of vijñāna and object is not, says the Yogācāra, attempted to be proved on the testimony of experience but on the fact that cognisability (grāhyatva) itself is dependent on the identity. No relation could be brought about between entities which last no more than a moment. Vijñāna and blue are both momentary and unless they endure for a time, the activity of vijñāna and of object essential for subject-object contact is impossible and as such grāhyatva would be impossible too. Hence objects must be regarded as but thought-forms. The relation between thought and object is adventitious and this cannot arise between entities which are momentary. Hence the relation between vijñāna and the external object can only be one of non-difference.

124. *Siddhāntin*: If that be so (*i.e.*, if momentariness is accepted) the ego-cognition should be regarded as an unrelated unique particular svalakṣaṇa) changing moment by moment. Now, let those people tell us who do not conceal their own experience (svapratyakṣam) whether that (unceasing change) is a fact or not.

*Vijñānavādīn*: There is distinctness, but it is not perceived owing to extreme similarity (between momentary cognitions which are in reality distincts).

*Siddhāntin*: If the distinctness (bheda) is regarded as of the very nature of jñāna (samvit) and if there is not its manifestation then the whole universe would be an absolute blank.<sup>176</sup>

Again the postulation of similarity to account for the manifestation of unit-cognition (tadrūpa=aikyarūpa) is opposed to pramāṇa and is unsupported by any pramāṇa.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Since the unit-cognition is illusory, it is not opposed to pramāṇa; nor is it unsupported by pramāṇa for illusion is impossible without a cause.<sup>177</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> यद्येवं-अहमिति, etc.—Now begins the discussion regarding the continuous existence of ātman which the Vedāntin establishes on the strength of recognition—pratyabhijñā, while the Buddhist avers it is momentary. If distinctness between one cognition and another is admitted we must know whether it is revealed by another jñāna or whether it is of the very nature of samvit. If the former, then again whether the other jñāna has for its object the distinctness only or both dharmī or anuyogī and pratiyogī, *i.e.*, the two relate (for bheda desiderates both). The distinctness alone without the relata cannot be comprehended. But if all the three—the two relata and distinctness are comprehended in bhedajñāna all become a single jñāna and there could be no bheda. If on the other hand it is maintained that the bheda (distinctness) is of the nature of samvit (*e.g.*, the paṭabheda is ghaṭasvarūpa) then since bheda is said to be unperceived owing to similarity, samvit (consciousness or vijñāna) also ceases and darkness veils the universe. This alternative only is dealt with in the PP—*cf.* VPS., p. 76. संविद्रूपभूतो भेदः सादृश्यान्नावभासत इत्युक्तं स्यात्; अतः जगदान्ध्य-प्रसङ्गः.

<sup>177</sup> The Yogācāra's reply is that the postulation of similarity cannot be said to conflict with what is a piece of erroneous knowledge, *viz.*, the unit-cognition. It could be so, only if the unit-cognition were pramā, for identity and similarity are inconsistent. On the other hand the notion of identity in what are really distincts cannot be explained except on the basis of similarity.

*Siddhāntin*: No, it is not so; for it is open to (the fallacy of) mutual dependence. It is only when illusoriness (of unit-cognition, *i.e.*, recognition or *pratyabhijñā*) is proved that similarity can be maintained as it then would be unopposed to *pramāṇa* and would also be supported by *pramāṇa*. [Page 26] And if similarity is proved then could illusoriness as adduced from it, be maintained.

125. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Yes, it would be so, but then this (charge of mutual dependence) applies equally (to the unit-cognition-*aikyajñāna*) if held to be non-illusory. When the postulation of similarity is proved to be unsupported by *pramāṇa* and also hostile to *pramāṇa* then would be established the non-illusoriness of the cognition in that form (*i.e.*, as a single entity—*aikyapratīti*); again if this (*aikyajñāna*) is (proved to be) non-illusory the postulation of similarity would both be unsupported by *pramāṇa* and hostile to it.

*Siddhāntin*: No, it is not so. The validity of cognition (in the present context it is *pratyabhijñā* which reveals identity) is self-proven (*i.e.*, it does not require proof *ab extra*) and (as such) is not dependent upon anything else. Hence, because of its validity the postulation of similarity has not only no *pramāṇa* in its support but is opposed to it.<sup>178</sup> The cognition of similarity (*kalpanā*, *i.e.*, cognition by postulation) does not exist in its own right; if it did it would have become *pramāṇa*. It (the postulation of similarity) is possible only on the presupposition of the invalidity (of recognition).<sup>179</sup>

---

<sup>178</sup> Only when recognition is invalid and is *bhrama* could we postulate similarity by *arthāpatti-pramāṇa* to account for the unit-cognition but in the case of recognition it is self-established as all *jñāna* is. It is only invalidity that is to be established *ab extra*. स्वारसिकम्—cognition is self-certifying. The Buddhistic view is just the opposite—validity is established *ab extra* while invalidity is self-proven—*svataḥ siddha*.

<sup>179</sup> It is the illusoriness of the unit-cognition of what are distinct momentary cognitions that necessitates the presumption of similarity and as such, similarity cannot be said to be self-established. What is insisted on by the Bauddha is that the ever-recurring *vijñānas* themselves constitute *ātman* and the identity-notion we have of them as given in *pratyabhijñā* or recognition is illusory and explicable on the assumption of intimate resemblance between one *vijñāna* and another. The Vedāntin on the contrary maintains that *pratyabhijñā*



126. *Pūrvapakṣin*: But since destruction is patent at the end, the inference of destruction at the beginning (is inevitable). Hence seeing that the cognitions are distincts similarity is postulated.<sup>180</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: Well, since the existence of pot (beyond a moment) is perceived at the moment of its existence why is it not (existence—*sattā*) inferred at the end (the moment of destruction) also ?<sup>181</sup> If it be argued that such inference is opposed to the (actual) perception of destruction, (we say) that here also your own inference is opposed to the evidence of recognition which gives

is perceptive knowledge and is therefore self-certifying in character and the identity or the notion of permanency vouched for by it cannot be challenged. The *ātmasthāyitva*, i.e., the permanency of *ātman* is, he says, established on the strength of *pratyabhijñā*.

<sup>180</sup> अन्ते—existence, say of the pot as associated with the moment immediately preceding the moment of destruction.

आदौ—All the existential moments of the pot preceding the last in the series. The reasoning of the *kṣaṇikavādin* may be expressed in the following syllogistic form:—

*Subject*: आदौ—the preceding existents except the last;

*Probandum*: स्वसत्ताक्षणादुत्तरक्षणे विनाशसंबद्धानि—are each associated with destruction the moment next after the moment of their existence;

*Probans*: घटसत्त्वरूपत्वात्—because their existence is of the nature of pot-existence;

*Example*: Like the pot-existence associated with the last moment (in the series).

The pot as existing at the last moment perishes the next moment and so the pot-existence at every moment is liable to destruction in the immediately following moment. *Ergo*, objects in general are of momentary existence.

<sup>181</sup> In his rejoinder the Vedāntin just reverses the position. आदौ—the word 'ādi' means moments associated with the pot-existence.

अन्ते—the word 'anta' means all moments regarded as associated with destruction. His reasoning may be stated as follows:—

*Subject*: विनाशावच्छेदस्त्वेन अभिमताः क्षणाः—moments regarded as associated with destruction;

*Probandum*: घटसत्तया व्याप्ताः are pervaded by pot-existence ;

*Probans*: कलत्वात्—because they are time-associated;

*Example*: Like time—associated with existence—*sattā*.

Pot-existence is continuous from moment to moment since each moment is an existent.

the very object (that was seen before). And certainly there is nothing to distinguish between the two experiences.<sup>182</sup>

127. *Pūrvapakṣin*: But if you hold that the ego-consciousness is a permanent entity, (we ask) whether it possesses any practical efficiency or not. In case it does not (produce anything) it acquires the character of non-being and as such loses its claim to reality. If, however, it does (produce) then it is not permanent. For casual efficiency is incompatible with an object that is permanent. How incompatible (it may be asked)? Incompatibility comes about this wise—while producing it (arthakriyā) does it (one may question) produce it successively or simultaneously? Not however successively; seeing that it (the permanent object) undergoes no change, *i.e.*, remains the same in the future as it was in the past (the question will naturally arise) why should it not bring into effect at the preceding time that also which it is going to effect in the succeeding time?<sup>183</sup> Nor even simultaneously; for having effected in a single moment only, what has to be done during a whole life-time, it (the so-called permanent object) acquires the character of non-being owing to its absence (*i.e.*, of the causal power) the next moment. Hence permanency is ruled out from the very fact of causal efficiency. It is evident therefore that the apprehension of permanency (permanence implying the identity of ego-notions) is due to similarity.

128. *Siddhāntin*: Well, this has to be urged:—which is this causal efficiency (arthakriyā) in the absence of which (you say) a thing acquires the character of non-being?

<sup>182</sup> न ह्युभयोरनुभावयोः कश्चिद्विशेषः—The kṣaṇikavādin avers that because the cognition of destruction is perceptive—abhijñā, it has greater probative value than recognition—pratyabhijñā by which the existential pervadingness, सत्ताव्याप्त—*sattāvyāpta*—is attempted to be established. But the Vedāntin points out that both abhijñā—perception, and pratyabhijñā—recognition are of equal probative value.

<sup>183</sup> अर्थक्रियाकारित्व—Capacity to produce an action or event. This is the definition, according to the Buddhists, of existence or being—*sattā*. And since each moment is associated with a new effect, the real, they maintain, is momentary. The contention is that if permanency is the mark of an object, say a pot, why it should not bring about to-day what it is going to bring about to-morrow since it retains its identity; for example it must all at once exhaust its capacity to fetch water—*vide* English Translation of *Śāstradīpikā*—Tarkapāda, G.O.S., p. 207.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: (Causal efficiency means the capacity of) originating the cognition of its object (in the same series, in the cognition series of another person, or in that of Īśvara, *c.f.* VPS., p. 79).

*Siddhāntin*: It follows then that all cognitions (without exception) will acquire the character of non-being since they are all by nature self-revealed and as such they need no other cognition to reveal them. Nor even in a different series have they the capacity of such revelation, because of its (*i.e.*, another's cognition series) not being apprehended by the senses. And in the case of inference also (it should not be forgotten that) it is not generated by what is real. (In perception reality can be the cause but not in inference where only universals which are mental constructs form the content. See Nyāyabindu Tīkā by Dharmottara, p. 16).<sup>184</sup> Even as regards the knowledge possessed by

<sup>184</sup> The Buddhist explains causal efficiency as the giving rise by one cognition, *i.e.*, moment, to another moment. In this view the Siddhāntin says the definition fails; for in a cognition-series one cognition does not reveal another since cognitions in their very nature are self-luminous. In other words there is no subject-object or cogniser-cognition relation विषयविषयिभावः or प्रमातृप्रमेयभावः. The Buddhist rejoins that though in the same series such revelation is not possible it is possible in a different series so that the validity of the definition is not vitiated; *e.g.*, when Maitra cognises Caitra's cognition by some indicative marks, it is evident that Caitra's cognition is the viṣaya (प्रकाश्य) of Maitra's cognition which is the cogniser (प्रकाशक). Hence स्वाविषयज्ञानजनकत्व of Caitra's cognition. The Siddhāntin points out that this is a case of inference and not of perception where alone the entity, say pot, is the cause of pot-cognition for the pot is an object of perception, whereas in inference (अनुमान) say of fire, it is not perceptive and therefore is not the cause of its cognition on the hill (अनुमिति). Similarly Maitra cognises Caitra's cognition only by inference so that the latter cannot be said to produce the other. Hence in no cognition is the sattā—existence, of the nature of origination of the cognition of itself, is present. In the same series there is जन्यजनकभाव but not विषयविषयिभाव whereas in a different series the reverse is the case. स्वाविषयज्ञानजनकत्व, he explains also as a particular cognition in the same series which is both the cogniser of itself and the cognised; but here there is no जन्यजनकभाव and as such the definition fails. It is necessary that to satisfy the definition there should be both janyajanakabhāva and viṣayaviṣayibhāva—the relation of originator and the originated as well as of the cogniser and the cognised—*cf.* V., pp. 78–79.

the All-knowing (Īśvara) it cannot be held (that the cognition of the jīva—individual soul) produces Īśvara's own knowledge directly (*i.e.*, as non-different from it with all its affections). For then it (the knowledge of the All-knowing) would become identical in nature with that of the jīvas (struggling) in the world.<sup>185</sup> In case its nature is not that, it ceases to be its object (*i.e.*, if the cognition of Īśvara is not non-different from the contaminated individual cognitions, the latter cannot serve as the object of the former).<sup>186</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, we maintain that causal efficiency means the giving rise to the (next) momentary state (the reference here is to the realm of being).

*Siddhāntin*: The last moment (then) will acquire the character of non-being.<sup>187</sup> And it cannot be argued that the cogency

<sup>185</sup> न सर्वज्ञेऽपि, etc.—Īśvara in his omniscience has the cognition of all jīvas as the object of his perception so that individual cognitions must be regarded as producing Īśvara's cognition, thus justifying the definition of practical efficiency, *viz.*, स्वविषयज्ञानजन्यत्वं. The Siddhāntin points out that individual cognitions being contaminated by affections of pleasure and pain cannot generate Īśvara-jñāna. It must be noted that the Buddhist admits non-difference between cognition and the object of cognition (this refers to Vijñānavāda School—*cf.* VPS., p. 70).

<sup>186</sup> अतद्वृत्ते—It may be urged by the Buddhist that though individual cognition is contaminated it becomes pure by the knowledge of reality—तत्त्वज्ञान and then it will be identical with Īśvara's knowledge. The Siddhāntin answers that since cognition as such is self-revealing the same cognition (तत्त्वज्ञान) would reveal the blemishes and negate them—an impossible position. If again it be argued that the blemishes are removed by a separate cognition then since viśaya and viśayī are not different all the blemishes found in the cognition that is negated will vitiate the negating cognition. No cognition can negate another without this other being its object. A third position may be taken up. Let not the blemishes be negated; let not the blemished cognition be the object of Īśvara's cognition. Even then cognition that is free from affections cannot get lost in Īśvara's cognition. To rebut this view the text proceeds with अतद्वृत्ते. In case it is not admitted that there is identity between Īśvara's and the contaminated individual's cognitions there will be no viśayaviśayibhāva (subject-object relation or cogniser-cognised relation). Then the Buddha will cease to be the teacher. He can impart the saving knowledge only when he is aware of the ills of mankind.

<sup>187</sup> चरमक्षणस्य असलक्षणप्रसङ्गात्—The second definition of causal efficiency—अर्थक्रियाकारित्व is that one momentary existent gives rise to the

(of the definition of causal efficiency) is secured by the fact that the last moment gives rise to the cognition of the All-knowing. For then it cannot be held to be the last moment and as such it will come to this that there will be no release (mukti).<sup>188</sup> [Page 27] Again one cognition cannot serve as the object of another cognition<sup>189</sup> for the reason that both are in essence cognition (nirākārajñāna—formless cognition) and as such are not different from one another, just as one light cannot be said to be the object (viṣaya) of another light.

Moreover its acquiring the status of being is not due to the fact of causal efficiency, because it gives rise to its effect having already come into being through the operation of its (specific) causes (such as in the case of pot, the potter, the wheel, the clay, etc.). Hence it can (only) be said (that casual efficiency) produces the cognition of the existence (of the cause; it does not make it real). Then the cognition of its existence (i.e., of the practical efficiency—arthakriyā) would depend upon something else (i.e., cognition of its own arthakriyā), that again upon another *ad infinitum*, resulting in the cognition of nothing that is existent so that the world would become a mere blank.<sup>190</sup>

---

next momentary existent. But this definition breaks down in the case of the last moment—चरमक्षण, for this consciousness moment is succeeded by mokṣa or annihilation of the series.

<sup>188</sup> मुख्यभावप्रसङ्गात्—In the doctrine of the Bauddhas the moments are similar and as cause and effect they belong to the same series—सन्तान; since both the last moment and Īśvara's cognition are pure, being of the same nature, and in the relation of cause and effect, Īśvara's cognition also must belong to the same series. Hence the so-called final moment will not be the liberation moment. Mukti in the Buddhistic doctrine is the diremption of the moment-series.

<sup>189</sup> न च संविदित्यादि—It was hitherto assumed that the Buddhist meant by mukti the termination of the ego-series in question, but that is not the only view of 'mukti' in Buddhism. There was another conception of it according to which 'mukti' is merging in cosmic vijñāna or sarvajñajñāna as the PP. puts it. It is to point out that even on this view of 'mukti' the Buddhistic position is not tenable that the text adds 'न च संविदित्यादि'—see *V.*, and *TD.* also *OIP.*, p. 219, and Bhikṣu's *Yogavārtikā*, p. 116.

<sup>190</sup> अनवस्थानात्—If on the basis of its kārya like fetching water, the reality of kāraṇa is to be understood, the reality of kārya also would require another kārya to justify its existence, the latter again

*Pūrvapakṣin*: But there is no regress since the causal efficiency of the nature of jñāna resulting from itself (*i.e.*, the first moment) is self-revealed (being of the nature of cognition).<sup>191</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: If so it is not from the causal efficiency that the cognition of its existence (*i.e.*, of the precedent moment which is the hetu of the next moment) arises. And it cannot be that its own self is its causal efficiency.<sup>192</sup>

129. You have argued that causal efficiency (resulting in some action) does not take place in succession (as opposed to instantaneous origination), on the ground that in the preceding and succeeding moments (*i.e.*, time past and time future) it (the kāraṇa) remains the same without any special feature (viśeṣa). It is no defect. Even a permanent kāraṇa can effectuate (causal efficiency in succession) since it desiderates the auxiliaries and as such it is wrong to say that the causal entity has no additions (viśeṣa) but remains the same. If it be argued that to speak of the need for an auxiliary is improper in the case of kāraṇa (*i.e.*, an entity which has the capacity to produce an effect), more so is it in the case of akāraṇa (*i.e.*, of an entity which through lack of capacity is impotent to be a cause). And it follows therefore that the world will exhibit no instance of any co-operation whatsoever. If again it be argued that what is not in itself the cause (akāraṇa) is in need of auxiliaries in the production of what really constitutes the cause (*viz.*, the aggregate—sāmagrī of, say, the sprout) then the question will be whether that (*viz.*, the inefficient seed) is the cause or not the cause (of the kāraṇa—the sāmagrī which produces the sprout). In case it is the cause (*i.e.*, potent in producing the aggregate) it is in no need (of auxiliaries). If

---

would require the reality of another kārya and so on indefinitely. Hence the existence of no object could be established.

<sup>191</sup> ननु—Arthakriyā means kārya and kārya in the yogācāra-view is the consciousness moment succeeding the preceding consciousness moment, and since cognition is self-established there is no regression. The second moment which is the kārya of the first moment is self-revealing and therefore does not require another kārya to reveal it.

<sup>192</sup> बहिस्स्वरूपमेव—Arthakriyā is of the nature of kārya and in its own nature it is kāraṇa so that both cannot be identical. The test of reality being arthakriyā, itself must be its own arthakriyā—an absurd view.

it is not the cause (akāraṇa) by no means (is there a need for auxiliaries). If it be averred that in regard to the auxiliaries (sahakāri) the causes (in general) are in no need of them, that statement would stand condemned by the testimony of experience (darśana). It is indeed perceived that causes do require auxiliaries. Hence when the effect is present the causal capacity of the cause is—no matter how—apprehended, because it is a matter of experience that only when cause is given, the effect is seen; even so is the effect perceived as resulting from the cause in association with the auxiliaries; as such the hetutva (tat) in the hetu along with the auxiliaries has to be admitted.<sup>193</sup>

130. One who thinks that the cause constituted by viśeṣa (additament or supplementation) produced by the auxiliaries brings the effect (kārya) into being since otherwise it would be relating what can render no help (*viz.*, the auxiliary) to (the effect) which does not need it, he should be questioned whether that (*i.e.*, the main or basal entity) is the cause or not (of the viśeṣa or additament). If it (the basal entity) is not the cause in the production of the viśeṣa then it would not be needed. What follows then is that the auxiliaries alone would originate the viśeṣa (since the seed remains inert) and from the latter the kārya would result (but this is absurd). If on the other hand it (*viz.*, the bare seed) does serve as a hetu, (the question is) how could it produce that (very) viśeṣa when (another) viśeṣa is not generated in it (seed) by the auxiliaries? If (the basal entity together with

---

<sup>193</sup> The Bauddha throws the Siddhāntin on the horns of a dilemma; the Siddhāntin seeks refuge in experience. The Bauddha urges that reason is of superior cognitive value and points out a case where experience is palpably in the wrong. In अहं मनुष्यः experience vouches for the bodily identity of ātman, reasoning negates it. The Siddhāntin however argues that we cannot ignore the truth as ascertained from repeated facts of experience—the highest tribunal in one's search after truth. When the effect is patent we must admit that the hetutva, the potency of being the cause, resides in the cause.

In the satkhyāti doctrine the pot exists in clay and is rendered manifest later. But why, it may be asked, is it subsequent in its appearance? The answer is that such is our experience and no logic can explain it. It is unexplainable. Hence the generalisation that the cause-effect is something that cannot be accounted for; it is anirvacanīya.



the *viśeṣa* is) regarded as producing the *viśeṣa* there would be infinite regress.<sup>194</sup>

131. *Pūrvapakṣin*: We maintain this view: not that every effect is the product of an entity in which the additament is wrought by the auxiliaries; when there is the full complement of causes and yet there is no effect as in the case of the sprout, etc., it is so (*i.e.*, it requires the production of a *viśeṣa*—puffing up—of the seed). In some (other instances) the effect is produced by the cause constituted by the auxiliaries when the cause and the auxiliary are together present as witness the sensory cognition which brooks no delay.<sup>195</sup> Such being the case, (*tatra*), the first *viśeṣa* (*viz.*, *ucchūmnatā* or *turgescence*) results from the mere proximity of the auxiliaries like the sensory cognition which brooks no delay—as such there is no infinite regress.

*Siddhāntin*: Then it comes to this that the auxiliary though it renders no aid to the basal cause is desired by it (but this is self-stultifying). In the production of protuberance (*tatra*) there is indeed no self-transformation (*i.e.*, no *atīśaya*) in the basal cause (*viz.*, the seed).

<sup>194</sup> यस्तु मन्यते—The *Pūrvapakṣin* is here supposed to be a follower of the *Vaiśeṣika*-school (*vide* TD.). It is doubtful if the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine is in conformity with the view expressed here.

अहेतुश्चेत्—If the basal cause, the seed, has no part in producing the *viśeṣa* (protuberance, etc.), then it is not right to speak of its requiring subsidiaries. It is only when its own competency is inadequate that it desiderates help and not when it is wholly incompetent.

अथ हेतुः—If it be said that the seed also is the *hetu* the question will be whether the seed without the *viśeṣa* or with it, is the *hetu* in the production of *viśeṣa*. Not the first, since the *viśeṣa* from a seed without the *viśeṣa* is impossible as in the case of the sprout; not the second for since *viśeṣa* in the seed is a *kārya* like the sprout, it requires another *viśeṣa* to produce it and so on, resulting in infinite regress.

<sup>195</sup> आक्षेपकारि—In the case of sensory cognition what is required is merely the vicinity of the auxiliaries such as, say, in regard to visual perception, light, object, etc. No change is effected in the eye, the organ of sight. There is no interval of time between the opening of the eye and the perception of the object. On this analogy it is argued that the *viśeṣa* which produces the sprout requires only the vicinity of the auxiliaries; it does not need the seed-cum-*viśeṣa*. There is thus, observes the *pūrvapakṣin*, no infinite regress.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: [Page 28] The (auxiliary) which renders no aid is not desired (by any-one) as otherwise it would lead to unwelcome results (*i.e.*, anything might become auxiliary to anything). The auxiliary does no service to the seed as such, but is of service in the origination of the *kārya*, *viz.*, the sprout, because it is indispensable for its effectuation, since it results immediately after.

*Siddhāntin*: Then why is it not admitted that the entity (*i.e.*, the basal seed) though permanent desiderates even when no *viśeṣa* is generated in it, the auxiliary for the effectuation of the *kārya* (the sprout) like the momentary seed? Just as the momentary entity produces the *kārya* at the very instant the subsidiaries are present because it (*kārya*) is contingent on the combination of the causes (such as earth, water, seed, air, etc.), even so the permanent entity also needs the compresence of the auxiliaries though they are of no service to itself (*i.e.*, not producing any *viśeṣa* in it) since they are indispensable in (the origination of) the *kārya*.

132. *Pūrvapakṣin*: But this is our view: the momentary seed also does not require (the presence of the auxiliaries) for when it is itself competent to produce the other (*viz.*, the sprout) there is no reason that it should require any external aid. The *kārya* (*i.e.*, the sprout) however which comes into being only in the com-presence of something (does need the auxiliary) because its coming into being is effected only, in the com-presence of something other, and otherwise not effected. But regarding the cause that is permanent, it is inevitable that it should always be effectuating (*i.e.*, an enduring begetter must ever begetting). And which is the cause that brings about the desired (com-presence) ?<sup>196</sup>

<sup>196</sup> को हेतुरन्यापेक्षया:—The Siddhāntin's argument runs as follows: though the seed is permanent it needs the subsidiaries for the origination of the *kārya* and as they come to exist in succession and are not always there, it is not permanently that the *kārya* is produced but only casually (आगन्तुक). The query then would be, what is it that has occasioned the coming together of the *kāraṇa*, *viz.*, the seed and the subsidiaries—को हेतुरन्यापेक्षया: ? If you posit a *kāraṇa* for *sannihitātva* (coming together) this *kāraṇa* cannot be either the basal cause, *viz.*, the seed or the subsidiaries, for if so being both permanent, *kārya* would always be effectuated. It must therefore be adventitious (āgantuka) but then the question will be how was this āgantuka caused and so on indefinitely.

As for the entity which is momentary and originates (the next moment) it (exists) neither before nor after, so that the effect (kārya) does not come into being either in the preceding or the succeeding instant.<sup>197</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: This does not stand the test of reason.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: What is it here that does not stand to reason? (We admit, say the Bauddhas, that kārya requires the proximity of the auxiliary, but not their cause-effect relation).

*Siddhāntin*: The fault lies in this that while admitting the relation of positive and negative concomitance (niyama) you reject the cause-effect relation (nirapekṣatvam). To explain—if the relation of something with something else is one of positive-negative concomitance, that relation (it is evident) has arisen because of the cause-effect relation. If it were not so the niyama (viz., the positive-negative, anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha) would be unintelligible. It is indeed thus that the nature of cause-effect relation is determined and (it is further observed that) those who wish to bring about a desired result utilise the entire aggregate of causes. As such, if it is averred that since the momentary cause does not need the auxiliary and its effect also (is not in need of the auxiliary), how is the niyama (positive-negative concomitance) possible? To explain—since the causes follow in unremitting succession, one casual moment giving rise to another the

---

<sup>197</sup> क्षणिकस्तु, etc.—The Siddhāntin tries to hoist him with his own petard. The seed cannot produce, say the sprout-instant at the very moment of its own existence for it is admitted that the cause, has its existence in the immediate precedent proximity of the effect and further the cause-effect relation between two entities originating at the same moment is as impossible as the right horn of a cow producing its left horn since both come into being at the identical moment. Nor again could it be said that the effect is produced in the second instant for then it would mean that even in the absence of the cause—the preceding moment has disappeared—the effect is produced. If the effect could come into existence in the second moment without the cause, it may do so in perpetuity.

This objection is met by the Bauddha in the following words:—  
क्षणिकस्तु यो जनको भावः स न पुरस्तात् पश्चात्. The cause, says he, must immediately precede the origination of the effect and not exist anywhere and at any time. Hence the effect cannot come into being at any time except at the instant immediately preceded by the cause-instant. Hence is obviated the occurrence of the effect at all times.

subsidiary is not needed either for the origination of itself (in the succeeding moment) or for (producing) the kārya (say, sprout), since it has in itself the potency to originate (the kārya). Not even does the kārya (require the auxiliary) for the unaided (moment—the seed immediately preceding the sprout) only has the power of forcibly producing the effect and as such the principle that the auxiliary should be in close proximity (at the moment of the sprout coming into being) would be purposeless. It would be a matter of fortuitous coincidence (kākatāliyam). If that be so (*i.e.*, if the auxiliary is something unlooked for) there would be an end to all dealings based on cause-effect relation. Hence (*i.e.*, seeing that your doctrine is liable to such grave objections) it has to be said that though the momentary causal entity which, of its own accord, produces (the kārya) is in no need of the auxiliaries for producing itself (svasvarūpa) it requires them for effectuating the kārya (say, sprout). Or (it has to be admitted that) the kārya (directly) requires them since it is brought about by the aggregate. That the aggregate constitutes the cause is evident from the invariable concomitance of the aggregate of the causes and the effect. Similar is the case with even a permanent causal entity so that we perceive no difference.<sup>198</sup>

133. When this is so, since the ego-consciousness is perceived to ever retain a uniform nature and since it possesses causal efficiency, though it is permanent the Māhāyānika-doctrine ought not to be supposed to be held (by the Vedāntin) merely on the ground (that he admits the relation) of identity between the blue and vijñāna or cognition.<sup>199</sup> It would, however, (amount to

<sup>198</sup> Even if permanency of objects is admitted it makes no difference. The objection that the seed in the barn also may produce the sprout does not hold good since the aid of subsidiaries is required whether the seed be permanent or momentary.

<sup>199</sup> तदेवम्—The invariable concomitance of the auxiliaries with the effect being inevitable, the Bauddha statement—whatever is real is momentary—यत्सत्-तत्क्षणिकम्—stands condemned. From PP. pages 25 to 28, the discussion has centred round the Māhāyānika-doctrine of momentariness or flux. Now on the ground that the Vedāntin like the subjectivist vijñānavādin admits the relation of identity—तादात्म्य, between jñāna and viśaya, the charge is laid at his door that he also upholds the Buddhistic doctrine. The charge, however, is baseless. The fundamental difference between the two schools is this, that while for the Bauddha the ego-entity has a momentary existence, for the

his siding with the Māhāyānika vijñānavādin) if a permanent self which is the cogniser and which is manifest in ego-consciousness is not taken to exist. And the existence of such ātman (aham-kartā) which is the (unchanging) one has been proved on the strength of both experience (*viz.*, of recognition) and reason.

134. *Pūrvapakṣin*: The object of inferential cognition, etc., is not apprehended as directly perceptive (which it ought to be in your view).<sup>200</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: [Page 29] This is the answer: As regards the object of inference, etc., there is no immediate presentation (*i.e.*, the object of inference is not perceptive) because in the origination of its own cognition there is no activity (on the part of that which is the object of inference),<sup>201</sup> and because with whatsoever object the probans is in (concomitant) relation that particular object only manifests itself in inferential cognition.<sup>202</sup> That

Vedāntin ātman as manifested in the ego is uniform in character and permanent. Though there is only one entity and the perceptive cognition is no other than the apprehension of identity between the witness (साक्षी) and the object (*i.e.*, viśayacaitanya) in experience, 'otherness' also is recognised as existing, and not in Buddhism—*vide* V., p. 83 (see page 25).

<sup>200</sup> In perception the object is immediately presented because it manifests the caitanya (intelligence), and on this analogy, the *Pūrvapakṣin* says that in inference also the object should be immediately presented, but as a matter of fact it is not. Fire, for example, is the object of inferential cognition but yet it is not of immediate presentation. What is an object—viśaya, is the manifestor—vyañjaka of caitanya and what is the manifestor is immediately presented. On this reasoning the objection is raised.

<sup>201</sup> The object acquires competency to receive the image of ātman by its contact with the vṛtti. But this does not happen in the case of inference since the object is not instrumental in the generation of the vṛtti and as such is not the vyañjaka of its cognition—the object of inference; the object may be at a distance and sometimes even absent as when we infer rain that is over.

<sup>202</sup> Then the question is why should one object alone be inferred and not another? In perception, no doubt, the cognition takes the form of (pot), because 'pot' has vyañjakatva and kārakatva but in inference owing to the absence of either why should cognition take the form of fire, pot, etc., in a certain order? The answer is furnished in the statement that the object can be no other than what is invariably concomitant with the probans.

the object of valid cognition (in general) is the *hetu* in the origination of its cognition is unsupported by any *pramāṇa*.

Let there be no further elaboration of this incidental topic; in its proper context when examining the Buddhistic doctrine, we shall enlarge it with greater precision.<sup>203</sup>

XXXIV. 135. (In what follows the *Bhāṣya* text—*asmat-pratyaya viṣayatvāt*—is commented upon).<sup>204</sup> The contexture of *ego-ahamkāragranthi* is termed 'aham' as well as 'pratyaya' since like a mirror which reflecting the image becomes the cause (*hetu*) of the cognition of the image, the 'ahamkāra', because it contains the consciousness element, manifests (*i.e.*, becomes the *hetu* of the cognition of) the *cit* (consciousness). Hence, because it assumes as it were the nature of object (*viṣayatvāt*), the entity which is not the 'this', which is consciousness, and which is (no other than) 'ātman-entity' is by courtesy described as the object of 'asmatpratyaya' (*ahamkāragranthi*).<sup>205</sup> And that (*ātman*)—of the nature of the 'not this' conditioned as ego in the waking

<sup>203</sup> प्रसङ्गात्, etc.—What is pertinent to the present context is the examination of the nature of the ego—अहङ्कारस्वरूपनिरूपण, but incidentally the Buddhistic doctrine of flux came in for review. The *Prābhākara*, *Naiyāyika*, and *Vaiśeṣika* regard the ego itself as *ātman*, while the *Vedāntin* holds that it is distinct from *ātman*—pure consciousness.

<sup>204</sup> अहङ्कारप्रतिबिम्बितत्वम्—The ego-complex indistinguishable from consciousness. प्रत्ययः, प्रतीयते—अभिप्रेत्यतेऽस्मिन्निति प्रत्ययः—The ego-complex is known both as *asmat* and *pratyaya* (अन्तःकरणे); तत्र—अन्तःकरणे, विषयत्वात्—प्रतिबिम्बितत्वात्; अहङ्कारप्रतिबिम्बितत्वमेव असत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वम्. What we mean by *ātman's viṣayatva*, *i.e.*, its becoming an object, is *tis 'pratibimbitatva'*—getting reflected in 'antaḥkaraṇa'. Hence *ātman* is spoken of as असत्प्रत्ययविषय—the insentient part of the ego-complex, अनिदं—the 'not-this', not the world of perception; hence consciousness—चित्. Just as the image is manifested in a mirror, consciousness—*cit*, is cognised in 'ahamkāra' for it is conjoined with it (*i.e.*, reflected in it).

<sup>205</sup> उपचारेण—Because of similarity, the quality of manifestation is common to both. The 'jar' for example is revealed in cognition and so is said to be the object of that cognition; *ātman* also reflected in the inner sense becomes manifest; hence is said to be the object of the ego-complex. In the case of 'jar' it is manifested by *cit* delimited by *vr̥tti* and becomes fit for *vyavahāra*. But *ātman* being self-luminous is not manifested but it becomes fit for *vyavahāra* that is the common feature. Hence *ātman* is by courtesy spoken of as object.



and dream states, and conditioned in deep slumber by avidyā which has within it traces of the impressions (that the inner sense has left behind), which is the opposite of jñāna and which obstructs the light (of ātman)—keeps going forwards and backwards and as such is termed in Śruti, Smṛti and in common parlance as saṃsārī, jīva, vijñānaghana, vijñānātmā, prājñā, śarīrī, śārīraḥ, ātmā, samprasādaḥ, puruṣa, pratyagātmā, kartā, bhoktā and kṣetrajña.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> गतम्-जागरितात्स्वप्नम्, स्वप्नात्सुषुप्तिं प्रति गमनम्—The soul passes from waking to dream—from dream to sleep; आगतम्—from deep slumber the passage is in the reverse order.

The different names given to the conditioned ātman are accounted for thus:—

संसारि—Because of the superimposition of pleasure-pain vṛtti of the inner-sense, *i.e.*, the soul is under the delusion that it experiences pleasure and pain which in reality are affections of the inner-sense.

जीवः—Because of identity with the inner-sense in its active phase. Jīva is prāṇābhimānī.

विज्ञानघनः—Because of identity with the pure inner-sense.

विज्ञानात्मा—Termed so in a general sense in relation to its identity with the inner sense.

प्राज्ञः—Because of the superimposition of nescience. This name is given to ātman in the state of deep sleep for then ajñāna alone is the upādhi or the limiting condition. Ātman there is Śuddha since there is absolute cessation of both mental and physical activity.

शरीरी—Because of ātman's identity with the gross body.

शरीरः—Because of manifestation in the body.

आत्मा—To show that ātman though styled शरीरी is not limited but all-pervading which the term आत्मा imports.

संप्रसादः—Because ātman identifies itself with the deep slumber state. The inexplicable relation between ātman and deep slumber is itself abhimāna.

पुरुषः—Because the bodily form consisting of head, trunk and limbs is superimposed on consciousness, cit.

प्रत्यगात्मा—The pure ātman—शुद्ध, but when conditioned, the same ātman engaged in all the manifold activities—mental and bodily.

कर्ता, भोक्ता—Ātman becomes agent when identifying itself with the conative aspect of the mind and is the enjoyer when identifying itself with the pleasure-modality of the mind,



XXXV. 136. Moreover, it is not that ātman becomes fit for superimposition only because it is the viṣaya of 'asmāt-pratyaya'.<sup>207</sup> It is so because of the nature of immediate direct presentation. To substantiate that (ātman is of immediate cognition) the Bhāṣyakāra says, 'because pratyagātmā is self-proven' (for no one denies the self). If ātman remains an unknown entity there would be no distinction between what is cognised by oneself and what is cognised by another.<sup>208</sup>

*Prābhākara view criticised:* Ātman's existence is not substantiated by the cognition of an object only (lit. what is cognised, like jar, cow, etc.,) because it (ātman) is not in the objective relation (to that cognition) and because it leads to unwarrantable conclusions.<sup>209</sup>

*Bhāṭṭa view criticised:* Nor (can ātman be established) by (its being regarded as the object of) a cognition which is distinct

क्षेत्रज्ञ—The word 'Kṣetrajña' brings home the existence of ātman so described. Kṣetra is kāryakāraṇasamghāta—i.e., the body, and kṣetrajña is the individual soul.

<sup>207</sup> न केवलम्, etc.—Because ātman is immediately presented. By the statement 'अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्' superimposition on the qualified ātman, i.e., ātman in association with antaḥkaraṇa was pointed out; now by the statement 'अपरोक्षत्वाच्च' superimposition on the unqualified ātman is pointed out. Ātman is of immediate presentation, प्रत्यक्ष in the sense that the chief element in perception, viz., annulment of doubt regarding the existence of the object—संशयनिवृत्ति is here. Because ātman is intimately known it can become the substratum of superimposition.

<sup>208</sup> न स्वपरसंवेदयोर्विशेषः—The distinction between my cognition and that of another is possible only when ātman is presupposed, for of every one the cognition takes the form—'by me is this known', 'मयेदं विदितम्'. Otherwise the subject-object relation itself would not arise and one who perceives an object and one who does not will be on a par.

<sup>209</sup> न च संवेद्यज्ञानेनैव—Prābhākara maintains that ātman becomes known by being the substratum—आश्रय, of jñāna without being its object. This view is criticised. संवेद्य—what is cognised, say, a jar. The existence of ātman cannot be proved by the cognition we have of a jar, etc., for ātman has no objective relation—कर्मकारकत्व and then if it is argued that even without the accusative relation ātman can be established, there is no reason why ātman alone should be the object—विषय. Ātman is not admitted as the object of jñāna by Prābhākara but yet ātman becomes manifest as the substrate of jñāna—संविद्.

from it (say, cognition of pot).<sup>210</sup> If that (cognition should arise) at a time distinct from that of the cognition of ātman then there could be nothing to distinguish one's object of cognition from that of another owing to the non-cognition of the relation of the object of cognition (and ātman). Nor can it be maintained that (the cognition of the object is simultaneous with the cognition of (ātman) since the two cognitions relating to (two) opposed objects (*viz.*, ātman and viṣaya) arise simultaneously. It is not perceived that Devadatta has established simultaneously a double contact, one with an object that is in front of him by moving forwards and another that is behind him, by moving backwards.

*Bhātta Defence:* Let not two acts of the nature of movement take place simultaneously, but what is of the nature of transformation certainly takes place (*i.e.*, a thing—here ātman—can undergo a double transformation at the same time).

*Siddhāntin:* No, it is not so; even what is of the nature of movement can take place without self-contradiction (*i.e.*, there may be two simultaneous movements), as in the case of a person who walks while singing. (*Per contra*) what is of the nature of transformation cannot take place (*i.e.*, a double transformation of a single object simultaneously) without self-contradiction, as the transformation due to youth and that due to old age cannot occur simultaneously (in the body). Hence the pure consciousness—ātman, is self-established, is the final limit (avadhi) of all our aversions and covetings (hānopādāna), itself is not an object, fit neither for abandonment nor for possession and because it is

---

<sup>210</sup> न च ज्ञानान्तरेण—It is argued that ātman's existence may be established by its being regarded as the object of jñāna which is other than that of object-cognition. This is the view of Bhātta, Gautama and Kaṇāda. It is refuted; the opponent has to answer whether that jñāna arises simultaneously with the perception of the object (say, jar) or at a different time. It cannot be the second alternative for then any distinction between one's cognition and another's will cease because of the absence of the experience of the relation between the object and ātman. Nor the first alternative, *viz.*, that the viṣayānubhava and ātmānubhava are synchronous, because as the PP. says न ह्येककाले विरुद्धविषयद्वयग्राहिज्ञानद्वयोत्पादः—ātman which is the substrate of jñāna and is void of parts, cannot suffer two transformations either in one part or in a distinct part—*vide* VPS, p. 85.

self-luminous (and so always immediately present) is fit to be the substratum of illusory knowledge.

XXXVI. 137. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, superimposition on the mere basis of immediate presentation has been nowhere observed hitherto; everywhere it is seen that illusory knowledge arises only when the eye comes into contact with a presented object.

*Siddhāntin*: Having premised this objection (the Bhāṣyakāra) says—["There is no such rule"]. ["In ākāśa (ether) though it is not an object of perception, etc.,"] which (latter statement) means that it (ākāśa) is parokṣa—not perceived (by the eye); [Page 30] or bālāḥ—men who cannot discern the truth, superimpose 'talam'—colour resembling that of sapphire and 'tamāla'-leaf and also 'malinatā,' i.e., (smoke, etc.), or something else similar to the colour of blue lotus, etc., on ākāśa which is perceptive though not through the activity of the visual sense; (ākāśa is perceived by the sākṣin).<sup>211</sup> ["So there is no discrepancy (in the superimposition of the insentient on the pure consciousness (cf., Bhāṣya, p. 39)"],—in these words the Bhāṣyakāra concludes (the section on) probability (i.e., of ātman's being the substratum of illusory knowledge which the opponent had denied). How ākāśa though not in contact with the sense of sight is perceptive, we will show (in the sequel).

XXXVII. 138. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, is not avidyā suggested (by Vyāsa) as the cause of the endless afflictions of mankind since he has set out with the proposition that the knowledge of Brahman is the destroyer of the cause of the miseries? Hence the nature of that alone (i.e., avidyā) which is the root cause of the ills of life in the shape of agency (activity, enjoyment, etc.), has to be expounded. Then why is the nature of superimposition described at length (by the Bhāṣyakāra)?

*Siddhāntin*: Presuming this objection the commentator gives the answer in the following words—this very superimposition (adhyāsa) which is defined in the manner above, the pañḍits—those

<sup>211</sup> The opponent contends that the self which is self-luminous and therefore immediately presented cannot be the substrate of superimposition, for he argues that unless the substrate and the superimposed object are apprehended by the same sense-organ no superimposition is possible. The Siddhāntin adduces the instance of superimposition on the ether which is not the object of sense perception but of the inner witness or of the mind.

who are skilled in appraising the means of knowledge—understand to mean avidyā.

139. They also give the name vidyā to the ascertainment of the essence of reality by its being differentiated from avidyā. The knowers of Brahman amongst mankind (loke) term as vidyā, the discriminating knowledge which effects the dispelling of the superimposed and false serpent (lit. serpent which is of the nature of the not-that, viz., the rope), and which thereby brings home the fact that the object in its real nature is no other than the rope only, a fact borne out by common experience.

140. *Pūrvapakṣin*: If it is so, after having begun with superimposition, to have again commented on its appellation of avidyā is unnecessary effort and as such it would have been better if (the Bhāṣya) had started with avidyā.<sup>212</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: This is not a sound objection. If the (Ācārya) had begun with (the exposition of) (avidyā) only, its feature as an enveloping entity (āvaraṇa) alone would have been denoted and not its causal potency to produce the ills of life by projecting something other than the real object. Hence the necessity of first characterising its potency to distort reality (lit. to make things appear different from what they are) as adhyāsa, since that aspect of it viz., vikṣepa is pertinent to the context. Again by terming it avidyā, its fitness for sublation by vidyā alone, has to be rendered explicit.<sup>213</sup> That being so, (i.e., since superimposition is dispelled by knowledge) the Bhāṣyakāra says ('where something is

<sup>212</sup> यद्येवम्—The objection is grounded in the fact that the commentator starts with the delineation of superimposition—अध्यास and then because the sublation of the superimposed by knowledge has to be established, he interposes avidyā (nescience) as its other name, (it must be remembered that knowledge—विद्या removes its opposite अविद्या and not अध्यास). Why not, the objector says, should he have begun with nescience, since by its removal on the rise of knowledge, its effect, viz., superimposition also would naturally disappear?

<sup>213</sup> अविद्येत्येवोच्यमाने, etc.—The answer to the objection raised above, is that avidyā by itself is not productive of the ills of life—अनर्थकारी. No doubt in its veiling aspect it hides reality as in sleep but in its projecting aspect it is responsible for the opposites like pain and pleasure, heat and cold, etc., with which one is assailed. The nature of vikṣepa as evident in the superimposition of ātman on non-ātman and vice versa has first to be rendered explicit. The primary object of inquiry into the nature of Brahman is to find a remedy for one's

superimposed on something else, not even to a tittle is the entity (on which something is superimposed) affected by either the bad or the good effects accruing from it (adhyāsa).<sup>214</sup> Thus the Bhāṣya-kāra shows the unreality of anartha (enjoyership, etc.). If they were real (the Sūtrakāra's) asseveration (pratijñā) that its sublation results only from jñāna would become void

XXXVIII. 141. Thus up to this point the bhāṣya commencing from 'the notions of non-ego and ego, etc.,' and ending with 'due to erroneous knowledge, not differentiating truth from error men carry on their empirical activities from eternity' has discoursed on superimposition, called avidyā which consists in the mutual confounding of ātman and non-ātman, as if it were validated (by pramāṇa).<sup>215</sup> And desirous of (establishing its existence) the commentator having given its definition and having shown the possibility (*prima facie*) of its occurrence in ātman and again desirous of determining its existence (*i.e.*, of superimposition) on the basis of sound logic, says: ["And this erroneous mutual transference of ātman and non-ātman, otherwise termed avidyā is presupposed in all activities—secular and sacerdotal based on the distinction between the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge as also in all the Scriptural statements whether injunctive or prohibitive or relative to liberation.]"<sup>216</sup>

---

sufferings brought on by vikṣepa. It is through superimposition that avidyā afflicts man. As such the nature of superimposition has to be explicated before that of avidyā.

<sup>214</sup> अणुमोत्रणापि न संबध्यते—In the ascription of silver to the shell, for example, brilliance which belongs to the silver is by no means related to the shell; in the rope serpent appearance, the poisonous quality of the serpent has absolutely no connection with the rope. Hence superimposition is nothing but error—मिथ्या.

<sup>215</sup> सिद्धवदुपन्यस्तम्—'Without stating the pramāṇas the commentator' says Padmapāda, 'has expounded the nature of superimposition, its cause, its definition and its probability—समावना. Now cogent reasons—प्रमाण's are adduced in proof of the actual existence of adhyāsa, सिद्धान्तयिषुः—प्रमाणेन साधयितुमिच्छुः—desirous of adducing valid means of knowledge in support of superimposition.

<sup>216</sup> मोक्षपरणि—Scriptures, *i.e.*, the Upaniṣads bearing upon liberation; from the insertion of this phrase it is evident that the Upaniṣads do not subserve the karmakāṇḍa or the ritualistic portion of the Vedas; on the contrary their independent instrumental value as subserving the highest human end is indicated,

[Page 31] The liberation texts of the śāstra demarcate it (*i.e.*, the topic of mokṣa) from the ritualistic section having admitted that their function is only to expound the real nature of ātman, since there is no occasion here for either injunction or prohibition and since consequently it is irrelevant to speak of possessing or eschewing (hānopādāna).

142. *Pūrvapakṣin*: ["But how could it be maintained that perception and other means of valid cognition as also the Scriptures have in view one who is under the spell of nescience" ?] Well, we admit that avidyā as defined (above, *viz.*, that it is the manifestation elsewhere of what was seen before) may have the pure ātman as its locus. By this alone its (avidyā) actual existence is not really established. Hence its existence has to be substantiated (by cogent reasons).<sup>217</sup> The pramāṇas are dependent on the knowing subject (pramātā); hence the knowing subject is the locus (āśraya) of the pramāṇas (*i.e.*, he is the ground of the means of right knowledge), and not the one who is under illusion—which means that avidyā has no place here. Or, the sentence (katham punaḥ, etc.) may be construed thus:—How can perception, etc., and also the Scriptures be the valid means of knowledge when they relate to one who is deluded (bhrānta) ? If they have their seat in one who is a bhrānta (*i.e.*, if they have a deluded person as their āśraya), they cease to be pramāṇas being vitiated by their contact with the defects inherent in such a person—this is the adverse criticism.

143. *Siddhāntin*: ["This will be answered. For one who is free from the erroneous notions of 'I' and 'mine' in the body and the senses, the idea of "a knower" is inappropriate and as such the operation of pramāṇas is unintelligible"]—so far it is the Bhāṣyakāra's succinct statement. The same is elaborated in, ["without employing the senses](there can be no talk of

---

<sup>217</sup> The commentary beginning with 'How could it be maintained that perception and other pramāṇas presume one who is under nescience, etc.?' has to be understood thus—apart from its being apprehended by the inner witness, is there any proof to show that superimposition is the basis of all activities connected with pramāṇa, prameya, etc.?

The questioner admits the probability of the superimposition of non-ātman on ātman, but then requires definite proof of its existence.

perception, etc.). The capacity to know is not perceived in one who is in deep slumber since in that state one is free from the erroneous notions of 'I' and 'mine' in the body and the senses, (so that in the absence of superimposition the triad of vyavahāras—pramāṇa, prameya, pramātā, is impossible). Because the illusory ascription of the ego is to the body, the notion of 'mine' is to the senses; from the word ādi (and so on), the bodily organs, such as the arm, etc., have to be taken. The term 'body' (deha) has to be understood as pointing to the whole (avayavī) possessing, the head, etc., and distinguished by the generic concept of 'man' etc., and not merely to the physical body; for it is evident that the usage does not take the form 'I am the body' (but rather 'I am man'). Activity of every kind presumes that the conscious principle (caitanya) has a locus (identical with that of) a particular genus, as exemplified in the usage, "I who am a man, know", "I, who am a deity, know", and that this is a matter of immediate, intuitive experience is self-evident. It cannot be (maintained) that any empirical activity (as evidenced by the employment of expressions) like the knower, (knowing and what is known), is possible on the basis of the relation of overlordship either by the bodily configuration or by the eye, etc., organically connected therewith, based on the relation of possession; for then such activity would be possible even through the servant, etc., possessing a human body.<sup>218</sup>

144. Some one else says:—The relation of the body (lit. the aggregate of the bodily organs and the senses) with the self is one of (subordination) being directed by one's will, and the relation of the self again with the body is one of (controller), directing the body at its own will. From that (takes place) every activity of the self as the knowing subject, etc., involving action, means of action and the result (phala). For example, with the desire to stand one stands up; and also with the desire to sit one sits down. But there is no such thing (*i.e.*, this kind of relation—that of controller and controlled) in the case of servants, etc. Hence the absence of vyavahāra there—involving the knowing

<sup>218</sup> If the relation between the self and the body be not one of (false) identity but only one of master and servant we might as well admit that the empirical activities of the self of the master are dependent upon the body of the servant. There is relation of ownership in either case—an unwelcome contingency.



subject, etc.,—is not wrong, because there is no direct dependence of action upon the will.<sup>219</sup>

145. *Siddhāntin*: What you say is not convincing to one who sets any value by experience; to explain—it is self-evident that our experience takes the form 'I am man' and not 'my man'.<sup>220</sup> If you argue that this is only a figurative use, all that can be said is your honour alone (*i.e.*, your bare assertion only) is the *pramāṇa* here. Moreover even desire is a specific modal change (of the inner sense) and how can that (desire) be of *ātman* which is changeless (lit. not subject to any transformation) unless it be through the ego which is *ātman* as (erroneously) related to the transformed inner sense? [Page 32] Hence the experience 'I will stand' which implies that it is by one's desire that one stands up as well as sits down. As such no value attaches to that (*viz.*, the attempt to explain *vyavahāra* by relations other than the identity-in-difference—*tādātmya*).

146. Therefore the knowership (*pramātr̥tva*) cannot be predicated of the entity (*viz.*, *ātman*) which is in itself relationless and changeless except (on the basis of) erroneous superimposition. Hence (*i.e.*, since the knowership is not intelligible without superimposition) though *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition) in its application desiderates one who has the capacity of functioning as the knower, yet that (knowership) itself is an offshoot of *avidyā*; as such it is stated that all *pramāṇas* presume one who is under

---

<sup>219</sup> 'If the master-servant relation does not fit in' says the *pūrvapakṣin*, 'let the relation be one of controller and controlled,—*विनियोज्यविनियोजकभावः*.'

*आत्मेच्छानुयायित्वम्*—*Ātman*, as agent, is the controller and the aggregate as the object is the controlled. Why the master-servant relation which is also *विनियोज्यविनियोजकभाव* fails is because the master's will is not the sole factor; the servant when commanded has also to will. But in 'I stand' and 'I sit' there is the direct dependence of action upon the will. Hence there is difference between the two.

<sup>220</sup> *मनुष्योऽहमिति*, etc.—The *pūrvapakṣin* attempts to explain all *vyavahāras* like *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc., by relations other than *tādātmya*. The *siddhāntin* points out that where these other relations exist between two words their case-endings are not identical as in *tādātmya*. Because of *tādātmya* relation between the body and the self we use the expression 'I am man—*अहं मनुष्यः*.' if it were any other relation the expression would be 'my man'—'*मे मनुष्यः*'.

the spell of avidyā; (*Cp.* 'Tasmāda vidyāvadviṣayāṇyeva pratyakṣā-dīni pramāṇāni śāstrāni, ca').<sup>221</sup> (Just as the pramāṇas presuppose a person who is under the sway of nescience) even so pramāṇas requiring as they do no other aid and revealing objects from their own self-potency possess validity since their negation is not perceived,<sup>222</sup> and as such it is not possible to say 'no' and deny what has been demonstrated by primarily adducing perception (*vidhi*), *i.e.*, that pramāṇas are (relatively, in the empirical realm) valid, and that they have as their viṣaya one who is under illusion. It is only the adventitious defect that is the cause of invalidity in knowledge (*jñāna*) and not the defect that is beginning-less (*naiṣargika*); even so is our experience.<sup>223</sup> And there arises

<sup>221</sup> The criticism here is that superimposition is an unnecessary hypothesis. The knower (*pramātā*) himself is the agent in all activities, mental and physical and there need be no superimposition (*adhyāsa*). To which the answer is that competency to act as knower is possible only in the case of one who is under the sway of *avidyā*. 'Hence' says Śaṅkara, 'all pramāṇas including the Scriptures presuppose primal illusion'.

<sup>222</sup> Merely on the ground that pramāṇas presuppose one who is deluded they do not lose their claim to validity. The critic advances the argument that pramāṇas like perception, inference, etc., are vitiated at their very source as their *āśraya* (ground) is one who is under illusion. In answering the critic, the Vedāntin queries thus:—(i) do you urge that they forfeit their claim to validity because they proceed from one who is deluded? or (ii) because they are valid, a deluded man cannot be their *āśraya*? As regards the first alternative again, (a) do you think that such pramāṇas are incompetent to reveal the absolute truth? or (b) to reveal the knowledge of empirical objects? In regard to (a) we admit the incompetency of pramāṇas other than the Upaniṣads; but as regards (b) the pramāṇas are certainly valid in the workaday world, since they are not negated. We cannot will away experience. (ii) is answered in the words—*प्राप्ताप्यमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं च*.

<sup>223</sup> *दोषस्वागन्तुक एव*—This is in answer to an implied objection. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that even Brahman which is the viṣaya of *Brahmajñāna* must be illusory like the cognition of shell-silver, for all cognitions have their sources in mind which is affected by *avidyā*. This argument is fallacious being associated with an adventitious condition (*upādhi*). If a particular cognition is to be illusory it must have arisen from a source affected by a defect that is occasional—*आगन्तुक*. *Avidyā* is not adventitious but primal. It can only frustrate the perception of *ātman* in its uniqueness and not in the revealing of

no idea of the existence of defect in what is universal and natural.

147. To illustrate (the above)—neither as regards the distress produced by hunger and thirst, nor as regards the digestion (lit. destruction) of food and drink brought about by the frequently recurring change effected by the gastric juice (jāṭharāgni—the digestive fire of the stomach) does any one conceive the idea of disease. (On the contrary) as regards even a mild fever returning for a brief period or cold caused by slight phlegm, there arises the idea of disease because of its adventitious occurrence (lit. non-natural). And it is with the notion that the defect pertains to the non-natural (has Śābara) said “Jñāna which is produced from defective sense-organs and where jñāna turns out to be false (the moment after it arises)—that alone is wrong knowledge and none other”. (T.D.)

XXXIX. 148. On account of this also that is so—[Those learned in the Śāstras) are on a par with the brute creation’].<sup>224</sup> For example, it is indubitable knowledge that cattle, etc., at the time of exercising their judgment as knowing beings (pramā-trṭva) assume an attitude either of purposeful activity or withdrawal or indifference, thereby indicating that they too illusorily conceive the aggregate of the body and the senses as identical with the self. In the matter of empirical activities (lit. yoga means acquisition, and kṣema, safeguarding what has been acquired) there is indeed similarity between their behaviour and that of men who are from their birth superior to them in intelligence and even of those who have acquired competency in the knowledge of the future world (derived) from a study of the Śāstras. Hence, that

duality. In the case of visual sense, etc., it is only when they are afflicted by some disease that what they reveal is invalid but when whole, their claim to denote empirical facts is not abrogated, though being under the influence of innate nescience they project diversity.

<sup>224</sup> It may be questioned why even those who have the conviction derived from the śāstras that the self is not the body, should be spoken of as no better than animals in their cognitional activities. It is to be noted that śāstraik knowledge is indirect—parokṣa, and as such it cannot negate superimposition—adhyāsa, which is mediate—aparokṣa. What is immediately cognised can be annulled only by another cognition which is also immediate. What is intended to be impressed is that activity in general, be it of animals or even of the educated men, presupposes superimposition.

is, since it is seen that the empirical behaviour (kārya) of even learned men is of the same character as theirs it is only right to conclude that the superimposition of the self on the aggregate of the body and the senses is similar.

149. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Will, on what grounds is it determined that in the case of cattle even, there is the superimposition of the self on the aggregate of the body and the senses, so that you speak of it as if it were already established?

*Siddhāntin*: It is thus answered:—It is only to persons of superior intelligence that ātman is taught by those expert in the knowledge of the real nature of pramāṇas like perception, etc. Otherwise it would result in its (*i.e.*, instruction) becoming purposeless; and likewise the whole world would understand what ātman is without inquiry into the means of valid knowledge.<sup>225</sup>

150. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, cowherds, women and others ignorant of the knowledge of pramāṇas (like the Veda, etc.) understand that a permanent enjoyer survives the fall of the present body and perform (religious rites) for his sake.

*Siddhāntin*: No, the practical behaviour, (the vyavahāra of the common people), has for its pramāṇa only the vyavahāra of those who are cognizant of that (*viz.*, that the soul is permanent and survives the body). Therefore it is that when asked who it is that (survives and) is related to the other world, they answer, “we do not know what it is in particular; it is, however, a well-understood belief in the world”. [Page 33] As such it is rightly said, [‘action based on perception, etc., of animals evidently presupposes non-distinction (between the self and the not-self, *viz.*, the body). And because such resemblance (with the vyavahāra of animals) is observed, the vyavahāra in the nature of perception, etc., of even men of understanding so long as superimposition lasts, is of the same character only (*i.e.*, originates in nescience)’.]

---

<sup>225</sup> It is perceived that the knowledge of ātman can be brought home only to those who possess higher intelligence, and if we should suppose that there is no superimposition in the cognitional activity of animals then (like them) the whole of mankind would cognise ātman without the necessity of study and inquiry. In the empirical sphere the behaviour of even the discriminating is on a par with that of animals. Their thoughts and actions are based on ‘adhyāsa’.

XL. 151. What has been said so far is this:—perception and other means of valid knowledge are established through the instrumentality of (the sense-organs like) the eye, etc., and they (*i.e.*, the instruments) cannot operate without a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the body is the *adhiṣṭhāna* (*i.e.*, the body on which *ātman* has been superimposed serves as the ground). And the cognitive function is ill-suited to the *ātman*-entity which is relationless, immutable and of the essence of pure intelligence, without its identification with the body, etc., through superimposition. In this way having pointed out that as a matter of experience, perception, etc., have as their *āśraya* (locus) one who is under the spell of nescience, and having explained the same on the basis of their *kārya* (procedure) also because of its similarity with the procedure of animals, (in other words *kārya* or *vyavahāra* of learned men being similar to that of animals is made the probans to infer that they also act under illusion), the *Bhāṣyakāra* premising (now) a specific doubt, *viz.*, that the *Śāstra* on the contrary (*i.e.*, action enjoined in the Scriptures) is intended only for one who is cognizant of *ātman* (as distinct from the body) and as such activity therein does not proceed from superimposition, shows that even in his case action presupposes *avidyā*, and says [‘As regards activities enjoined by the Scriptures it is true no doubt that an intelligent man who undertakes them does so not without knowing (beforehand) that *ātman* (is distinct from the body and) is related to the other world’].

152. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, the injunctions (Vedic mandates) relating to interested action, obligatory action, occasional action and expiatory action do certainly possess validity without the pre-supposition of an enjoying agent who survives the collapse of the present body.<sup>226</sup> We will point out how (it is argued that the Vedic

---

<sup>226</sup> The materialist *Cārvāka* questions the *Bhāṣyakāra*’s statement that when one pursues an action for the sake of an unseen *phala* one must have a knowledge of *ātman* apart from the body, for the Scriptural injunctions (he says) may acquire the status of *pramāṇa* even in the absence of heaven and a dweller therein.

(i) फलचोदना—Injunction relating to interested action—*kāmya-karma*, performed for a reward—*phala*.

(ii) नैयमिकचोदना—Injunction relating to obligatory duties—*nitya-karma*, as sun-rise and sun-set prayers, sacrifices on new and full-moon days, autumnal rites, etc.

texts acquire validity without necessitating a disembodied ātman) when commenting on the section beginning with the Sūtra—“Some (maintain that) the self (is non-different from the body, because knowledge, etc., are manifest) when the body exists (and not when the body does not exist)”.<sup>227</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: This is true as you say (*i.e.*, ātman as an entity distinct from the body is not established). But yet the Bhāṣya-kāra has made this statement (*viz.*, that ātman as related to Heaven exists apart from the body) admitting the reality of

(iii) नैमित्तिकचोदना—Injunction relating to occasional obligatory duties, as bathing at the eclipse, etc.

(iv) प्रायश्चित्तचोदना—Injunction relating to expiatory ceremonies such as are done when one commits a sin.

The Cārvāka must be supposed to reason thus:—Interested action may yield its phala in this birth only as the bestowal of cattle, etc. If it is performed for svarga even that could be had here, for svarga means a state of supreme happiness and joy and that also may eventuate in one's life-time as a reward for the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma, etc. As for (ii) and (iii) the Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that Nitya and Naimittika duties yield no reward, but that one will be committing sin if one neglects them. As for (iv) evil deeds may be expiated in this life only since the affliction they bring also relates to the present life. If fruits of one's deeds here should eventuate, as held by some, in some other region called svarga a man can proceed there in this earthly body with the aid of mantra and medicine. The Cārvāka conclusion, therefore, is that the validity of Vedic mantras (if one believes in them) can be maintained without presuming a disembodied soul.

<sup>227</sup> V. S., III. iii. 53—A Pūrvapakṣa sūtra which declares the materialistic position that no spiritual entity apart from the bodily aggregate exists. The siddhānta sūtra, *i.e.*, the sūtra declaring the true doctrine runs thus:—“व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वाच्च तूपलब्धिवत्”—V. Sut., III. iii. 54; ननु नत्वेतदस्ति—Your contention that a distinct ātman does not exist, is untenable; व्यतिरेकः—Ātman distinct from the body does exist; why? तद्भावाभावित्वात्—even though the body exists, say, when a man is dead, there is the absence of consciousness, desire, etc., which are admitted to be attributes of the Self; उपलब्धिवत्—as the knowledge of the external world is something distinct from the external world and is not identical with it; even so it must be admitted that upalabdhi or knowledge is distinct from the body and ātman is no other than such knowledge.



such an entity as vouched for by a consideration of all the Śāstras.<sup>228</sup>

153. Even so the commentator (Śabara) in commenting on the sūtras (of Jaimini) purporting to explicate the Vedic mandates has advanced *ab extra* a powerful defence for the existence of an independent ātman (though ātman is not established in the sūtras).<sup>229</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*: On what ground (does he undertake to establish ātman) ?

*Siddhāntin*: Having in the sūtra—‘Inquiry into Dharma’ *Jai. Sūt.*, I. i, resolved to expound the nature of kārya and basing the validity of its (*i.e.*, Dharma) knowledge on the non-requirement of any other pramāṇa, the Sūtrakāra (Jaimini), it is to be supposed, admits the validity of even those Vedic statements which relate to self-existent objects because of the absence of any distinction. Similarly having stated that codanā (the vidhi or mandatory statement) is indeed competent to convey the knowledge of the past, the present, the future, the supersensuous, the separated (in space), the distant (in time) and all other objects of this nature, (Śabara), it is seen (understands) that in the knowledge of existent entities even though as auxiliary to mandatory statements, the non-requirement (of pramāṇas other than śabda)

<sup>228</sup> सत्यमेवम्, etc.—This is partial agreement. Though śāstraic duties can be undertaken without reference to the other world, Śamkara bearing in mind the true doctrine as expounded in the Devatādhikaraṇa (V. S., I. iii. 26–33) where the validity of mantra and arthavāda is admitted, has made the statement that an entity distinct from the body and related to the other world exists. What is however pertinent to the context is the adduction of proof for the existence of illusion.

<sup>229</sup> उत्सृज्यते, etc.—If the postulation of ātman as distinct from the body was necessary for the carrying out of the Vedic mandates Jaimini would have framed a sūtra for that purpose but such postulation is unnecessary to enforce the fulfilment of a mandate. Hence Jaimini’s omission. But Śabara has expounded the nature of ātman when commenting on the Vth sūtra known as the ‘autpattika sūtra’ on the strength of the ‘anapekṣatva hetu’—that the Veda as a whole requires no other pramāṇa for its validity. The Upaniṣads forming part of the Veda must necessarily be valid and they reveal the nature of ātman an existent entity—भूतार्थः उत्सृज्यते—beyond the sūtra, apart from the sūtra.



is of equal application. And as to where or how the Vedic texts relating to the cognition of the existent entity (serve as a *pramāṇa* is not explained by the revered Jaimini since in accordance with his resolve he set about investigating into the nature of *dharma* only and since such knowledge (*i.e.*, of *ātman* as distinguished from the body) is not to the purpose.<sup>230</sup>

154. But the revered Bādarāyaṇa on the other hand having resolved to inquire into a different topic altogether, has expounded (the subject of the separate existence of *ātman*) in the 'saman-vayādhikaraṇa'—V.S., I. 1-4. And there *svarga* the bliss of which is to be enjoyed in a world other than ours is (as good as) proved to exist. And all that is pertinent to *svarga* can never become significant without an enjoyer different from the aggregate of the body and the senses (being premised). And its proof (*i.e.*, *ātmasiddhi*) does not depend solely on the Scriptures. [Page 34] A statement relating to a thing which when fit for cognition by a different *pramāṇa* is unsupported by such *pramāṇa* or is contradicted by it would become as invalid as the statement that stones float. Hence (Bādarāyaṇa) has devoted his sole attention to the demonstrability of that (*i.e.*, *ātman* as described in the Upaniṣad.

155. It is true that validity would belong (to the injunctions relating to the performance of ritualistic duties) even without that (*i.e.*, without the necessity of *ātman* as distinguished from the body being established). But that (validity) does exist (in regard to existent objects like *svarga*). And when Vedic passages relating to existent objects are valid, the Vedic utterances relating to *phala* (*i.e.*, the reward accruing from the performance of sacrifices) will have no validity without it (*i.e.*, unless the self as distinct from the body is substantiated). Knowing this the Bhāṣya-kāra (Śamkara) says, ["as regards the duties enjoined by the Scriptures on the person qualified, it is true no doubt that an intelligent man who undertakes them does so not without knowing beforehand that *ātman* is distinct from the body and is related to the other world"].

---

<sup>230</sup> The mandatory statements demand implicit obedience and no question as to whether *ātman* as distinguished from the body exists or not is pertinent. Even without reference to the surviving self the *karmakāṇḍa* imposes obligation to carry out its behests.

XLI. 156. ["And yet (a knowledge of the real nature of ātman) to be had from the Vedānta (is not required in the performance of karma)."] Which is that ātman (*i.e.*, of what essence is that ātman which is to be known from a study of the Vedānta)? To this query he (Śamkara) says, ["the knowledge of the real nature of ātman as an entity free from transmigratory existence is not required in the performance of karma (adhikāra)= karmānuṣṭhāna—performance of sacrifices) because it serves no purpose and (not merely that), it is opposed to karma."] By (the phrase), "that which is free from longing for food, etc.", he points out the negation of transmigratory existence.<sup>231</sup> Indeed every creature that is afflicted by the gnawings of hunger finding no rest (*i.e.*, not being free from love and hate) will be engaged in some kind of activity; when that (hunger) disappears, remaining in peace perceives nothing that is either to be acquired or rejected. By (the phrase) "unassociated with all distinctions of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, etc.," he points out the total negation of the world and (the existence of) the one entire consciousness-entity of the nature of Bliss (rasa).

157. He further says, ["And prior to the rise of such knowledge (as described above), the Veda (*i.e.*, the Scriptural injunction) in its application cannot step beyond, but must refer to one who is under the spell of avidyā"]. (This means) that prior to the rise of the knowledge derived from the (Mahāvākya—the great pronouncement)—"That thou art", the śāstra which proceeds (to instruct) on the presupposition of saṃsāra, (empirical life) the creation of avidyā, rendered manifest in the ego notion, does not step beyond the man who is deluded (*i.e.*, it addresses itself only to one who is still in the realm of nescience). Hence it was rightly said that the pramāṇas like perception, etc., as well as the śāstras are operative in relation to those under the spell of nescience.

<sup>231</sup> (a) अशनायाद्यतीतम्—अनेन मयेदमनुष्ठेयमिति बुद्धिर्निराक्रियते.

When one is no longer subject to hunger and thirst the idea that one is under the obligation to do any specific duty ceases.

(b) अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम्—अनेन मदभिलषितसाधनमिति बुद्धिर्निराक्रियते.

When distinctions of caste disappear specific karmas enjoined as the means to some end, on Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, etc., cease.

(c) असंसारीव्यनेन 'समाय नियोग' इति बुद्धिर्निराक्रियते.

When the idea of bondage ceases there is absolute freedom and Scriptural commands have no authority on the liberated person.

158. He establishes that same point. To explain:—The Vedic mandates, ‘Let the Brāhmaṇa perform the Sacrifice’, etc. proceed on the basis of the superimposition on ātman of what is not that (*viz.*, ātman). The statements ‘Initiate a Brāhmaṇa (*i.e.*, perform Upanayana) in his eighth year’, etc., (presuppose) caste and age-superimposition. The āśrama-superimposition is indicated in “Do not beg after ‘having bathed’.”<sup>232</sup> The superimposition of a particular state (*avasthā*) is indicated in ‘if one is suffering from a chronic disease one should perform such and such a sacrifice’. The word ‘ādi’ points to the text ‘Till life lasts perform (*agnihotra*)’ whereby the superimposition of ‘living’ (is premised).<sup>233</sup>

XLII. 159. Thus having established the existence of superimposition (*prasādhya*—by defining it and adducing *pramāṇas* in its support), the Bhāṣyakāra, with the statement “we have explained that all that superimposition means is the apprehension of something in what is not that something” reminds us that, what has already been defined in the commentary beginning with ‘of the nature of recollection’, etc., and ending with ‘*adhyāsa*, however understood, does not depart from the definition that it is the apparent manifestation of the attributes of one thing in another”, is literally the superimposition of ‘what is not that’.<sup>234</sup>

<sup>232</sup> न ह वै स्नात्वा भिक्षेत्—Having finished studies under a preceptor, in the celebrate state—*ब्रह्मचर्य*, one should perform the ceremony known as ‘*snātakakarma*’ and enter upon a married life, the stage of a house-holder—*गृहस्थ*. He should now cease to beg food as he used to do while pursuing studies as a *Brahmacārin*.

<sup>233</sup> Obligatory duties such as daily prayers to the Sun, and new moon and full-moon sacrifices are to be performed during the whole of one’s life-time. But this obligation does not bind a liberated man but only that man who is under the illusion that he exists as an individual Self—*Jīvādhyasā*. And when one realises one’s own true self the obligatory duties lose their binding force.

<sup>234</sup> अध्यासो नाम ‘अतस्मिन् तद्बुद्धिः—In these words, Śamkara restates briefly the definition of superimposition already stated: स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः—with the object of illustrating it. The examples already given, *viz.*, ‘shell-silver’ and ‘double-moon’ no doubt substantiate the definition, but they are not elucidative of the topic under discussion. It is the superimposition of the ‘I’ and ‘mine’ that should be rendered intelligible. Hence another illustration—तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति.

(And this statement is made) in order to specifically point out, which thing, as denoted by the 'thou (object)', is superimposed on which thing, as denoted by the 'ego' (subject) and again in the reverse order. What it means is the apparent presentation of the notion of what is denoted by the 'thou' (*i.e.*, 'the this') in what is denoted by the 'not this'-ego; (again) in what is the 'not-this', (*i.e.*, in what is denoted by the 'not-thou'). Hence says (the commentator—'As when sons and wife, etc.')

160. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, it is not literally (*i.e.*, in the primary sense) that the soundness or the unsoundness (of health) of one's children, etc., that one attributes through ignorance to one's own self and indeed it was undertaken by you to show the superimposition of what is not the 'that' in a primary sense (and not in a figurative sense).

*Siddhāntin*: [Page 35] Yes, it is true (that superimposition is literal and not figurative). That only is illustrated. How? It is thus—when a baby-son is decorated with clothes and ornaments by someone who is in no way related (to the child) except as a neighbour, the father thinks in no figurative sense that he has honoured the father only, because of the fact that he himself is honoured; and the person honouring also thinks that he honoured the father only, because of the fact that the sense of pride at being honoured has not developed in the child. Similarly, with the object of vanquishing a king a neighbouring king who is desirous of victory, having destroyed only a single town in his kingdom thinks that he has vanquished him only; and he also (*i.e.*, the pillaged king) grieves (saying) 'I am vanquished'. Hence in this wise, superimposition in a real sense is perceived in the self which is patently distinct (from children, wife, etc.). Where then is the need to state that superimposition is real (not figurative) in the case of one who imagines thus—'I am lean, I am stout', etc.? To point this out (the Bhāṣya) says, ["myself alone am unsound or sound; thus he superimposes on the self qualities which do not pertain to him']. The super-

---

It is through *adhyāsa* that the non-related self erroneously relates itself first with the internal organ. This is the direct, primary identification—the non-personal self becoming the personal self. The self becomes 'I' and on this further superimpositions take place, *e.g.*, identifying oneself with one's wife, child, etc. These are cases of mediated *adhyāsa*.

imposition of what is denoted by the 'Thou' (Yuṣmat) is only that of the attributes (dharma) belonging to external objects as (when one appropriates to oneself) the honour, etc., done to the sons and so on. The meaning of the word 'asmāt'<sup>235</sup> is in fact that which is interrelated to the ground of the ego-notion (*i.e.*, the inner sense or antaḥkaraṇa), which is the sentient part as distinguished from the 'this' (*i.e.*, the nonsentient world), and which is the object (viśaya and not viśayī); but it is not pure consciousness only, as in the case of the superimposition of the inner sense (on ātman) where there is no interposition of an additional superimposition (except ajñāna); even so 'the attributes of the body such as leanness, etc.,' (are superimposed on the self); alike the superimposition of the thing possessing attributes (dharminopi, *viz.*, the body, etc., which are the locus of leanness, etc.). The use of the word 'dharma' is to indicate that the superimposition is of the body, only as associated with attributes like 'manhood' (being a man), etc., and not to denote (association with others as illustrated in) 'I am body'. And based on that (*viz.*, the superimposition of attributes—dharmādhyāsa) distinct (lit. such and such) rules relating to distinct actions are enjoined by the Scripture. Even so, 'the attributes of the senses such as dumbness, etc.,' so that only the attributes (are superimposed on the Self). Likewise in the bhāṣya ['the attributes of the inner sense such as desire, etc.'] the attributes alone are to be understood as superimposed (on the self). The word 'antaḥkaraṇa'

---

<sup>235</sup> अस्मदर्थश्च, etc.—Here the word 'ātman' in the bhāṣya statement, बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति is explained. The bhāṣya starts with the superimposition of external objects on the body, the latter on the senses and so on up to the superimposition on the pure ātman. But this order has to be reversed. In reality the superimposition takes place thus:—

- (i) the superimposition of nescience on the pure consciousness—ātman;
- (ii) the superimposition of antaḥkaraṇa on the nescience—conditioned, *viz.*, ātman;
- (iii) the superimposition of the senses on that which is conditioned by antaḥkaraṇa;
- (iv) the superimposition of the body on that which is conditioned by the senses;
- (v) the superimposition of what is external on that which is conditioned by the body.

(inner sense) denotes (here) the cognitive potency aspect of what is denoted by the ego-notion and desire, etc., are its (antaḥkaraṇa in its cognitive aspect) characteristic properties.

XLIH. 162. (From the bhāṣya), 'evamahampratyayinam' the dharmin (having attributes) is to be understood. (Padmapāda proceeds to explain the bhāṣya text—"evamahampratyayinam-aśeṣasvapracāraśākṣiṇi pratyagātmanyadhyasya, tam ca pratyagātmānam sarvasākṣiṇam tadviparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiśvadyasyati")—pratyayāḥ, desire, etc., (kāmadayaḥ); asya—of this (antaḥkaraṇa); hence pratyayī (the inner sense is called 'pratyayī' because it undergoes modal changes—vikāraḥ to express desire, aversion, etc.; it is the āśraya). It is ahampratyayī because it is both ego and the modally transformed; and having superimposed that (ahampratyayī) on the inner ātman (pratyagātman) which is the witness of all its transformations; by the word 'svam' is denoted the ego-complex (the intelligence and non-intelligence tangle—cidacidgranthi) which is (as it were) the main pillar of the dancing-hall of the life-cycle (saṃsāra). Its (antaḥkaraṇa) operations are the innumerable modal changes (psychoses) in the shape of desire, resolve, agency, etc., on account of which (transformations) the creature from Brahman down to an immobile object (like plants) wander again and again, forlorn, as if with a blazing head. And the whole of that (modal change of the inner sense, as desire, aversion, etc.) the consciousness entity (cidvastu) manifests directly, without the intervention (of another vṛtti), itself remaining unattached, undergoing no change, and (therefore) being void of (the desire) to own or disown (anything). And that (*i.e.*, the consciousness entity) only, is spoken of as the inner self (pratyak) since it appears as if shining inwards in the direction, opposite to that of the body, etc., which have acquired the character of externality being designated by the 'this'.<sup>236</sup> The term 'ātman' itself (is justified on the ground that it is so) in its own nature (*i.e.*, not in a figurative sense).

163. Having superimposed (the nonsentient) on that (the self), again, the superimposition of that, *viz.*, the inner self on the nonsentient is effected. If the superimposition were only

<sup>236</sup> असज्जडविलक्षणत्वेन अद्यति प्रकाशते—ātman is सच्चिदानन्दस्वरूप, *i.e.*, is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss and manifests itself as the very opposite of non-existence, insentience and pain. Hence it is known as 'pratyak'.



of that which is denoted by the 'thou' on the inner self then the inner self would not reveal itself.<sup>237</sup> (For instance) in the superimposition of 'silver' on the nacre, is not revealed. But here consciousness (caitanya) manifests itself in the ego, etc. [Page 36] Similarly if there were only the superimposition of consciousness on the ego (the insentient part) then the world beginning with the ego would cease to manifest itself. In order to obviate both (the Bhāṣyakāra) in conformity with experience says—["And *vice versa*, the inner self which is the universal witness is superimposed on the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), etc., (including the senses)"]. It ought not to be contended here that because in the sphere of mutual superimposition the manifestation is (of two) separate (entities) it is (a case of) figurative (usage) and not (of) mithyā (illusion). Since experience contradicts it (*i.e.*, that it is a figurative expression) it is illusion proper. The validity of what is given in experience cannot be questioned.

164. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, it is only on the antaḥkaraṇa that the inner self—the pure consciousness, is superimposed. Elsewhere on the other hand, (say the body, the senses and so on) it is only the antaḥkaraṇa when it has become endowed with the property of immediate cognition as the result of the superimposition of consciousness on it, that is superimposed (and not the pure ātman). For that reason (because the conditioned self only is superimposed on the senses, etc.) it was said: ["Tadviparyayaṇa viṣayinaḥ, taddharmāṇām ca viṣaye adhyāso mithyeti bhavitum yuktam—*vice versa* it is wrong to superimpose the subject (viṣayī) and its attributes also on the object (viṣaya)"]. Otherwise (if the superimposition of the conditioned ātman is not accepted) whence could ātman which in its entirety is cons-

<sup>237</sup> तं च प्रत्यगात्मानम्, etc.—Since it is maintained that the self and not-self are mutually superimposed it may be urged that both are illusory and if both be substrates we should not have the cognition of special property—विशेषांश of the substrate, but as a matter of fact when ātman is the substrate its special property, its knowledge aspect, is cognised, *e.g.*, we say, अहमुपलभे.

The answer is that ātman may become illusory when in conjunction with the insentient—जड and not in its pristine state.

Again उपलब्धि is perceived as conjoined with the ego and not as conjoined with ātman. Hence ātman's becoming the substrate is valid.



ciousness get its attributes which may be superimposed (on the senses, etc.) ?

*Siddhāntin*: Your honour has spoken the truth only; but still elsewhere (*i.e.*, apart from antaḥkaraṇa) the inner sense as associated with cit only (consciousness) is superimposed and at such where it is superimposed (say on the senses, etc.), there it remains discarded, as if itself were non-existent, having assigned to that only (*viz.*, the sense) the function of generating action in ātman.<sup>238</sup> In every case of superimposition (on the body as well as on the inner sense) it is ātman (cidrūpa—consciousness) alone that remains unaltered either in itself (svarūpeṇa—as when superimposed on the inner sense) or when distinct (upādhirūpeṇa—as when along with the inner sense, it is superimposed on the senses, etc.).<sup>239</sup> Hence it is said—“ tam ca pratyagātmānam sarvasākṣiṇam tadviparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣvadyasyati” (*vide* above). Because it is so (*i.e.*, since ātman only is superimposed on the body, etc., the disbelievers—Cārvākas) and others fancying that consciousness which accompanies (all mental modes) is no other than buddhi (intellect), etc., and associating ātmatva (self-hood), with intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), vital breath (prāṇa), sense-

---

<sup>238</sup> We admit that ātman as conditioned by the internal organ only is superimposed on the senses, etc.; but then in the bhāṣya text अन्तःकरणादिषु, the mention of the word आदि beginning with (the internal sense), would imply that the pure ātman alone is superimposed on the senses, etc. Hence there is contradiction. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction, for in such a situation it is only the senses that prompt the self to action and not the internal sense. Hence though the internal sense remains as the conditioning agent—उपाधि the bhāṣya states that the pure self is superimposed on the senses, etc., because the internal sense is ineffective in producing action in ātman.—*vide VPS.*, p. 65.

<sup>239</sup> स्वतः परतो वा न विशिष्यते—In whatever manner ātman is superimposed on the internal sense, in the same manner it is superimposed on the senses, etc. It means that the nature of ātman in both is unaltered. Nor is there any change even when the superimposition of the conditioned ātman is effected. No doubt ātman in its pure state, *i.e.*, conditioned only by nescience, is superimposed in the internal sense and conditioned both by nescience and internal sense it is superimposed in the senses, etc. Still as the internal sense does not function in the latter case, the pure ātman, should be supposed as being superimposed in every case of superimposition.

organ (indriya), and body, ascribing consciousness to each, delude themselves.

XLIV. 165. (The Bhāṣyakāra) thus concludes: ["*evamayamanādirananto naisargikodhyāsaḥ*"]—In this manner proceeds this natural beginningless and endless superimposition.

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, when prefacing this topic it was said that all empirical activity (*lokavyavahāra*) was natural (*naisargikaḥ*—beginningless) as witness—'*ahamidam mamedamiti naisargikoyam lokavyavahāraḥ*'. How then is it that here it is concluded with '*adhyāsa*' (superimposition—*i.e.*, that *adhyāsa* is beginningless)? And further how is it that the word '*anādi*'—'without beginning', is added? (*cf.* '*evamayamanādirananto naisargikodhyāsaḥ*').

*Siddhāntin*: Here is the answer. There also (*i.e.*, in the introductory bhāṣya beginning with "*tathāpyanyonyasmin*, etc.," and ending with "*lokavyavahāraḥ*") it is only the superimposition of the ego (the 'not-self') on the inner self that is meant by 'the natural empirical activities'. And that inner self (which is the substratum of superimposition) is a beginningless entity and as such the beginningless superimposition on it should be presumed as established. Hence the conclusion is in conformity with the beginning and there is no inclusion of any adventitious matter.<sup>240</sup>

166. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, let us grant (that superimposition is) beginningless; but how endless (*ananta*)? If it be (endless) how can for its eradication the study of the Vedāntas be commenced?

*Siddhāntin*: Suppose it ends, even then (we rejoin why should one begin the study of the Vedānta for its effacement)? Its end is brought about either by itself or some other (cause). Hence what is intended to convey from the statement that all the Vedāntas are begun for the destruction of what is endless, is that this alone (*i.e.*, Vedāntic study) is presumably the cause of its removal.<sup>241</sup> If that (Vedāntic study) be absent it is evident that it (*adhyāsa*) will be endless.

<sup>240</sup> The objection is met by pointing out that *lokavyavahāraḥ* means '*ahamkāradhyāsa*'—*cf.* अहमिदं, ममेदम्. The *anāditva*—beginninglessness of superimposition, is established by *arthāpatti*.

<sup>241</sup> तस्मात् अनन्तस्य प्रहणाय . . . The Bhāṣyakāra has stated that superimposition is endless and that the study of Vedānta brings on its end. This is apparent contradiction. It is resolved by the statement that the eradication of superimposition is effected by the knowledge resulting from Vedāntic inquiry.

167. (In the phrase) 'mithyāpratyayarūpa' the inclusion of the word 'rūpa' is to show that it appears so (*i.e.*, false), only if judged by its definition (*lakṣaṇataḥ*) and not in the empirical sphere (*e.g.*, in the ordinary usage 'I am a man, I am lean, etc.,' no one regards it as false knowledge—*mithyā*; it is only when scrutinised that falsity is detected). [Page 37] From the phrase 'kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-pravartana—(pravartakaḥ)'—being the cause of agency and enjoyment, it is pointed out that superimposition is the cause of the afflictions of mankind (because agency and enjoyment are the source of all evil as evidenced in ('I' and 'mine') in order that they (*ahantā*—egoity and *mamatā*—acquisitiveness) may be avoided.

By this statement the doctrine of those who maintain that while *ātman's* agency and enjoyment are actual wrong knowledge leads to erroneous deeds, stands refuted.

Now as to the phrase 'sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ' perceived by all, (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) having explained to start with, that *pramāṭṛtva*—cognisanship, is impossible without the erroneous notion that the body, the senses and the rest are identical with the self, and stating that 'without the employment of the senses, etc., perceptive and other activities cannot take place, points to *anubhava* (*pratyakṣa*) as the determining factor in the establishment of *mithyātva* (*adhyāsa*) and concludes with it (*i.e.*, *anubhava*)

XLV. 168. Thus up to this point, having shown that *Jīva's* appearing as something other than Brahman is due to nescience, in order to substantiate (that the *Vedānta* has a definite) result, which (content and fruit—*viṣaya* and *prayojana*) can be presumed from the *Śūtra* (*viz.*, *athāto Brahmajijñāsā*), the commentator (*Śamkara*) pointedly draws attention to the fruit (result) by the phrase—'asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya'—for the eradication of the cause of this evil.<sup>242</sup> It is indeed from the destruction of

---

<sup>242</sup> अर्थदुपात्तयोः—From the first *sūtra* it is learnt that subsequent to the desire for liberation inquiry into the means of Brahman-knowledge has to be undertaken. By the well-understood rule that what is undertaken subsequent to the desire is itself the means of achieving it, it is clear that inquiry विचार is the means of attaining liberation. Because inquiry is the means through the channel of Brahman-knowledge, knowledge—*jñāna* also becomes the means of liberation—मोक्ष. And liberation is the sublation of evil—अनर्थ. Hence प्रयोजन or fruit is secured as *jñāna* is the means of eradicating evil.

the cause that there results the total destruction of that which is the effect of that cause (*viz.*, the *kārya* in the shape of agency, enjoyment, etc.).

169. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, *adhyāsa* (erroneous transference, the cause of the ills (of life) is beginningless; how can it be terminated? To explain—in the ego-notion the superimposition relates specifically to the entire class of men (*manuṣyatva*); hence though (ascertained) by reasoning that the ego is distinct (from *ātman*) the superimposition remains unaltered (shrouding the self) as before, because it is beginningless.

170. *Siddhāntin*: This is no defect. For what we seek is the unique knowledge (*jñānāntara*) which pointing to the nature of Brahman arises from (the comprehension of) the proposition That thou art—(*tatvamasi*)'.<sup>243</sup> And that (knowledge) arises revealing simultaneously the real nature of Brahman, and dispelling nescience which by concealing the Brahman-nature of consciousness, brings on *jīva*hood (*i.e.*, finitises it as individual self), and exists from eternity and which (again) is the cause of the manifestation of the ego-notion, etc.<sup>244</sup> From that (*i.e.*, from the *Brahma*-knowledge) arises the effacement of the cause (*viz.*, nescience) and then its effect, which as the notion of ego assumes enjoyership in the individual self, is destroyed together with all its paraphernalia; and this stands to reason. The ego-notion again, is existent from eternity and is in intimate association with the entire bodily aggregate which is also existent from

---

Again, because the illusion is of the *jīva* and it is eradicated by *Brahma*-knowledge, there must be identity between *jīva* and Brahman. *Jīva* is the locus, आश्रय of nescience which is sublated by *Brahma*-knowledge. Hence *jīva* must be one with Brahman. As such this identity is itself the subject of inquiry—विषय.

<sup>243</sup> ज्ञानान्तरम्—शरीरात्मव्यतिरेकज्ञानाद्विज्ञं ज्ञानम्—which is महावाक्यज्ञान. We do not say that the cognition of difference between the body and the self sublates illusory knowledge. But we maintain that such illusory knowledge is sublated by verbal testimony, *i.e.*, by the knowledge of the *mahāvākya*. Hence there is no conflict with *pratyakṣa*.

<sup>244</sup> Brahman being delimited by the final psychosis (*i.e.*, Brahman reflected in the *vṛtti*) resulting from the *mahāvākya* sublates nescience. The PP. mentions a four-fold qualification of nescience—(i) obscuration of Brahman's nature, (ii) finitising Brahman by individuating it, (iii) existing from eternity, and (iv) causing egoity.

eternity and as such there is no antagonism between them. Hence superimposition cannot be eradicated, by one's merely discriminating ātman from the bodily aggregate; nor has the other knowledge (*viz.*, 'aupaniṣadātmajñāna'—the knowledge of ātman as revealed in the Upaniṣads) yet arisen—this is the distinction.<sup>245</sup>

XLVI. 171. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, the Scriptures declare that Brahman is of the nature of transcendental bliss (*cf.*, 'vijñānam Brahma'; 'ānando Brahma') and that the means of attaining Brahman is the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmavidyā) as witness such Śruti, 'He who knows the supreme Brahman does indeed become Brahman only'—(Muṇḍ. Up., III. ii-9). Hence it must be stated that (the study of the Vedānta) is for the attainment of the highest happiness; how then is this said that it is for the eradication of the cause that brings on the evil (of metempsychosis)? It may however be urged that the Scriptures also declare that the eradication of the evil together with its cause is the end (phala) of Brahmavidyā, as witness, 'the knower of ātman steps across sorrow (which is evil)'; 'when he sees the other, the adored, the Lord and His greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow' (Muṇḍ. Up., III. i-2; Svet. Up., IV. 7 respectively). If so both should be mentioned (as phala), because of the declaration of the Scriptures and of their serving as the highest human end.

172. *Siddhāntin*: It is needless to state (both). How? From the Bhāṣya 'for the attainment of the knowledge of the unity of the self' (we gather) that the subject-matter of the Vedānta śāstra is ātman's, *i.e.*, jīvā's identity with Brahman. From this (*i.e.*, because this unity is the viṣaya of the śāstra) the jīvā's attainment of the nature of Brahman which is identical with Bliss, itself becomes the viṣaya (for whatever is the subject-matter must be the subject of investigation). [Page 38] And it (the

<sup>245</sup> औपनिषद्ज्ञान, व्यतिरेकज्ञानयोः कार्यकारणसंघातासहभावसहभावरूप एको विशेषः ; ततो विरोधाविरोधरूपोऽपरो विशेषः ; ततः कार्यकारणसंघातनिवर्तकताऽनिवर्तकतारूपोऽन्यो विशेषः—

The distinction between verbal knowledge derived from the Upaniṣads and the discriminating knowledge is that verbal knowledge does not suffer association with the body, etc., which the other tolerates; as such there is opposition in the one case and not in the other; again while verbal knowledge eradicates the bodily aggregate, the other does not.

attainment of bliss) is not something outside the viṣaya (*i.e.*, it is viṣaya itself), and it would have been appropriate to have predicated separately (the end—prayojanatva of ānandāvāpti) in case (it had not partaken of the nature of the viṣaya). On the other hand, the eradication of evil with its root-cause falls outside the content of the śāstra which is (no other than) the unity of the self with Brahman.<sup>246</sup>

173. *Pūrvapakṣin*: If so, even the eradication of the cause of evil need find no separate mention, the reason being that in all the Vedāntic texts the identity of the individual soul (jīva) with Brahman is enunciated only after expounding the nature of Brahman since the (latter) is beyond the range of the empirical means of knowledge. To explain:—All the texts beginning with ‘my dear, this (world) was verily being’ (sat—*i.e.*, the object of sadbuddhi—mere existence) in the beginning (*i.e.*, before the world came into existence—Chānd. Up., VI. 2–1) and ending with ‘All this (the entire universe) is of the essence of that (*viz.*, the Being, sat); that (being) is Reality, that is ātman’—(Chānd. Up., VI. 16–3), should be construed as a single sentence intended to show that what is denoted by the word ‘that’ (‘tat’ in ‘tatvamasi’) points to an entity which is of the nature of the sublation of the entire universe. Because of this (*viz.*, that all these sentences cohere and point to the world-sublated Brahman), the import of the ‘thou’ (in tatvamasi) coalescing with the import of the ‘that’ of the above description is determined (from the knowledge of the mahāvākya) to be also such (*i.e.*, as rid of all the ills of life) preceded by the total destruction of both nescience and illusion, *i.e.*, avidyā, which serve as the cause of misery, which obscure reality, and which generate erroneous knowledge.

174. *Siddhāntin*: If that be so, *i.e.*, if the eradication of avidyā which is the cause of evil must necessarily precede the knowledge of Brahman-identity then śabda is not operative there

---

<sup>246</sup> It is true that both the eradication of the cause of world-misery and the attainment of bliss constitute the phala. Still, because it is necessary that the identity should be stated as the viṣaya and because that itself is of the essence of bliss, the phala, *viz.*, the attainment of bliss is secured by arthāpatti, by the mention of viṣaya; the Bhāṣyakāra, to avoid prolixity, has refrained from stating it. The other phala, *viz.*, the eradication of the cause of evil is not of the nature of viṣaya and therefore finds a separate mention.



(i.e., in the eradication of nescience). Therefore it is separately mentioned (by Śamkara). And this (separate mention) stands to reason also:—it is indeed impossible to determine the real nature of a thing cognised in a false light (i.e., illusorily apprehended like shell taken for silver) without its (illusion) eradication. Hence the sentence (mahāvākya) establishes the reality, only by first eradicating the unreal (ataddharma—what is not, the ‘that’—the real) which was (the object of illusory cognition before).

175. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, how could you make the statement (that the mahāvākya teaches the pure Brahman) only by first eliminating the world, in the absence of (lit. when not heard) the negating particle ‘na’, etc., and of the word denotative of the thing that is negated?<sup>247</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: Here is the answer: Where the illusory knowledge alone is got rid of as in ‘this is not silver’ and the real nature of the object is not brought to light, (viz., this is nacre), there let it be so (i.e., begin with the negative particle). Here on the other hand (in the sentence, ‘tatvamasi’) the cognition itself arises in that very manner (i.e., negating the world and its illusory knowledge at the very moment of its origin) since without first negating its opposite it would be incompetent to bring home what its object is (viz., Brahman)<sup>248</sup>—just as the act of raising one scale-pan of a balance necessarily, without a separate effort, lowers the other scale-pan. To explain—the act of raising cannot bring about the contact of its object (viz., the scale-pan, which is raised

---

<sup>247</sup> When not prefaced by a negative how could the mahāvākyas तत्त्वमसि and अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, etc., negate erroneous knowledge? Now, when negating the illusory cognition of silver in nacre the statement takes the negative form नेदं रजतम्. Again negation means the negation of something that is the counter-correlate and this must be mentioned. In the Vedāntic statements noted above there is no mention of the world which is the counter-correlate of negation. On these grounds, says the opponent, the mahāvākyas cannot be said to involve the notion of the prior negation of the world.

<sup>248</sup> The elimination of error is effected by the cognition of the positive entity, viz., nacre in the stock example, or by the apprehension of the absence of the superimposed object, viz., silver. When the illusory knowledge alone is to be got rid of and there is no idea of getting at the knowledge of the object on which superimposition has taken place there is the need of the negative but not when the knowledge of the locus is sought.



by the act) with the space above without at that very time effecting its (the other pan) contact with the space below. And it is not (to be supposed) that the effort of the hand, etc., which serves as the cause in the raising is also the cause of the lowering, for such a view does not obtain currency and it is against all experience.

176. Similarly in regard to the object that is apprehended under the spell of illusion, the cognitive activity arising from śabda (viz., mahāvākya) which illuminates the Reality underlying that object comprehends the notions—‘I am Brahman’, ‘I am not agent’; it is like our having the notions—‘this is nacre’, ‘this is not silver’.<sup>249</sup> Hence ‘this is nacre’ is a non-desiderative sentence and ‘this is not silver’ is an explanatory (or repetitive) sentence.<sup>250</sup>

177. For this reason only, when the word denoting a verbal idea constitutes a sentence, from the mere knowledge of the action (as indicated by the verb) the knowledge of all its accessories (of necessity) results. Therefore, the exegetists (the Mīmāṃsakas) aver that the other words in a sentence (apart from the verb) are meant either for exclusion or explanation.<sup>251</sup> And

<sup>249</sup> The question is how could the cognition of the elimination of evil—अनर्थ arise without its specific mention in the śāstra. The answer is that when Brahma-knowledge arises the deremption of evil is inevitable on the analogy of the scale-pan; there is no separate effort needed for the eradication of the conflicts of life; the effort to realise the Supreme cannot but bring about the disappearance of evil. The notions of ‘I am Brahman’, ‘I am not agent’, etc.—अहं ब्रह्मा, नाहं कर्ता rise together, just as when the presented object is perceived to be nacre, the falsity of silver becomes apparent.

Note that the order of नाहं कर्ता and ब्रह्माहम् should be reversed, because the notion of नाहं कर्ता results only from arthāpatti subsequent to the identity-knowledge.

<sup>250</sup> अनिराकाङ्क्षवाक्य—The sentence ‘this is nacre’ conveys in itself the full sense whereas ‘this is not silver’ is implicated in ‘this is nacre’. Hence it is only अनुवाद or re-statement of what results from arthāpatti. The first cognition necessarily leads to the second.

<sup>251</sup> अत एव, etc.—What follows is to illustrate that the cognition of one object may produce that of another. In the Vedic command ‘sacrifice with rice’ the use of the word ‘rice’ is for excluding ‘barley’, etc., which also may serve as an element of sacrifice. In ‘eat using sugar’ the word ‘sugar’ is a mere restatement for excluding other accessories. Hence it is evident that the leading word in a

so they say—"The mandate, perform the sacrifice" (instructing action reveals the substance and deity also) because its full import is possible only when the knowledge of the group including the substance, the deity and action arises.

[Page 39] Others, however, say—"We expound the nature of Yajña as consisting of the substance, the deity and the gift (to the God).<sup>252</sup>

*Question:* How (is it that the substance and the deity are known by implication and not directly denoted (by the verb—yaj) ?

*Answer:* The manifestation of the substance and of the deity by the root 'yaj' which by its denotative power expresses only the sacrificial act without being the cause of their cognition is effectuated by implication. Even in the sublation of perceptive cognition the process is the same, for the sublation cannot be the object of sense-contact.<sup>253</sup>

sentence is the verb and the others either indicate 'exclusion' or are merely repetitive. Now in the sentence 'I am Brahman'—अहं ब्रह्मास्मि the statement 'I am not agent'—नाहं कर्ता is implied and therefore it is a restatement. Similarly the mandate 'sacrifice'—यजत denotes the action directly, and by implication, the accessories and the deity.

<sup>252</sup> अपरे तु, etc.—The composers of Kalpasūtras like Āpastamba. The Jaimini Sūtra—यजति चोदना, etc., IV. 2. 27 and the Kalpasūtra—यज्ञं व्याख्यास्यामः द्रव्यदेवता त्याग इति—आप. परि. सू. १ both illustrate the fact that 'यजेत' denotes action in the shape of bestowing the gift directly and the substance and the deity by presumption or implication.

<sup>253</sup> The opponent concedes that where the negation is of an illusion and expressed in a sentence as in 'this is nacre'—'इयं शुक्तिः' the cognition of the object शुक्तिज्ञान opposed to illusory cognition implies that it is not silver; but why not, he asks in perception the two together arise, viz., the nacre and absence of silver? As such why should arthāpatti be postulated to establish the negation of silver? Even so in the context अहं ब्रह्मास्मि—I am Brahman; since this cognition is perceptive why not it take the form नाहं कर्ता; किन्तु ब्रह्मा—I am not agent, but Brahman, and why should the cognition of non-agency be supposed to result from arthāpatti? The objection is met in the words—प्रत्यक्षबाधस्यापि, etc. The same procedure that is followed in the expressed statement 'इयं शुक्तिः' applies here also, i.e., in the perceptive context. Just as the negation of illusion and its cognition follow by implication when we use the sentence 'It is nacre' so also in the perceptive context the sublation of silver and its cognition follow by

178. Therefore it is that the revered commentator who is master in the knowledge of the Scriptures and Logic, knowing that the destruction of the ills of life (avidyāvilayam) is not something that can be ascertained from śabda (*i.e.*, mahāvākya) points it out as apart (from the viśaya) in the words 'for the destruction of the cause of this evil—'asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya'. The use of the dative case also is with the object of showing that the destruction of evil results from the potency of the knowledge (of unity): and it is not (that the study of Vedānta) is undertaken for that purpose—*viz.*, the destruction of evil.<sup>254</sup> (But it need not be doubted that because the Brahman-knowledge and not the eradication of evil is the phala of the Vedānta śāstra the eradication of evil is by no means the fruition of the śāstra). (And the eradication of evil)—the phala—may be regarded as resulting (though indirectly) from man's desire only (for everyone ardently wishes to be free from the ills of life).

XLVII. 179. *Pūrvapakṣin*: It is not that vidyā (the knowledge of unity) is acquired like getting a cow from without as if it stood apart (from the knowing subject), which (standing apart) would render the acquisition from outside possible. But that knowledge having the knower as its locus arises even while manifesting the object (of knowledge) to him.<sup>255</sup>

implication. Similarly when we get the immediate knowledge (प्रत्यक्ष) of Brahman as in अहं ब्रह्मास्मि the cognition, 'I am not agent'—नाहं कर्ता, arises by implication, since there is no contact between the eye and the negation—बाध. It is for this reason that the commentator makes a specific statement regarding the destruction of evil as it has to be ascertained by presumption—अर्थपत्ति and cannot be directly understood from the Scriptural text—'that thou art'.

<sup>254</sup> चतुर्थीप्रयोगेऽपि, etc.—The objection anticipated here may be stated thus:—Instead of saying that the eradication of evil is the result of knowledge since knowledge alone is hostile to ignorance (अनर्थ or evil) the Bhāṣyakāra says that it is the result of inquiry into the Vedāntic texts—*cf.* अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते.

The answer is that the study of the Vedānta śāstra is for arriving at the indubitable knowledge of the unity of ātman and thereby and not directly, getting rid of evils of recurrent births. And this riddance is welcomed by all.

<sup>255</sup> न हि विद्या गवादिवत्, etc.—Objection is taken to the use of the word प्रतिपत्ति in आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये for attaining the knowledge of

*Siddhāntin*: True, it is so elsewhere. But in what we are now considering though knowledge arises in regard to the viṣaya (viz., Brahmātmā-identity) it does not attain indubitable certainty because it (viṣaya) is beset with improbability (and contrariety). Such is the experience of men:—when there is a rooted conviction that a particular object by its very nature cannot exist (say) in this region and at the present time, if it should somehow by sheer accident come to view, the person though perceiving it himself will not be convinced of its existence as long as he does not take the trouble to ascertain its probability. Hence the right knowledge also (though it has arisen) not being indubitable as regards its viṣaya (content, viz., Brahmātmā-identity) will be as if it did not compass the viṣaya. As such the knowledge that arises from the vākya calls in the aid of tarka for self-certainty (i.e., for securing indubitableness to its context).

180. Therefore (i.e., since logic clarifies and stabilises the knowledge derived from pramāṇas) it is, that those proficient in tarka (aver) that tarka is an (indispensable) aid to pramāṇas (here verbal means of knowledge).

What is it that is meant by the term 'tarka'?

It is reasoning.

Well, this is only a synonym. Its nature had better be explained.

This is its explanation:—It is of the nature of discriminating cognition by which the probability (or improbability) of pramāṇa,

the absolute unity of the self. आत्मैकत्वविद्यायै is alone sufficient; for no knowledge can arise without at the same time embracing the knower. Knowledge implies the knower and the object. It is not like getting a cow which stands apart from the person having had its origin elsewhere. Hence प्रतिपत्ति is redundant.

*Answer*: In other spheres of perception no doubt there are not two distinct events—the rise of knowledge and the comprehension of its content. Both happen together. But in the case of the attainment of the knowledge of unity though the meaning of the text may be grasped by a cultivated mind no conviction as to its content arises since the mind is assailed by doubts and difficulties. Hence constant reflection—tarka—is indispensable for removing impediments and rendering the knowledge acquired indubitable. As such the justification of the use of the word प्रतिपत्ति, attainment of certitude *ab extra*, i.e., by the employment of reasoning.

śakti and viṣaya (viz., the identity of Brahman and the individual soul) is ascertained.<sup>256</sup>

181. *Pūrvapakṣin*: 'Well, if so (the Vedānta) since it requires tarka to establish the certitude of what it imports becomes invalid having lost its character of non-dependence (on extraneous aid).

*Siddhāntin*: It does not (become non-valid merely because it requires tarka); for by its own potency it is productive of the indubitable knowledge of what it denotes (svaviṣaya, which here is the identity of ātman and the absolute).

*Pūrvapakṣin*: Then what is the purpose served by tarka? (If the mahāvākya itself is competent to bring home the knowledge of identity, what is the function of tarka)?

*Siddhāntin*: When there is improbability regarding the viṣaya (viz., the unity of the individual soul with Brahman) and the fruition of that kind of experience (which brings about the destruction of anartha or the evils of life) has not arisen (tarka is useful) in removing the obstacles to the phala (fruition) through pointing to its probability (sambhava). As such in the mahāvākya (tatvamasi) the meaning of 'tvam' is the jīva (or individual soul) and this jīva presuming the improbability of his being identical with Brahman which the word 'tat' denotes, (nay), further, thinking that he is of an opposite nature, fails to arrive at the truth, though the knowledge (identity) has arisen,<sup>257</sup> so long

<sup>256</sup> अथ कोऽयं तर्को नाम? The place of tarka has to be ascertained here. Tarka or reasoning helps in the ascertainment of the probability as to (i) pramāṇa, i.e., that the scriptural testimony supports unity; (ii) the probability that the śakti, the significance of the mahāvākya is the unity of the individual soul with the Universal; and (iii) Viṣaya: the probability that the individual self is Brahman. प्रमाणशक्तिविषय should be resolved as—प्रमाणं च, शक्तिश्च, विषयश्च.

<sup>257</sup> समुत्पन्नेऽपि ज्ञाने, etc.—The text avers that 'tatvamasi' fulfils its function, even before tarka operates in showing that the Veda is an independent testimony. It is therefore necessary to understand the exact place of tarka in arriving at Brahma-knowledge. Now the function of verbal testimony may be taken to be the conveying of immediate or mediate knowledge according to the difference of opinion among those who adopt verbal testimony. (i) Let us suppose that the mahāvākya gives rise to the immediate knowledge of unity. But then such a view conflicts with our experience since even after comprehending the meaning of the sentence we feel that the knowledge of unity has not risen in us. How is this discrepancy to be explained?

as he does not recognise the probability of his own self being identical with Brahman, having (first) through the aid of tarka removed the impediments.

182. Hence, before (rational inquiry), though the knowledge of identity has arisen from the sentence (tatvamasi) it is as good as not having been acquired. The way of acquiring it is pointed out in the Vedānta itself with a view to (help one to attain) the phala of immediate experience. Therefore it is said (by the Bhāṣyakāra); [“The study of the entire Vedānta is intended] for attaining the knowledge (of ātman-identity)].

XLVIII. 183. *Pūrvapakṣin*: The knowledge that the individual self is identical with the supreme self is not potent enough to eradicate the cause of the evil (anartha that plunges one in saṃsāra). To explain: [Page 40] The cognition by the individual self of its identity with Brahman is not any way distinct from the cognition of its difference from the bodily aggregate. It is so because (in both the cognition of ātman as distinct from the body and the immediate cognition of identity with Brahman) there is the unabated persistence of the ego-tangle extending up

---

It is by presuming that our feeling of non-realisation of unity is the result of bhrama. Every case of bhrama presupposes some mental blemish—cittadoṣa, as one of its causes. There must be cittadoṣa here also which when removed by manana, etc., brings home to us the knowledge conveyed by the mahāvākya. It should be noticed that it is the purified mind—śuddhacitta that removes the bhrama which is different from tarka which as stated in the text leads to the removal of obstacles—pratibandhakaniṣṭti. To avoid the divergence between the statement of the Pañcāpādikā and its explanation by himself Prakāśātman, the author of the Vivaraṇa, understands by tarka, śuddhacitta. There is nothing out of the way here because tarka has been interpreted secondarily as citta (cf. Tatvadīpana) because citta serves virtually the same purpose that the purified mind does.

(ii) Let us suppose that ‘tatvamasi’ yields only mediate knowledge, then there is no difficulty in admitting that verbal testimony fulfils its function here. But what is the place of tarka? Now, mediate certainty—parokṣaṇiścaya is only one of the factors contributing to immediate cognition—aparokṣajñāna with the aid of the purified mirror of the mind—चित्तदर्पण or tarka. In neither case does tarka interfere with the independent validity—nirapekṣapramāṇya of śabda.



to the illusory ascription of the notion of man (to the pure being as in 'I am man—*manuṣyoham*').<sup>258</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: This is our answer: There (when *ātman* is known as not identical with the aggregate) let that (the persistence of the tangle) exist, as *avidyā* (in the shape of *samsāra*) is not seen to have disappeared; but here however (in the cognition of identity with Brahman) when the Brahman-cognition has dawned having dispelled the taint of illusion, how could it remain without arresting the current (*i.e.*, the continuous succession of complexes) of the notions of enjoyer, etc., generated by nescience? It is indeed evident that the cognition of the Supreme by the individual cannot come about before destroying the ignorance that shrouds it (*viz.*, the Reality)—which is its object.<sup>259</sup>

184. *Pūrvapakṣin*: If from the knowledge of Brahman, *avidyā* (lit. non-comprehension) should disappear then there ought to occur at that very moment the disappearance of the

<sup>258</sup> अहङ्कारग्रन्थि-ग्रन्थिरूपाहङ्कारः ; मनुष्याभिमानपर्यन्तस्याहङ्कारग्रन्थेः.

By the word 'aham' is meant the complex of *sākṣin*—the Inner Witness, and *antaḥkaraṇa*—the mind. It is this complex that is here described as '*ahamkāragranthi*'. But 'aham' is not always restricted to this complex. When we think that we are deaf or blind the identification is not between the *sākṣin* and *antaḥkaraṇa* but between the *sākṣin* and the senses through the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This varying connotation ends in '*aham manuṣyaḥ*'—'I am man'. It is to indicate this wide range of the connotation of 'aham' that the adjective—'*manuṣyābhimānaparyantasya*' is used.

<sup>259</sup> न हि जीवस्य, etc.—The *pūrvapakṣa* is that the cognition of the fact that the individual is other than the body, is not in effect (फलतः) distinct from the knowledge of the nature of Brahman; and because we see that *avidyā* in the shape of *samsāra* persists in the first case, it must persist even after the rise of Brahman-knowledge. The Vedānta reply is that the two cases are entirely different. In the first, though one is aware of *ātman*'s being distinct from the body *ajñāna* that is the cause of *samsāra* has not been removed. There is an uninterrupted succession of the ego-complexes. In the second case however, it must be understood that the rise of Brahman-knowledge presupposes the complete annihilation of the primal *ajñāna* along with its effect. When the rope is cognised the serpent superimposed upon it disappears together with the *ajñāna* that had brought about the illusory knowledge. So it is with *Brahmajñāna*. The Scriptural texts also support this view: भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः. यत्र हि द्वैतमिव पश्यति, यत्र त्वस्य सर्व-मात्मैवाभूत्, and so on.



ego-complex (*viz.*, the body, etc.) which has that (*viz.*, avidyā) as its cause.<sup>260</sup>

*Siddhāntin*: No. Even from mental impressions there results the continuance of avidyā like the continuance of fear (after its cause has disappeared; *e.g.*, the fear of serpent even with the knowledge of the rope in the rope-serpent illusion). To explain: even though removed by the knowledge of the real, fear persists on account of the mental impression and becomes the cause of trembling, etc. Similarly avidyā (agrahaṇa) also through its saṃskāra (mental traces left behind) continues and becomes the progenitor of ahaṃkāragrahanthi or ego-complex. As such there is nothing that offends reason.

XLIX. 185. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Well, not all the Vedāntic texts proceed to expound vidyā (*i.e.*, the knowledge of Reality); a part of the Vedānta is understood as expounding a variety of upāsanās (or modes of contemplation) for the attainment of the reward of 'salvation by gradation' (karmamukti), for achieving super-human powers and for the speedy fruition of karma performed with the object of attaining svarga (abhyudaya).<sup>261</sup>

---

<sup>260</sup> ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानादग्रहणापाये, etc.—The contention is that when the knowledge of unity rises the primal nescience must vanish and the human frame too which is its product must perish. This raises the question of the status of jīvanmukta, *i.e.*, of the person who has attained freedom while yet in this life, here and now. The text explains it on the basis of residual mental impressions. The Vivaraṇa explains the word saṃskāra to mean a small residue of avidyā. And of the several explanations given in this connection, the one which appears more satisfactory than the rest is that the jīvanmukta has overcome all karma except the prārabdha which has begun to yield fruit in this life and to that extent he may be said to be bound from our point of view though his mental purity is such that he lives and moves in this world unperturbed by the joys and sorrows and all the passing shows of life—*cf.* *Bhagavadgītā*, Chap. 2, where a full description of Sthitāhprajña or jīvanmukta is given.

<sup>261</sup> आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते. All Vedāntic texts proceed with the single aim of inculcating the knowledge of the unity of the self. This statement of the commentator is criticised on the ground that a section of the Vedānta deals with 'meditation'. For instance we have, कर्मज्ञावबद्धोपासना, *e.g.*, उद्गीथाद्युपासना, अहंब्रह्मोपासना, etc., V.S., III. The criticism is thus met—the different paths of meditation prescribed are in relation to saṃguṇa Brahman and not the nirguṇa and

*Siddhāntin*: It is true. The object of contemplation however is Brahman (*i.e.*, the qualified Brahman) and that (Brahman) when divested of all determinations is the real nature of the individual soul (*jīva*); and in order to clarify this point (*viz.*, that *jīva* is identical with Brahman), Brahman who is the inner self of all, the omniscient, and omnipotent was first (*i.e.*, prior to the negation of attributes) defined as the cause of the origin, etc., of the entire universe.

186. And in that (state of *avidyā*) without negating the world in Brahman, the contemplation of Brahman as qualified by specific attributes is enjoined for specific rewards. It is like the mandate specifying the 'milk-jar' (*godohana*) for fetching water if one desires cattle—which mandate occurs in the *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa* (new-moon and full-moon sacrifices) context.<sup>262</sup> Hence since the other (section of the *Vedānta*) is but subsidiary to that (section relating to the *nirguṇa*-Brahman) there is no contradiction in the (commentator's) statement, *viz.*, 'It is for the elucidation of the knowledge of *ātman*-identity that all *Vedāntas* (*Vedāntic* texts) proceed'.

---

these *vidhis* or mandates regarding meditation occur incidentally in the *nirguṇa* context and as such are of subordinate importance; the primary subject-matter of all *Vedāntic* texts is *nirguṇa* only. Moreover the *saguṇa*-meditation is helpful in bringing mental clarification and purification, essential for self-realisation. Again it is by the method of *adhyāropa*—superimposition, and *apavāda*—elimination that the real nature of the Absolute can be cognised—*cf.* अथारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चते. First Brahman finitised by determinations should be brought home and then by the negation of these determinations by negative statements—*neti, neti*, would it be possible to understand the real. So all meditations refer only to the qualified Brahman—*vide VPS.*, p. 105.

<sup>262</sup> The 'godohana' analogy is to show that the meditation *vākyas* are not something distinct but are closely related to the negative statements—*neti, neti*; since a negative desiderates a positive we posit the attributes when describing Brahman as the cause of the world's origin, etc.—'Janmādi' and negate them so that we may realise the Absolute Reality defined as Existence, Knowledge and Bliss. The first is known as '*tatasthalakṣaṇa*' of Brahman which is thus expressed: लक्ष्यस्वरूपात्मकं सत्-ज्ञापकत्वम्—not being of the nature of the defined yet reminds one of the defined; and the second known as '*svarūpalakṣaṇa*' is expressed thus: लक्षणस्वरूपात्मकं सत्-ज्ञापकत्वम् being of the nature of the defined reminds one of it.

L. 187. *Pūrvapakṣin*: Are not meditations on what is non-Brahman, such as those embracing prāṇa (life-breath), etc., perceived (to be stated) in the Vedāntas?

*Siddhāntin*: It is true. They also have mukti as their end though by gradation (the purified jīva first reaching the Hiranya-garbhaloka). And this is mentioned by the composer of the aphorisms—"With the disappearance of the world of Hiranya-garbha, they, the purified souls, reach in the company of the Lord of that region, Brahman that transcends Hiranyagarbha, as declared in the Śruti".<sup>263</sup>

188. ["That this is the substance of all the Vedānta texts, we shall show in (expounding) this Śārirakamīmāṃsā"]—in these words the commentator points out that the logical proofs (nyāya) which are (as it were) strung together on the aphoristic sentences commencing from the Samanvaya sūtra (*i.e.*, the fourth sūtra of the first pāda in the I Chapter) are meant to show that the purport of all the Vedānta-texts is the one set forth here.<sup>264</sup> (The word 'śārirakaḥ' is thus explained); 'śarira' is 'śārirakam' (the body), 'śārirakaḥ'—jīvaḥ (the embodied soul or the individual self); and the work composed having that (individual self) as its subject-matter (*i.e.*, the Uttaramīmāṃsā) is śārirakaḥ. Because the Vedānta texts start with the main object of elucidating the nature of the individual self and end in showing that the self is of the nature of Brahman, it comes to this that the aphorisms composed (by Bādarāyaṇa) for pointing out this fact (*viz.*, that

<sup>263</sup> V., Sūt. IV. iii. 10.—It is explained thus—अभिधानात्—on the authority of the scriptural statement—*cf.* न च पुनरावर्तत इति *Chānd. Up.*, VIII. XV—1, कार्याख्ये—हिरण्यगर्भलोकस्य नाशे on the destruction of Hiranyagarbhaloka, तदध्यक्षेण along with the Lord of that region उपासकाः—those who have gained the knowledge of reality therein, अतः—transcending that region, परं—the Absolute, प्रतिपद्यन्ते—attain. The individual soul after its probation in the region of Hiranyagarbha attains the state of the pure Brahman.

<sup>264</sup> It must be understood that the first is pratijñā or upodghāta-sūtra, indicating viśaya and prayojana—the content and the value of the Vedānta-śāstra; the second is Brahma-lakṣaṇa-sūtra, where the definition of Brahman is given, the third is pramāṇa-sūtra where śāstraic proof is adduced to establish Brahman, and from the beginning of the fourth, reasons are advanced to substantiate that the entire Vedānta-texts are congruent in the elucidation of the unity of the individual soul and the supreme Brahman—Brahmātmaikya.

the Vedānta teaches the absolute identity of the individual sou with Brahman) purport to have been composed, having the embodied soul (śārīrakam-jīvatatvam) as their topic. Hence here (in this commentary) the name 'śārīraka' (is given to the sūtras).

LI. 189. [Page 41] Though the sūtra (*viz.*, 'athāto Brahma-jijñāsā) from its express statement means only that one should endeavour to attain Brahma-knowledge after the longing for release has arisen, still by presumption (*arthāpatti*) it is as good as declared that the release is the fruit (*phala*) of Brahma-knowledge. To explain: where following a desire to obtain an object which is a human end, a certain course of action is enjoined, there its instrumentality in bringing it about is also seen by presumption to be indicated. As such (*i.e.*, where through Brahma-knowledge inquiry is established as the means of release) when questioned how Brahma-knowledge becomes the means of attaining that mokṣa (we say), that it is intimated from this Śāstra (sūtras), by implication, so that Brahma-knowledge (the Brahma to be known—jñeya-Brahman) is pointed out as the viśaya (subject or topic) of the śāstra.<sup>265</sup>

190. Therefore it is that, having shown that the (first) sūtra reveals by implication both viśaya and prayojana (*phala*) of the Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā śāstra, by first inculcating the duty of acquiring Brahma-knowledge following closely upon the longing for freedom, then having described the nescience-constituted bondage which is desiderated by them (*viz.*, viśaya and prayojana) and which is implicit therein (in the sūtra), and, on the need arising for reasoning to substantiate the proposition set forth (*viz.*, that the whole of the Vedānta is concerned in the exposition of the identity of the individual self with the supreme self), having declared (in these words)—“we will in this very sūtra (*i.e.*, the

<sup>265</sup> The critic points out that in the first sūtra what is stated is that the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta has to be undertaken for the knowledge of Brahman and that there is no mention of either the subject of the discourse—viśaya, or the benefit accruing—prayojana. He therefore queries to know how the commentator is right in maintaining that adhyāsabhāṣya—the comment on world-illusion, is for the purpose of substantiating the viśaya and prayojana. The answer is that both are implied in the first sūtra though not expressly stated. The first sūtra is an introduction to the whole work and as such it must set forth both viśaya and prayojana like all introductions.

sūtras) show it (*viz.*, pratijñātārtha) thereby suggesting the propriety of commenting (on the śāstra),—he, the Bhāṣyakāra, wishing to undertake the commentary states the reason why at the very commencement, prayojana and viṣaya have been taken for consideration—[“ of the Vedānta-mīmāṃsā or discussion on the meaning of the Vedāntic texts to be commented upon, this *viz.*, ‘then therefore the inquiry into Brahman’, is the first sūtra ”].

191. This is what it (the above bhāṣya) means: Of the Vedānta-mīmāṃsā śāstra (*i.e.*, the Vedānta-aphorisms) this is the first. And in the beginning, prayojana—the desired end, (and) viṣaya—the content, have to be made known to subserve the purpose of inducing one to undertake (the study). And this is a sūtra; therefore whatever import comes to light either from the denotativeness of the words or from implication, the whole of it, is its import only,<sup>266</sup> so that the sūtra by its very potency is connotative of a number of meanings. Because of the reason that this sūtra is the first (in the series) and because it is an aphorism, having stated that viṣaya, prayojana and bondage of the nature of avidyā, necessitated for securing those (two, *viz.*, viṣaya and prayojana), are all ascertained by postulation (srutārthāpatti) (the commentator) begins the explanation of every word to show the competency of the sūtra therein (*i.e.*, in yielding the meanings referred to).

*Here ends the First Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā*

<sup>266</sup> It cannot be doubted that a single aphorism can yield a multiplicity of meanings, *viz.*, (i) the duty of investigating the meanings of Vedānta, (ii) the statement of the topic and the subject of study, and (iii) the illusoriness of bondage. All these do result from the very fact that it is a sūtra.

## VARṆAKA II

### VEDĀNTA—NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI

I. 1. *Anārambhavādin.*—[Page 42] Well, the inquiry into Brahman is as good as accomplished since the investigation into the meaning of the whole body of the Veda is rendered explicit in (the Sūtras of Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā beginning with)—‘Then therefore inquiry into the nature of Dharma.’ Further, since the knowledge of Brahman comes within the purview of vidhi (Vedic mandate) it acquires the character of Dharma. Hence Brahmajijñāsā also has indeed received full treatment (in the scholium of Jaimini).

2. Because (also) there exists no additional doubt to demand a fresh inquiry.<sup>1</sup>

II. 3. *Ārambhavādin.*—Here some (critics)<sup>2</sup> pointing to the existence of an additional doubt (āśamkā) (find the need to)

---

<sup>1</sup> The criticism starts with the assumption that Jaimini in his aphoristic treatise on the Karmakāṇḍa has dealt with the whole body of the Veda in which is comprised the Vedānta or the Upaniṣad section as well, and that therefore there is no justification for a separate work by Bādarāyaṇa. The first Varṇaka (section), it will be remembered, started with the contention that the Brahman-inquiry was unnecessary since it lacked both viśaya (subject-matter) and prayojana (benefit) and concluded by pointing out the need for such inquiry as both viśaya and prayojana did exist. The second Varṇaka starts with the pūrvapakṣa that the previous Śāstra, viz., the ritualistic treatise by Jaimini has anticipated what Bādarāyaṇa has said and that as such there is no point in composing the Vedānta Sūtras. The Siddhāntin maintains that there has been no such anticipation and that in consequence a fresh inquiry is justifiable.

<sup>2</sup> अत्र केचित्—One class of critics justify Brahma-jijñāsā apart from Dharma-jijñāsā, on the ground that some of the Vedāntic texts like ‘Sadeva saumya idam agra āsīt’ are not mandatory in character though Jaimini has shown that the entire Veda enjoins action—kāryapara. And this might lead the unwary to conclude that no further inquiry is desirable as without a Vidhi Vedānta is purposeless. It is to obviate such a conclusion being drawn, that Brahma-jijñāsā is undertaken. The additional doubt—अधिकाशंका is raised that the Vedānta being non-mandatory, has no independent status and is unfit for exposition.



commence a separate investigation into the nature of Brahman. Now the question is—which is here the additional āśamkā? That Vidhi or Vedic injunction is authoritative as a valid means of knowledge was shown (by Jaimini) when formulating (the Sūtra), ‘codanālākṣaṇo artho Dharmah’—(vide: Vol. LXXXIX, p. 17, G.O.S.). Here (i.e., in the Vedānta) the Vidhi is not declared at all in some statements as in—“Sadeva saumya idam agra āsīt”—“Existence alone this (world) was in the beginning, my dear” (Chānd. Up., VI, 2-1, etc.).

4. And where Vidhi is declared as in “ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ”—“Lo, verily is the ātman to be seen” (Brh. Up., II. 4-5); and in “Tasmin yadantaḥ tadanveṣṭavyam, tadvāvavijijñāsitavyam”—“That which is within it, that is to be sought, and that alone is to be inquired into”—there, no doubt grammar (smṛti) warrants the use of the terminations ‘tavya’, etc. (as in draṣṭavyaḥ) in the sense of Vidhi, on the ground that there is no distinction (between the ‘tavya’ termination and liṅ when expressing a mandate).

5. Even then it is only that ‘tavya’ termination which denotes the root-meaning (as in gantavyaḥ) that is competent to direct the person to undertake an act since primacy (there) is in relation to action, but if it is used with the emphasis on the object (i.e., on that which is in the objective relation), there it cannot enjoin the act that is adjectival (guṇabhūta, i.e., subordinate) to the object as related to some other kārya (phala, viz., mokṣa). And if (it be supposed that) the injunction (as expressed in ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’) refers to the ‘atīśaya’ produced in the object (dravya), since (ātman) is not something that is to be originated, something to be modified, something to be obtained, nor, something that is to be purified, (there can be no injunction relating to ātman).<sup>3</sup> And because even when purified it (ātman) serves

<sup>3</sup> In the mandate ‘athāto Brahma-jijñāsā’ the jñāna-kriyā (act of meditation, jñāna taken to mean dhyāna or meditation) cannot be enjoined either for an independent phala, say, mokṣa for it stops with pointing to ātman as the object of meditation, or for the purpose of generating some new feature in ātman which is in the objective relation to the vidhi, for ātman is incapable of any such modification. The functions of a kriyā, when operating on a substance—dravya, it may be noted, are: (i) उत्पत्ति—producing, (ii) आप्ति—getting, (iii) विकार—modifying, and (iv) संस्कार—purifying. Now, none of these effects can take place in ātman as the result of kriyā, for ātman is not the phala of kriyā for it is eternally existent and as such cannot be



no purpose in any other act, it does not admit of any purification.<sup>4</sup>

6. Hence, in statements like 'ātmanamupāsita'—'meditate on ātman', ātman ceases to be (sought as) the most desired object.

*Anārambhavādin.*—Well, why not suppose, on the analogy of 'saktu-homa', the reversal of the order of principal and subsidiary?<sup>5</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—Even then it is not known which that meditation is, and how that is done by ātman (*i.e.*, what the instrumentality of ātman is).

*Anārambhavādin.*—Well, it is (certainly) known:—jñāna itself is upāsana, and ātman in its character as viṣaya is the cause of it (*i.e.*, meditation). Ātman as the object of meditation is Karma-kāraka and in its capacity as affecting the viṣaya is in the instrumental relation).

7. *Ārambhavādin.*—If so, (*i.e.*, if ātman stands in the objective relation to jñānakriyā) there would be the same predication that ātman is something to be had (āpyate—to be originated) by jñāna (the cognitive act enjoined by the root terminating

a product; ātman is not liable to change, and being eternally pure it is wrong to think of it as fit for purification.

When ātman ceases to come under the purview of a vidhi it can no longer be regarded as the most coveted object; it is only what one gets by following a Vedic mandate that constitutes one's highest good. It is to obviate such a contingency that a fresh treatise has to be begun.

<sup>4</sup> Let, by the potency of the injunction—ज्ञानविधि the removal of the impurities of ignorance, demerit, etc., be effected, though the vidhi may not operate in the usual way of originating, etc. This is answered by the observation that ātman rid of impurities, even if admitted, can serve no purpose in any other act—कार्यान्तरे as does the purified rice, for it is used as oblation.

<sup>5</sup> सक्तुन्यायेन कल्प्येत—In the mandate 'he offers saktu—barley meal, as an oblation to 'fire', the word 'saktu' is not taken in the objective case but in the instrumental case and the passage, सक्तून् जुहोति is understood as सक्तुकरणकहोमविधिः. The homa then becomes a pradhāna karma. On this analogy, आत्मानमुपासीत is to be interpreted as आत्मकरणक-उपासनाविधिः. Thus the objections that would arise if ātman is construed in the objective relation are avoided since it now occupies a subordinate position while upāsana becomes primary.—*Cf.* "तद्वत् 'आत्मानमुपासीत' इत्यत्रापि आत्मनो विभक्तिपरिणामेन आत्मगुणकमुपासनाकर्मैव स्वतन्त्र-फलाय प्राधान्येन विधीयते". *VPS.*, p. 112.

in 'tavya'). And that is purposeless, amounting as it does to doing a thing that has been done (kṛtakaraṇam), for ātman is eternally existent (*i.e.*, self-revealing and is not something to be originated). And it has been said that no purpose is served by the purification of ātman (unlike the purified rice). Hence as there is no room for vidhi (in the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) one would suppose that the Vedānta texts carry no (direct) import with them and that as such the study-completion-bath should follow immediately after the inquiry into what constitutes Dharma. (To point out that such a view is wrong) this, *viz.*, 'Then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Brahman' is begun (*i.e.*, Bādarāyaṇa begins the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā with this aphorism). What is meant is that without a break (anantaram, *i.e.*, immediately after completing Dharma-jijñāsā), Brahman has to be inquired into (Brahma-jijñāsītavyam), and the 'bath' should not be performed (na snātavyam).<sup>6</sup>

III. 8. No doubt the objective relation is denoted (in the vākya) but yet from the 'tavya' termination the vidhi (a niyoga) is apprehended and as such it is impossible to discard niyokṛtva (*i.e.*, we must posit an agency from which the mandate emanates; here it is the śruti or Veda; ordinarily it is a person); that this is so is evident in commands like 'the mat has to be made by you', 'the village has to be reached by you'.

9. The statement that niyoga if it points to something (dravya) that is in the objective relation serves no purpose as being incapable of producing any result, is void of truth, because of

---

<sup>6</sup> स्नाने प्राप्ते....न स्नानव्यम्—The ceremonial bath known as 'samāvartana karma' has to follow immediately after the pupil finishes his study of the Veda and is about to quit his preceptor's house. The question is whether mastery in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā marks the close of the study necessitating the 'bath' or whether it has to be followed by the study of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā and the 'bath' postponed. The ārambhavādin holds the latter view. In the *Śāstra Dīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra, the discussion on the 'bath' centres round the question whether residence in the preceptor's house has to be terminated immediately after the pupil has acquired the ability to merely chant his branch of the Veda or to be prolonged for inquiry into its sense—arthajñāna. The Siddhānta is in favour of the latter, *vide* LXXX, p. 1 ff., G.O.S.).

the destruction of avidyā, which ensues (from this samskāra), and avidyā is the (veritable) cause of Samsāra.<sup>7</sup>

IV. 10. Others again argue thus: Perception and other pramāṇas (distinct from Śabda) though acknowledged to be capable of revealing existent objects since they generate their cognition, are incompetent in (so far as the revelation of) Brahman (is concerned); and as regards the Veda (āmnāya) it (such revelation) is wholly improbable seeing that it relates to something that is (yet) to be accomplished (kārya). [Page 43] To one who thinks thus the idea arises that Vedic inquiry closes with the close of Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa.<sup>8</sup> Hence this fresh resolve (as evidenced in the 1st Vedānta sūtra) to dispel (such an idea).

11. Here also (in the Vedānta or Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) all the texts enjoining ātmajñāna (e.g., ātmānamupāsīta-ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ) set out that kārya is their import in the same manner (as in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā). And the knowledge of Brahman (tatvābodha) is kārya (i.e., something to be attained by effort—kṛtisādhya) because it is perceived as being related to the agent (adhikārin) and is the viśaya of the mandate (niyoga).<sup>9</sup> Therefore

---

<sup>7</sup> The anārambhavādin's contention is that as a result of the mandate relating to mat-making something is actually produced but no such result is possible from the mandate, say, 'ātman is to be seen—आत्मा वरे द्रष्टव्यः' and as such the niyoga is purposeless. The answer is that the phala here is the disappearance of the nescience that contaminates one's self, so that the niyoga has a supreme purpose to serve (*vide TD*).

<sup>8</sup> Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa—This consists of the last four chapters in Jaimini's *Dharma-sūtras*, from the 13th to the 16th. Some hold that these are by a different author and that Jaimini's authorship is limited to twelve chapters only. Notice that the critic here is different from the one referred to as 'अत्र केचित्' in Section II, who premising that an additional doubt—अधिका शङ्का exists justifies Bādarāyaṇa in undertaking his work. The objection here is that the question of inquiry into Brahman does not arise at all and that all inquiry should end with the sixteen chapters of the Jaiminiya aphorisms.

<sup>9</sup> Why a separate treatise is necessary, it is argued, is because in the Pūrvatantra Jaimini has not dealt with the tatvābodha or the knowledge of Brahman. To the objection that if the Veda is non-mandatory it fails of its purpose it is answered that the Vedānta also is mandatory in character. The Upaniṣads establish the relation between Brahmajñāna, i.e., tatvābodha, and mokṣa, which is its

the Śāstra (Vedānta) should be begun with the object of investigating it.

V. 12. *Anārambhavādin.*—Here this will be said: The (Vedānta Śāstra) need not be commenced for the subject has already been dealt with. How? The reason first stated for commencing (the Vedānta Sūtras) was that from the 'tavya' termination related to the object there arises no knowledge of niyoga (mandate). (But) it was shown that the injunctive character is expressed by itself (*i.e.*, by the termination itself) and it is universally admitted that statements like 'svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ—one should study one's branch of the Veda' are injunctive in character. (Hence) there is no reason to justify the postulation of any additional doubt (śamkā).<sup>10</sup>

13. *Ārambhavādin.*—Has it not been said that in neither of the four ways is the result of kriyā possible in ātman?

*Anārambhavādin.*—If that be so the analogy of saktu will step in.<sup>11</sup>

phala. One who desires the phala should undertake the meditation, and the anuṣṭhāna, *i.e.*, engaging in the act of meditation must be prompted by niyoga. Hence jñāna (meditation) becomes niyoga-*viṣaya* or the object of a mandate. It may be noticed that the ārambhavādin like his opponent admits the entire Veda including Vedānta as enjoining kārya. The justification he finds for the new Śāstra is that the kārya of the nature of Brahmajñāna has not received any treatment in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

<sup>10</sup> The ārambhavādin's argument is that only under a particular condition (*i.e.*, in bhāvārtha or root-meaning) the 'tavya' termination denotes niyoga and not always, but the advocate of anārambha—non-commencement, points out that the 'tavya' ending always denotes kārya and because Jaimini has intimated the adhyayana vidhi in the first sūtra he has, it should be inferred, admitted the jñānavidhi also. The reading कृत्यप्रत्ययेन नियोग, etc., should be अनियोग—*vide* V.

<sup>11</sup> In the Vedic statement 'सक्तुर्बुधोति' he offers the rice-meal as an oblation—the objective case सक्तुन् is changed into the instrumental सक्तुना to shift the emphasis from सक्तु to होम (बुधोति) since the homa-samskāra in relation to सक्तु serves no purpose. So also, says the anārambhavādin, आत्मानमुपासीत should be construed as 'आत्मना उपासीत' so that the emphasis will be on Upāsana and not on ātman. This mode of construing would obviate the objection that ātman cannot be the *viṣaya* of a vidhi, being eternal and changeless. Hence no need for Śāstrārambha as the objection that there is no mandate, is absent.

*Ārambhavādin.*—Even that is not (pertinent). We have said that the knowledge pertaining to the self (*i.e.*, ātman-cognition) is eternally established.<sup>12</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—Even of that (ātmajñāna) which is eternally existent concentration (lit. repetition) styled upāsana (meditation) will be the result of vidhi for effectuating abhyudaya (mokṣa) like the wearing of a golden ornament.<sup>13</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—It is not incumbent that the stream of ātman-consciousness should arise from the vidhi either, for that succession of cognitions relating to ātman is always present in one's waking state.<sup>14</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—If so let during such times as one is disengaged from attending to the needs of the body (arthāviruddheṣu) the mind remain concentrated in ātman (prompted by vidhi).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> तदपि न—The ārambhavādin again argues that ātman cannot but be construed in the objective relation; otherwise the doubt persists whether jñāna which has not an object or viśaya can be enjoined. For the removal of that doubt Śāstrārambha is necessary.

<sup>13</sup> हिरण्यधारणवत्—What the anārambhavādin means is that though ātman cannot be in the objective relation since it is impossible to effect any change in the changeless it is by meditation as enjoined by vidhi only that abhyudaya or salvation results. It is the restrictive injunction or niyamavidhi that is to be understood here. Everyone knows that gold is meant for ornamental purposes, but still one is enjoined to wear gold to the exclusion of other metals if one courts prosperity.

<sup>14</sup> The consciousness of the ego-aham is continuous in all the three states—waking, dream and sleep (the word 'जाग्रतः' stands for all the three states—V). Hence there is no rule that meditation which here means the stream of atman-cognitions should be secured by niyamavidhi. There is no room for an alternative.

<sup>15</sup> When the restrictive injunction is shown to be inapplicable the anārambhavādin advances the parisamkhyāvidhi or 'exclusive specification' as being appropriate in the present context. Where more than one alternative has simultaneous scope the mandate restricts the choice to one of them by excluding the rest; *e.g.*, we have the injunction 'पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या'—'five five-nailed animals may be eaten', excluding the eating of five-nailed animals other than the specified ones. Similarly when one is not engaged in his usual avocations one has leisure which may be spent equally in idle thoughts or ātmajñāna. The anārambhavādin says that the parisamkhyāvidhi excludes the first alternative.—

Again, you have argued that ātmajñāna results in the elimination of nescience and that from its elimination results the cessation of the life-cycle (saṃsāra). This is untrue. The entire body of men always experience ātman as the ego (aham) and yet saṃsāra has not ceased.

*Ārambhavādin.*—Our contention, however, is that ātman-entirety which is quite distinct from what is given in the ego-notion, and which has cut asunder the knot (of the notions) of experiencer-experienced-experiencing, is brought to mind by the Jñānavidhi (viz., the mandate—Ātmā vāre dr̥ṣṭavyaḥ) as something to be known (i.e., the injunction has as its content the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman).

*Anārambhavādin.*—That is wrong; for it is evident that a vidhi is competent to reveal a particular when in its general aspect as action it is understood and not in regard to the revelation of a thing that is absolutely non-existent. It may be said that patently such knowledge (i.e., mere ātmajñāna) is possessed by all; but still the knowledge pertaining to pure consciousness from which the world has been eliminated (i.e., the qualityless pure Being devoid of all upādhis) is asiddha (i.e., unsupported by evidence), and any injunction for its effectuation (kārya) is as impossible as commanding one to strike the void with one's fist.<sup>16</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—But the knowledge of such ātman (i.e., ātman divested of all upādhis) is comprehended (by all).

*Anārambhavādin.*—What then is the use of the mandate ?<sup>17</sup>

---

अर्थाविरुद्धेषु कालेषु गात्रयात्रानिर्वाहकसमयातिरिक्तसमयेषु ; अनात्मप्रतिभासनिवृत्तये परिसंख्याविधिः—The operation of parisamkhyā is at those times which are different from the ones in which a man is occupied in the struggle for existence.—TD.

<sup>16</sup> If one had some general conception of the transcendental Brahman injunction to acquire the knowledge of such Brahman would be feasible as in the case of actually experienced cognitive entities. But no such injunction of knowledge would be appropriate in regard to Brahman of which there is not even a vague notion.

<sup>17</sup> किं विधिना—The anārambhavādin questions whether that ātmajñāna is private to the person seeking liberation or is the property of another. If private it is already there and so there is no need for vidhi; if not private, i.e., when it is not the property of the agent in the cognitive act, it is foreign to him and as such he cannot be enjoined to acquire it, with the result that no purpose will be served by vidhi. The dilemma cannot be avoided.



*Ārambhavādin.*—Even as regards the other view (referring to the second critic), viz., that since the revelation of the supreme lies outside the cognitive range of perception, etc., and since the Śāstra (Veda) relates to something that is to be accomplished (kāryārthatvāt), the Vedic inquiry closes with the Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa (so far pūrvapakṣa), it should be noted that the mandatory character (kāryaparatā) of the Vedāntic texts is equally (evident). The cognition of the nature of Brahman is kārya (i.e., that which can be acquired by effort, kṛtisādhya), for this is known from the fact that it is in intimate relation to the adhikārin (one who desires liberation) and is the content of niyoga. As such (there is justification for) the commencement of the Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā for its inquiry (i.e., inquiry for the knowledge of Brahman).

*Anārambhavādin.*—We have refuted that also having pointed out, on the strength of the reasoning already adduced, that kārya (or Niyoga) is out of place whether the cognition of Brahman does actually exist or does not exist.

VI. 16. *Another Ārambhavādin.*—[Page 44] Here is a different view. It is true that the Veda has kārya as its content but its office is not confined to that alone. When it is there (i.e., the vidhivākya or mandatory statement (denoting kārya) whatever things are cognised, are each one of them to be regarded as having been denoted by it (viz., the vidhi); for example, when colour is presented to the eye, it starts functioning, but it is not the colour only that is the object of sight; on the other hand the substance also along with the colour. Similarly here (i.e., in the mandatory statement having Kriyā as its content) the essence of Reality (Vastutatva—the pure Brahman) also is the viśaya.<sup>18</sup>

17. *Anārambhavādin.*—How is that?

*Ārambhavādin.*—This is how—(from the Upaniṣad text) ‘what all this (meaning thereby, the universe) is, that is ātman’ (Brh. Up., IV. 5), it is not intended to teach that ātman is of the

<sup>18</sup> The contradiction lies in this that the Veda is said to denote action and yet to reveal the eternally established entity, viz., Brahman. It is resolved by maintaining that when a Vidhi prompts action it must reveal all that is pertinent to the kārya such as the viśaya, etc. It follows therefore that though the Upaniṣadic texts are related to action (upāsanā) they also reveal the Pure Brahman, the Reality. Vidhi therefore is pertinent. The distinguishing feature of this third view is that in addition to the pratipatti-vidhi it conjoins ātma-svarūpa-jñāna to ātmopāsanā.



very nature of this all. If ātman were taught as being identical with the all (*i.e.*, the world) then since insentience is the mark of this all, ātman would also assume that form (*i.e.*, become insentient); this would lead to the elimination of knower (lit. the knowerhood—*bodhṛtva*) thus depriving the śabda (Veda) of its knowledge-imparting character (for when there is none to receive knowledge, the Veda would lose its knowledge-imparting function). Hence what is enjoined is that the all is of the essence of ātman (*i.e.*, the universe derives its existence from the Supreme ātman and has no independent existence); it is indeed from the elimination of what is non-ātman (*viz.*, the world) that the knowledge of reality comes.

*Anārambhavādin.*—Well, here no vidhi is mentioned.<sup>19</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—If so let a Vidhi be understood.<sup>20</sup>

VII. 18. *Anārambhavādin.*—Is (the word denoting) a mandate (Niyoga) to be postulated when the meaning of the Vidhi has been comprehended or when it is not comprehended? If postulated after comprehension, the postulation is of no use.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> What the anārambhavādin urges is that in the Vedic sentence 'idam sarvam yadayamātmā' there is no word to indicate a mandate. The sentence imports only the secondlessness of ātman.

<sup>20</sup> When in a Vedic statement the mandatory part is absent it is considered a hiatus and the substitution of the part in question is allowed. For instance, यष्टव्यः is inserted in the passage पूषा प्रपिष्टभागः अदन्तको हि सः and the sentence is construed thus: पूषदेवताकपिष्टद्रव्यक्यागः कर्तव्यः. On this analogy the ārambhavādin says that the sentence इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा has to be completed by the addition of the phrase ज्ञातव्यः.

<sup>21</sup> किंप्रतीति विध्यर्थे—The objection raised against the postulation of Vidhi is based on the following reasoning:—Karma which is unrelated to either part, present or future, when understood from śabdaśakti, being otherwise inexplicable demands Niyoga, which is of the nature of kārya and then is postulated the word (with the termination, liṅ or tavya) denoting vidhi. For example, we have the vākya पूषा प्रपिष्टभागः अदन्तको हि सः—'the sun has for his share the kneaded flour, he is indeed toothless'. Here are mentioned पूषा the deity, पिष्ट the sacrificial material; and in order that the material may reach the deity, yāga has to be postulated (by arthāpatti). Hence vidhikalpanā, *i.e.*, postulation of the word यष्टव्यः indicating kārya by the liṅ or tavya termination is appropriate. But ātman in इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा is not something fit for अनुष्ठान or performance and there can be no mandatory

A word is sought, as is well known, only for the understanding of the content (of a Vidhi), but what is it that is achieved by one who postulates a word when that content is (already) known? If you should argue that having premised a (word denoting, vidhi only in relation to what is wholly uncomprehended (*viz.*, vidhyarthanīyoga or apūrvā), the thing-Niyoga is to be understood from that (from the mandatory termination—liṅ. etc.), (it can only be said) that the reasoning (*i.e.*, your way of imagining the vidhi) is highly ingenious.

19. *Ārambhavādin.*—Well, even when the vidhis are not declared as in “Therefore the kneaded flour indeed belongs to the sun who is toothless, etc.” the vidhi is premised.

*Anārambhavādin.*—It is true. There it is appropriate, for the sun’s connection with the flour-substance is (merely) denoted by the compound (prapiṣṭabhāgaḥ, *i.e.*, the relation between substance and deity is known from the ‘Bahuvrīhi’ compound – prapiṣṭaḥ, bhāgaḥ yasya saḥ); it (the relation) does not exist as accomplished and will not come into being from something (apart from yāga) because of the absence of any corroborative evidence. Nor is this statement (pūṣā, etc., laudatory) to necessitate its connection with some mandatory statement (vidhivākya) to secure syntactical unity, as, had it been so, (laudatory vākya) we might, somehow posit the syntactical relation (ālambana) on the analogy of the vākya relating to the unsheathing of the omentum (vapokhanana). Hence to avoid discontinuity (nirālambana) we presume that this vākya (pūṣā, etc.) has reference to Kārya.<sup>22</sup>

20. *Ārambhavādin.*—Well, even here (*i.e.*, in the sentence—‘idam sarvam yadayamātmā’—what all this is, that is ātman) the word ātman denotes the sentient agent who is the enjoyer, and because he is the one to be mandated there is need for the mandate (niyoga).

---

word. It is Siddhavastu or an accomplished entity. Hence vidhikalpanā is untenable. And there would be no hiatus if vidhi is not premised.

<sup>22</sup> पदैकवाक्यता—All laudatory statements are intended only to extol the yāgas and thus act as incentive to their performance. They have no independent status but must subserve a vidhivākya. If there is no such vākya one has to be postulated. We have the laudatory statement प्रजापतिरात्मनो वषां उदखिदत्; the vidhivākya with which it is connected is प्राजापत्यमजन्तुपरमालभेत—*Tait. Sam.*, II, 1. Praśna.

*Anārambhavādin.*—This is vapid. It is true that *niyoga* is not perceived to exist in the world independently of its association with a specifically denoted person and as such it desiderates a specific person as in *yāgas* like *viśvajit*, etc.<sup>23</sup> But is it that a *puruṣa* independently of any *niyoga* unthinkable by us so that it would be incumbent to supply a *vidhi* (*niyoga*) ?

VIII. 21. Still let us grant the existence of *vidhi* (in the statement—*idam sarvam*, etc., but) that (*vidhi*) is not perceived to exist by itself unconnected with the root.<sup>24</sup> It is therefore to be postulated along with a root. Which is the root ?<sup>25</sup> If (you should answer that) the root is (*kr̥ñ* in 'kartavyam' understood), (even then) the non-*ātman* (that is—the insentient) nature of the world will not be eradicated.<sup>26</sup> It is like the injunction 'Let these flour-balls be modelled into lions' where even after the injunction is carried out, the nature of the flour is not effaced. And (it has also to be noted that) the auxiliaries (*itikartavyatā*) have not been indicated, so that the injunction-statement desiderating the auxiliaries would go in vain.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Viśvajit*—For an account of *viśvajit yāga* vide the English translation of *Śāstra Dīpikā*, Tarkapāda, p. 2, note 4, G.O.S., 89

<sup>24</sup> The rule is that when in a Vedic statement there exists a relation between two things, say substance and deity, such relation demands association with *Niyoga*. This being so, the relation of *ātman* with the world demands a *niyoga* as otherwise it would be violating the rule. The objection being thus postulated the answer is given in *PP.* beginning with the phrase अथापि.

<sup>25</sup> When *niyoga* or *vidhi* is premised, the *vidhi* termination, either *liñ* or *tavya*, is to be understood as connected with a root. In asking the question—कोऽसौ धातुः 'which is that root ?' the *anārambhavādin* means that no root will fit in.

<sup>26</sup> The root 'kr̥'—'*kr̥tiḥ*', to make, may be understood since it is common to the root-meanings of all the verbs; hence says the *anārambhavādin* that the sentence has to be completed thus—इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा कर्तव्यः. But such substitution will not give the sense of the *vākya*—'*idam sarvam yadayamātmā*', viz., by eradicating the world the realisation of *ātman* has to be secured. The non-*ātman* nature of the world persists.

<sup>27</sup> The *anārambhavādin* raises another objection—when the word *kartavya* is understood what is enjoined is 'the making the world assume the *ātman*-nature', but the manner of performance—*itikartavyatā*—which is an essential constituent of a mandate is lacking and

22. Now the word 'jñātavyaḥ' (to be known), it may be urged, is to be understood; but even then, there remains the identical fault—the non-ātman nature (of the world) will not disappear. Further it would amount to enjoining a thing that is unfit to be so enjoined (it is evident that knowledge jñāna, is not kṛtisādhya). [Page 45] Indeed one thing cannot be understood as of the nature of another.<sup>28</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—If that be so the word 'jñātavyaḥ' may be understood and there (*i.e.*, when the ellipsis is supplied) the meaning of that root (dhātvartha) is a mere restatement (anuvāda) and the termination (*i.e.*, the 'tavya' ending) is indicative of vidhi or mandate.<sup>29</sup> Would you ask 'From what is that jñāna derived of which this is the restatement'? We say it is from the words expressly stated (in the Vedānta texts like 'tatvamasi' which are distinct from the mandatory words).

*Anārambhavādin.*—If that be so the enjoining (vidhānam) would become meaningless since even at the time of learning to chant the Vedas (of course this presupposes one who is competent to understand the significance of the words chanted) the jñāna (it must be admitted) has arisen.

IX. 23. *Ārambhavādin.*—As in the case of the mantras, jñāna once acquired is enjoined again to be acquired (*i.e.*,

---

as such the sentence इदं सर्वं; etc., would be purposeless. As for the itikartavyatā sentence, *viz.*, śāntodānta, etc., it is stated in connection with jñānavidhi but not with kṛtividhi.

<sup>28</sup> न हि वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरात्मना ज्ञातुं शक्यते—It is possible to meditate upon one thing as if it were another; *e.g.*, any symbol say śālagrāma-pebble may be mentally dwelt upon as Viṣṇu; but then the nature of the pebble remains what it is. So also the world may be meditated upon as ātman but its insentient nature will not disappear. We may consciously or even by illusion regard one thing as another, but it can never be valid cognition.

<sup>29</sup> एवं तर्हि—What the ārambhavādin means is that the knowledge of the Eternal by negating the world results from some other means such as the Scriptural testimony—tatvamasi—but this knowledge (jñāna) should become the object of a vidhi. Hence the termination, 'tavya' alone has to be added to the root 'jñā' in jñātavyaḥ. The object is to bring in the Vedāntic teaching also under the purview of Vidhi. The meaning of the root 'jñā' therefore is only a restatement—*anuvāda*, for jñāna has been obtained from another valid instrument of cognition, *viz.*, Śabda.

kṛtisādhya—the object of attainment by following the mandate).<sup>30</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—The prayogavacana there (in that context) is mandatory (vidhivākya; here there is none such).<sup>31</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—We say that here also (in the ātmajñāna context) the prayogavacana is mandatory.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> यथा मन्त्रेषु—The ārambhavādin advances the analogy of mantras or hymns which when recited at the time of sacrifice recall to mind the substance—dravya, and the deity—devatā, connected with the sacrifice. The utility consists in their serving as aids to securing apūrva from the yāga. It may be said that dravya and devatā are recalled to mind even by the Brāhmaṇa vākyas; but the niyamavidhi enjoins that they should be brought to mind only through the mantras and not through the Brāhmaṇa if apūrva should result; even so ātmajñāna though it has arisen even in the absence of the injunctive word, is again enjoined by a vidhi for it is only this mandated jñāna that yields salvation—mokṣa, and not the one understood otherwise.

<sup>31</sup> प्रयोगवचनस्तत्र विधायकः—Here is pointed out when and under what circumstances the mantra-analogy is appropriate. The vidhi known as prayogavidhi which enjoins the order in which the subsidiaries—āṅgas, of a sacrifice have to be performed operates in regard to the mantras. The rule is that if no prayogavidhi is expressly stated, one has to be understood. The injunction of performance therefore impels one to acquire that meaning of the mantra which is helpful in securing apūrva, to the exclusion of its sense acquired when learning to recite the Veda.

<sup>32</sup> What the ārambhavādin means is that even in the ātmajñāna context the prayoga injunction is operative. The originative injunction, वेदान्तैः आत्मज्ञानं कुर्यात् is to be understood and that desiderates 'itikartavyatā' or the mode of performance and this is afforded by the Vidhi in the same context relating to ātmajñāna associated with a beneficent result, viz., "seek ātman in ātman having cultivated such virtues as peace of mind, self-control, etc."

वेदान्तैः शमादिभिः उपकृत्य आत्मज्ञानं कुर्यात्—This is the viniyogavidhi. Hence the originative injunction has become viniyogavidhi and it denotes the relation between ātmajñāna which is āṅgī and śama, dama, etc., which are āṅgas. The viniyogavidhi in turn becomes the adhikāraavidhi which is thus expressed in full—मोक्षकामः वेदान्तवाक्यकरणैः शमदमादि इतिकर्तव्यतानुग्रहीतैः विहितकाले देशे च विहितकर्मणा आत्मज्ञानं कुर्यात्. Then it becomes prayogavidhi. The man desirous of freedom shall effect the attainment of the knowledge of ātman (in himself) with the aid of the Upaniṣadic statements and possessed of such qualities as composure of mind, etc.

24. *Anārambhavādin*.—Well, as regards the mantras, since what they signify (*viz.*, material, deity, etc.) is established from something other than themselves (*viz.*, Brāhmaṇa) it is right that they should denote the (mere) jñāna (pratyaya), but here (in the sentence ‘idam sarvam yadayamātmā’) there would be contradiction if the words composing the vākya refer to the injunction of that which they signify (namely, the Brahman-nature of the world) as also to the injunction of jñāna.<sup>33</sup>

25. *Ārambhavādin*.—There is no blemish. What is meant to serve one object does (often) serve another;<sup>34</sup> the instance in point is this: canals are cut for (irrigating) the fields, and from them thirst is quenched and ablutions made. Even so here. Just as śabda (a Vedic statement) enjoining (that one should acquire) the meanings of the words (composing it) enjoins also

<sup>33</sup> ननु मन्त्रेषु—Here is pointed out the difference between the mantra and the Vedānta-vākya. The mantra merely gives rise to the apūrva-producing jñāna, whether that jñāna has a valid viṣaya (object) or not. There is no need that there must be the objective counterpart of what it denotes; *e.g.*, when the mandate relates to meditation, say, on ‘vāk (word) as cow (vācam dhenumupāsīta)’ we know it is a mere figure of speech. But as regards the Vedāntic text it is purposeful not only in producing jñāna but also in its artha; *i.e.*, the object that it denotes must be real. In the Vedāntic statement ‘ayamātmā jñātavyaḥ’ so far as meditation is concerned it may consist in contemplating that the world is ātman but it is not necessary that the negation of the world should become actual. प्रत्ययपरस्वम्-ज्ञाने तात्पर्यम् as in वाचं धेनुमुपासीत where meditation alone is meant—The Vedānta unlike mantra gives rise to jñāna and also points to a fact—प्रपञ्चविलयपरस्वम् and also आत्मस्वभावज्ञानपरस्वम्. The anārambhavādin therefore points out the contradiction, for the same sentence imports two ideas, a sentence-split, vākya-bheda. स्वार्थविधिपराणां—फलवद्ज्ञातार्थपराणां. The word vidhi is appropriate only in the sense that the Vedānta points out something not known before and is also productive of some benefit.

<sup>34</sup> अन्यार्थमपि, etc.—The ārambhavādin answers that the same proposition may denote its own sense and also enjoin jñāna. The statement ‘ayamātmā jñātavyaḥ’ is denotative of a mandate—vidhi-paratva, since what is enjoined is jñāna—this is the main idea (mukhyārtha); and it is also denotative of its intrinsic sense, *viz.*, the world-negation prapañca-vilaya—this is the subordinate idea (avāntaratātparya). अन्यार्थम्—प्रत्ययविधानार्थम्. The sentence enjoining ātmajñāna. अन्यार्थं भवति—प्रपञ्चविलयार्थं भवति.



the order (of performance of a yāga), similarly śabda enjoining the acquisition of its own specific sense becomes the vidhi (mandate of jñāna).<sup>35</sup>

26. *Anārambhavādin*.—This looks as if no thought has been bestowed (upon the subject). How (it may be asked)? The mantras, the prompting to chant which comes from the mandate requiring one to study one's branch of the Veda, because their significance is determined by some other means (*viz.*, Brāhmaṇas), cannot confer validity on it (*i.e.*, on what they signify); having thus missed their claim, to serve as valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) they are ranked as prameya (object of knowledge) like rice (and barley, etc.) and as such it is but right that they should become auxiliaries to (yāgas) as ascertained from śruti, (līṅga, prakaraṇa, etc.). (The Mantras) construed (thus) as auxiliaries should be regarded as reminders since at the time of sacrifice the recollection of what ought to be done (*e.g.*, taking out a certain quantity of grain for preparing the cake for oblation) is desiderated. But here the cognition which arises from the syntactical arrangement of words in the (Upaniṣadic) sentence, 'what all this manifold is, that is ātman' points to the ātmanature of this all and that cognition (vijñāna) is not the object of a vidhi; and it is so because its object (viśaya) is not ascertained by anything *ab extra*. But if it should be the object of a mandate (vidhi) then it loses its capacity to make known a prameya. And neither could both (*i.e.*, vidhiviśayatva and prameya-bodhakatva) manifest themselves at the same time for it would result in one and the same vākya denoting opposite senses (vairūpyaprasaṅgāt).<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> पदार्थानां विधायकः शब्दः क्रमस्यापि विधायकः—This is in answer to anārambhavādin who points out the inappropriateness of the example taken from irrigation. The channel is stationary and so might serve a double purpose either simultaneously or in succession, but śabda can yield only one sense because of its momentary existence. But says the ārambhavādin, there are cases of śabda yielding a double sense. In समिधो यजति, the words not only indicate the padārthas—Samit (name of Yāga), etc., but also the order of performance after Samidyāga, Tanūnapāt and then Idā and so on since a single agent—kartā, cannot perform these yāgas—simultaneously.

<sup>36</sup> वैरूप्यप्रसङ्गात्—In case the same sentence, *viz.*, 'idam sarvam yadayamātmā (jñātavyaḥ)' should constitute a vidhi and also mean



X. 27. *Ārambhavādin.*—If it be so (*i.e.*, if it be thought that it is a blemish for the same sentence to convey senses which contradict one another) then the mandate, wherever it occurs, relating to auxiliary duties would be to no purpose.<sup>37</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—It will not be purposeless. (There can be *guṇavidhāna*.) Where (*e.g.*, in the sentence, ‘he sprinkles rice’) that which stands in the objective relation (*viz.*, rice) to the auxiliary karma (*viz.*, sprinkling) is ascertained from a distinct *pramāṇa*, there karma (*viz.*, sprinkling) which brings about as its result any one of the following—originations, etc., enjoined; where however the *viṣaya* that is in the objective relation to *jñāna* (as in ‘*idam sarvam*, etc.’) is not ascertained from a distinct *pramāṇa*, there it (the *Karmakāraka*) is vouched for by the same (statement—*tenaiva*) and as such cannot be pointed to as *uddeśya* (on the supposition that it is) previously established (like

---

Brahman (*ātman-nature*) there would be a triad of mutual contradictions: (i) it is *Brahmajñāna* that is enjoined; hence in relation to *jñāna* the primacy—*prādhānya*, is of Brahman; again the subsidiary nature—*guṇatva*, of Brahman is indicated because Brahman is adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) to *jñāna* which is enjoined (for *apūrva*); (ii) because Brahman is the object sought (*prameya*) it is to be achieved—*Upādeya*; and in relation to *vidhi* (*jñātavyaḥ*) Brahman is something existing to which the *vidhi* points—*uddeśya*; (iii) because it is *prameya*—something vouched for by a *pramāṇa*—Brahman which is unknown is made known—*ajñātajñāpya*, *i.e.*, *vidheyatva*; again since *jñāna* of Brahman is enjoined, Brahman which is already known is merely recalled—*anuvādyatvam*—*V.P.*, 117.

<sup>37</sup> *गुणकर्मणां सर्वत्र*—The mandates ‘*त्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति*’—he sprinkles the rice-grains with water, (*त्रीहीन् वहन्ति*—he pounds the rice, which are subsidiary acts—*गुणकर्म* serving a main *yāga*, would lose their significance since such mandatory sentences bear conflicting ideas. Now in *त्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति* because some other *pramāṇa*, *viz.*, perception vouches for the existence of rice it acquires *अनुवाद्यत्व* the quality of being restated, but because some *adṛṣṭa* (unseen good) is generated in it by the sprinkling of water it acquires the opposite quality, *viz.*, *विधेयत्व*; again in relation to *प्रोक्षण* the rice is the main, *प्रधान*; but in relation to *yāga*, *त्रीहिभिर्यजेत* it is subsidiary *गुण*; so also it acquires *उपादेयत्व* or something that is to be accomplished by an act, *viz.*, sprinkling which produces *अतिशय* or *अदृष्ट* but because the sprinkling is enjoined in relation to rice it acquires *उद्देश्यत्व*. The opposite qualities are *उपादेयत्व* and *उद्देश्यत्व*, *प्राधान्य* and *गुणत्व*, *अनुवाद्यत्व* and *विधेयत्व*.

vṛīhi); for had it been so, there would be justification for the injunction of knowledge relating to it (Brahman) for the purpose of generating some new feature (atiśaya).

28. Hence here (in 'idam sarvam, etc.') since the two cannot arise simultaneously the statement cannot but denote ideas repellent to each other. And the same concourse of words when sundered from the mandatory word which is its (integral part) will be incapacitated from yielding any sense (*i.e.*, no (śābdabodha relating to Brahman is possible) for a truncated sentence cannot convey any valid piece of knowledge (pramā).<sup>38</sup>

29. *Ārambhavādin.*—[Page 46] Well, we opine that like laudatory passages, the statement 'Satyam, jñānam, anantam, Brahma', etc.), having revealed some sense on the strength of the mutual relation (of the words composing it) gets into contact with a vidhi (or mandate—jñātavyaḥ).<sup>39</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—That is not right. There is reason in the laudatory passages assuming a subsidiary position in relation to a main action which alone yields a fruit, because they cannot independently produce any fruit and as such are not complete in themselves. Here however (*i.e.*, in "satyam jñānam anantam Brahma") the collocation of words unrelated to any vidhi (mandatory statement) reveals while revealing its own sense, the real nature of ātman, (which is no other than) the cessation of all the mundane ills, the experience *ne plus ultra* of bliss, beatitude, and

---

<sup>38</sup> न च स एव समन्वय, etc.—The ārambhavādin argues that there are two cognitions in the present context as well:

- (i) one arising from that part of the statement, *viz.*, 'idam sarvam yadayamātmā' which is divested of the mandatory word—jñātavyaḥ;
- (ii) the other arising from the full sentence, *viz.*, 'idam sarvam yadayamātmā jñātavyaḥ' and that ātmajñāna is established from (i) and is made the object of the mandate in (ii).

The answer is that (i) being truncated cannot be denotative and there results no apprehension of the same. समन्वय-वदसमूह—Assemblage of words. प्रमाणत्वायोगात् cannot produce any pramā or valid knowledge.

<sup>39</sup> The ārambhavādin, to avoid the triad of opposites, regards the statement—'satyam, jñānam, anantam, Brahma' as a laudatory sentence being auxiliary to the mandatory vākya—'idam sarvam yadayamātmā jñātavyaḥ'.

secondlessness.<sup>40</sup> Then for what purpose (when thus the nature of ātman is revealed by 'satyam jñānam, etc.) should one obtain the phala generated by making it (the 'satyam, etc.' vākya) subsidiary to a vidhi? This (viz., that nothing worthy is to be gained further) is borne out by the Smṛti text—"Nothing else is enjoined (i.e., to be gained) beyond the acquisition of ātman (ātma-jñāna)."

XI. 30. *Ārambhavādin*.—Well, that variety of experience is not to be had from verbal knowledge (śabdajñāna). Hence the need of vidhi for its immediate apprehension.<sup>41</sup>

*Anārambhavādin*.—(We ask) by what instrument of knowledge is that jñāna which is enjoined for the acquisition of that experience produced? As for perception, etc., they are powerless to generate such experience (lit. the Brahmajñāna lies beyond the range of the senses), as witness the mantra (Kāṭha, II. 3-9), "With the eye it is not perceived," and so on. And verbal knowledge (śabdajñāna having the potency to destroy nescience) is not accepted by you, (because śabda gives only indirect knowledge and it is the immediate knowledge that is potent to dispel nescience).

*Ārambhavādin*.—Yes, it is true. Śabdajñāna if unassociated with vidhi is incompetent to produce the experience (which implies the negation of avidyā) but if associated it does serve as the hetu (instrument of that experience.)

*Anārambhavādin*.—That does not stand to reason. As for that jñāna which naturally arises from the contexture of words memorised as the result of the vidhi that one should study one's

<sup>40</sup> The anārambhavādin regards that statements such as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म are unlike what are distinctly arthavādas like वायुवै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता, since its own sense constitutes the highest phala it needs no association with a mandatory sentence which imports a phala.

<sup>41</sup> The ārambhavādin contends that by verbal cognition, i.e., by the denotative power of words—satyam, etc., we only comprehend what was uncomprehended; e.g., the nature of Brahman unknown hitherto becomes known on hearing the words satyam, jñānam, etc. But we cannot stop here. We have to get rid of all illusory cognitions and the mental traces they have left behind. And this is not possible by śabdajñāna. It is the immediate intuitive knowledge of Brahman that can bring about such a result. Hence the need for vidhi for effecting sāksātkāra or immediate perception—a result which the knowledge of the import of the vākya—"satyam, jñānam, anantam, Brahma", is incompetent to produce.

branch of the Veda, it is not something that is enjoined; for it has already been said that since its sole purpose is to point to prameya (Brahman) there is no ground to regard it as the valid object (prameya) of a vidhi.

31. *Ārambhavādin*.—Well, we maintain that the vidhi (mandate) is to the effect that the same jñāna should be meditated upon continuously.<sup>42</sup>

*Anārambhavādin*.—How could it (*i.e.* the Vidhi relating to jñānasamtāna) result in the absence of either of the verbal roots signifying upāsanā (upāsti) or dhyāna (dhyāyati) which express the cognition series? Nor can it be urged that its own series is implied in a secondary sense in the word jñāna itself, since there exists no inseparable connection such as invariable concomitance (sāhacarya)<sup>43</sup>, etc. And further the intuitive and immediate cognition of the Supreme cannot result from continual meditation.<sup>44</sup> And there is no Vedic text enjoining dhyāna (meditation on Brahman), by which had there been one, meditation on the cognition-series would have been enjoined for its sake (*i.e.*, for immediate knowledge—sākṣātkāra).

32. *Ārambhavādin*.—Well, what is the purpose served here by a vidhi (śravaṇa, *i.e.*, a mandate relating to it)? (None); for a man of his own accord (*i.e.*, without the prompting of a vidhi) inclines towards the attainment of immediate knowledge since it (such sākṣātkāra) is the most cherished object. When the text

<sup>42</sup> One who is competent otherwise gets a fairly correct comprehension of the Vedic passages the commits to memory and vidhi is out of place here. The ārambhavādin admits this but says, that the vidhi is for nididhyāsana, *i.e.*, it lays down that one who longs to achieve freedom has to meditate constantly upon the jñāna which results from adhyayana.

<sup>43</sup> The contention is that when jñāna is enjoined its series may in a secondary sense be understood. But no secondary sense is possible since there exists none of the grounds to justify it. The grounds are invariable association—साहचर्य, similarity—सदृश्य, opposition—विरोध, etc. Here jñāna or cognition is the primary sense—ज्ञेयार्थ, and cognition-current—प्रवाहरूप, is the secondary sense—लक्ष्यार्थ and there is nothing to suggest their invariable relation.

<sup>44</sup> नपि अभ्यासात्साक्षाद्भावः सिद्धः।—‘Let meditation be enjoined as in ‘निदिध्यासितव्यः’ says the objector, ‘yet meditation does not bring about the realisation of the Supreme’ for meditation is excluded from the category of pramāṇa or valid instrument of cognition.

(Srotavyo, mantavyo, nididhyāsitavyaḥ) is heard (the nature of ātman is cognised) and constant meditation on that is doubtless the hetu of immediate knowledge.

*Anārambhavādin.*—If that be so what is the good of vidhi? When it is understood that it leads to puruṣārtha (a human end) and when jñānābhyāsa which is the hetu is also known the person himself begins to act (*i.e.*, practices contemplation).<sup>45</sup>

XII. 33. The example however, which you have adduced, *viz.*, that channels dug for the purpose of irrigating crops (incidentally serve other purposes is beside the point). There no doubt it holds good since it is perceived to actually serve a double purpose; here, on the other hand (*i.e.*, in idam sarvam yadayam-ātmā) it has to be established by reason and it has been said (*vide ante*) that there exists no reason to suppose that both occur simultaneously.<sup>46</sup>

34. And what was said again, *viz.*, that a vākya (śabda) decreeing padārthas (*i.e.*, specifying particular yāgas) decrees also the order (of performance) and that similarly the vākya (samanvaya—fit combination of words, idam sarvam, etc.) which signifies the single ātman entity also puts in mind that to which the injunction relates is something that does not appeal either.<sup>47</sup> Now

<sup>45</sup> The anārambhavādin pertinently asks if the opposite view which accepting vidhi advocated that the Vedānta Śāstra needed a separate treatment, is not abandoned. The answer is that by vidhi is not meant the impelling of an inactive person to act. It is merely a reminder, bodhaka, *i.e.*, what the vidhi ordains is that ātman-realisation is to be secured through mind-concentration, and this aspect of vidhi is not abandoned. But, says the anārambhavādin, it has already been said that a person desirous of self-realisation enters of his own accord upon meditation without being prompted by vidhi.

<sup>46</sup> The anārambhavādin points out the inapplicability of the analogy adduced from the irrigating channel. There the thing is stationary and can therefore serve a double purpose. But the words composing a sentence cannot assume a double function being fleeting in their nature. It is impossible for the sentence under consideration to refer to the nature of ātman as this-all, and also to the vidhi, *viz.*, that such ātman has to be cognised.

<sup>47</sup> यदपीदमुक्तम्—In support of the contention that a double purpose could be achieved by a single statement another analogy had been adduced by the ārambhavādin समिधो यजति; तनूनपातं यजति; इडो यजति; स्वाहाकारं यजति; now the mandates relate not only to the particular yāga

in regard to the mandatory texts like prayāja referring to separate (yāgas) it must be noted that the mandates as expressed by them (texts) are applicable only to those (yāgas) and not to krama or order of performance. Now are they (*viz.*, the yāgas such as Samit, Tanūnapāt, etc., fit to be) designated by the word 'krama'.<sup>48</sup> And the prayoga vākyas also directing the undertaking of the yāgas (padārthas) refer only to these (*viz.*, prayājādi) and it has been said that they are not identical with krama or order of performance.<sup>49</sup> [Page 47] And (it should be pointed out) that the existence of such an entity as krama cannot be wholly denied for if so there would be no basis for such a notion (*viz.*, sequence) as well as for such a name (*viz.*, anteriority—posteriority). (Since krama is the ground of both the notion of sequence and the term śabda, *viz.*, the word 'anantara') there certainly is such an entity as krama. They only (*i.e.*, the padārthas like prayāja) become in association with some limiting adjuncts (as space and time) the ground for both the idea and the term on the analogy of

such as समित् but also to the order in which they are to be performed. The anārambhavādin however points out that the padārthas only, *i.e.*, the specific yāgas to be performed, are denoted by the mandatory sentences and that the order of sequence of the yāgas is known by presumptive evidence or arthāpatti pramāṇa since a single agent cannot perform several yāgas all together and not by verbal testimony. Construe the sentence thus: यत्तावत् प्रत्येकं प्रयाजादिविधयः तैः पुनः तेषामेव विधानं, न क्रमस्य विधानम्. 'Samit', etc., are the names of the five prayājas or the 'fore-offerings of ghee'—*vide Ar.S.*, Sections 12 and 61.

<sup>48</sup> नापि ते क्रमशब्दाभिधेयाः—Two questions arise in this context—Do these texts bearing on the fore-sacrifices denote 'krama' or sequence presuming that such sequence is quite distinct from the fore-sacrifices or identifying the two, *viz.*, prayāja, etc., and krama (*cf.* that which is distinct from 'pot' is the same as 'cloth'—घटभेदस्य पटात्मकत्वम्. The first alternative is met by the statement यत्तावत् प्रत्येकम्, etc. The second alternative is met by the statement नापि ते, etc. What is meant is that if krama is only another name for the fore-sacrifices then the word krama would have stood for prayāja, etc. But it is not so.

<sup>49</sup> प्रयोगवचनोऽपि, etc.—The point is whether the five injunctive passages are indicative of both the things—padārthas like samit, etc., and the order of performance of these yāgas. It is seen that they cannot do both. Krama is secured neither as the result of originative injunction—उत्पत्तिविधि nor as the result of injunction of performance—प्रयोगविधि. But it is known by arthāpatti or presumption.



'forest'.<sup>50</sup> Or the recollective knowledge would, on the occasion of performance, (anuṣṭhānakāla) suggest the padārthas (prayājādi) in the order of remembrance (*i.e.*, in the way each yāga is recollected). However it be, there does exist a jñāna (of krama) distinct from the jñānas arising severally from each of the padārthas (samit, idā, etc.). And that (distinct cognition of order) which is desiderated and which immediately presents itself is obtained by prayogavacana (injunction of performance), since the kartā or agent is one and since padārthas (fore-sacrifices) are many and as such it is out of the question that there could be simultaneous performance—this is right way of understanding. But here no such double cognition exists (as in the other, where we have the knowledge of samit, etc., from śabda and of krama by arthāpatti), which had it existed would have denoted the universal pervasion of ātman as well as the mandate (that such ātman is to be known). Therefore, owing to the absence here of anything fit to be enjoined, owing to the absence of any mention of a vidhi (expressed either by liṅ or tavya termination) and also because no adhyāhāra (postulation of a vidhi to complete the sense) is warranted by any pramāṇa (say, arthāpatti), the prayogavacana, which would have decreed again the acquisition of jñāna also as in the case of mantras (where the prayogavidhi enjoins both mantra and mantrajñāna) is not found (in this context). Hence the view is wrong that the Veda though having kārya (apūrva) as its subject, also expounds the nature of reality (*viz.*, idam sarvam yadayamātmā).

35. Again the example that you adduced, *viz.*, just as the eye when it reveals the colour, reveals also the substance, the Veda revealing kārya, reveals also the nature of reality (is also inapplicable). There, no doubt it is appropriate; sense of sight is independently probative in every item of knowledge that it reveals, but here on the other hand the tātparya only, *i.e.*, the sense (of the passage) as a whole invests it with validity (*i.e.*, pramāviṣayatā)

<sup>50</sup> त एव केनचिदुपाधिना—Sequence-krama, implies space and time as being inevitable for its existence. It is the same whether we use the word krama or say that things take place in a certain sequence of time. A group of trees growing together in a particular region come under the designation of 'forest'. The very term 'forest' implies an assemblage of trees as limited by a particular region (*i.e.*, limitation of space).



and not each item of knowledge (that is given in isolated words)—this is what distinguishes (verbal from the perceptive knowledge).<sup>51</sup>

XIII. 36. *Ārambhavādin.*—Let there be no two cognitions; let the knowledge which the denotative potency of the words yields subserve the object of the vidhi, and when the injunction is with reference to that (*viz.*, what is denoted by śabda) then inevitably by arthāpatti pramāṇa the ātman-nature of the whole (world) results, for cognition means cognition of an object (*i.e.*, cognition implies something cognized).<sup>52</sup>

*Anārambhavādin.*—Even so (*i.e.*, when you premise that the vākya—idam sarvam, etc.,—is injunctive in character and that ātmatatva results from Śrutārthāpatti) your construing the sentence (*i.e.*, the manner in which you understand the sense of the Upaniṣadic text—idam sarvam) is most amazing seeing (that in your interpretation) the sense which is not pertinent to the context (*viz.*, injunction of knowledge results from the śabda, while what is pertinent (*viz.*, the all-ātman nature of the world) results from arthāpatti).<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> In perception the eye gets into contact with form and substance separately, hence it can point to both; but the denotativeness of śabda is in conformity with the sense of the phrase or passage considered as a unity and not with reference to each component part. It depends entirely upon the speaker's idea as a whole. This is the difference between perceptual and verbal knowledge.

<sup>52</sup> Conceding that śabda can yield only a single cognition unlike the sense of sight, the 'ārambhavādin' points out that the universal nature of ātman—सर्वस्य आत्मस्वरूपता is ascertained from the same vākya by the valid means of knowledge known as 'śrutārthāpatti' or postulation from words. The mandate इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ज्ञातव्यः has jñāna as its object—विषय and naturally jñāna desiderates a ज्ञेय or विषय and that is the ātmahood of this all. The conclusion is that the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā Śāstra has to be begun, since the injunction of knowledge is established and as such the doubt that such injunction does not exist, has been removed.

<sup>53</sup> Arthāpatti is of two kinds: Śrutārthāpatti, *i.e.*, presumption from what one hears, and Dṛṣṭārthāpatti, *i.e.*, presumption from what is actually experienced; Caitra, we are informed, is alive, but we do not find him in his house, ergo, he is out—this is in illustration of dṛṣṭārthāpatti. Devadatta, we are told, is fat but does not eat by day, the implication is that he eats by night—this is in illustration of

37. Moreover, (*i.e.*, apart from the fact of your illogical interpretation) it is not that the mandate regarding jñāna (prati-patti) invariably (niyogataḥ) denotes the relation of what it enjoins (*viz.*, jñāna) with an object that is really existent (*i.e.*, the injunction may not reveal that the relation between the world and ātman is real). The cognitions (pratipattayaḥ) which are enjoined by the Veda (codanā), it is well known, have (often) as their objects even those things which are only imagined (and not those which correspond to reality), and which (nevertheless) yield (some) fruit, as witness the statement 'meditate on speech as the cow', etc. And this alone (*viz.*, that jñāna has the imagined identity) is appropriate here (*i.e.*, in this vākya, 'idam sarvam, etc.') the jñāna which is enjoined is incapable of producing the valid cognition of what stands as its object, very like the case of meditation on the 'speech-cow,' vak-dhenu), because the text when it does not (according to you) really mean that (*viz.*, the ātman-identity of this-all) and when such identity-knowledge is also opposed to perception, etc., it becomes incapable of determining the sense as denoted (by the phrase—idam, etc.). Hence it is mere fancy to suppose that the Veda whose object is to denote action establishes the nature of reality (vastutatva).

XIV. 38. Therefore ātman is only that which is rendered explicit by the ego-notion (ahampratyaya) and of that (ātman) there exists no other form (rūpāntaram, *i.e.*, the entity characterised by world-negation—niṣprapancasvarūpam) which is super-sensuous and determined (only) by verbal testimony, for śabda is not competent to reveal such an entity. When this is so the words 'Brahman', 'antaryāmin', etc., found in the texts:— "This self (ātman) is Brahman (ayamātmā Brahma)", "This person is your ātman, indweller, immortal (eṣa te ātmā antaryāmyamṛtaḥ)" somehow (*i.e.*, figuratively) find this significance in ātman as rendered explicit in the ego-notion. Hence it is but

Śrutārthāpatti. In both cases what on the face of it is a contradiction is resolved by a suitable postulation. The text under notice, *viz.*, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा, means that all, is of the nature of ātman and this meaning is to be had by arthāpatti, whereas injunction knowledge (jñānavidhi) which is not there, is said to be its meaning by the addition of the phrase—jñātavyaḥ. When jñāna is enjoined it would require a viśaya and that viśaya is no other than the identity of the world with ātman. This is postulation or arthāpatti. This way of construing the vākya, says the anārambhavādin, is most novel.

right to conclude that the text: 'that is ātman, that thou art' (enjoins meditation on ātman in association with the qualities which either actually exist or are imagined, which (meditation) yields the fruit of mokṣa (freedom from bondage).

39. Hence since the import of the (whole) Veda is to inculcate action (kārya or karma) and since it (karma) has been in all its aspects investigated (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) what else is there remaining which would necessitate the commencing of the inquiry into the nature of Brahman?<sup>54</sup>

XV. 40. *Paramasiddhānta*: [Page 48] It is thus answered: This would be so (*viz.*, the anticipation of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā by Jaimini) if the whole of the Vedārtha had been taken up by him for investigation in formulating the Sūtra—athāto dharmajijñāsā—'then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma' and investigated too. (On what ground, it may be asked, is it presumed that the entire Veda is not commented on by Jaimini)? Because (yāvatā) only that portion of the Veda which deals with duty—kriyā—has been inquired into and not that which relates to the essential nature of reality.

41. To explain: The introduction to the (Mīmāṃsā) Śāstra is thus set forth by the commentators. How? Dharma verily is some instrument by which the performer (of karma) obtains happiness (such as Svarga) in the future, (kālāntara, *i.e.*, after death) and this Dharma in its general aspect is the viśaya of the cognition arising from that semblance of pramāṇa (pramāṇā-bhāsa—men's untutored perception) known by the name of loka.<sup>55</sup> But as regards its specific nature thinkers hold diverse views. Some maintain that Dharma consists in agnihotra, etc.; others,

<sup>54</sup> एवं सति, etc.—Brahman, antaryāmin, etc., denote only ātman as revealed in the ego-notion—अहंप्रत्यय and not any Higher Being; for one who maintains that Uttara-Mīmāṃsā need not be commenced jīva or individual soul alone exists and apart from it there is no śuddha or the pure self.

कथञ्चित्—Somehow, either etymologically or figuratively, गौण and not by conventional usage—रूढि विदामानैः existing qualities like mahatva, magnitude, etc.

<sup>55</sup> लोकाख्यप्रमाणाभासोत्थेन—What appears to be a valid means of knowledge, *i.e.*, the common sense view, and this is termed loka. Dharma is not altogether a novel conception; in its general nature it is manifest to all; but difference of opinion exists as regards its special feature—whether it is yāga or worship at Caitya, etc.

in the adoration at Buddhistic places of worship. (There being diversity of opinion the pūrvapakṣin like the Bauddha) argues thus: "It is not that Dharma means only what is of the nature of agnihotra, etc.; therefore there is no occasion for inquiring into the meaning of Vedic sentences expounding agnihotra, etc. Nor is there any meaning intended to be conveyed (by these Vedic statements).<sup>56</sup> Hence, of the adoration of Caitya, etc., what constitutes Dharma is only one of them and it is some one statement of Buddha expounding that (Dharma) that has to be inquired into, or not even that. For it is clear that in human utterances the meaning is not in conformity with the denotative potency of the word (śabda) but on the contrary with his (speaker's) intended sense.<sup>57</sup>

42. When such a question is raised by the opponent (Bauddha or some other non-follower of the Veda, the Siddhāntin proceeds to answer). Intending to inquire (from the second Sūtra onwards) into the meaning of the Vedic texts for (ascertaining what constitutes Dharma) Jaimini framed the (first) Sūtra—Athāto Dharmajijñāsā—"then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma"—i.e., to point out that the Veda conveys a specific sense that therefore there is occasion for investigation and that after gaining mastery over the Vedic text, it is incumbent that one should undertake the inquiry into Dharma and not take the ceremonial bath which amounts to quitting the preceptor's house. When this is so, (i.e., when the introductory Sūtra, restricts the inquiry to Dharma) the idea is not, that the Śāstra (i.e., the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) embraces the entire Vedārtha but it is understood that there exists (a part of) the Veda significant of an accomplished entity (siddharūpa—already there, not coming into existence by one's effort as is the case with Dharma), distinct even from Dharma, which is unnoticed by Jaimini since it forms the subject-matter of a separate philosophical system (Nyāya).

<sup>56</sup> The negative particle 'no' is to be taken along with the preceding as well as the succeeding sentence—न अग्निहोत्रादिलक्षण एव धर्मोऽभिप्रेतो न तत्प्रतिपादकानां, etc.

<sup>57</sup> मा वा तदपि—On reflection, inquiry is inappropriate even in the case of Buddha's utterances; for according to the Bauddhas as also according to the Prābhākaraś words have no significative potency in the empirical sphere: they merely serve as a mark—liṅga for inferring the speaker's intention—शब्दस्य लिङ्गविधया प्रामाण्यम्—न तु शक्यनुसारेण प्रतीयमाने अर्थे प्रामाण्यम्.

43. *Anārambhavādin.*—How is it to be determined that this alone is (Jaimini's) view ? (*i.e.*, on what grounds are we to suppose that the *Pūrvakāṇḍa* deals with Dharma only and not the entire Veda ?)<sup>58</sup>

*Ārambhavādin.*—This is how it is determined. Now Dharma is understood in its general sense by what passes muster with the people but when conflicting views exist regarding its nature and its (validating) *pramāṇa*, even *agnihotra*, etc., as the meaning of the Veda become fit for inquiry. Because inquiry into that also (*i.e.*, whether Dharma means *agnihotra*, etc., or something else) has been occasioned, it is but right to understand that the Veda has a specific sense to convey. And the mere recital (of one's branch of the Veda) does not conclude one's duty. Hence after finishing the Vedic recital, one ought not to quit the preceptor's abode; on the contrary the question whether *Vedārtha* (*i.e.*, the import of the Scriptures) is Dharma or anything else merits investigation. It is to point this out that the word Dharma has been rightly introduced into the aphorism '*athāto Dharmajijñāsā*'—'then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma' and not *Vedārtha-jijñāsā*; for no one will undertake (*agnihotra*, etc.) if they are taken as the meaning of the Veda. (It is when *agnihotra* means Dharma that one undertakes it.)

XVI. 44. Again the second Sūtra (of Jaimini, *viz.*, '*codanā-lakṣano artho Dharmah*') is intended to elucidate the nature and *pramāṇa* of Dharma, and (as such) it amounts to this that Dharma has the Veda as its *pramāṇa*. Why then is the phrase *codanālakṣaṇa* (used in the aphorism)?<sup>59</sup> It is therefore evident

<sup>58</sup> तत् कथम्—From the use of the word 'Dharma' how do you infer that Vedāntic inquiry is excluded? Because the words 'atha' and 'atah' are used, the Sūtra means the inquiry into Vedārtha only and not Dharma. There is sequence between *adhyayana* and *Vedārthavicāra* and not between *adhyayana* and *Dharmavicāra*. This is *Pūrvapakṣa* अथ-स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तरं; अतः-स्वाध्यायस्य विवक्षितत्वात्.

<sup>59</sup> यत्पुनः—The first Sūtra of Jaimini makes it clear that the nature of Dharma has to be investigated, for Dharma in its general sense is conducive to man's highest good but its special sense admits of controversy. Jaimini sets about investigating Dharma and not the meaning of the Veda as a whole. The second Sūtra also is in relation to Dharma only, though *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila* interpret it differently. The former thinks that the Sūtra is concerned with the definition

that (Jaimini) is of the view that not the whole of the Veda finds its fulfilment in (or ends in expounding) Dharma of the nature of kārya, but that some portion of it bears on the essence of the thing (existent reality) where the idea of kārya is absent.

45. *Anārambhavādin*.—[Page 49] Well, the use of the word codanā is with a different purpose altogether, the meaning of the root 'cudā' is prompting-prerana, so that the root cūda which denotes prompting assumes the form codanā. Hence the injunction of the nature of prompting being unable (*i.e.*, it being inappropriate) to prompt (one) to an action that does not result in one's highest good, causes svarga, etc., though denoted by a different word, (*viz.*, svarga, in svargakāmaḥ) to get into objective relation with the bhāvanā (or puruṣapraṇṛtti—action) and this it does having discarded the root meaning which is denoted by the same word (as contains the mandatory suffix—yajeta') and which is much nearer (spatially than svarga, etc.); it is to express this idea that the word codanā is used.<sup>60</sup>

---

—लक्षण of Dharma, and only by implication—अर्थापत्ति, with the pramāṇa (*i.e.*, the valid means of knowledge by which Dharma is cognized); the latter thinks that the postulation of pramāṇa is primary, and definition is by implication. However it be, both schools admit that the second Sūtra states not only the definition of Dharma but also the validating pramāṇa which is the Veda. The question then will be, why was the Sūtra been worded as चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः and not as वेदलक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः.

<sup>60</sup> The advocate of the view that a separate treatise dealing with an existent entity unassociated with kārya need not be begun assigns a different reason for the use of the word codanā in the second sūtra and rejects the view that it is meant to exclude that portion of the Veda which is uncommented upon by Jaimini. In 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' the termination 'ta' denotes impulsion or prompting and prompting to action is consistent only when some good is held forth as the reward of action. This reward on the face of it would be 'yāga' indicated by the root 'yaj' in the same word 'yajeta', but no one will undertake yāga if it ends there. Hence svarga which is indicated in 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' is to be understood as the reward for the attainment of which one is prompted to action. It is to make this point clear that the word codanā is used. The Pūrvapakṣin's idea is that in all vidhivākyas, the prompting (codanā) denoted either by the 'optative' suffix or 'tavya' suffix results in action leading to svarga as the object of attainment.



46. *Ārambhavādin*.—That is jejune. The vidhi relating to adhyayana (*i.e.*, the mandate enjoining the getting by rote one's branch of the Veda) setting about to induce the pupil (*mānavaka*) to master the Vedic text finds itself incapable of inducing him without first showing that adhyayana is the means of attaining the highest good, for the vidhi fails to fulfil its purpose (*viz.*, that of prompting one to action) when the highest human end is not evident even if remotely. Hence it is not for that (*i.e.*, for denoting *puruṣārtha*) that the word *codanā* is used for that may be secured even by the use of the word Veda.<sup>61</sup> Moreover the use of the word Veda alone is appropriate since it leaves no room for doubt, but the use of the word 'codanā' surely generates doubt because we have also empirical mandates.<sup>62</sup>

47. *Anārambhavādin*.—In the *Vedādhikaraṇa*, we have the sūtra—"some make the assertion that the Vedas are of recent origin," (*i.e.*, ascribe nearness of time to the Vedas; because of the presence of names therein). From this it is established, because of specific indication, that the Veda (alone) is intended (and not empirical mandates).<sup>63</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> वेदग्रहणेनापि—Even if the sūtra had been worded as 'वेदलक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' the purpose, *viz.*, that a mandate before it prompts one to action must hold out the highest bliss as the reward—could have been served. For the vidhi in general, as in the example 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' demands for its fulfilment, *svarga*, etc., as its guerdon. The question, therefore, has to be answered, why has Jaimini specifically used the term *codanā*?

<sup>62</sup> 'लोकेऽपि विद्यमानत्वात्—*Codanā* or mandate may be either scriptural or empirical (*i.e.*, mandate emanating from men). Empirical statements also may point to *Dharma* which of course is against the doctrine and as such doubt arises as to which to take. Moreover *Upaniṣadic* statements which relate to an existing entity dissociated from action may have to be regarded as not falling within the scope of Vedic mandates. Hence the use of the word 'codanā' is detrimental to the opponent's position.

<sup>63</sup> 'अथ वेदाधिकरणे'—The *Pūrvapakṣin's* rejoinder is that *codanā* cannot possibly refer to empirical mandates since in VIII-27, Jaimini has used the word Veda specifically. The sūtra runs thus: वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षमिति. It is obvious from the use of the word Veda that scriptural injunctions alone and not empirical, are to be taken. The *Vedādhikaraṇa* is the last in the *Tarkapāda* of *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā* of Jaimini. The meaning of the sūtra is as follows: एके some, *viz.*, the



*Ārambhavādin.*—This is as the proverb goes: “Licking the hand having thrown away the morsel of food”. It would be attributing lack of ingenuity to the aphorist (Jaimini).<sup>64</sup> Hence by the employment of the word *codanā* (meaning a command) it is perceived that the existence of a section of the Veda which is not of a mandatory character was admitted (by Jaimini). And this (*viz.*, the word *codanā*) he has used in order that the Veda in its entirety might not mean duty (*karma*). Therefore in this way the aphorist himself has hinted that no inquiry has been made into that part of the Veda which deals with a topic different from that of his own treatise (*śāstra*—sacred work).

XVII. 48. *Anārambhavādin.*—Well, (we have the following texts)—“Its (*i.e.*, of the Veda) sense is evidently the inculcation of duty” (*i.e.*, *karma* or *niyoga* is the obvious sense of the Veda, S.B., p. 6). “The utterance of the words which are implied in the meanings, is with the object of enjoining some action”—Jaimini Sūtra, I. vii-25.

“The Veda is meant to inculcate duty (hence whatever portion means something other than that is devoid of purpose.”—Jai. Sūt. I. ii-1).

The whole of the Veda is thus shown to prescribe duty.

49. *Ārambhavādin.*—Yes, it is true. But on the strength of what has been set out (as the object of inquiry, *viz.*, *Dharma* or duty, the terms used subsequently like ‘*tasya*’, *āmnāyasya*, ‘*tadbhūtānām*’, etc., though general in character should be understood as referring only) to a portion of the Veda, *i.e.*, to *codanā* (or mandatory section) and not to the whole of it. (Further Śabara’s statement)—“The knowledge of *karma* (*Niyoga*, etc.) is the obvious fruit (*prayojana*) of the Veda” is not for pointing out that the entire Veda inculcates *karma*. How? (it may be asked); on completing the *Vedādhyaṇa* (*i.e.*, memorising the

---

*Naiyāyikas*, etc., (say that) वेदान् the Vedas (are of man’s creation), सन्निकर्षात् the reason for this view is that there is mention of names like *Kāṭhaka* and *Kālāpaka* pointing to authors.

<sup>64</sup> अकौशलं प्रदर्शितं स्यात्—To assert that because Jaimini has used the word *Veda* in I. viii. 27, *codanā* in I. 2 must mean *Veda* is to belittle Jaimini’s intelligence. If he meant that the whole of the Veda was action-related, धर्मपर, the right place to use the word *Veda* would be I. 2 which is the *Lakṣaṇa* sūtra and he would not postpone its employment to the VIII *adhikaraṇa*.

text of one's branch of the Veda) one comes across the authoritative statement enjoining the ceremonial bath (which should therefore follow immediately) so that one entertains the impression that the Veda (apart from its committal to memory) carries no sense; then (to eradicate such an impression the Bhāṣyakāra, viz., Śābara says)—“We will transgress this mandate. If we do not transgress it we would be rendering the Veda meaningless when (actually) it is fraught with meaning.”<sup>65</sup> The knowledge of karma is indeed its obvious fruit,<sup>66</sup> so that it is clear that what is pointed out is that the Veda does really possess a meaning and not that there exists no other meaning (i.e., other than karma). That statement (i.e., *dr̥ṣṭohi*, etc.) is made to dispel the notion that the Veda is unrelated to artha (sense) and not to disprove that anything apart from karma (viz., Brahman) is to be found in the Veda.

The word karma denotes Dharma only (like *agnihotra*) because it is something to be achieved by effort and because the person who undertakes to acquire the knowledge of Dharma seeks to know if the Veda is significative, i.e., whether there is any meaning yielded by the Veda or not and whether it is possible to understand that significance as being (identical with) Dharma.<sup>67</sup> Hence (to conclude) the Bhāṣyakāra (Śābara) should not be deemed as holding the opinion that the knowledge of karma alone is the fruit of the Veda.

---

<sup>65</sup> *Vide* the present writer's English translation of *Śāstradīpikā*, G.O.S., Vol. LXXXIX, pp. 1-15 for a discussion of this topic; also S.B., pp. 5 and 6.

<sup>66</sup> दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मवबोधनम्—The Veda in general, with no portion excepted possesses meaning. It is to indicate this fact that the above statement is made by Śābara and not that any portion of the Veda is void of meaning, when it denotes something other than karma.

<sup>67</sup> कर्मशब्देन धर्म एव, कार्यत्वादभिहितः—Since the word karma means object of knowledge in general—*प्रमेयसामान्य* it denotes both Brahman and Dharma. There is therefore no need for a separate treatise dealing with the nature of Brahman. This is *pūrvapakṣa* and the answer is given in the text beginning with *कर्मशब्देन*, etc. The *siddhāntin* says that from the context *दृष्टो हि*, etc., karma should naturally mean Dharma only but that meaning is discarded because of the need to remove the doubt whether the Veda is significant or not. Hence the word karma is taken in the sense of artha.

50. [Page 50] Again (let us take the Sūtra)—“Since the object of the Veda is to enjoin kārya, what does not enjoin kārya is purposeless”—Jai. I-ii. 1. There, if the word ‘ānarthakya’ is taken to mean non-denotative (*i.e.*, conveying no meaning), that interpretation is wrong, because the meaning is made clear; we have the Bhāṣya text—“Thus in this manner only they—arthavādas (the laudatory or condemnatory texts) restate existing things” (S.B. P. 105). If on the other hand the word means ‘serving no purpose’ (it is unwelcome) since the mandate enjoining the recital of one’s own branch of the Veda (*viz.*, ‘svādhyayodhyetavyaḥ’) does not so much as admit the getting up of even a single letter that is purposeless.<sup>68</sup> We will grant that arthāvada statements like ‘He cried, etc.’ (are purposeless) since in themselves they do not serve a desired human end (*puruṣārtha*).<sup>69</sup> And it is inappropriate to postulate a separate kārya (*vidhi*) because it (the arthāvada—so *rodīt*, etc.) is in syntactical unity (with the negative *vidhi*—‘*baṛhiṣi rajatam na deyam*’). It is not possible either, to supply (a mandate, since it is absurd to enjoin *rodana*—howling).

51. The (Upaniṣadic) statements on the contrary (unlike the arthavāda), are productive of that knowledge which enables one to realise the ātman that is rid of every trace of affliction, and fraught as they are with such irreproachable beneficence their value is beyond compare. Hence (*i.e.*, since the Vedānta passages possess an independent value) it was shown (in the ritualistic section) that arthavādas being in themselves incompetent to serve a human end become purposeful as aids to it (*puruṣārtha-yāga* which is the means to Svarga) by extolling it (*i.e.*, the injunction)

<sup>68</sup> The ārambhavādin says that the word आनर्थक्य in Jai., I. ii. 1. cannot be taken to mean ‘void of sense’ for all the Mīmāṃsakas are agreed that the Veda in its entirety is significant. Now that the anārambhavādin might urge that if it should mean ‘purposeless’—निष्प्रयोजन it would be unacceptable to the ārambhavādin also—so far, the resumé of the view held by one who advocates the non-commencement of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā Śāstra.

<sup>69</sup> The word अनर्थकम् could be interpreted in two ways: (i) having no meaning whatever. This is unacceptable both to the opponent and the Siddhāntin; (ii) serving no purpose. The Siddhāntin admits purposelessness only with reference to such statements, *i.e.*, arthavādas, as are non-significant without their association with mandatory statements—*vidhivākyas*—*cf.* Jai. Sūt., I. ii. 1.

in one way or other (in a secondary sense), and (their utility as auxiliaries to some *kriyā* was stated) not on the supposition that none of these (texts including both *arthavādas* and *Vedāntic* texts) served any useful purpose unless related to some *kriyā*. And therefore, only sentences of that description (like *so rodīt*, etc.) were there (under *Jai. Sūt. I. ii. 1*) adduced in illustration (and no *Vedāntic* passage was instanced as auxiliary to *kārya* like *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

XVIII. 52. Some (*Prābhākaras*) however account differently for commencing the *Śāstra* (*viz.*, *codanālakṣaṇo artho Dharmāḥ*). It is indeed not thus (*i.e.*, as stated by the *Bhāṭṭa* School) that the *Śāstra* (*Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*) sets about, *viz.*, whether *Dharma* is what the *Veda* imports or what the *Buddha* declares to be such. How else then? One who has learnt to recite the *Veda* will gather (in a general way) some sense (from what he has mastered) and it is there only that views, one discrepant with the other, exist, (leading to the doubt) whether this one is its sense or that. And it is to resolve those doubts that the *Śāstra* is commenced.<sup>70</sup>

53. Even there, *i.e.*, even in the view of the *Prābhākaras*, it is not to be understood that inquiry into the *Veda* in its entirety has been undertaken. How is that (to be known)? If it were so, (*i.e.*, when the inquiry related to the meaning of the entire *Veda*) the *sūtra* should have been framed thus: *athāto Vedārthajijñāsā*, since the inquiry is not about *Dharma* but about *Vedārtha* (and *Vedārtha* is the object of inquiry).

*Prābhākara*.—It is true; but then (it must be admitted that authors of sacred writings compose their works to inculcate

---

<sup>70</sup> The *Bhāṭṭa* School justifies the commencement of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* on the ground that doubt arises as to whether *agniṣṭoma*, etc., are *Dharma* or *caityavandana*; to resolve such a doubt and to prove that *agniṣṭoma*, etc., are alone *Dharma* that the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* has to be begun. The *Prābhākaras* on the other hand aver that doubts as to the special significance of the *Vedic* passages arise and to resolve these doubts the *Śāstra* has to be begun and not for refuting the opinions held by the heretical schools regarding the nature of *Dharma*. The first *Sūtra* in consequence would mean—It is incumbent on one to inquire into the meaning of the *Veda* and not—It is incumbent on one to inquire into the meaning of *Dharma* as the *Bhāṭṭas* maintain.

that which is of value (Puruṣārtha). Hence the inclusion of the word 'Dharma' for impressing puruṣārtha.<sup>71</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—If that be so, let the inquiry be confined to Dharma only, because it is fraught with a human value and admits of doubt (as to its nature).<sup>72</sup>

54. And further the next Sūtra also is in consonance (with the first). It is to dispel contrary notions held regarding the nature of Dharma (that the second Sūtra)—“That which is supported by Vedic testimony and beneficent in its results, is Dharma” is intended. Otherwise, *i.e.*, if Vedārtha itself is understood as giving rise to contrary notions, then to dispel them the Sūtra should have been (framed as) ‘codanā lakṣaṇo Vedārthaḥ’ (Vedārtha and not Dharma is what the Veda defines), for if ‘Dharma’ is taken (as the right word) then it will not be possible to dispel contrary notions regarding Vedārtha. How? (Why not regard Dharma as used in the sense of Vedārtha and the second sūtra as intended for the purpose of refuting any wrong interpretation of Vedārtha?) In so far as the thing that is revealed by the mandatory statement is Dharma (this is what the Sūtra means); if thus its (*i.e.*, of the thing denoted—artha) nature as Dharma (Dharmatva) is brought to mind, then it cannot be concluded that that alone (*viz.*, Dharma like Jyotiṣṭoma, etc.) is Vedārtha (*i.e.*, what the entire Veda enjoins) and none other.<sup>73</sup> If however

---

<sup>71</sup> The justification, says Prābhākara, for the use of the word ‘Dharma’ instead of ‘Vedārtha’ is that Vedārtha as a whole is puruṣārtha; Dharma means puruṣārtha or ‘iṣṭasādhana’.

<sup>72</sup> The word ‘Dharma’ cannot mean Vedārtha in general on the basis of rūḍhi, *i.e.*, common usage, since it may also mean caityavadana. Ordinarily by Dharma we understand śreyassādhana, *i.e.*, means to the attainment of bliss. Since Vedārtha also is the means of attaining bliss the word ‘Dharma’ may import Vedārtha. But this is not right. Dharma however relates only to agnihotra, etc., and they alone are the means to bliss. Brahman is not sādhana to bliss but bliss itself. Hence it is evident that Jaimini has not proposed the inquiry into the whole of Vedārtha, but has left Brahmajijñāsā unexpounded, which therefore demands a fresh treatise.

<sup>73</sup> It has been pointed out that the word ‘Dharma’ does not mean Vedārtha by common usage—rūḍhi. It cannot also be supposed that figuratively it can be so taken. If the word ‘Dharma’ should mean Vedārtha by (i) Jahallakṣaṇa—where the primary sense of the word is altogether discarded, then Vedārtha instead of being Dharma would

(the second sūtra is interpreted) as laying down that Dharma is the name for what the codanā denotes pointing thus to the relation of the name and the named, such a course would clash with the beginning of the śāstra (Dharmavicāra), would lead nowhere, and would be quite arbitrary.

55. [Page 51] But still if it be maintained that the word 'Dharma' somehow means Vedārtha only, then it would amount to saying that Vedārtha is what the codanā defines and not what arthavāda denotes; and this would lead to the conclusion that like the second adhyāya and the sequel of Jaimini sūtras this inquiry (*i.e.*, of the first adhyāya) is in relation to the meaning (artha) of the Veda whose validity has been previously established.<sup>74</sup> 'Tatra,' *i.e.*, if the validity has been established in the first sūtra itself; 'anantaram', *i.e.*, again, the attempt to prove the validity (as Jaimini does in sūtra V—'anupalabdhe arthe tat pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasya, etc.) would be out of place; as also useless would be (the statement of Śābarasvāmin)—'Vṛttam pramāṇalakṣaṇam'—(Bṛhati—Ānandāśrama Edn., p. 370). (In the first adhyāya Jaimini has established only that the Veda is a valid means of knowledge and if what the Veda imports—arthavatva—has also been established by him, Śābara should have said. "Vṛttam pramāṇalakṣaṇam, Vṛttañca Vedasya arthavatvaniścayaḥ"). (Again if the Vedārtha has been determined in the second sūtra as the one denoted by codanā) doubt as to whether mantras and arthavādas signify kārya (or not) would not arise; (but then) that doubt is dispelled only in the sequel (*i.e.*, in the arthavādādhikaraṇa—Jai. I. ii. 1, 'āmnāyasya', etc.).

Hence on the ground already stated it must be concluded that that part of the Veda only which is associated with kārya

---

be Adharma; (ii) Ajahallakṣaṇa—where the primary sense does not wholly disappear, then as the Pañcapādikā says (यत्तावच्चोदनालक्षणो, etc.) we would not be justified in concluding that what is not enjoined by codanā or mandate, is not Vedārtha.

<sup>74</sup> वेदस्य यो विवक्षितोऽर्थः स चोदनागम्यो वा, अर्थवादगम्यो वा, इति संशये, चोदनागम्य एवेति सूत्रेण निश्चीयते सर्वथापि वेदस्य यो विवक्षितोऽर्थः, इत्युक्तौ, वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकृतं स्यात्.—The doubt arises only after the prāmāṇya of the Veda is understood. Hence the inquiry into the prāmāṇya of the Veda beginning with the third sūtra and ending with the first adhyāya would be supererogatory.



was undertaken for inquiry, and inquired into, but not that part of the Veda whose object it is to inquire into the existing entity. That being so, this (first sūtra of Uttara Mīmāṃsā, viz., athāto Brahmajijñāsā—‘then therefore the inquiry into Brahman’, is (it is evident) begun with the object of investigating that part of the Veda which deals with the nature of Reality.

*Here ends the Second Vaṅraka of the Pañcapādikā*



### VARṆAKA III

#### THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT

I. 1. Inquiry into the meanings of words constituting the Jijñāsā Sūtra—Athāto Brahmajijñāsā.

[Page 52] “There (*i.e.*, in the first sūtra) the word ‘atha’—then, is to be understood in the sense of immediate succession<sup>1</sup> and not in the sense of adhikāra (which means commencing a fresh topic for exposition), the reason being that the desire to understand Brahman is not (a fit subject for commencement)” —and so on is the Bhāṣya. The objection is raised that such comment (Śamkara Bhāṣya) will be appropriate if the word ‘jijñāsā’ is construed according to its component parts (avayavārtha). For there is no prominence assigned in the Sūtra either to Brahman or to Brahmajijñāna whose exposition may fitly be commenced

---

<sup>1</sup> Śamkara comments on the word ‘atha’ found in the first sūtra—अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा in the following words: तत्राथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः.... ब्रह्म जिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्.—Now the first Varṇaka dealt with the topic under inquiry, *viz.*, identity of the individual with Brahman and also the benefit resulting from the knowledge of the identity, *viz.*, the removal of the ills of life; the second, with the topic whether the contents of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā are, or are not subsumed under the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. The present section discusses the question whether there is any indication in the first Sūtra as to the person competent to pursue the inquiry—adhikārin. The word ‘atha’ means ‘immediate conclusion’—ānantarya, implying that Brahman-inquiry is preceded by something. The question is what is that something? It is the preliminary discipline—moral and spiritual. The antecedent requirements for Brahmajijñāsā are known as Sādhana-catustaya or the four essential means, *viz.*, discrimination between what is eternal and what is ephemeral—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, aversion from the enjoyment of objects here and hereafter—इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः, acquisition of mental peace, self-restraint, etc.—शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, and longing for liberation—मुमुक्षुत्वम्. The word ‘atha’ cannot mean ‘commencement’ as some suppose since ‘desire—jijñāsā—jñātumicchā—desire to know’ is not a thing to be commenced. The point to be noticed is that we must be able to ascertain from the Sūtra who the person is that is fit for the study of the Śāstra and this is evident from the word ‘atha’.

and of desire which is prominent, such commencement is not possible.<sup>2</sup>

2. But this word 'jijñāsā' is used by many learned men as a term denoting inquiry—vicāra—otherwise known as mīmāṃsā (investigation or examination); *e.g.*, "This therefore they inquire into (jijñāsamte), *viz.*, whether the meditation pertaining to Vedic chanting which is subsidiary to the ritual has to be done by the sacrificer or by the officiating priest."—(V.S., III. iv-44). "But this has to be inquired into (jijñāsyam), *viz.*, whether these two (tapya—what is fit to be burnt, *viz.*, body and tāpaka—that which burns, *viz.*, samsāra) are but features of the single ātman or belong to a distinct species (*i.e.*, something distinct from ātman—*vide* V.S., II. ii-10).

3. The commentator of Dharma Mīmāṃsā also (Śabara) has taken the word (jijñāsā) in the aggregate (and not in its component elements)—"Let one desire to investigate (jijñāsitum) Dharma"; for the aggregate denotes inquiry, otherwise he would have said, "Let one desire to understand (jñātum) Dharma." Hence it is that the caturthī samāsa (the compound of the fourth case-ending) has been selected (by Śabara having) admitted that the meaning is of the aggregate and so dissolving the compound (Dharmajijñāsā) as Dharmāya-jijñāsā (the inquiry is for Dharma). And the extracts that follow are in conformity thereof:—"So the Vedic statements are inquired into (vicāryante) by these (Sūtras of Jaimini)"; "The Vedic statements are to be inquired into (vicārayitavyāni)", and "how are the Vedic statements to be inquired into (vicārayet)?" And again, "the inquiry regarding kratvartha and puruṣārtha", "kratvartha and puruṣārtha are both inquired into jijñāsyete".

4. Here also the Bhāṣyakāra (Śamkara) says:—"therefore has Brahman to be inquired into"; and again "the inquiry

---

<sup>2</sup> In Brahmajijñāsā—Brahmajñānecchā—it is icchā or desire that is the leading element and not Brahman or Brahmajñāna; for 'icchā kartavyā' is meaningless. Hence 'atha' cannot mean 'Commencement'. It is to be noted that the inappropriateness of taking 'atha' in the sense of commencement of a new topic will be apparent only when jijñāsā is interpreted derivatively—jñātum icchā and not as a whole which then would mean merely vicāra or inquiry. The objection raised is, "Why should not the word jijñāsā be construed collectively—*सदृश* instead of construing it by dismembering it into its component parts?"

(mīmāṃsā, *i.e.*, jijñāsā) into the meanings of the Vedāntic statements, which is based upon ratiocination—logical aids not conflicting with them, and which leads to the ultimate good of the nature of Liberation, is begun.” Hence since the undivided aggregate (*viz.*, jijñāsā taken as a whole) has (investigation) as its sense, adhikārārtha fits in (with the word *atha*); indeed the word jijñāsā means Śāstra signifying vicāra or inquiry. As such, it should be understood that the commencement of inquiry into Brahman (is what the first Sūtra means).

5. This is said in answer:—This word jijñāsā is not used purely as a synonym of mīmāṃsā having altogether abandoned the meaning of the component parts, nor is such usage (jijñāsā in the sense of vicāra) supported by grammar (*smaraṇa*). Further when a sense is yielded by the component parts it is not right to ascribe a different meaning to the aggregate.<sup>3</sup>

6. Well, it is not merely our fabrication; the usage of the learned has been adduced (in evidence).

No, that (usage) can be explained otherwise. You may query—‘How is it explained otherwise?’ It is on second thoughts (*antarṇīta*—implied sense) that the word jijñāsā means vicāra or inquiry; to explain—the meaning of the word jijñāsā is the desire in relation to that knowledge which presupposes careful inquiry and not to that which results from mere instruction (*upadeśa*).<sup>4</sup> It is thus (only) that we find the word jijñāsā used and the idea (*śābdabodha*) also conveyed by it. Hence, *i.e.*, since a cogent sense can be had from the constituent parts of the word

<sup>3</sup> अर्थान्तरकल्पनाऽप्युक्ता—When the word jijñāsā means by accepted usage, jñānecchā—desire for knowledge, it is not right to take it in the sense of vicāra. Neither etymologically nor on the basis of convention रूढि is it possible to regard jijñāsā as meaning vicāra or inquiry. In the citations made in support of jijñāsā meaning vicāra the secondary sense alone is feasible. Based on the *yogaśakti*, *i.e.*, the significative force of the components, vicārārtha is understood by *lakṣaṇa* (*i.e.*, secondary sense). What is intended to be refuted is that vicārārtha is yielded by *śakti*, *i.e.*, the significative force of the word.

<sup>4</sup> नेपदेशमात्रसाध्यज्ञानविषया—The word jijñāsā relates to the desire for that knowledge which is the outcome of inquiry—vicāra and not to that which one gets on trust from others. Hence ‘inquiry’ is the probans and jñāna the probandum. Therefore owing to this relation of *sādhya-sādhanabhāva* that the word jijñāsā means vicāra by *lakṣaṇa*.

jijñāsā what the Bhāṣyakāra (Śamkara) has said, viz., that Brahma-jijñāsā is not what can be commenced is perfectly justifiable.

7. *Objection.*—[Page 53] Well, even then (i.e., even if the word jijñāsā is taken in its derivative sense) how is it appropriate to maintain that jijñāsā does not mean the undertaking of a fresh topic?<sup>5</sup> Vicāra may no doubt be admitted as secondary form from the word—standpoint; if on the other hand we emphasise the sense-aspect of jijñāsā which brings vicāra into prominence and (remember) that Brahman and Brahma-knowledge are fit topics for being commenced and accept the possibility of commencing them, why not take adhikāra as the meaning of ‘atha’?<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> नन्वेवमपि, etc.—The opponent thus argues: the word jijñāsā means desire for jñāna; jñāna is that which we long for, and such jñāna cannot result without inquiry. Hence vicāra being the means is implicit in the word jijñāsā. It comes to this therefore that the word ‘atha’ is appropriately used to mean ‘commencement’ since it may relate either to Brahman or Brahmajñāna or inquiry, all of which are dealt with in the Śāstra. How then is the statement ‘anadhikāryatvāt’ reasonable?

<sup>6</sup> The phrase Brahmajijñāsā points to Brahman, cognition of Brahman, and the desire to know Brahman. Emphasis (प्राधान्य) is of two kinds: word-emphasis (शब्दप्राधान्य) and meaning-emphasis (अर्थप्राधान्य). Now Brahman and its cognition come under arthaprādhānya and ‘desire to know’, under śabdaprādhānya. On the basis of śabdaprādhānya, desire (इच्छा) is therefore the principal element and Brahman and Brahman-cognition are attributive (viśeṣaṇas) and therefore subordinate. The pūrvapakṣin admits that on the basis of śabdaprādhānya the Sūtra denotes ‘desire’ and as such becomes purposeless since ‘desire’ cannot be ‘commenced’; but then he urges that on the basis of arthaprādhānya Brahman and its cognition would be primary and so fit for ‘commencement’ (अधिक्रियमाणत्व). Hence he maintains that the word ‘atha’ means ‘commencement’ and not ‘consecution’—अन्तर्णीतं विचारमाश्रित्य शब्दतो गुणत्वेऽप्यर्थलक्षणेन प्राधान्येन ब्रह्मतज्ज्ञानयोः अधिकारयोग्यत्वात् च अधिक्रियमाणत्वमङ्गीकृत्य अधिकारार्थत्वं किमिति न गृह्यते. This sentence has to be split up into two: (i) अर्थलक्षणेन प्राधान्येन अन्तर्णीतं विचारमाश्रित्य, अधिकारयोग्यत्वात् अधिक्रियमाणत्वमङ्गीकृत्य किमिति ‘अथ’ शब्दस्य अधिकारार्थत्वं न गृह्यते. Why not the word ‘atha’ be taken to mean ‘commencement’ by focussing attention on the meaning—emphasis and construing the Sūtra as denoting inquiry—vicāra which sense is to be had by lakṣaṇa (अन्तर्णीति)? (ii) ब्रह्मतज्ज्ञानयोः शब्दतो गुणत्वेऽपि अर्थलक्षणेन प्राधान्येन अधिकारयोग्यत्वाच्च अधिक्रियमाणत्वमङ्गीकृत्य ‘अथ’ शब्दस्य अधिकारार्थत्वं किमिति न गृह्यते? Why not the word ‘atha’ be taken to

and for what reason is it maintained—attaching importance to the formal aspect of jijñāsā, and on the basis that desire cannot be willed, that ‘atha’ means consecution only?

*Answer.*—This will be said (to meet your objection)—Since it would result in the non-undertaking (the study) of the (Brahma-mīmāṃsā) Śāstra, the adhikārārtha (*i.e.*, construing ‘atha’ as commencement) is inappropriate.<sup>7</sup> Indeed the Śāstra serving no purpose if adhikārārtha is accepted would be as valueless as the inquiry into the number of a crow’s teeth and as such would not be undertaken. Hence (*i.e.*, when the Śāstra becomes purposeless) who can be spoken of as qualified for the study?

8. *Objection.*—Well, the knowledge of Brahman is the prayojana (fruit) and it is for securing it that the (study of the) Śāstra is to be commenced.<sup>8</sup>

*Answer.*—No, there is no possibility of the desire to acquire the knowledge of Brahman arising.<sup>9</sup> The Scripture declares that with the acquisition of Brahmajñāna one is isolated even from

---

mean ‘commencement’ seeing that Brahman and its cognition though attributive on the basis of śabdaprādhānya are primary on the basis of arthalakṣaṇa?

<sup>7</sup> If we undersatnd by the word ‘atha’, commencement—अधिकारार्थ and not, consecution—आनन्तर्य there will be none competent—अधिकारी to undertake the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā, with the result that the Śāstra will fall into neglect. ‘Atha’ therefore means ‘after the acquisition of the preliminary discipline’ which consists in the acquisition of Sādhana-catuṣṭaya. When a fit recipient of the teaching is not available the question naturally arises—‘for the fulfilment of whose wish is the study to be commenced?’

<sup>8</sup> The Siddhāntin pointed out that if ‘atha’ is construed as ānantarya, it would mean ‘after the mumukṣu’ is secured. Hence ‘mokṣa’ becomes the prayojana. But if it means ‘commencement’, no prayojana would result. The pūrvapakṣin answers that prayojana could be had on the analogy of ‘Rātri Satra Nyāya’ where the adhikārin though not directly stated can be ascertained from arthavāda. In the present context the arthavāda vākyas are—‘तरति शोकमात्मवित्’, ‘ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्’, etc., where it is seen that crossing the sorrow and attainment of the ultimate, constitute the prayojana and the adhikārin is one who longs for freedom from sorrow or one who longs to attain Brahman.

<sup>9</sup> The Siddhāntin queries if all are competent for Vedic study since the desire for Brahmajñāna is common to all, even without the mandate, or is competency conferred on all by the mandate?

the mind, with the result that there will be no contact with any of the sense-objects. And that (cessation of contact) puts an end to every grade of happiness, declared in the Śruti. (Tait. Up. Ānanda Valli) beginning with that of the world-sovereign and culminating in that of Brahmāloka, each succeeding happiness excelling the previous one (nay, putting an end also to) the means by which such happiness is attained. Hence the world turns away from Brahmajñāna in aversion. Why will one covet it?

9. *Objection.*—Well, the state of bliss also is attained by Brahmajñāna and as such one strives after it.

*Answer.*—That is not so. Brahmānanda (*i.e.*, the joy that one experiences by Brahmajñāna) never having been experienced before, is powerless to mitigate the longing for that happiness which has been experienced; had Brahmānanda been potent, it could have prompted one to acquire Brahmajñāna abandoning the other.

10. *Objection.*—Well, we know that Brahmajñāna yields also what is of the nature of supreme satisfaction; hence what does the man, who is satisfied, desire, for all desire springs (by reason of) dissatisfaction? To this effect is the (corroboration of) Śruti—‘whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is ātman’ (Brh. Up., IV. 4-6); also of Smṛti—‘nothing higher than the attainment of ātman is known’; ‘O, Bhārata, knowing this (*i.e.*, ātman) he becomes wise, well-contented too’—(Bh. G., XV. 20).

*Answer.*—No; from satisfaction itself arises repulsion because it destroys (all appetite for) objects of enjoyment (through satiation). Even so do people say—‘alas! how sad that the creation was not thus; (*i.e.*, did not provide for) ‘capacity for constant enjoyment, non-satiation, and indestructibility of the objects of enjoyment’. And they adduce in illustration a verse sung by the sensualist, *viz.*, “O, Gautama, one would rather long for the life of a jackal in a desolate forest but never would one desire liberation which is the negation of all objects of enjoyment.”

III. 11. *Objection.*—Let not desire for Brahma-knowledge arise (independently of vidhi). Because of its (Brahman) being (a part of) the very import of the Veda, it is incumbent on one to acquire Brahma-knowledge.<sup>10</sup> (If it should be urged that vidhi

<sup>10</sup> It was pointed out that there would be no competent agent in case the word ‘atha’ is not interpreted as meaning ānantarya. The pūrvapakṣin tries to show that the adhikārin can be had from the



is incompetent to initiate vicāra, the answer is no), because the chanting of one's section of the Veda has the understanding of its import as its phala (end to be achieved).

*Answer.*—Yes, it would be so if the Vedic chanting had the understanding of its meaning as its result (phala). The adhyayana-kriyā, obviously has as its phala (only) the acquisition of that which is studied and ends in one's learning the words of the Veda.<sup>11</sup>

*Objection.*—[Page 54] Well, it is profitless, the (mere) acquisition of words; as such the mandate does not find its fulfilment there.

*Answer.*—Then let the analogy of 'the saktu' hold good (i.e., as in the sentence—saktūn juhōti, the root meaning 'homa' is the principal and the adjacent word—'saktu' is subsidiary.<sup>12</sup>

*Objection.*—Even that will not suit; because it is seen that from the words, a knowledge of the meaning which serves a useful end is obtained.<sup>13</sup>

---

Scriptural mandate; the mandatory statement—स्वाध्ययोऽध्येतव्यः, confers adhikāritva on the first three castes. This means that the meaning of the texts chanted, should be known by all the three castes and they should consequently investigate into the meaning, i.e., be engaged in inquiry. Hence they become adhikārins for inquiry.

<sup>11</sup> The Siddhāntin argues that mastery over words only is the phala of adhyayana and not the knowledge of the meaning since the vidhi—svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ is meant only for the acquisition by rote of one's branch of the Veda and not for the acquisition of its meaning. There is no word suggesting the latter. The 'tavya' termination points to svādhyāya in the objection relation. Hence we ought not to go beyond it for phala; that itself is the phala.

<sup>12</sup> On the analogy of the Saktu-homa the sentence स्वाध्ययोऽध्येतव्यः has to be construed thus—स्वाध्यायकरणकाध्ययेनेन स्वर्गं भावयेत्, so that adhyayana would be undertaken for Svarga only since it is coveted by all and not for arthajñāna; cf. सक्तुकरणकहोमेन इष्टं भावयेत् a form got by changing the accusative सक्तुन् into the instrumental.

<sup>13</sup> The analogy of saktu-yāga is inappropriate. There does result a phala from adhyayana; for when one studies the Veda with its auxiliaries—grammar, phonetics, etc., one is sure to acquire the meaning of the Veda. And because the determination of the meaning अर्थनिश्चय is the meed—फल of Vedic study, inquiry or vicāra becomes essential and in its wake the adhikārin. Thus according to the opponent, the adhikārin, i.e., the person fit to study the Śāstra is secured without the necessity of taking 'atha' in the sense of ānantarya—immediate succession.

*Answer.*—If so the mere words (*i.e.*, acquiring command over the bare text) are not without serving some end. Hence adhyayana which ends in that (*viz.*, akṣaragrahaṇa) is not without meed. As such the purpose of the niyoga or vidhi (mandate) is fulfilled from the mere acquisition of the letters (composing the Veda) and the outcome of the memorised text which is the phala of adhyayana is the knowledge of the meaning (artha).<sup>14</sup>

12. Again, maintaining the view that the purpose of the mandate is not fulfilled with the acquisition of the bare text, you cannot possibly suppose that everywhere (*i.e.*, in all contexts the vidhi) finds its fulfilment in inculcating the knowledge of the meaning which has some purpose to serve. In such contexts (*tatra*, *i.e.*, in regard to statements where the knowledge of the meaning is to no purpose) it becomes incumbent to suppose that the vidhi has its object fulfilled in merely enjoining the acquisition of the mastery over the words—for instance, in the case of a member of the warrior caste (rājanya) Vedic statements relating to sāstra (Brahmans only are competent for this ritual), Vaiśyastoma (Vaiśyas only are competent for this ritual), and Bṛhaspatisava. Brahmans only are competent for this ritual; and in the case of a Vaiśya, the texts relating to Aśvamedha, Rājasūya (intended only for the warrior caste) and Satra. And it cannot be said that these sections (*i.e.*, those relating to rituals from which they are excluded) have to be left unchanted (by these respective castes); for from the word svādhyāya (in 'svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ) it is evident that the study of the whole content of the Veda is enjoined (on all the three castes).

13. *Pūrvāpakṣin.*—The Adhyayana mandate has not stated the adhikārin (*i.e.*, the person competent to study the Veda; hence an adhikārin has to be understood, and the knowledge of the meaning, it is evident, supervenes the acquisition of the mastery over the words. (This is urged to meet the argument that one

<sup>14</sup> अतः अक्षरग्रहणादेव नियोगसिद्धेः फलप्रयुक्त एव अर्थावबोधः—The Siddhāntin's point is that if svādhyāya is not regarded as the bhāvya (phala) of adhyayana, it would mean the abandonment of bhāvya of svādhyāya (*cf.* स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः where bhāvya is specifically mentioned) and the acceptance of the unmentioned भाव्यत्व, *viz.*, arthāvabodha. For the Siddhāntin the knowledge of the meaning is through svādhyāya or the memorised text while for the Pūrvapakṣin it is through adhyayanavidhi or the injunction enjoining Vedic study.

desirous of Svarga may be considered as the *adhikārin* on the analogy of *Viśvajidyāga*. The knowledge of the meaning is *dr̥ṣṭaphala* and as such the man who desires the knowledge of the meaning is the *adhikārin*). And that (*i.e.*, *arthāvabodha*) having obviated the need for supplying the *adhikārin* (on the analogy of *Viśvajidyāga*.) itself becomes the *hetu* of the *adhikārin* (*viz.*, the man desirous of acquiring the meaning—*arthāvabodhakāma*). In all cases where the *adhikāra* is of the *dr̥ṣṭa* type, that *adhikāra* which is obvious, itself constitutes the circumstance relating the *vidhi* with the person carrying it out. Hence the scope of the *vidhi* contained in 'svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ' extends up to the attainment of the knowledge of the meaning (of the memorised texts).<sup>15</sup> It is evident therefore that the inquiry into the meaning of the entire Veda (here of course the *Upaniṣads*) is only for the fulfilment of the *niyoga* (or *vidhi*).

IV. 14. *Siddhāntin*. This will be said in answer: Granted that the apprehension of meaning is the outcome of the *adhyayana* mandate, it (*arthāvabodha*) fails to be the means of inducing one to undertake the inquiry for the reason that before *adhyayana* (*i.e.*, Vedic study) the meaning is not understood. It is (before the *vidhi* is heard) that the knowledge as to who the *adhikārin* is becomes purposeful (*i.e.*, we should know beforehand who is competent and then the *vidhi* will be fruitful). Hence (since the *adhyayanavidhi* is out of the question) no apprehension of the meaning will result as *dr̥ṣṭaphala* (direct experience) from the *vidhi* (because such a result is not patent).

V. 15. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—If that be so (*i.e.*, if as the result of acquiring mastery of the Vedic text the meaning is not understood) since the *phala* is not mentioned in the mandatory sentence and since you do not admit that *arthāvabodha* (understanding of

---

<sup>15</sup> दृष्टाधिकारेषु—This is the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s answer to the objection that even if we admit that the *adhyayanavidhi* itself points to the *adhikārin*, *viz.*, one desirous of acquiring the sense of the memorised text, the question as to who it is that is competent for undertaking the inquiry into the Vedic sense would be left unsolved. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that since *arthajñāna* is not possible by mere *adhyayana*, inquiry is posited by *arthāpatti*—'presumption'. Hence effort to undertake the inquiry becomes possible without the necessity of taking the word 'atha' as the *Siddhāntin* does, in the sense of 'immediate succession'.

the sense) is in the attributive relation to the adhikārin (in other words, that the desire to know the sense is the hetu of adhikāra) the result would be that no effort will be made for Vedic study.

16. *The Prābhākara View*.—Here some (meaning the Prābhākaras) say:<sup>16</sup> The pursuit of the Vedic study (adhyayana) is impelled by the mandate relating to preceptorship on the analogy of ādhāna which (ritual) is undertaken when impelled by a Śruti connected with an interested act.<sup>17</sup>

17. *Siddhāntin*.—Others<sup>18</sup> (the Siddhāntins) say that it is untenable. How? if it be thought that the mandate—‘initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year’ is the one relating to the preceptor, then the neophyte (māṇavaka or the boy just initiated) will not be under obligation to carry out the mandate. And in one whom the mandate does not bind, there results no effort to study one’s

<sup>16</sup> केचिदाहुः—The Prābhākaras maintain that impulsion to Vedic study अध्ययन comes not from the mandate relating to Vedic study—अध्ययनविधि, viz., स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः but from that relating to the preceptor—अध्यापनविधि, viz., उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयोद् द्विजः । सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥ It comes to this that Vedic study is undertaken on the strength of the adhyāpanavidhi and not adhyayanavidhi. Since the motive for action arises from adhyāpanavidhi, the other loses its motivating force.

<sup>17</sup> आधान—Since the sacred fires are essential for the performance of rites the injunction relating to those rites will apply only to him that has maintained these fires. In the case of injunctions relating to interested acts—काम्यकर्म the man desirous of the fruit—फल creates आधान—the sacred fire if he has not already maintained it, by consecrating it; but he may not so create it when the injunction relates to obligatory duties—नित्यकर्म, for there is no phala—fruit (according to Prābhākara). Now adhyāpana is an interested act, for the preceptorship is a coveted honour and hence the preceptor seeks a boy—माणवक and instructs him in the Veda. Thus the pravṛtti or effort to study is secured through adhyāpanavidhi.

<sup>18</sup> तदयुक्तमित्यपरे—The Prābhākara view is criticised by others, meaning the Siddhāntins as well as the Bhāṭṭas. In the statement—उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं, etc., there is no vidhi relating to instruction since the vākya is only anuvāda as indicated by the word यत्. Upanayana and Adhyāpana are both referred to (anuvāda) and only the name ācārya is declared to be given to one who undertakes the initiation and instruction of the pupil. Hence since the Vedic study (adhyayana) is not prompted by adhyāpanavidhi it is evident that the mandate relating to adhyayana alone impels the study.

branch of the Veda. Yet another (flaw has to be pointed out).<sup>19</sup> The mandate governing preceptorship, is optional (anitya). Teaching (the Veda), officiating at a sacrifice (yājana) and acceptance of gifts (pratigraha) are (privileges to which a Brāhmaṇa is entitled) in addition (to those common to all the three castes, viz., learning the Veda, performing a sacrifice and offering gifts) and these special privileges are utilised only for the sake of a living. Hence the exercise (of these privileges) is at one's option. The purificatory ceremony named Upanayana (*i.e.*, of investing the boy with the sacred thread and making him fit to approach a guru for Vedic study) on the other hand is obligatory. If not performed (*i.e.*, if the boy is not initiated)<sup>1</sup> there is this imprecation:— 'Those of the three (castes) who after the prescribed time remain without going through the purificatory ritual, who are deprived of holy association with the Sāvitrī, (and who are therefore) out-castes become fit objects of reproach by the faithful (āryas—the respectable). With such unregenerate men no Brāhmaṇa, even when in distress, should at any time or place enter into authorised (by śāstra) ritualistic or marital relationship. The purification (*viz.*, Upanayana) is for (fitting the pupil) for his Vedic study so that the Vedic study also is obligatory (as Upanayana is). To this effect is the condemnatory passage—'Those who have forsaken the obligatory duties, abandoned Vedic study and have not maintained the ritualistic fire are (as good as) pursuing the dharma of a śūdra' (for none of these is enjoined on the fourth caste). When it is so you (referring to Prābhākara) have to explain how

<sup>19</sup> अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत—If the mandate 'initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year, etc.' is intended for one desirous of attaining preceptorship then there will be little inducement for the pupil to undertake the Vedic study. When there is no direct vidhi, adhyayanavidhi will not be binding on the mānavaka. The conferment of preceptorship will hardly stimulate it. If the Prābhākara should admit the mandatory character of adhyayana but refuse to concede 'prerakṭva' (*i.e.*, the compelling force) then the question will be whether the vidhi desiderates both viśaya and adhikārin in order that its nature (svarūpa) may be ascertained. If viśaya only, then the blemish will be that even those who are forbidden to study the Veda will become competent (adhikārins) for such study. If both are admitted to be necessary the mandate relative to Vedic study will certainly have an adhikārin; and hence the adhyayanavidhi itself will impel the neophyte and not the adhyāpanavidhi.

what is nitya (obligatory duty like Upanayana) is brought about by what is anitya (optional duty like the one enjoined on a preceptor).

VI. 18. *Pūrvapakṣin.*: *Prābhākara.*—[Page 55] How can it be shown that the mandate relating to the preceptorship (*i.e.*, one relating to instruction) is optional, seeing that it (mandate) is intended to enable one to earn one's living? It is evident that no one will get on in life without money; and so it is said 'It does not stand to reason to suppose that one can live without money'. Hence being the means, as it always is, to all, of securing the most desired fruit (*viz.*, money) how could it (the ācārya-karaṇakavidhi) become an optional mandate?

19. *Siddhāntin.*—(The vidhi relating to the preceptorship) may be admitted to be nitya in so far as the fruit (phala, *viz.*, money) is considered but not on the authority of śabda (Vedic mandate, for there is none such). To explain:—Since the fruit is the one always desired, the obligatoriness (of adhyāpana or undertaking the instruction) is dependent upon the vastu (object, because the vastu, *viz.*, the living is always sought after, it confers nityatva on the mandate). There, śabda being inoperative (*i.e.*, in regard to the obligatory performance of adhyāpana) the knowledge of obligatory performance arises from the desire (for wealth) and not the desire (for performance) from a sense of duty. If from a specific mandate (śabda) we come to know that instruction (adhyāpana) is obligatory (nitya) then indeed the desire (for undertaking the instruction of the pupil) also being dependent on it (adhyāpanavidhi) would become nitya, since śabda is uniform in its operation and binding always on all (*i.e.*, the first three castes).<sup>20</sup> No doubt the desire to perform karma is greatly mitigated when appropriate means such as some one (fit to undertake the karma), some aid (needed for karma), some place, some

<sup>20</sup> The *Pūrvapakṣin* might urge that it was immaterial whether nityatva—obligatoriness to initiate and instruct the pupil results from vastu or śabda. The difference is pointed out—in the one-case it is dependent on the vastu,—the object of desire, in the other on Vedic authority. The order of precedence is reversed. The scope of Vedic authority cannot be restricted; not so of desire. If obligatoriness should follow desire it is possible that adhyāpana may become anitya—optional, since all those competent to undertake the teaching many not be willing to do so. But śabda is peremptory and as such the desire (icchā) derived from a sense of obligation cannot but be nitya.



time (*i.e.*, a fit place and fit time) are not available.<sup>21</sup> Hence the undertaking of karma (*i.e.*, *adhyāpana*) prompted by a *vidhi* that is *nitya*, becomes *nitya* similarly, so that the irreconcilability of the obligatory and the non-obligatory getting into relation is obviated. But if the need for undertaking it (*adhyāpana*) is understood as depending on the *phala* that it yields then the need to perform the karma, *viz.*, *adhyāpana* ceases to be obligatory.<sup>22</sup>

20. It is true that the *phala* is always coveted, but since it is possible of achievement by other means also (apart from *adhyāpana* instruction does not become obligatory). Even when it (*adhyāpana*) is the only means (as in the case of one who is unqualified otherwise), either from indolence or from inability to bear the strain, one's desire (for gain) is impeded and as such one fails to regard it (*adhyāpana*) as obligatory, so that when it becomes non-obligatory (*anitya*) it (*adhyāpanavidhi*) ceases to be the incentive to what is obligatory (*viz.*, *adhyāyana*).

VII. 21. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, the mandate enjoining on the father the obligation to beget a son (does not stop there) but its scope extends to requiring the father to give proper instruction to the son, as witness: 'Hence they say that the son who is instructed is the way to the higher worlds (*i.e.*, the father goes to Heaven through the instrumentality of a worthy son); therefore he instructs him.' Hence since the duty of rearing a progeny is obligatory, since its scope extends to 'instruction', and since initiation (*upanayana*) and pupilage (*adhyayana*) are per force implied,<sup>23</sup> how could the mandate relating to preceptorship (lit.

---

<sup>21</sup> औचित्यादिमावेदपि—This is in answer to the objection that when appropriate means are not available the desire to undertake instruction ceases to be obligatory even though the imparting of instruction is an enjoined act. The *Siddhāntin* admits that the desire springs when the required means such as the right time, the right place, etc., are available but he urges that even in the absence of all these auxiliaries *adhyāpana* will be undertaken as far as it lies in his power, if there is Vedic injunction for fear of disobeying an enjoined act and thereby committing sin.

The text here appears to be corrupt. Following V. we have to omit the incomplete sentence प्रमाणतस्तावन्नित्यः.

<sup>22</sup> 'अनित्यैव सा स्यात्' to be understood after वशात्कर्तव्यताप्रातिपत्तौ.

<sup>23</sup> When the *vidhi* relating to getting a son fulfils itself only when the father imparts learning to the son, both initiation and 'instruction' are postulated by *arthāpatti pramāṇa*—no Vedic instruction can be

preceptor-making), become non-obligatory (*i.e.*, optional)? How again could Vedic study stop short of conveying the meaning (of the memorised text)?<sup>24</sup>

22. *Siddhāntin.*—This is to be said: From this (*i.e.*, from the quoted text) it is not to be understood that ‘instruction’ (*anuşāsana*) is enjoined either as auxiliary to the *vidhi* relating to the ‘rearing of a progeny’, or independently. But this (*viz.*, *anuşāsana*—‘*tasmāt putram anuśiṣṭam lokyamāhuḥ, tasmādenam anuśāsati*’) is *arthavāda* being subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to the injunction relating to the *sampattikarma*<sup>25</sup> because it is syntactically connected with it. Hence this (statement, *viz.*, *tasmāt putram*, etc., merely) reiterates the *anuşāsana* that has been established (by implication).

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—What does that ‘instruction’—*anuşāsana*, consist in? How again is that to be taken as if it were a reiteration of what has already been established (by some other *pramāṇa*)?

23. *Siddhāntin.*—This is the answer—The benefit (*phala*) of the injunction in relation to ‘the begetting of a son’ which is obligatory is ‘the rescue of the manes of one’s ancestors from falling into hell, by performing the *karma* consisting of the offering to them of bolus of rice and water, because of the Śruti (Vedic statement) ‘that one’s forefathers go to hell if deprived of the offering of bolus (*piṇḍa*) and water (*udaka*)’. And its

---

given to a boy before he is initiated and *ācāryatva*—preceptorship cannot be secured unless the boy is instructed.

<sup>24</sup> कथं वा अध्ययनस्य अर्थोवबोधपर्यन्तता न भवेत्? The *Mīmāṃsakas* of both the schools maintain that the Vedic study—*अध्ययन* has its purpose fulfilled only when the meaning is comprehended, while the PP. declares that mastery over the words—*अक्षरावप्ति* alone is the fruition of such study.

<sup>25</sup> संपत्तिकर्म—This ought to be संप्रत्तिकर्म. For a description of *samprattikarma* *vide* *Aitareyopaniṣad*, Ch. II and Śamkara’s commentary thereon: ‘*sampratti*’ means the giving away or transference; that topic is termed *sampratividyā* wherein is described the *karma* which the son has to do after it has been transferred to him by the father.—Bṛh. Up., I. v. 17; *vide* the present writer’s translation of *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, the Bangalore Printing and Publishing Co., Bangalore, Page 104—note 1.

*Arthavāda* is of three kinds: (i) *guṇavāda*, (ii) *anuvāda* and (iii) *bhūtārthavāda*. The *anuşāsana* implied in *putrotpādana* *vidhi* is a case of *anuvāda* or assertion (*vide* *Arthasamgraha*, Section 93). *Samprattikarma* presumes *anuşāsana*.

performance (*i.e.*, *pitṛkarma*) will not be possible without a knowledge of the *Śāstra*. Hence in order that the obligatory injunction of 'begetting the son' prescribed in his behalf may be fulfilled the father lays down the command (*anuśāsana* or advice) relating to the duty that should be necessarily carried out by the son, *viz.*, 'By you who are a *Brāhmaṇa* the *samskāra* (the purificatory ceremony, *viz.*, *upanayana* or investiture with the sacred thread) has to be got done in the eighth year of your birth which *samskāra* has been enjoined for the purpose of befitting one for the study of the *Veda* (*adhyayana*)'. This is the *anuśāsana* (*upadeśa*) and it is here restated (*i.e.*, in the context of *putrotpādanavidhi*) with the words, 'tasmādenam *anuśāsati*'.

24. Even so the *liṅga* (*i.e.*, it is corroborated by *liṅga*)<sup>26</sup>.— "Now there was *Śvetaketu*, the grandson of *Aruṇa*. Him the father (*Aruṇa*) addressed: 'Śvetaketu, lead the life of a *Brahmacārīn* (*i.e.*, a student of the *Veda*); in our family indeed, my dear, there is none who fails to study the *Veda* and remains a degraded *Brāhmaṇa* (lit. one who can only point to a *Brāhmaṇa* relative—himself having fallen low)." *Chānd. Up.*, VI. i-1. [Page 56] When it is so you have to explain how what is obligatory (*nitya*) could be brought about by the non-obligatory *vidhi* relating to preceptorship.

25. And it should also be noted that when the preceptor (*ācārya*) is dead the pupil does not seek another preceptor (*ācāryāntarakaraṇa*—the pupil will not help another to attain preceptorship).<sup>27</sup> Nor is the *adhikārīn* to be secured by a substi-

<sup>26</sup> लिङ्गम्—indirect suggestion. It is thus defined:—तदन्वयतात्पर्यकत्वे सति तदर्थबोधकं तल्लिङ्गम्. We have this indirect implication when a word used in a different context is explicative of the point under consideration. The *Chāndogya* passage—श्वेतकेतो वस ब्रह्मचर्यम्, etc., is intended to extol Divine Knowledge—ब्रह्मज्ञान but it indirectly points to *Brahmacarya*, in that the boy should go to a preceptor for Vedic study. *Brahmacarya* means Vedic chanting preceded by the initiation ceremony.

<sup>27</sup> आचर्ये प्रेते, etc.—It may be argued that when the preceptor is dead after having commenced instruction—अध्यापन the pupil completes his tuition under another, thereby securing preceptorship to the other. But this is impossible; the impelling agency is absent. The mandate relating to Vedic study—अध्ययननियोग according to the *Prābhākaras* is no incentive to Vedic study for its place is taken by a *adhyāpanavidhi* and *adhyāpanavidhi* is inoperative because the *ācārya* is dead.

tute, nor is adhikāra feasible either.<sup>28</sup> The adhikārin (*i.e.*, the functionary, the sacrificer entitled to enjoy the fruit resulting from the sacrifice), it is right to state, will, in order that he may make good his qualification substitute one auxiliary (ingredient) when another fails and thus secures his title (adhikāra). It is then evident that this view (*viz.*, that Vedic study is prompted by adhyāpanavidhi and not by adhyayanavidhi) is vitiated by many defects. Hence the niyoga (*i.e.*, the adhyayanavidhi) pertains to the pupil only.<sup>29</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—How can the vidhi (injunction) related to the activity of the subordinate agency apply to the principal agent?<sup>30</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—In the mandatory sentence—“By this (yāga—iṣṭi) conduct the sacrifice of one who is desirous of acquiring a village;” the yāga is enjoined on the person wishing to obtain a

<sup>28</sup> नहि, अधिकारी प्रतिनिधीयते नाप्यधिकारः—This is in answer to the contention that the māṇavaka (pupil) by seeking another preceptor may bring about the fulfilment of preceptorship to his first ācārya on the strength of what is known as ‘pratinidhinyāya’. If in the performance of obligatory karma an accessory, say rice is absent, it is enjoined that some other ingredient say wild rice—nīvāra—may be substituted. But, says the Siddhāntin, that the ‘representative theory’—pratinidhinyāya, does not apply here. It is only when the adhikārin is alive that he can substitute another. Even if the pupil should select a substitute, the substitute will not succeed in establishing his own preceptorship—नाप्यधिकारः with the result that neither ācāryatva of the first teacher nor of the representative will eventuate.

<sup>29</sup> In ‘initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year and teach him to chant the Veda—अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत तमध्यापयीत there is no vidhi regarding initiation and tuition which are the duties pertaining to the ācārya but it relates to the māṇavaka who should go to the preceptor—उपगमन and get tuition under him—अध्ययन.

<sup>30</sup> The Pūrvapakṣin argues thus: the word ‘उपनयीत’ consists of the root णीञ् and the causative sense. Hence the word should mean causing the pupil to come to him (ācārya). Now the ācārya is guṇakartā or auxiliary functionary while the pupil is pradhānakartā or the principal functionary. If the word ‘उपनयीत’ is interpreted as the Siddhāntin does (उपगच्छेत्) what the vidhi (liṅ) enjoins has to be transferred from its legitimate functionary—the auxiliary, to the pradhānakartā—the principal—a procedure opposed to the rules of verbal interpretation—वाक्यप्रमाणविरुद्धः.

village and the action (vyāpāra) of the subsidiary agent (guṇa-kartā—the priest) is restated because of its having been already established because the officiating at the sacrifice by the priest is done in pursuit of his profession. Similarly here also the function of the subsidiary agent which results from the pursuit of his profession is (merely) repeated.<sup>31</sup>

VIII. 26. At this point some critics interpose with this observation—in 'yājayet' (cause the performance of the yāga) the causative 'ṇic' which denotes the action of the subordinate agent and which is a distinct word (as contrasted with the root 'yaj') comes after the root which denotes the action of the principal agent and because it (*viz.*, yajana denoted by 'ṇic' is not what is enjoined, it is but right that the injunction should relate to the action of the principal agent (*viz.*, yāga).<sup>32</sup>

27. Here on the other hand the single root 'nī'—(*i.e.*, having no ṇic termination) may denote either the action of the māṇavaka or of the preceptor. It cannot be that the pupil as the active agent is indicated in the root—meaning of 'nī' (nayati) because the word 'pupil' is in the objective relation (Brāhmaṇam upanayīta). Hence how could the mandate apply

---

<sup>31</sup> The mandatory sentence, 'ग्रामकामं याजयेत्' would ordinarily mean 'officiate at the sacrifice of the person desirous of owning a village'. The vidhi, it must be noted, always relates to something that is unknown and not to what is already known. Here the sacrificer is not unaware of 'village' but is ignorant only of the means and consequently the vidhi prescribes a certain yāga for the attainment of the object in view. The new element is the yāga, and 'village' which is already known is merely referred to. Hence 'याजयेत्' is to be taken as 'यजेत्' the causative force being ignored. On this analogy 'upanayīta' has to be taken, says the siddhāntin, in the sense of 'upagacchet'—the pupil should go to the teacher for instruction.

<sup>32</sup> 'याजयेत्'—Here is another criticism; in 'याजयेत्' we have the causative termination—ṇic—from which the activity of the subordinate functionary, *viz.*, the officiating priest is indicated, and the root—yaj from which the activity of the principal functionary, the agent—yajamāna, is indicated. And it is right therefore that the one (yajana) is treated as a restatement and the other (yāga) as a mandate. But in 'उपनयित', which is a single word only the activity of the subordinate functionary ācārya, becomes evident and as such there is no possibility of taking one activity as a restatement—*anuvāda*, and the other as mandated—*vidheya*.

to one to whose activity there is no reference. It is not possible that in the (legitimate) activity of one (ācārya) another (mānavaka) could be enjoined. Surely it is in one's own activity that one is enjoined (lit. the niyoga is applicable to the sphere of a person's own activity). Hence (because upanayana does not constitute the function of the mānavaka) this mandate (initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year, etc.) does not relate to the pupil.<sup>33</sup> When it is so, adhyāpāna is prompted by the mandate enjoined on the preceptor and there need be no mental perturbation as to who is the adhikārin.

IX. 28. *Siddhāntin.*—This has to be said: the Niyoga (viz., initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year, etc.) is enjoined on the pupil only and there is nothing that is enjoined to be accomplished by the preceptor.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—What is the proof of the aforesaid statement (viz., that the vyāpāra of the prayojya-mānavaka, is known by implication, and that the vyāpara of the prayojaka-ācārya, is only a restatement of what is otherwise established)?

*Siddhāntin.*—The meaning of the word 'upanayīta' both from the śabdaśakti—primary significance and 'from rational usage' amounts only to this—that to make oneself an ācārya one should get some (pupil) to one's vicinity and impart Vedic instruction to him. And all this (i.e., initiation and instruction) having been established from a different pramāṇa (i.e., distinct from scriptural testimony—viz., perception or inference) as meant for a Brāhmaṇa's vocation, need not here be enjoined.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—There (i.e., in adhyāpayet) the question naturally will be 'whom shall he teach?' When there is such specific

---

<sup>33</sup> 'तस्माच्चैष माणवकस्य नियोगः'—The opponent argues that the pupil cannot come under the injunction because the vyāpāra which is what is enjoined—vidheya, is absent in him. He is not the one that is enjoined. The action connected with the initiation—upanayana, belongs to the preceptor. Hence the text 'initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year' is intended to impose the duty on the preceptor and not on the pupil. The siddhāntin might concede the absence of niyoga in so far as upanayana is concerned but not as regards adhyayana which is the duty enjoined on the pupil only. But says the Prābhākara that both sentences 'अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयति' and 'तमध्यपयति' are in juxtaposition and are similar in form; as such they must be interpreted alike. Hence adhyayana—Vedic study, also is the outcome of the niyoga relating to the teacher—तदेवमाचार्यकरणविधिप्रयुक्तत्वाद्ध्ययनस्य.



expectancy (akāṅkṣā) the vidhi (in adhyāpayet) will relate to the auxiliary (aṅga) a Brāhmaṇa who is eight years old.<sup>34</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—There, if the activity (as indicated in the root-meaning) is already established (prāpte—if some other pramāṇa has previously established and it is only anuvāda), it is not possible to ascribe mandatoriness (vidhi) to two things (artha) in a single sentence,<sup>35</sup> as it would result in sentence-split. Hence no duty (vidheya) of any sort is enjoined on the preceptor.

29. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, not even the māṇavaka has any vidheya (activity) enjoined on him, (i.e., viṣaya as ascertained from the root).

*Siddhāntin.*—We say that it (injunction) does exist.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—How?

*Siddhāntin.*—At the very time the vākya 'upanayīta' (perform the ceremony of the sacred thread) brings to mind, both on the strength of the word—import and reason (nyāyataḥ) the duty of undertaking, for attaining the status of preceptor, the purification by initiation (upanayana) of some one and instructing him in the Veda, there is also this idea in general that there must be some one (māṇavaka) who has to undergo initiation for learning the Veda (i.e., the upagantā—one who should approach the guru); and this idea arises on the analogy of a Vedic mandate relating to a yāga where the dravya (the substance to be offered

<sup>34</sup> The opponent argues that even conceding the absence of injunction regarding initiation and instruction there can be no injunction regarding the pupil's going to the preceptor—upagamana, and Vedic study—adhyayana. The injunction in 'upanayīta, etc.', though not with reference to the preceptor is with reference to the Brāhmaṇa pupil who is eight years old. This is guṇavidhi or injunction of the accessory. It specifies that he should be a Brāhmaṇa and of eight years of age.

<sup>35</sup> Since adhyāpana is established by the necessity of earning a livelihood, it will be evident that the vidhi in upanayīta and adhyāpayīta should relate to aṣṭavarṣatva and Brāhmaṇatva, but then there will be sentence-split if these two—aṣṭavarṣatva and Brāhmaṇatva—which are the vidheyas, are to be related to the bhāvanā, viz., upanayana or adhyāpana each of which is anyathāsiddha.

<sup>36</sup> कथम्—It is a rule that in any complete sentence the activity of the subject कर्ता is perceived and not of that which is in the objective relation. The māṇavaka is in the objective relation; your contention that the activity of the māṇavaka is enjoined, is untenable.

as oblation), and the deity (to whom the offering is to be made) are both understood in general.<sup>37</sup>

30. [Page 57] An intelligent lad will not embark upon a thing that is profitless and though the Vedic text, when learnt, yields the sense he will not be aware of it before (he gets it up) and therefore since the knowledge of the Vedic import cannot be regarded as prompting him to undertake the study (it must be concluded that) he actively engages in the study because he is aware of the existence of a mandate enjoining such study as his obligatory duty, and this he does of his own will (*i.e.*, neither with any desire to know the sense for he is ignorant that the Veda is pregnant with sense nor prompted by a preceptor). Hence the import of the sentence—‘Initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year’ (aṣṭavarṣam Brāhmaṇam upanayīta) is that a Brāhmaṇa lad in his eighth year should go to a preceptor, just as the mandate ‘cause a yāga to be performed by one who longs to own a village’ (grāma-kāmam yājayet) has to be interpreted as ‘let one who desires to own a village perform a yāga’ (grāmakāmo yajeta).

X. 31. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Even then the agency is not determined.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> ‘Nayati’ has a double object of which the principal object is ācārya-samīpadeśa (preceptor’s vicinity), the subordinate object is māṇavaka. The māṇavaka is prayojyakartā and the ācārya is prayojaka-kartā. The gamana—going, which results from the action of the prayojaka-kartā has as its agent—kartā, one who is in subordinate or objective relation, *viz.*, māṇavaka, and as such the activity of the māṇavaka is vidheya. Hence the sentence implies ‘māṇavakaḥ ācāryam upagacchet’—let the pupil go to the preceptor.

<sup>38</sup> नन्वेवमप्यधिकारो न लभ्यते—The opponent contends that in spite of the existence of the obligatory mandate relating to Vedic study there is no connection established between the import of the mandate—विध्यर्थे and the pupil. Adhikāra is used to mean either the hetu bringing about the connection between the injunction and the person enjoined, or the connection as between the prompter and the prompted, or active effort. None of these three is applicable here. It may be urged that the specification of one’s being a Brāhmaṇa and of eight years old—ब्राह्मणत्व and अष्टवर्षत्व serves as the hetu of the required connection. But these two attributes can relate separately only, to the principal element in the sentence, *viz.*, the verbal idea—आख्यातार्थे, or what the verbal part of the suffix in upanayīta, etc., denotes, and cannot by being mutually related become the hetu of

*Siddhāntin.*—There certainly is the hetu which is nitya (*i.e.*, obligatory or compelling in nature establishing the connection between the performance—kārya and the performer—kartā, prompter and the prompted,—preraka and prerya), *viz.*, caste qualified by one's eighth year or eighth year qualified by caste.<sup>39</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, caste and age are attributes to what is upādeya and it is an accepted fact that what serves as pointing to agency should be other than the attributes to upādeya, (an attribute to what is not upādeya is alone the hetu of adhikāra).<sup>40</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—True such is the situation (according to some; it is true that aṣṭavarṣatva and Brāhmaṇatva are attributive to what is upādeya and that what constitutes the attribute of anupādeya only is the hetu of adhikāra). But there are (other) men well

आख्यातार्थ. The आख्यातार्थ, say, in yajeta, is action or effort conducive to the performance of yāga. It is known as ārthabhāvanā or end-efficient force.

<sup>39</sup> अस्यत्रधिकारहेतुः—The Siddhāntin's answer is that अष्टवर्षत्व and ब्राह्मणत्व are constant hetu and not accidental. It is not incumbent that what is denoted by the words as they stand in grammatical relation (here ब्राह्मणम् and अष्टवर्षम् are in objective relation) alone should bring about the connection between the arthabhāvanā and the person enjoined. It may be implied on the analogy of the performance of a yāga where the implication is that only he who is competent is enjoined, though such competency as possessing wealth, bodily strength, and learning, is not actually expressed in the mandate—स्वर्गकामो यजेत. Or we may first construe Brāhmaṇatva and aṣṭavarṣatva separately with the kriyā or ākhyātārtha (according to the Bhāṭṭa view) and then arrive at the propositional import that the boy who is a Brāhmaṇa and of eight years is enjoined—उपगमनमध्ययनं चाष्टवर्षब्राह्मण-कर्तृकम्.

<sup>40</sup> उपादेय—In यजेत the vidhi for mandate is furnished by the 'ta' termination and its object or viṣaya, by the meaning of the root यज् which is yāga and under upādeya (what is signified) should be included also its attributive, the kartṛkāra or that which stands in any case-relation or words qualifying it. The subject of the sentence—the pupil—is the kartṛkāra both in 'upagamana' and 'adhyayana' and 'aṣṭavarṣatva' and 'Brāhmaṇatva' are the qualifying adjuncts of the kartṛkāra. Hence falling under the category of upādeya—the opponent says—these adjuncts cannot be the hetu of the adhikārin of either the Vedic study अध्ययनक्रिया or approaching the preceptor—उपगमनक्रिया. The attributes of kartā cannot be the attributes of bhoktā.

versed in the śāstra (Pūrva-mīmāṃsā) who admit that whoever is the agent (kartā) is also the adhikārin (one entitled to obtain the fruit of action).<sup>41</sup>

32. Again here in the act of initiation the boy who comes under the particular caste and age is not the upādeya, *i.e.*, not kartṛkāraṇa but it is upanayana only that is enjoined having him in view; for (it is a rule that) purification—samskāra is enjoined for the sake of that which is to be purified.<sup>42</sup> Hence age and caste are both limiting adjuncts of the pupil that is to be purified (samskārya) and as such these distinguishing (avacchedaka)

<sup>41</sup> किन्तु कर्तुरधिकार इत्यपि स्थिता न्यायविदः—According to the explanation of the Bhāṭṭas age and caste constitute the hetu, *i.e.*, stand in attributive relation to the agent or adhikārin—फलस्वामी.

It is thus:—In the statements उपनयीत and अध्यापयीत the verbal element आख्यातांश denotes bhāvanā or action कृति which desiderates the agent—कर्ता, the object to be achieved—कर्म, and the means—करण. The phala is the acquisition of the meaning—अर्थावबोध and the karaṇa is adhyayana. By elimination the eight-year old Brāhmaṇa pupil becomes the kartā. But according to the general rule that the fruit accrues only to the kartā—शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तारि. Jai. Sūt., 4th Chapter—the attributes of the kartā, *viz.*, being a Brāhmaṇa and eight years old, become the hetu of phalasvāmī—being entitled to the fruit. Hence the said pupil becomes anupādeya in his capacity as the phalasvāmin.

According to the Prābhākaras the liṅ denotes niyoga or kārya so that what is primarily suggested is the niyojya. The question is who is the enjoyer—भोक्ता for whom this niyoga is meant? Hence aṣṭavarṣatva and Brāhmaṇatva are associated with the enjoyer, not the doer—kartā.

According to the Vedānta School the liṅ denotes the possibility of effecting of one's good—श्रेयस्साधनत्व and even here the question is 'of which enjoyer—bhoktā is this the means of effecting good?' The import of the mandate—स्वर्गकामो यजेत is स्वर्गकामकर्तृकः श्रेयस्साधनीभूतो यागः.

From the above it is clear that the words Brāhmaṇatva and aṣṭavarṣatva particularise the bhoktā and not kartā.

<sup>42</sup> उपनयनमेव विधीयते—On the face of it this appears to contradict the previous statement that upagamana only is enjoined. But it must be noted that the preceptor is the prompter in the action—प्रयोजककर्ता and the pupil acts on being prompted—प्रयोज्यकर्ता. It is only to emphasise the latter point that the word विधीयते is used. Hence the mandate in reality is with reference to upagamana only.

epithets become obligatory requisites (nityanimitta) in the purification (*i.e.*, the investiture ceremony) of the pupil.

33. It comes to this therefore that because upanayana (which has to be taken as upagamana) is for the purpose of adhyayana—Vedic study, and because that (upagamana) is associated with the adhikārin (*viz.*, a Brāhmaṇa boy of eight years) it follows that the mandate enjoining adhyayana becomes associated with the adhikārin from that very adhikāra (*viz.*, age and caste). The adhikāra (*i.e.*, the title to the phala) is secured by the acquisition of the mastery over the bare text; as for the understanding of the sense of the text it is got from the other sources (such as a knowledge of grammar, etc.).<sup>43</sup>

XI. 34. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, “the memorised Vedic text is perceived to be the hetu of the inquiry into Dharma; thereafter is Dharma to be inquired into”—thus they say that the memorised text serves as the hetu (incentive) to the inquiry of Dharma requiring no other aid—(*Cf.* Śābara Bhāṣya, p. 8, Ānandāśrama Edn.).

*Siddhāntin*.—Yes, it is true. It is even as you say. Whoever takes a contrary view (*lit.* whoever says otherwise)? Indeed a person who has completed acquiring mastery over the Vedic text being aware that the daily and occasional duties which are obligatory and which if neglected are productive of sin, perceives that their import (*i.e.*, of texts relating to obligatory duties) has perforce to be inquired into immediately after the Vedic study in order that he may know how these (duties) are to be performed.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> The Siddhāntin's point is that the acquisition of the mere verbal mastery is the fruit of adhyayana and such mastery can be had even without inquiry. Therefore he contends that a distinct adhikārin has to be sought for inquiry into the meaning if the Upaniṣads and as such the necessity to take the word 'atha' to mean subsequence. The adhyayana injunction by itself cannot prompt one to inquire—विचार.

<sup>44</sup> What the PP. means is that the mandate relating to adhyayana is not directly the hetu of vicāra but only medially. To start with is the adhyayana vidhi and then follow those relating to nitya and naimittika karma, *i.e.*, obligatory and occasional duties. One has to necessarily inquire into their sense if one has to perform them rightly. It is evident therefore that inquiry is occasioned by the subsequent mandates and not directly by the mandate relating to Vedic study. Such is the way, says Padmapāda, to interpret the

Hence, *i.e.*, since the existence of the subsequent mandates (uttaravidhis) is not cognised prior to the Vedic study and as such since the uttaravidhis cannot necessitate the Vedic study (the Mīmāṃsaka) declares that the memorised text only without the intervention of anything else becomes the *hetu* in the understanding of the sense.

35. There is no such obligation in the case of Brahman-knowledge for no *pramāṇa* that its neglect is productive of sin exists. Hence inquiry into Dharma is essential and not inquiry into Brahman for one who has mastered the Vedic text. From what has been said so far, since the desire for the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajijñāsā) is not a fit subject for commencement and since Brahman and Brahman-knowledge though fit for commencement are not sought after (by such a person) the *jijñāsā* becomes inadmissible.<sup>45</sup>

XII. 36. [Page 58] Since the word 'atha' even in the sense of auspiciousness (*maṅgala*) fails to become an integral part of the import of the statement, and since when merely heard the word 'atha' constitutes auspiciousness, (like the sweet sounds of *viṇā*), the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) has rightly said, the word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon.'

37. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, from the word 'atha' we gather for a certainty that there is something antecedent to the topic

---

statement of Śabara quoted in the text. Moreover *vicāra* is not a necessary sequel of *adhyayana* but the case is different with *uttaravidhis* which enjoin the performance of rituals.

<sup>45</sup> तदेवं . . अनुपपन्ना . . अधिकार may also mean either प्रस्ताव, *i.e.*, topic of discourse or कृति, *i.e.*, action. Now Brahmajijñāsā means Brahman-jñānecchā—desire for the knowledge of Brahman. 'Atha' in 'athāto Brhamajijñāsā' cannot be construed as *adhikāra* for 'desire' which is the principle element in the sentence is not fit subject of inquiry nor is it to be had by action कृति. No doubt Brahman and Brahman-knowledge are discoursed upon by Vyāsa but then these words occupy a subordinate position in the sentence and as such 'atha' cannot get related to them. Hence the conclusion is that the word 'atha' should be taken to mean 'thereafter'. It implies an antecedent condition. Brahmanvicāra should be undertaken by one subsequent to one's acquiring certain qualifications. This is Padmapāda's comment on the Bhāṣya—तत्र 'अथ' शब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते—नाधिकारार्थः.



now under consideration. Hence why not 'atha' be understood as denoting such sequence?<sup>46</sup>

38. *Siddhāntin*.—We say that this (interpretation—arthāntara) is in no way different from its interpretation as immediate consecution—ānantarya.

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—How?

*Siddhāntin*.—This is how. That becomes the indispensable precedent of the topic undertaken, if it (Brahmajijñāsā) should be begun necessarily after that, and if it requires that (the preceding) only. Then (evam sati) that something which has preceded necessarily becomes the immediate cause of what has been undertaken. Otherwise, *i.e.*, if it (the topic on hand) desiderates something or other (not necessarily that which serves as its inevitable cause) then it would result in its becoming either a restatement (anuvāda) or something pointing to adṛṣṭa (unseen good). Hence what is required is some antecedent constituting a necessary condition (hetu). And this is what the Bhāṣyakāra means.—The sense of 'atha' as immediate consecution (ānantarya) does not in essence differ from its sense as some precedent topic—(Pūrvaprakṛta).

XIII. 39. "When (the word 'atha' is understood as) 'immediate consecution' it must be rendered explicit on what antecedent, Brahmajijñāsā, *i.e.*, the inquiry into Brahman, is necessarily dependent, on the analogy of Dharmajijñāsā, (*i.e.*, inquiry into Vedic duties) which necessarily depends upon the antecedent Vedic study—adhyayana. Vedic study however is common (to both Dharmajijñāsā and Brahmajijñāsā"). The cause (hetu) without which what follows is not necessarily undertaken, and following which the inquiry into Brahman is (as a matter of fact) undertaken must be pointed out as having been the (inevitable) antecedent.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> तत्प्रतिपक्षर्थम्—The sequence that the opponent means by 'tat' here is mere sequence, such for *e.g.*, as 'b' following 'a' in the alphabet, while for the Siddhāntin it means causal sequence. Note that the opponent has accepted 'ānantarya' as the meaning of 'atha' and is now differentiating one kind of it from another.

<sup>47</sup> Three alternative meanings of 'atha' were advanced by way of Pūrvapakṣa:—(i) commencement of a new topic, (ii) auspiciousness, and (iii) something distinct from a prior topic. All these have been shown to be wrong either because they cannot be construed properly with the sentence—'athā to Brahmajijñāsā', or they are not logical.

40. Learning the Veda by rote (Svādhyāyādhyayana) however is common, that is, it is the same antecedent of the inquiry into both religious duty and Brahman. And therefore, the word 'atha' in 'athāto Brahmajijñāsā' will serve no purpose if it is intended to denote only that (*viz.*, Sādhāraṇa kāraṇa). Or what is meant by the word 'samāna' is a cause which is not unnecessary but which at the same time is, 'not potent by itself to capacitate a person for inquiry and impel him to commence the jijñāsā in question.'<sup>48</sup> Hence such a hetu (in this special sense) which is common does not necessarily bring about (the result, *viz.*, inquiry into Brahman).

41. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, is there not here the additional feature, *viz.*, the subsequence of Brahmajijñāsā to the knowledge of religious duty (karma)?<sup>49</sup> Even so, it is stated in another commentary (vṛttyantara)—“the word 'atha' standing for immediate consecution means 'after acquiring the knowledge of Dharma' (karma)”; because either by engaging in the performance of graduated karma or by attaining step by step mental purity as enjoined by the Veda or by the enjoyment of the rewards of karma (in succession) choosing at option the one or the other alternative, one obtains through karma that knowledge (that is of Brahman), and also finds it is helpful in the attainment of

---

<sup>48</sup> No doubt in the absence of Vedic study the inquiry into Brahman is out of the question but then not all those who have mastered their branch of the Veda will undertake the inquiry into Brahman for they are lacking in the urge for freedom. Hence mere adhyayana does not capacitate one for higher knowledge.

<sup>49</sup> कर्मविबोधानन्तर्यम्, etc.—The contention is that inquiry into the meaning of the Veda comprising both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā is necessary since mokṣa involves knowledge—jñāna, and jñāna results only by inquiry—vicāra. Of these the inquiry into the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is upakāraka and as such should precede the inquiry into Brahman, which is upakārya, *i.e.*, their relation is one of helper and helped, or principal and subordinate. The fresh point urged here is that a knowledge of karma, if not Vedic study, is an adequate cause—puṣkalakāraṇa of Brahmajijñāsā. One of three courses is recommended in order that the inquiry into Dharma may be of help to the knowledge of Brahman—(i) the performance of rituals in a graduated series; or (ii) enjoyment of the desired objects acquiring mental purity (in succession); and (iii) mental purity, by following the injunctions laid down in the Scriptures.

mokṣa.<sup>50</sup> By another commentator also it is thus stated, 'the words 'atha' and 'ataḥ' were explained in the first sūtra of the first adhyāya only (i.e., the Mīmāṃsā sūtra); the word 'atha' is intended to mean that after the inquiry into Dharma which is the antecedent condition, the inquiry into Brahman (follows); the word 'ataḥ' states that what has already been indicated is the hetu in regard to Brahmajijñāsā.

42. *Siddhāntin*.—No, (it is not as you explain)—“ Even prior to dharma-vicāra, inquiry into Brahman is possible to one who has studied the Vedānta section ”. No doubt the getting up of the words of (Upaniṣads) is not by itself an adequate hetu (i.e., prerequisite for inquiry into Brahman); still without it desire to understand Brahman does not arise, but it does arise even without the knowledge of Dharma—this is the substance.

43. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—How ?

*Siddhāntin*.—[Page 59] There, anyhow, in the Dharma Mīmāṃsā three factors become apparent:—(i) the thousand interpretational principles enunciated in the twelve chapters (of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā), (ii) the determination of the meaning of the ritualistic statements, as revealed by the application of those maxims, and (iii) karmas like Agnihotra which form the import of those statements. Now of these three (tatra) the nyāya (or reason which is implied from the use of the word 'atha' in the first aphorism 'athāto Dharmajijñāsā') serves as the instrument (hetu) for producing in us the knowledge that the Vedic study (adhyayana) is meant for understanding the sense (of the memorised text).<sup>51</sup> Again in the Autpattika sūtra (V adhikaraṇa of

<sup>50</sup> The word 'samskāra' used in the text has been explained in the Vivaraṇa in this two-fold way. We shall need this distinction in following the coming discussion of this part.

<sup>51</sup> अथशब्दोपादानसूचितो न्यायः—From the insertion of 'atha' in the first sūtra a certain maxim—nyāya, is indicated and on the basis of that nyāya we understand that one who studies the Veda must know its sense. The nyāya in question is that when two alternatives are possible the seen should be preferred to the unseen—दृष्टे फलं संभवति अदृष्टफलकल्पनायाः अन्याय्यत्वम्. Vedic study may be regarded as meant for attaining svarga or for understanding the import; the latter sense is to be preferred being the seen result, to the former which is unseen. This is the mīmāṃsaka view. The Vedāntin however maintains that the understanding of the sense of the Vedic texts is not direct but is mediated through the bare verbal mastery—अक्षरावाप्ति.

Jaiminī's Pūrvamīmāṃsā) the self-validity of the Upaniṣadic texts has been made out by establishing their non-dependence (on any other pramāṇa) on the ground of the eternity of the relation between the word and its import and the self-existent nature (apauruṣeya) of those texts. And let both these be utilised here (in Brahnavicāra) also since they are required.<sup>52</sup> But the rest of the assemblage of the (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) nyāyas serve no purpose in the investigation into the nature of Brahman. For the topic proposed for consideration is not the identity of the individual soul with Brahman which is rid of all misery. There is no mention of any nyāya by which śabdās (Vedāntic passages) could be construed as expounding the nature of Brahman, nor any nyāya that they (śabdās) are potent to expound Brahman.

44. Again even in this (tantra, viz., Vedānta, as regards the mandates relating to meditation—*vide* V.S., III. 3) dependence upon the nyāyas enunciated in the Pūrvatantra (*i.e.*, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā śāstra), is only so far as it concerns the knowledge of the qualified Brahman. And there (*i.e.*, in passages relating to meditation) what is enjoined in meditation which is a mental act, whose reward is temporal and as such it is but a variety of Dharma (karma); it being so, the total body of such nyāyas can serve no purpose in Brahma-vicāra. Hence the word 'atha' does not need that, as its prerequisite.<sup>53</sup>

45. (It may be urged that 'atha' need not mean 'subsequent to Dharmavicāra,' but might mean 'subsequent to the inquiry into the validity of the Veda as 'a pramāṇa,' the answer is) that the two nyāyas enunciated, of which the one serves to show that the learning of the Vedic text is for understanding the meaning, and the other to show the non-requirement of other pramāṇas to establish the self-evidential character of the Veda, though

---

<sup>52</sup> तदुभयमिहाप्युपयुज्यते अपेक्षितत्वात्—is another reading. The two nyāyas establishing the eternity of the relation between the word and its sense and the non-human origin of the Veda are authoritative for Vedānta as for Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Because they are common to both they cannot be regarded as the adequate cause of Brahnavicāra. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas are useful for the knowledge of kārya—something to be done but not for the comprehension of Brahman, a siddhavastu, an accomplished entity.

<sup>53</sup> न तदपेक्षो 'अथ' शब्दः—न्यायकलापमपेक्ष्य मीमांसाज्ञानानन्तर्यार्थकः 'अथ'—शब्दो न भवति.

required (in the Uttara-mīmāṃsā) are not like the Vedic study (which is a precondition of the inquiry of both Dharma and Brahman)—the *hetu* exclusively of inquiry into Brahman. Hence the word 'atha' does not mean 'subsequence' to mīmāṃsā in so far as those two *nyāyas* are concerned.

46. If it be argued that the determination of the meaning of the Vedic statements (is a preliminary requisite) it is evident that it (*vākyārthanirṇaya*) does in no way help in the inquiry into Brahman.<sup>54</sup> The knowledge of one thing can by no means initiate effort in the direction of something that is quite different. Sometimes it is possible as in inference, etc., that the knowledge of the one (say, smoke) leads to the knowledge of the other (fire); but even that is absent here, since no relation between Dharma and Brahman could be ascertained.

47. Hence the possibility of utilising karma (alone remains). Accordingly this is what was said by them also (*viz.*, by those commentators)—“the word 'atha' standing for 'immediate consecution' means 'after acquiring into the knowledge of Dharma (leading to its performance) since the karmas (prescribed duties) performed in their ascending order of importance or mental purity cultivated on the authority of Vedic testimony or by the enjoyment of the rewards of karma—choosing the one or the other path—will enable a person to obtain that knowledge (*i.e.*, of Brahman)”. This point is discussed by us here. Which is this gradation of acts to be performed? And how are they the means to *jijñāsā*? For him who wishes to climb to the top of a mansion the flight of steps gradually ascended becomes the means of gaining the top floor, not so here; the prescribed duties performed

<sup>54</sup> वाक्यार्थनिर्णय—It has been pointed out that the import of the Vedic texts is dharma or karma, *i.e.*, ritual. And the determination of dharma can in no way serve as a preliminary either for inquiry into Brahman or for ascertaining Brahman's real nature. It may be noted that three other alternative explanations of the word 'atha' have been ruled out, *viz.*—

- (i) subsequent to Vedic study—स्वाध्यायानन्तर;
- (ii) subsequent to knowing the Pūrvamīmāṃsā *nyāyas*—न्यायकलापानन्तर;
- (iii) subsequent to knowing the particular *nyāyas*—न्यायद्वयानन्तर, *viz.*, reason, to show that Vedic study is meant for the comprehension of the sense, reason to establish the self-evidential character of the Veda.

up to the end of even a thousand years are not the means of inducing that act (*viz.*, Brahmajijñāsā) in one who is desirous of inquiring into the nature of Brahman, because of the absence of valid proof.<sup>55</sup>

48. It may be said that a person, whose mind is overpowered by cravings will be ever inclined to gratify them and will not entertain the idea of Brahmicāra; when however the cravings are satisfied by the performance of karmas they disappear and then he enters upon the inquiry into Brahman. Even so (*i.e.*, in elucidation thereof) it is stated that religious duties performed, cause the fulfilment of one's cravings by yielding a succession of rewards beginning with universal sovereignty and ending with the attainment of Brahmaloaka, each reward (in the ascending scale) being a hundred times more excellent than the one preceding it.<sup>56</sup> Because there exists nothing beyond Brahmaloaka and because no desire springs in the absence of objects, cravings subside as fire subsides when the faggots are burnt out; then it is that one engages in the Brahman inquiry.

49. *Siddhāntin.*—[Page 60] If so the wording of the Bhāṣya should have been 'after the performance of karma' and not 'after understanding the nature of dharma'. Again how can the attainment of longings be the means of quelling the longings?

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—On the strength of familiar instances of it in life—fire which though it gains in volume by the (pouring in of the) oblation, subsides of its own accord having burnt up the whole oblation when all of it has been offered to it. Even so it is but right to regard that desire having the objects (of sense—viṣaya) for its faggots, though it goes on increasing so long as the objects (last) subsides of itself on its (viṣaya) destruction (brought about by satiation), like the fire when the faggots are destroyed.

---

<sup>55</sup> Here begins the discussion of the second of the three items referred to above, *viz.*, samskāra in the sense of phala. We shall presently meet with the discussion relating to the second meaning, *viz.*, mental purity.

<sup>56</sup> सार्वभौमत्वादि—*cf.* Tait. Up., II, 8th anuvāka.—There, grades of bliss are enumerated, beginning with the universal sovereignty and culminating in the bliss of Hiraṇyagarbhaloka. It must be noted that the ascending scale of happiness described here belongs to the sphere of samsāra only. It is the realisation of unity that constitutes the supreme bliss of which the other varieties are as drops compared to the ocean.



*Siddhāntin.*—Yes, this would be right if the bliss of Hiranyagarbhaloka did not wane. It does wane however, because it is the result of action (*viz.*, meditation—*upāsana*) and because it is derived from finite objects (unlike *Brahmānanda*). When that (the bliss of Hiranyagarbhaloka) wanes desire is sure to spring afresh as before for the attainment of that which has not been attained. Hence even for Hiranyagarbha the cessation of cravings (is brought about) by his realising the evanescence and other defects (inherent) in the objects of sense (and not from their gratification). And to this effect it is said—“To him who is the Lord (*i.e.*, Hiranyagarbha) of the world, unimpeded knowledge, dispassion, sovereignty, and dharma, these four are congenital.”<sup>57</sup>

50. Hence what causes the eradication of all desire is the knowledge of the defects of the objects of sense as well as the realisation of the Eternal Being, as witness the *Smṛti*—“objects turn away from the man who practises abstinence, but not the subtle attachment for them, but even that attachment vanishes when he sees the Supreme Reality” (*Gītā*, II. 59). And there exists no such scriptural authority to show that from the attainment of all the objects of enjoyment in the region of Hiranyagarbha the desire perishes.

51. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, is not this self-evident to all that a man on the attainment of (a particular) desire gets peace of mind and becomes fit to engage in some other act?

*Siddhāntin.*—True, (this happens) from the satisfaction of one's longing. But that satisfaction of longing comes, because the capacity (for enjoyment) ceases at the time; for as long as the capacity exists there results unrestricted self-indulgence. If however one is absolutely rid of all desire for an object, one does not cherish again that object. Hence it is not by the eradication of desires (after gratifying them) that the karmas (like *agnihotra*) generate capacity in a person to undertake the inquiry into Brahman. As such the word ‘*atha*’ does not signify the knowledge of karma.

XV. 52. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Let then the antecedent existence of karmas by reason of their purificatory function be admitted. In support thereof are the following quoted:—‘He who has gone

<sup>57</sup> The point to be noticed in this quotation is that the *vairāgya* of Hiranyagarbha is congenital and not the result of *phalabhoga* as the *pūrvapakṣin* seeks to make out.

through the forty purificatory rituals and possesses the eight self-regarding virtues, attains union (with the Absolute);<sup>58</sup> ‘By the performance of mahāyajñas, and yajñas, the person becomes fit for Brahma-knowledge’; “knowledge arises in men by reason of the destruction of sinful karma; just as (the aspirants) perceive their own selves in the inner sense resembling a (purified) mirror”; these are the smṛtis. “They (the aspirants) desire to know (Brahman) through sacrifice, charity, meditation and temperance”; “By the performance of any one of the yāgas or of Darvīthomas one’s mind will get rid of all impurities”—these are the Śrutis. And the Sūtrakāra (Vyāsa) also says, “Hence it is that karma pertaining to (each) āśrama is needed”; “There is need of all karmas (for Brahmajñāna) because of the Śruti relating to Yajña, like the horse”.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>58</sup> संस्कारद्वारेण—etc.—Samskāra is either the removal of impurities—मलापकरण or the generation of some quality—गुणाधान. We have the text, “The yogins engage in karma without attachment, for the purification of the Self”—Gītā, V. 11, pointing to the eradication of sin by the performance of karma. It is also well known that apūrva is generated in one who follows the Vedic mandates. (This is guṇādhāna). Of the forty-eight samskāras, forty are ritualistic and eight are personal virtues, viz., दया—compassion, दाक्षिण्य—kindliness, अनसूया—freedom from jealousy, शौच—cleanliness, अनायास—not given to listlessness, मङ्गल—benignity, अकार्पण्य—not being niggardly, अस्पृहता—not being covetous. The ritualistic samskāras are five mahāyajñas, twenty-one yāgas, ten ceremonies beginning with garbhādhāna and ending with Upanayana and four vratas—vide Gautama Dharma Sūtras, Ch. VIII. 13–23. The sāyujya is only relative; it is not absolute identity with Brahman.

<sup>59</sup> “अत एव आश्रमकर्मापेक्षा”—This is quoted as one of the sūtras of Vyāsa but is not traceable. It is no doubt a variant of III. iv. 32. विहितत्वाच्च आश्रमकर्मापि सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्—V.S., III. iv. 26. सर्वापेक्षा-सर्वाणि आश्रमकर्माणि—all the duties prescribed for each of the four orders of religious life.

यज्ञादिश्रुतिः, viz., तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति—यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन—Bṛh., IV. iv. 22. The Brāhmaṇas long to know such a Being by the repetition of the Vedas, by sacrifices, by offerings, by penance, by fasting.

अश्ववत्—The illustration is to show that karma is needed as a means for the origination of Brahma-knowledge and not as a means for Release. The horse is used for drawing chariots and not for ploughing.

53. *Siddhāntin*.—[Page 61] What you say would be true if the karma performed in the same birth did purify the man and render him fit for Brahmajijñāsā. But there is no time-specification for the eventuation of the reward accruing from enjoined karmas. As such the man regenerated by acts of karma in his previous births enters upon the inquiry into Brahman even without undertaking the inquiry into dharma (karma) and its performance either, so that the word 'atha' is not used to indicate subsequence in relation to that (Dharmajijñāsā or karmānuṣṭhāna).

54. On the parity of this reasoning is refuted the view that through the discharge of one's debts (to the manes or one's ancestors) karma constitutes the antecedent condition.<sup>60</sup> To this effect (there is also the authority of) both Śruti and Śmṛti—"Because, otherwise also one may enter on the order of samnyāsa while yet in the stage of a bachelor" (Jābālopaniṣad—4). "Some have stated that one may assume samnyāsa in any one of the (three) alternative stages—(Gautama Dharma Śūtra—III. 1). Rightly therefore it is said (by the Bhāṣyakāra) that 'it is possible for one who has studied the Vedānta portions to undertake the inquiry into Brahman before even inquiring into the nature of Dharma.'"

XVI. 55. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Let it be even so. We do not say that the word 'atha' (means subsequence) desiderating a knowledge of karma as an immediately preceding cause, but (is used) only for bringing home the order of succession as evidenced in (the mandate) "First he cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the chest (of the animal to be sacrificed)."—*Vide* Tait. Sam. VI Kāṇḍa.

56. *Siddhāntin*.—Even that (namely 'atha' meaning succession) is untenable (occurring as it does) in a nyāyasūtra.<sup>61</sup> And where a number of acts having a single agent cannot be

<sup>60</sup> ऋणापाकरण—The discharging of one's debts, viz., pitṛ-ṛṇa; this can be discharged by begetting sons; ṛṣi-ṛṇa, manuṣya-ṛṇa—by Vedic study, deva-ṛṇa—by yajña.

<sup>61</sup> तदप्ययुक्तं न्यायसूत्रे—In the nyāya-sūtras, i.e., both dharma-sūtras and vedānta-sūtras, only the nyāyas or interpretational rules are intimated and not the order or krama. Its direct indication is the function of Śruti. The sūtras are concerned with merely laying down the nyāyas.

accomplished all at the same time and as such the order of succession being unavoidable, the word 'atha' might intimate the rule (by which to determine the order). And unity of agency (ekakartṛka) is found where one act is auxiliary to another, or where several auxiliaries are related to a single principal (or main act) or where an act is dependent upon the qualification conferred on a person for another act, but not elsewhere (*i.e.*, in no other context).<sup>62</sup> But indeed there exists no proof to show that one or other of these relations obtains between the inquiry into Dharma and the inquiry into Brahman. The same is thus expressed (by Śamkara):—"There is the restriction of (a particular) succession in cutting off of the heart, etc. (of the sacrificial animal) since such order is intended; like that there is no order intended here, because there exists no proof for assuming the inquiry into Dharma and the inquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and auxiliary or the relation of qualification conferred on a person for a particular act."

XVII. 57. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—It (the order of succession) may also be thus—just as svarga is the specific single reward (phala) for the six yāgas consisting of Āgneya, etc., similarly inquiry into Dharma as well as Brahman has svarga as the single reward (for both) and hence requiring as such inquiries do a certain order, (we have to take) 'atha' as intended to determine it. Or just as from all the twelve chapters of (Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras*) Dharma alone has to be inquired into by an orderly discussion of one or other of its phases in every chapter; or again in the present treatise (tantra, *viz.*, Vedānta) also composed of four

<sup>62</sup> एककर्तृकाणां बहूनाम्—etc. The intimation of order would be appropriate if the agent in both cases were identical. What the Siddhāntin points out is that between Dharmajijñāsā and Brahmajijñāsā there obtains neither the relation of principal and subordinate—शेषशेषिसंबंध, *e.g.*, between the prayāja and Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice; nor the relation of several auxiliaries and one principal—शेषानां च बहूनां एकशेषिसंबद्धानाम्, *e.g.*, the relation between the fore-sacrifices related to the Darśapūrṇamāsa; nor the relation as found when one action qualifies a person for another—अधिकारान्तरप्रयुक्त्युपजीविनाम् the same person who is the agent—yajamāna in Darśapūrṇamāsa is the agent in Godōhana, *i.e.*, fetching water in the milk jug. In these cases there is the need for krama or order.

chapters it is the one Brahman that is the object of inquiry by an orderly discussion of one or other of its phases in every chapter, it follows that there should be a proper arrangement of the chapters. So that it is the Brahman only that is the object of inquiry in both the tantras (*viz.*, the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās); as such the use of the word 'atha' is for the purpose of kramaniyama (*i.e.*, to intimate the order of succession).

58. *Siddhāntin*.—Premising this demurrer (the Bhāṣyakāra) says, ["Because of the difference of phala (result of inquiry) and of the object of inquiry".] After the expression 'phalajijñāsyabhedācca', the inquiry into Dharma and that into Brahman is to be understood. That very difference is explained—(the knowledge of Dharma has prosperity as its phala which is dependent upon action). That prosperity is the reward of the knowledge (and subsequent performance) of Dharma is universally admitted and is disputed by none. Even that (prosperity) is not the result of the knowledge (as such of Dharma) but of the object of knowledge (*viz.*, Dharma or Karma) and of that again it is the result not of Dharma but of its performance. [Page 62] ("the knowledge of Brahman on the other hand has mokṣa, the bliss-supreme as its phala and does not depend upon the performance of any distinct act") so that the fruit of Brahman-knowledge is final beatitude (apavarga). And that (apavarga) is eternally accomplished, immediate (*i.e.*, it is one's own ātman and so always possessed) and self-revealed. Because nescience (avidyā) is the cause of saṃsāra—the world-cycle (there is need for self-regeneration and Vedāntic study, for its eradication). And knowledge does not arise without dispelling nescience. As such their natures being so radically diverse, and the paths to their approach also being different, a single agency (of both śāstras) does not fit in even through (your postulation of an identical) phala. Hence there arises no requirement (ākāṅkṣā) of the order of precedence as between these two śāstras.

59. As for the objects of inquiry (jijñāsyā), they are totally distinct; because what is inquired into the first tantra (*viz.*, Pūrvamīmāṃsā) is Dharma which is a thing to be effected and which is dependent upon man's action and whose very being (*viz.*, the act of religious duty) is absent at the time of inquiry into its nature. Here on the other hand Brahman which is eternally accomplished and which is not dependent on man's effort is the object of inquiry.

60. Again ['owing to the difference in the operation of the Vedic texts also'], (the two inquiries differ)—This is another difference in regard to the objects of inquiry depending upon the difference in the *pramāṇas* (*i.e.*, *pramāṇavākyas* or authoritative texts). The *codanā* (Vedic injunction) relating to Dharma no doubt prompts one to action, but finding itself incapable of prompting in the case of an absent *viṣaya* the object to be achieved, instructs one in the *viṣaya* also. The *pramāṇa* (text) relating to Brahman on the other hand, is confined only to the instruction (*jñāpanamātra*) and the man is not prompted to exert to achieve it. Knowledge indeed arises in conformity with the object and in conformity with the *pramāṇa*, and does not conform to man's desire. How could there be any prompting? When, for example, there is proximity between the sense and the object, cognition is produced in the man by the perceptive sense owing to proximity and the man is not enjoined (to acquire it). It is analogous to it; even if undesired it arises of its own accord. And as for Brahman, however, because it is eternally existing there is no room for prompting. The word '*codanā*,' in the *Bhāṣya* '*Brahmacodanā*' is used with the object of denoting *pramāṇa*<sup>63</sup> (*i.e.*, valid means of proof relating to Brahman) and not with the idea of denoting *preraṇa*—incitement to action or *niyoga* and this (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) states:—["That *codanā* which defines Dharma intimates the knowledge of its own subject (of Dharma) to the person while at the same time enjoining action on him; *codanā* relating to Brahman on the other hand merely instructs the person (in the knowledge of Brahman and does not urge him to action); the person is not enjoined (to exert) for instruction, because instruction (immediately) results from *codanā* (*i.e.*, the Vedic sentence explicative of Brahman, *e.g.*, 'That thou art'). It is analogous to the perception of an object when the perceptive sense and the object are in juxtaposition."] It is therefore evident that no order of succession between the two *tantras* (*śāstras*) is intended as depending upon the identity of the object of knowledge; and the word '*atha*' would (no doubt) have been explained in that sense (if there had been identity of objects).

---

<sup>63</sup> This is added because the same word *codanā* has been interpreted as injunction—*preraṇa*, in the previous portion dealing with Dharma.



61. [It comes to this therefore that something (some antecedent) or other must be postulated subsequent to which the inquiry into Brahman is proposed to be undertaken.]

XVIII. 62. (The antecedent conditions,) [we say, are discrimination between what is eternal and what is not eternal; renunciation of desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of one's deeds here as well as hereafter; the acquirement of such aids as tranquillity and self-restraint; and the desire for eternal freedom.<sup>64</sup>] It was pointed out before, that the word 'atha' if taken to intimate the ushering in of a fresh subject, the undertaking (of the composition) of the Śāstra (*viz.*, the Uttara Mīmāṃsā)

<sup>64</sup> नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, etc.—The Pūrvapakṣin concedes that the word 'atha' may not import subsequence to (i) Vedic study—अध्ययन (ii) inquiry into Dharma—धर्मजिज्ञासा, (iii) knowledge of what constitutes karma—कर्मविबोध, (iv) performance of ritualistic duties कर्मानुष्ठान, but urges that it may mean subsequence to something within ordinary experience and not necessarily subsequence to the antecedents here specified. The answer is that the Vedāntic inquiry must follow only after acquiring the qualifications prescribed in the Scriptures themselves. And these qualifications are known as sādhanacatuṣṭaya and they are—

- (i) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, discrimination of what is eternal and what is transient—*cf.* तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेव अमुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते. Chānd. Up., VIII. i-vi.
- (ii) इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः—aversion to the enjoyment of the fruit of one's action here and hereafter—*cf.* आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति,—Bṛh. Up., II. iv. 5. This enjoins renunciation of everything that is not Ātman.
- (iii) शमदमादिसाधनसंपत् —  
 शम—tranquillity;  
 दम—self-control; the other aids are:  
 उपरति—abandonment of ritualistic duties;  
 तितिक्षा—bearing one's cross patiently;  
 समाधान—concentration of mind; and  
 श्रद्धा—faith.

These are known as sādhanasatka—*cf.* Bṛh. Up., IV. iv. 23.

- (iv) मुमुक्षुत्व—desire for Release—*cf.* तरति शोकमात्मवित्.

When the riddance of all misery is promised as the reward of the knowledge of Brahman desire for such reward springs and the man in whom such desire becomes dominant is the one entitled (*adhikārin*) for Vedāntic study.

would be valueless since none would endeavour to study it. And the reason for the lack of endeavour has also been stated.<sup>65</sup> (Why there arises no effort is explained). The inquiry undertaken, would be privative of the enjoyment of the whole body of pleasures extending upto the attainment of the Hiraṇyagarbha state so that all inclination to the inquiry into Brahman would be absent and as such what incentive could there be for a person to attempt such inquiry?

63. [Page 63] Hence as long as one does not realise the ephemerality of that enjoyment culminating in Hiraṇyagarbha, subject as it is to destruction, because it originates and is of restricted scope (one fails to take to jīṇāsā). And though this (world of sense) perishes (to him that is a virakta) it perishes only up to (and not including) the Being—immutable and eternal; otherwise there is no possibility of a thing again coming into existence when its ground is destroyed so that even the present world would vanish and there would be a mere blank (abhāva)—by such exposition (it is evident) that so long as discrimination between the lasting and the evanescent does not arise ('so long, there arises no detachment').<sup>66</sup>

64. And as long as he does not cease to hanker after pleasures,—though in his very presence the pleasures even of him who is in the actual enjoyment of them perish, like the flower-garland, unguent, raiment and other decorations put on by one (the wife) with the object of entering the fire,<sup>67</sup> though experiencing all the worries resulting from attempts to secure the objects of pleasure, and though failing to attain happiness resulting from enjoyment on account of the worries incidental to them, (so long the desire for Freedom does not arise in him).

---

<sup>65</sup> Of the four indispensable qualifications, desire for Freedom is the principal and the other three are auxiliaries. 'Atha' in the sense of 'commencement of a new topic will not stimulate inquiry as the end in view (phala) is left unspecified. 'Atha' meaning subsequence, ānantarya, therefore means after the desire for Freedom arises.

<sup>66</sup> The text stops with 'नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेको यावन्न जायते'; the Vivaraṇa completes the sentence by the addition of 'तावद्विरक्तो न जायते' and this is printed in the body of the text.

<sup>67</sup> Refers to the Satī performed of yore when the wife bedecked with jewels and flower-garlands and wearing a saffron-coloured garment proceeded to the cemetery to immolate herself on the funeral pyre of her husband.

65. Therefore as long as he does not entertain the desire for Freedom by cultivating (such virtues as) tranquility, self-control, self-abnegation, endurance, mental equipoise, (earnestness), which are the means of its attainment, so long who will betake to the inquiry into Brahman? If, however, some person under impulsion from the Unseen, or by curiosity, or from a desire for much learning, should undertake the inquiry he will not have the competency to comprehend indubitably, that Brahman is one's own self, because lacking in the possession of the means just enumerated his mind without turning inward will be engrossed in things external only.<sup>68</sup>

66. Hence the Ācārya (Bādarāyaṇa) has used the word 'atha' to mean 'subsequence' to the (acquirement) of the group of disciplines described. And the same is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (in the following words):—"If those disciplines exist either prior to the inquiry into Dharma or after it, one may engage in the inquiry into Brahman and acquire the knowledge of Brahman but not otherwise (*i.e.*, in the absence of these disciplines). Hence by the word 'atha' is pointed out that the inquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquirement of the above-expressed means (disciplines).]

67. ["The word 'ataḥ' expresses a *hetu* or reason."]

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Let it be so; but a thing that is a product and a thing that is delimited or conditioned do not for that reason necessarily denote perishability, as for example, the red colour of the atoms which is the result of baking and therefore an effect, is admittedly eternal and the atoms themselves which are delimited (by space) are eternal.<sup>69</sup> In the Veda also imperishableness is

<sup>68</sup> Cf. पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयम्भूस्तस्मात् पराङ्पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्-कश्चिद्दीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैश्वरावृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन्. Kāṭha Up., II. i. 1. Our senses are so fashioned that they can only grasp external objects being attracted by them and cannot therefore perceive the internal Ātman. But some heroic soul by turning his eye inwards and longing for immortality realises Ātman.

<sup>69</sup> The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects to the taking of the word 'ataḥ' in the sense of *hetu* or cause for he says the word 'atha' meaning 'subsequence' also denotes the same idea. The *Siddhāntin* maintains that the aphorist by the use of the word 'ataḥ' emphasises the causative sense of 'atha' for such emphasis is needed seeing that doubt as regards the compatibility of *sādhana* *catuṣṭaya* serving as a *hetu* is not easily dispelled. When the fourfold discipline is once established as being indispensable

declared of the fruit of meritorious action (puṇyaphala) as witness—"Of one who performs the cāturmāsyā-yāga, the merit does indeed become imperishable"; "we drank some and became immortal".

68. Hence it is not that even men of discretion invariably renounce the pleasures of sense. Nor again does desire for liberation arise on the strength of a being that is immutable and eternal (for there is no probability of identity with the inner witness); and because of its absence (*viz.*, renunciation as well as desire for liberation), no one cultivates tranquillity, self-control, etc.; for which reason (*i.e.*, Jīva and Brahman being opposite in nature) the jīva's (bhoktā's) tādātmya with that (Brahman) is improbable, nor does (*i.e.*, since Brahman is all-pervading) jīva's reaching that—kūṭastha—(desire for liberation on the support of Kūṭastha) arise.<sup>70</sup> Though sorrows have ceased (in the state of mokṣa), since there is no enjoyment of (positive) pleasure that puruṣārtha (*i.e.*, the human end) is not irreproachable. (Therefore the abandonment of the enjoyment of the fruit of karma does not stand to reason). For fear of indigestion there is no abandonment of food, for fear of mendicants there is no cessation of mounting cooking vessels, on the oven. If consequences that are evil should arise a remedy must be sought—this is the right principle. Hence it (desire for freedom) does not constitute the cause of the inquiry into Brahman.

*Siddhāntin.*—To meet this argument it is advanced that the 'atah' (therefore) is used to point out that it (desire for freedom) does constitute the reason (for Brahman-inquiry).

69. How? (It may be asked). [Because the Veda itself declares that the fruit (phala) of Agnihotra and other ritualistic acts

for Vedāntic study all covetings for non-eternal things cease and the truth that Brahman alone is eternal while the rest however exalted is ephemeral, becomes apparent in conformity with the nyāya—यत्कृतं तदनित्यम्—whatever is a product is perishable.

<sup>70</sup> यतः भोक्तुः ब्रह्मणा तादात्म्यं न संभाव्यते, अतः प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मैक्यज्ञानार्थिनां श्रवणादौ न प्रवृत्तिः—(T.D.).

Because of the improbability of the identity of the individual soul with Brahman there arises no effort for the Vedāntic inquiry by those who long for the knowledge of identity—नापि तदवाप्तिः—यतः नापि तदवाप्तिः अतः श्रवणादौ न प्रवृत्तिः And because there is no samyoga relation between the jīva and Brahman there arises no effort for inquiry संयोग-समीपगमन, approachability.

which are a means of happiness (śreyas) is non-eternal on the strength of such passages, 'as everything acquired here on earth by action perishes similarly whatever has been acquired by the performance of religious duties perishes in the other world—Chānd. Up., VIII. i-6, etc.]. (Hence after the acquisition of the four-fold discipline the inquiry into Brahman has to be undertaken.)

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—[Page 64] Well, we have already said that the Veda itself has declared that even the meritorious acts (like quarterly offerings) yield imperishable fruit.

*Siddhāntin.*—It is not so. What is a (mere) laudatory statement is incompetent to declare imperishability when it is conflicted (with a Śruti—Vedic text) which has the additional strength of reasoning based upon facts of experience.<sup>71</sup> Because of the perishable nature of atoms and of the quality generated therein by heating (we do not admit that either of them is eternal—*vide ante*). Hence the knowledge of the non-durability of the enjoyments of the objects of sense does constitute the reason for mumukṣutva (longing for Freedom).

70. As for the reason urged for the absence of mumukṣutva the Bhāṣyakāra says, ["even so (*i.e.*, as a contrast to what has been said of ritualistic acts) the Veda declares that the highest end of man is realised by one who has the knowledge of Brahman, as witness 'He who knows Brahman attains the Supreme'—(Tait. Up., II. i' "]. Hence the conclusion—"therefore the inquiry into Brahman has to be made after acquiring the aforesaid means." It is because the *hetu* when adequate must immediately bring about the effect that the Bhāṣyakāra has used the word 'kartavya' to denote inevitability. By one who recoils from all contact with duality, and is conscious that his identity with Brahman is within grasp the inquiry into Brahman has necessarily to be undertaken

---

<sup>71</sup> वस्तुबलप्रवृत्तानुमानविरोधे—Now there are two Vedic texts which seem to conflict with each other. The *Pūrvapakṣin* depends on 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः' while the *Siddhāntin* on 'तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते—एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते—Chānd. Up., VIII. i. 6. The position of the *Siddhāntin* is however stronger than that of the objector because the text he relies upon, has the support of the logical inference—that which is a product is non-eternal—यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम्. The other text therefore occupies a subordinate position being regarded as laudatory in character—अर्थवाद. वस्तुबलप्रवृत्त—व्याप्तिबलप्रवृत्त—supported by concomitance—व्याप्ति.

on the analogy of one who should plunge in a lake to cool his burning head or of one who standing on tip-toe and touching with his finger-ends a luscious fruit, plucks it. When such is the case (*i.e.*, when on the strength of both Scriptures and reasoning it is proved that the four-fold discipline alone serves as the *hetu* for Brahman-inquiry) the view that the word “*atha*” involves the necessary antecedence of inquiry into Dharma is on the aforesaid grounds refuted by implication (*arthāt, i.e.*, by *arthāpatti-pramāṇa*).

XX. 71. [The phrase ‘*Brahmajijñāsā*’ has to be construed as ‘*Brahmaṇo jijñāsā*’)—desire for the knowledge of Brahman. If the word ‘*Brahman*’ in ‘*Brahmajijñāsā*’ is construed with ‘*inquiry*’—*vicāra*, which is the secondary sense (*antarṇīta*, lit. inner sense) of *jijñāsā* then indeed the ‘dependent determinative compound’ (‘*Tatpuruṣa samāsa*’) would be preceded by a word in the dative case (*Brahmaṇe jijñāsā*) but not when ‘*Brahman*’ is construed with the primary sense of *jijñāsā*, *i.e.*, *jñānecchā*—desire for the knowledge (of Brahman); with this view, accepting the meaning (of the phrase *Brahmajijñāsā*) as yielded by its component parts, the *Bhāṣyakāra* regards it as the genitive (objective) compound.<sup>72</sup>

72. Now that it is time to explain the meaning of the word ‘*Brahman*’ (in *Brahmajijñāsā*) the *Bhāṣyakāra* says that the

---

<sup>72</sup> अन्तर्णीतविचारान्वये, etc.—The question may well be raised why preference is given to the objective genitive compound when the dative compound is equally applicable. In the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* the word *Dharmajijñāsā* has been dissolved also into ‘*dharmāya jijñāsā*’ (*vide* *Sābarabhāṣya*, p. 9). The answer is that Śamkara accepts the primary sense of *jijñāsā*, *viz.*, the desire to know, and not the secondary sense, *viz.*, *vicāra* or inquiry. Now desire—*icchā*—being desiderative demands a word in the objective relation. Hence ‘*Brahman*’ in ‘*Brahmajijñāsā*’ is to be regarded as the object of desire. Hence also the need for dissolving the compound as *Brahmaṇo jijñāsā* and taking it as genitive-objective. When the desire to know relates to Brahman, the *prayojana* or fruit has to be stated. But it must be noted that whatever is the object of desire—*viz.*, Brahman, that itself is the *prayojana*—*viz.*, *Brahmajñāna*.

In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be distinct but not so in the case of verbs denoting desire. On the other hand if the secondary sense, *viz.*, *vicāra* is accepted Brahman becomes the *prayojana* and the *Vedānta*, *karma*. The *prayojana* being thus prominent the compound may be dissolved into *Brahmaṇe jijñāsā*.



author of the Vedānta aphorisms, himself will state it—[‘ By Brahman is meant that from which the origin, etc.] (of the world proceed)—Ved. Sūt., I. i-2.

In construing this passage (tatra) the other senses of the word Brahman are premised (by way of Pūrvapakṣa) and discarded by other commentators. For indeed by the word Brahman the Brāhmaṇical caste is not meant since the thing is patent and there is nothing to inquire about; nor could it be said that the inquiry is to be undertaken by that (caste alone), for Vedic Study is enjoined on all the three castes; nor does the word Brahman mean the individual soul (jīva), since if jīva is taken as the agent (in the Vedāntic inquiry) the attributive (*viz.*, jīva agency) would serve no purpose (for there can be no inquiry apart from jīva); if it is taken as the object (of jijñāsā), because it is ever present (*i.e.*, since its existence is undoubted, there would be no room for inquiry); nor does (Brahman) mean the Veda (lit. the assemblage of Vedic passages), since it has already been elucidated in the Dharmajijñāsā and ‘ autpattika ’ sūtras that the Veda is explicative of something productive of good (arthavatva) and that is a valid pramāṇa;<sup>73</sup> nor is it (Brahman) to be taken to mean Hiranyagarbha, since the inquiry into Brahman is enjoined on one who has renounced all thought of reaching even that state (*i.e.*, of Hiranyagarbha), nor can it be said that Hiranyagarbha is the kartā of (*i.e.*, the person engaged in) Vedāntic inquiry since knowledge and renunciation are inseparably associated with him. (He is a jīvanmukta having attained jñāna and vairāgya and waiting for final release). All this (*i.e.*, the objection raised and its rebuttal) need not be undertaken, says Śamkara (in the following words)—[“ It is therefore not to be imagined that the word Brahman may denote some other sense such as the Brāhmaṇa caste, etc.”]

73. [The genitive in the word Brahmaṇaḥ is used in the accusative sense.] In another commentary however the genitive

---

<sup>73</sup> The word ‘ Brahman ’ has several connotations of which one is the Veda, but that does not suit here. In the first sūtra of Pūrvamīmāṃsā Jaimini has shown that karma or ritualistic act is what the Vedic texts mean and that karma is productive of good. In the fifth sūtra known as autpattika sūtra he has pointed out that the validity of the Veda as a means of knowledge is unexceptional. Hence it would be mere reiteration to accept that sense (*vide* the present writer’s English Translation of Śāstra Dīpikā in the Gaekwad Oriental Series).

is explained as denoting relation in general, but that is discarded (by the statement)—[‘not some supplementary relation in general.’] The reason for that (*i.e.*, for not taking it as śeṣa-śaṣṭhī) is given in [‘because the desire for knowledge demands the object of desire’.]

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Even then the object of inquiry may be something different (from Brahman which may have a supplementary relation to the inquiry).

*Siddhāntin.*—To this it is answered—[Page 65] [‘No other object of inquiry is indicated.’]

74. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—The advocate of ‘Śeṣaśaṣṭhī again argues thus:—“Even if ‘śeṣaśaṣṭhī’ is accepted the objective relation of Brahman to the inquiry is not jeopardised since that general relation necessarily demands a specific relation”. (*Cf.*, *nirviśeṣam na sāmānyam*—there can be no general relation without the specific relation). No doubt the rule is that the genitive is used to denote relation in general (śeṣaśaṣṭhī), but still Vyavahāra (common transactions) do depend upon particulars. And the specific relations are many, and of them one has to be singled out as otherwise vyavahāra would not be possible. There (*i.e.*, among the specific relations) in the absence of the context and of the Upapadas (juxtaposed words) from which the specific relations could be determined, the relation is one of kāraka (*i.e.*, one of the six relations of nouns with verbs as determined by implication, since a specific verb has been used, *viz.*, *jijñāsā*). There again the objective relation (karmakāraka) is to be preferred seeing that we have a transitive verb (*viz.*, *jijñāsā*) so that there is nothing (in this) to conflict with ‘Brahman’ being the object (of inquiry).

*Siddhāntin.*—With all your reasoning your labour would be wasted if you discard the desired sense (*viz.*, objective relation) of the common word (*i.e.*, the word which denotes either the objective relation or other) and accepting a different sense, again try to cognise through its means the desired sense. Hence says (the Bhāṣyakāra)—[“But this way (of interpreting) would amount to refusing to take Brahman as the direct object and then again to indirectly (*i.e.*, through the means of the general relation) postulating it (Brahman) in the objective relation—and this attempt (of the Vārtikakāra) serves no purpose.”]

75. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, how is it purposeless? If we take it (Brahmaṇaḥ) as śeṣaśaṣṭhī (*i.e.*, as genitive of supplementary

relation in general) it would be as good as our resolving to investigate everything that is connected in general (*i.e.*, relations as such) with Brahman, in fact every particular without whose inquiry the nature of Brahman would remain unexpounded. Hence it is that the specific relation is not directly intended; since it is included in the 'general'—this, that is advanced [by the Pūrvapakṣin (the Bhāṣyakāra), states (thus)—“Not needless; it is for promising the discussion of all matters connected with Brahman (that the word ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is to be understood as importing general relation)].

76. Himself premising thus, what is said by the pūrvapakṣin, the Bhāṣyakāra says—[“This is not a cogent argument. For the mention of the principal topic naturally implies (by arthāpatti-pramāṇa) all subsidiary topics connected therewith.] This statement is a brief summary of what is intended and it is expanded thus:—[“Brahman is indeed the most cherished of all objects of knowledge; and when that principal (entity) is taken as the object of inquiry, all that is related to it, without inquiry into which, the nature of Brahman remains unexpounded, is by implication presupposed; as such those objects need not be specified in the Sūtra; it is parallel to the sentence, ‘The king is there going’ which is as good as saying that the king is going with his retinue.”] Because the attainment of Brahman is the highest human end therefore it is the most desired object that is to be attained by knowledge. Hence (its being the most desired object) since effort (by way of study—śravaṇa, etc.) is for its attainment it (Brahman) is the most pre-eminent, and when that which is pre-eminent is inquired into, even that (*i.e.*, comprising subsidiary topics, like the definition of Brahman—lakṣaṇa, proof for the existence of Brahman—pramāṇa, etc.) without whose exposition the inquiry would not be complete, by implication only (sāmarthyādeva) will be inquired into with that purpose (*i.e.*, in order that Brahman may be understood in all its aspects) and there is no useful purpose served by its separate mention. For instance when it is stated ‘the king is going’ because of the presumption that a certain retinue is following him as without which there can be no royal progress, no one makes any explicit statement of it. Analogously here also the inquiry regarding the nature (svarūpa), proof, (valid means of knowledge), helpful reasoning (yukti), means (of attaining—sādhana), and the purpose (prayojana)—all of which is necessary for the knowledge of Brahman to be complete—results

by implication (arthāt) and need not find a separate mention in the sūtra.<sup>74</sup>

77. Moreover even the trend of the Śāstra points to the objective genitive. [Page 66] How (it may be asked)? It is indeed thus that the Śāstra should be begun. To him who has cultivated a spirit of detachment on seeing that the merit (one has acquired by works) vanishes, as evidenced by the Śrutis, like 'the world gained by one's puṇya-karma perishes'—Chānd. Up., VIII. i-6, and on the principle—nyāya (what is a product, that is ephemeral) and who ascertaining that the highest human end that is achieved from the knowledge of Brahman is the *ne plus ultra* as corroborated by the Śruti 'The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme (Tait. Up. Brahnavallī—i) and who as such desires to know (Brahman), (the Ṛṣi Varuṇa) first expounding the nature of Brahman in (the words), 'Whence surely these beings are born, etc., instructs (his son Bhṛgu) thus—'that seek thou to know; (that is Brahman);—Tait. Up. Bhṛguvallī—i)' which is a mandate enjoining that Brahman is to be known directly as the object. And this that (Varuṇa taught and Bhṛgu learnt) is aphoristically expressed by the present Śūtra—"Then therefore is the inquiry into Brahman." Hence if (Brahmaṇaḥ) is taken as the objective genitive the sūtra which as the name suggests strings together the reasonings (necessary to determine the import of the śrutis, will be conformable to it (śruti). Otherwise not being conformable to, the lakṣya (i.e., the śrutis which the śūtras—lakṣana, expound) the śūtra ceases to be coherent (lit. becomes disconnected with the Śruti). This the Bhāṣyakāra expresses thus: ['This interpretation is in agreement with the Scripture']—a

<sup>74</sup> So far the meaning of the radical Brahman has been explicated; now begins the inquiry into the meaning of the genitive termination in 'Brahmaṇaḥ'. The text commencing with ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी and ending with न पृथक्सूत्रयितव्यानि is taken up with maintaining the objective sense of the genitive termination as against शेषषष्ठी whose proper sphere is to denote 'relations such as obtain between persons or things denoted by nouns'. While the upholder of the śeṣaṣaṣṭhī has to bring the objective relation indirectly by presumptive evidence—arthāpatti the Siddhāntin by maintaining karmanī ṣaṣṭhī shows that all the relations expressed by the genitive in its primary sense cannot be implied in the objective sense. Pramāṇa is pramājanaka, yukti or tarka is pramāṇānugrāhaka, i.e., supportive of a pramāṇa by pointing to the probability of the conclusion to which it leads.

brief statement which is expanded in, ["Whence, surely, are all these beings born, etc."—śrutis such as these, (again) 'Desire to know that',—'That is Brahman', directly represent Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; and it is only when the genitive case is taken to denote the object that the śūtra will conform to the Śruti; hence it must be understood that the word 'Brahmaṇah' is in the objective genitive."<sup>75</sup>

XXI. 78. ["The word *jijñāsā* means—'desire to know'"] —(by this statement) the *Bhāṣyakāra* gives the meaning of the component parts of the word *jijñāsā* for showing that the 'san' termination means desire. It is thereby indicated that that *jñāna* (knowledge) should terminate in the final beatitude (*mokṣa*) since in the case of (all) the desires (*icchā*) the *viṣaya* is identical with the result (*phala*). The *Bhāṣyakāra* says: ['The object of the desire as denoted by the 'san' termination is knowledge up to and inclusive of the complete comprehension of Brahman since all desire has for its object that which is its *phala*.] By the word 'avagati' is meant direct experience; the word *jñāna* however may signify even what is mediate (*parokṣa*) and has not yet been verified by one's own experience. It arises as stated before in an undetermined form even in that which though immediately present appears impropable. Thus the *Bhāṣyakāra* says:—"It is indeed knowledge which is the means (*pramāṇa*) by which the full comprehension (*avagati*) of Brahman is sought to be obtained; the comprehension of Brahman is the *puruṣārtha* or the human end] which means the direct intuition of the self as identical with Brahman.

79. The śūtra under consideration (*viz.*, the first śūtra which has been so far explained) is an integral part of the śāstra.<sup>76</sup> And

<sup>75</sup> The *Pañcapādikā* concludes this section by showing that the śūtras based as they are on the Śrutis must indicate the objective relation since such relation is directly expressed in texts like 'तद्ब्रह्म ज्ञासस्व' 'तद्ब्रह्मेति',—*Tait. Up.*, *Bhṛuguvallī*, I. 3. We have thus direct verbal authority in support of the objective relation. Hence 'Brahma-jijñāsā' has to be taken as *karmaṇi śaṣṭhī*—the inquiry has Brahman as its subject-matter.

<sup>76</sup> तदतच्छास्त्रान्तर्भूतं सूत्रं कथयितुमाह—This statement serves as the introduction to the *Bhāṣya*—ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम् which is the finale of the third *varṇaka*. The *Vivaraṇa* synopsis is here given:—In the preceding *bhāṣya* the root *jñā* (in *jijñāsā*) was explained as denoting

from this sūtra what is understood is that of the two qualifications associated with the person possessing competency (for Vedāntic study—adhikārin), viz., desire to comprehend (the Ultimate) and the will to attain Freedom, the one (as well as the other three constituting the four disciplines) which has arisen from other causes constitutes, by implication, the means (hetu), because it precedes

immediate comprehension—‘akhaṇḍavṛttijñāna—अपरोक्षवगम, and as such the desire for the direct knowledge of Brahman constitutes the import of the sūtra statement. It is thus—subsequent to the attainment of the four disciplinary aids—sādhana-catustaya—there arises the desire for the direct and immediate comprehension of Brahman’. Now it is urged that the prescription of inquiry—ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या is needless since the very excellence of the desire (it is to attain the immediate knowledge of Brahman than which there is nothing more excellent) prompts one to begin the inquiry and that as such the first sūtra is a mere restatement—anuvāda. To meet this objection what it is that is to be done has to be stated. Since jñāna is declared in the Śruti as the desired object it follows that the means to such jñāna is also desired. But mere desire—इच्छा cannot be the means for the acquisition of the direct knowledge of Brahman; it is the inquiry into the Vedānta which must follow the desire and precede jñāna. Hence the word jijñāsā should by secondary significance be taken to mean inquiry into Vedānta. To point out the import of the proposition thus arrived at the Bhāṣya proceeds with the words तस्माद्ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्. In order to explain this bhāṣya तस्माद्ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्, the PP. premises a possible objection which it refutes. The point of the objection is that the first sūtra which serves as a foreword to the śāstra—Vedānta sūtras—does not deserve to be commented upon since it forms no part of the śāstra. For if it did, the question would be whether itself is the introduction or another? The first alternative is liable to the fallacy of ‘self-dependence—ātmāśraya’ and the second to infinite regress—anavasthā. The PP. maintains that the first sūtra is an integral part of the śāstra and yet is free from any defect. How (it may be asked)? The Śruti आत्मा वारं द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः, etc., suggests inquiry (श्रोतव्यः) in a general way and in order that it may be specifically known the Śruti itself necessitates the first sūtra which expounds the three essential elements—anubandha tritaya, viz., agent competent to study the śāstra—अधिकारी, the subject-matter of the śāstra—विषय, and the fruit to be had from such inquiry—प्रयोजन. Hence the first sūtra belongs to the śāstra proper and is occasioned by the Śruti and as such is not open either to ātmāśraya or anavasthā.



(inquiry).<sup>77</sup> The obligation to undertake the other (*viz.*, *jijñāsā* or inquiry) which follows it (*viz.*, the fourfold discipline) and is prompted by it, is intimated directly (*Śrutyā śaktyā*—by the primary significance) from the word *kartavyaḥ* to be understood). There no doubt he (the *adhikārin*) knows that it is his duty to undertake it (*i.e.*, to acquire the knowledge of Brahman; hence the *sūtra* need not state that the knowledge is to be acquired), but by what means (he should acquire it) he does not know. Hence the means to its acquisition has to be specified (*i.e.*, he should be instructed that the inquiry has to be undertaken by him. It is the inquiry that serves as the means to achieve what is desired—knowledge of Brahman). The relation—*sambandha*, the object—*viṣaya*, the utility—*prayojana*, of the *śāstra* have to be stated. Otherwise everything would appear as if lacking in sense.<sup>78</sup> Hence in order to point out that all this (*anubandha-cauṣṭaya* the four essential requisites in any *śāstra*) has been indicated in this very aphorism the *Bhāṣyakāra* says:—[Therefore is the desire of knowing Brahman to be cherished.]

80. Admitting that what is *vidheya* (*vidhiviṣaya*) is *vicāra* implicit in (the term (*jijñāsitavyaḥ*) that term is to be taken as equivalent to *mimāṃsitavyaḥ*. This is substance in what has been said in the *bhāṣya*,—“Therefore is the desire of knowing Brahman to be cherished”—by one who is desirous of knowledge of Brahman is this *śāstra* (beginning with ‘*Janmādyasya yataḥ*’)

<sup>77</sup> कारणान्तरमिच्छायाः—Because the desire for freedom together with the other three requisites constituting *sādhana-cauṣṭaya* must precede *vicāra*, it is to be regarded as occasioning the latter. The causality of the fourfold discipline follows from *arthāpatti pramāṇa* but that of inquiry—*विचार* from the direct statement.

<sup>78</sup> शास्त्रस्य च, etc.—It may be said that the explanation of individual words comprised in the first *sūtra*, *viz.*, *atha*, *atēḥ*, Brahman (as objective genitive), *jñā*, and ‘*san*’ termination, is quite adequate to convey the import of the sentence and that in consequence the statement ‘*तस्माद्ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्*’ is needless. But it must be borne in mind that the discrete meanings of words fail to convey the import of the sentence and as such it must be expressly stated. *तस्मात्-अनुबन्ध-चतुष्टयसम्भवात्*—because of the existence of the four essential elements; *ब्रह्म-ब्रह्मानुभव-ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराय*—for the intuitive perception of Brahman; *विजिज्ञासितव्यम् विचारः कर्तव्यः*—inquiry ought to be made.

to be heard (*i.e.*, studied and comprehended), because the knowledge of Brahman arises from the study of this treatise. Hence (*i.e.*, since Brahma-knowledge results from the śāstra) the śāstra constitutes the means to what is desired (*viz.*, Brahma-knowledge) by the prayojya (the agent). Therefore it comes to this that (the first sūtra, *viz.*, ‘athāto Brahmajijñāsā’) has by implication stated the sambandha—relation, abhidheya—viṣaya or object, prayojana—fruit of the śāstra.

*Here ends the Third Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā*

## VARṆAKA IV

### IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY ?

I. 1. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—[Page 67] ["It may again be asked whether that Brahman is well known or not well known (before one undertakes the inquiry). If known, there is no need to inquire into it, but if not known, it is not possible to inquire into it."'] In these words the objection points to the absence of prayojana (fruit), viṣaya (content of inquiry), and sambandha (relation).<sup>1</sup>

*Siddhāntin*.—How (does your criticism stand)?<sup>2</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—The word 'prasiddha' ('tat punar Brahma prasiddham aprasiddham vā syāt'—bhāṣya) means 'what is known'. If that (Brahman) is already known by some other pramāṇa, then it is not the content of this Śāstra.<sup>3</sup>

*Siddhāntin*.—For what reason (do you maintain that when a thing is once known it cannot be the object of inquiry) ?

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Because of the rule that viṣayatā (*i.e.*, objectivity) is justifiable only when what is yet to be known is expounded, and when that is already known the śāstra (undertaking to expound its nature) will serve no purpose.<sup>4</sup> Hence Brahman cannot be

<sup>1</sup> तः पुनर्ब्रह्म, etc.—The pūrvapakṣin urges that since doubt arises as to whether there is any relevant subject—viṣaya for the Uttara-mīmāṃsā śāstra to discuss, we are in perplexity and as such he thinks that the study of the śāstra need not be undertaken. His point is that there is neither viṣaya nor prayojana whether Brahman is known or not. The first sūtra by showing that the anubandha-catuṣṭaya exists dispelled this doubt. Now the question is again raised whether the śāstra has a viṣaya. In the first varṇaka objections were answered on the basis of illusion. Here the question is raised directly and answered.—*cf.* VPS., p. 176.

<sup>2</sup> कथम्—The Siddhāntin points out the untenability of the objection since both viṣaya and prayojana are implied in the mandate regarding inquiry, *viz.*, 'ātman is to be perceived, heard about, and meditated upon'.—Bṛh. Up., IV. v. 6.

<sup>3</sup> The śruti quoted, आत्मा वाङ्मे, etc., is not an injunction in reality. It is only laudatory since there can be no injunction regarding a thing that is already known.

<sup>4</sup> अकिञ्चित्करं-अज्ञातज्ञापनरूपप्रयोजनसाधनं न भवति—It will not be the means to the end, *viz.*, revealing what is unknown. Lit. अकिञ्चित्करं means useless for the purpose.

its viṣaya. And because the knowledge (which can dispel nescience) does not arise, from this śāstra, the knowledge of Brahman is not the fruit of this śāstra. Hence (*i.e.*, since the knowledge of Brahman which is the instrument by which freedom is attained does not result) even prayojana or phala is negated.

2. But suppose (Brahman) is altogether an unknown entity then its inquiry is an impossibility.

*Siddhāntin.*—How (can you maintain this position when you have admitted the absence of previous knowledge as a necessary element) ?

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—How is any exposition possible of a thing which in its real nature has at no time been brought within the ambit of one's mind? Hence (*i.e.*, since Brahman is an unknown entity) the Vedānta śāstra incapable of expounding it cannot even so much as touch it.<sup>5</sup> If however you ask what about the known Brahman, we say that it is expounded in this śāstra, because of the very fact that it is a known entity, and yet (even though the śāstra here merely reminds one of what is known), it (śāstra) is not (to be regarded as) supportless (unrelated) merely on the ground that it reveals the significance of the known Brahman (prasiddha Brahman).<sup>6</sup>

The unknown (aprasiddha) on the contrary is supportless (*i.e.*, śabda has no significative potency to reveal such Brahman). Hence (*i.e.*, in the absence of abhidhā or significative potency) the śāstra establishes no relation with any meaning—thus criticised the sambandha (or the significative potency of śabda).

II. 3. *Siddhāntin.*—In order to induce effort on the part of the learner, the comment, 'Brahman is certainly known' meets

<sup>5</sup> न स्पृशति लक्षणरूपसंबन्धनापि—nor even in a secondary sense is there any connection between the Vedānta and Brahman.

<sup>6</sup> This is an answer to the objection that the absence of relation is admitted in the case of unknown Brahman and not of the known Brahman. If the Śāstra, says the pūrvapakṣin, expounds Brahman that is established from some other pramāṇa even then there does exist the relation known as Vṛttisambandha which includes the primary-śakti, secondary-lakṣaṇa, and figurative guṇa, relations. Because śabda conveys its sense, śaktisambandha must be admitted. It is true that there is neither viṣaya nor prayojana if what is expounded is the known Brahman but on that account sambandha cannot be said to be absent. In the case of the unknown Brahman both sambandha and prayojana are absent.

the contention that the triad (*viz.*, *viṣaya*, *sambandha*, and *prayo-jana*) is absent.<sup>7</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, the *śāstra* (*Vedānta sūtras*) is the work of one whose critical acumen and unimpeachable trustworthiness are a guarantee that he will not undertake a work which is devoid of *prayojana* (fruit), *viṣaya* (object), and *sambandha* (relation). Hence the learners begin the study solely from their sense of reverence to him (*viz.*, the sage *Vyāsa*). As such why this trouble (to establish the triad—*anubandhatraya*) ?

4. *Siddhāntin*.—Yes, it is true. Because of the respect due to the author there arises in a general way the belief that the *śāstra* has some benefit to confer, but that in itself cannot induce effort. It is well known that all effort is for a benefit that is voluntarily sought but what that (benefit) is cannot be understood unless it is distinctly expressed.

5. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Even so let the specific benefit (*prayojana*) alone be expressed (and not the other two, *viz.*, object and relation). What is not identical, with the *viṣaya* (object of inquiry), and is unfit to be expounded fails to be *prayojana*. For instance, the tree which is the object of the act of cutting is spoken of as the *phala* (*prayojana* or the desired result) after it is cut; again the same clay which is the *viṣaya* for the operation of the potter's club becomes the *prayojana* in its changed condition as pot.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Śamkara is emphatic about Brahman's being known. Then the question will be why inquiry should be undertaken regarding an entity the knowledge of which none doubts. The answer is that the inquiry is appropriate where the knowledge of a thing is superficial and its specific nature remains unknown. Now in regard to Brahman though its knowledge is not altogether new what its real essence is has to be ascertained. Hence there is scope for inquiry and the treatise undertaking such inquiry has all the three prerequisites—subject-matter or *viṣaya*, purpose or *prayojana*, and relation or *sambandha*.

<sup>8</sup> विषयभावमनापन्नम्—Without being identical with the *viṣaya*. अशक्यप्रतिपादने-प्रतिपादनायोग्यम्—it is not a fit subject for exposition, *i.e.*, there exists no proper relation between the work and the subject it proposes to expound. In fine the subject-matter should be special to it. What the *pūrvapakṣin* means is that when the *phala* is stated, *ipso facto*, the *viṣaya* and *sambandha* become known and there is no need for their specific mention.

6. *Siddhāntin*.—It is true<sup>9</sup>; but even then when (for instance) there are several medical authorities like Caraka, Suśruta, Ātreya and so on, for acquiring knowledge in therapeutics or (to vary the example) when there are different ways for the production of rice (from paddy), like pounding, unhusking with the finger-nails, and grinding, the adoption of the one to the exclusion of the other (say the study of Caraka for the knowledge of medical treatment, pounding for getting rice) is not incumbent. [Page 68] Even so here also if the knowledge of Brahman could be had somehow (*i.e.*, through some other *pramāṇa*) one does not necessarily undertake the study of this (*śāstra*) only. Hence (*i.e.*, to obviate such dubiousness) a *viśaya* that stands out distinct from the rest has to be stated; it is like this—when it is said that this (*viz.*, the killing of the demon by name *Nivātakavaca*) is the *viśaya* of Arjuna (*i.e.*, what is to be accomplished by him) we understand that the *viśaya* (the killing) is something not possible for another (in other words the competency to kill the demon is to be found only in Arjuna). As such (*i.e.*, since, if the *viśaya* is not specifically mentioned the knowledge that is unique—*ananyasādhāraṇa* does not arise) the *viśaya* as the auxiliary (*i.e.*, the means) to effort has to be stated (*i.e.*, that the nature of Brahman is to be ascertained from this and not from any other *śāstra*).

7. *Sambandha* (relation) also in its character as auxiliary to effort only, has to be stated. For instance the knowledge of the correct use of words before one has commenced the study of grammar is not possible of achievement by any other means;

<sup>9</sup> सत्यं-तथापि—The *siddhāntin* queries the *pūrvapakṣin*—

- (i) whether all the three *prayojana*, *viśaya* and *sambandha* are identical;
- (ii) whether when the *prayojana* is specified the other two necessarily follow by *arthāpatti*—implication;
- (iii) whether *viśaya* and *sambandha* need not be stated seeing that *prayojana* is a sufficient inducement for effort.

He says that none of these contentions can be maintained. The three are distinct. *Prayojana* means what is sought for by one; *viśaya*, that which is not established by any *pramāṇa* except by *vicāra śāstra* and *sambandha* is the relation between the *śāstra* that expounds and Brahman that is expounded. *Arthāpatti* is inapplicable here since there is no necessary sequence between the one and the other. No effort is possible unless all the four (the fourth is the *adhikārin*) constituent elements—*anubandha-catuṣṭaya* are found in combination.



hence there exists no relation with anything else. Therefore he who seeks it (*i.e.*, the knowledge of correct usage) does not enter upon any other study (say, the study of medicine). Again, the preparation of food though possible of accomplishment by one process only (*i.e.*, by cooking), it is not possible of accomplishment by the one process of the act of going. Hence there exists no relation between the act of going (*gamanakriyā*) and the production of food. Therefore one desirous of food does not undertake a journey, etc.<sup>10</sup> As such the fruit—*prayojana*, which consists in the fulfilment of some human end, object—*viṣaya* or what is not possible of attainment from any other than from the one intended, and relation—*sambandha* being (one of expounder and expounded), all these differ from one another (and therefore have to be stated separately).

<sup>10</sup> It may be argued that relation—*संबन्ध*, apart from the subject of inquiry—*विषय*, need not be mentioned since *viṣaya* cannot remain isolated but must imply relation. But it has to be pointed out that by *viṣaya* we mean what is possible of being expounded only by the *śāstra* of which it is the *viṣaya* and by none other; *sambandha* on the other hand emphasises its (*viṣaya*) inseparable relation, with the *śāstra* or in other words negates its non-relation—*अयोगव्यवच्छेद*. Hence both *viṣaya* and *sambandha* should be explicitly stated. Two illustrations are given in the text to show that mere mention of *viṣaya* without *sambandha* would lead to an irrelevant conclusion.—(i) A person wishing to acquire knowledge of the correct use of language, when he is not engaged in the study of grammar may proceed to the study of a medical treatise like *Caraka* for here is *viṣaya* without *sambandha*. How? Because the knowledge of the correct use of language is not possible of acquisition 'by a pursuit other than that of medical science'. Here the definition of *viṣaya* is satisfied, *viz.*, *अनन्यप्रीतिपाद्यत्वं*—incapable of being expounded by any means other than that. To avoid such a contingency distinct mention of *sambandha* is essential. But there exists no relation between the study of medical science and linguistic knowledge. Hence no one engages in the study of medical science for acquiring knowledge of the right use of words. Similarly one who wishes to prepare food will not undertake a journey to a village, for there is no *sambandha*, though *viṣaya* in its literal sense exists. Before one is engaged in cooking which alone is the means to produce food, one will not proceed on a journey though food is not the outcome of "any means other than the journey"—thus satisfying the definition of *viṣaya*. But since the relation between the two acts is absent one whose object is to get food will not proceed on a journey,

8. And these three are the means to effort (*pravṛtti*). No sensible person will engage in an occupation which serves no end, such as the counting of a crow's teeth or the threshing of husk. When the knowledge of the healing art which is the end in one's view is secured by the study of *Suśruta*, etc., one is not constrained to study *Caraka*. Nor when rice is produced by grinding (the paddy) would one necessarily resort to pounding—the latter two examples relate to the absence of *viśaya*). Though the knowledge of the correct use of words which is the object aimed at is not acquired by any other means—(here we have both *viśaya* and *prayojana*), no one would resort to the study of medical science since it is not the means (of acquiring such knowledge) nor resort to 'gamana' (setting out on a journey) since it is not the means of producing 'odana' (meal). There (when the opponent raised the query whether Brahman was known or not known and urged that inquiry was out of place in either case), having discarded, on the ground of the conflicting views (held by different schools of thought), the absolute knowability or absolute unknowability (of Brahman, the *Bhāṣyakāra*) has shown the possibility of explaining the nature of Brahman, as also the impossibility of establishing it by any means other than (the *vicāraśāstra*) and thereby has justified the tenability of both *viśaya* and *sambandha*. And when it is stated [that the inquiry having the highest beatitude as its *prayojana* is begun] (the existence of) *prayojana* also (has been proved).<sup>11</sup>

III. 9. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Is not Brahman the subject-matter (*viśaya*) of the Vedānta portions and the *śāstra* (*i.e.*, *Vicāra śāstra*, *Uttaramīmāṃsā*) on the other hand is concerned with stating reasons by means of which the conviction arises that the Vedānta texts generate the knowledge of Brahman? Then how could it

<sup>11</sup> तत्र विप्रतिपक्षकान्तः—The opponent's contention is that though *viśaya*, *prayojana* and *sambandha* are indispensable for inducing the study of any *śāstra*, they cannot be shown to exist here on the postulation of either alternative, *i.e.*, whether Brahman is known or is not known. If known, *viśaya* and *prayojana* are absent, if unknown, *sambandha* as well as *prayojana* is absent. In answer, the *Bhāṣyakāra* says that neither alternative is right in entirety and that Brahman is an entity that can be expounded. He thus maintains the tenability of all the three essential requisites for the commencement of the *śāstra*.

be maintained that the śāstra has viṣaya and sambandha ?<sup>12</sup> As for prayojana it is even possible of occasionally resulting though indirectly, just as the object of one's wish is possible of attainment by the study of the śāstras dealing with dharma and artha.<sup>13</sup>

10. *Siddhāntin*.—Well, just as the fore-offerings (prayāja, etc.) constitute the 'itikartavyatā' of yāgas like Āgneya which yield svarga, even so the vicāra (mīmāṃsā) is the itikartavyatā of the Vedānta which yields (the fruit in the shape of) the right knowledge of Brahman; hence being of the nature of itikartavyatā the śāstra also has the same subject-matter (viṣaya) as the Vedānta itself, seeing that it is auxiliary to it in producing the knowledge of its import (*viz.*, Brahman).<sup>14</sup> It cannot be that water, etc., which are aids to the paddy grains in putting forth the sprout have not also the sprout as their product (kārya). Therefore it is indubitable that the vedānta śāstra alone is means of the knowledge of Brahman and that the inquiry (mīmāṃsā) fulfils the function of itikartavyatā (*i.e.*, steps into the place of itikartavyatā) and yet it (the vicāra) has Brahman only as its viṣaya. It is not that the wood-cutter's action (vyāpāra) of the nature of raising and bringing down (the axe) having the axe as its viṣaya has not also

<sup>12</sup> ननु ब्रह्म वेदान्तानां विषय—The inconsistency pointed out here is that the three essentials spoken of, can justly pertain to Vedānta only and not to the Uttaramīmāṃsā (Vedānta sūtras). The function of the latter is to interpret the Upaniṣads by adducing pertinent texts and cogent reasoning. It is interpretational and has only an instrumental value.

<sup>13</sup> The prayojana in the case of Vedānta is Brahmasākṣātkāra or the direct realisation of Brahman. The study of Vedānta sūtras by eradicating all doubts and wrong notions strengthens the conviction of identity got from the pregnant texts like 'That thou art'. Thus the sūtras have an indirect value. A parallel may be cited. The study of works dealing with dharma (ritual) and artha (wealth) helps one to attain happiness indirectly through obtaining 'svarga' or wealth as the study is of the one or the other.

<sup>14</sup> The Vedas enjoin the performance of yāgas of which the principal ones are Āgneya, etc., and the auxiliary ones are the five prayājas. Without the latter the desired end will not eventuate. Similarly, Vedānta is the direct means of Brahma-realisation, but the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā is an essential auxiliary to the right understanding of vedānta.

इतिकर्तव्यता—Procedure of performance.

the tree as its viṣaya because it is meant for that purpose (*i.e.*, for splitting the tree), and because (the action of) the instrument (*viz.*, the axe) is the intermediate step (by which the required object is gained). Otherwise (*i.e.*, if the objective relation of the tree *via* the axe is not admitted) the agent's action would be in one locus (*viz.*, the axe) and the result (of such action) in another, (*viz.*, the tree) so that each would be subsisting in a different substratum (and this goes counter to common experience).

11. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—[Page 69] This is to be said—your illustration is inappropriate. It is only where (*i.e.*, in which object) the phala (end in view) itself does not eventuate without the aid of something else, that something also has that object as its viṣaya.<sup>15</sup> But here on the contrary even apart from the mīmāṃsā (the Uttaramīmāṃsā śāstra) the sentence (the vedāntic text) conveys the sense requiring only (on the part of the hearer) a knowledge of the primary significance of words, its recollection and the revival in the mind of the meaning, and it (sentence) does not need any other aid.<sup>16</sup>

12. *Siddhāntin*.—Well, the inquiry (mīmāṃsā) by removing all doubts and erroneous notions becomes the means of determining the sense (of the Vedāntic texts) and because the determined (*viz.*, Brahman that is demonstrated) is the principal (viṣaya) of this determination (nirṇaya) the entity that is demonstrated becomes the object of the hetu (*viz.*, vicāra) of the nirṇaya also.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The phala—the being split in twain, has the tree as its locus and it cannot be brought about except by the upward and downward movement of the axe. Hence the axe is directly the viṣaya of the movement and the tree indirectly. Here however, says the opponent, even without inquiry the phala—Brahman-cognition takes place in the locus, *viz.*, Brahman; as such it is not the viṣaya of inquiry—vicāra.

<sup>16</sup> In order that the Uttaramīmāṃsā may be considered indispensable like the fore-offerings in a ritual there must be Vedic sanction which, the pūrvapakṣin says is absent. Nor is the inquiry indispensable since one who has a fair knowledge of the language can construe the sense of the Upaniṣadic passages with the aid of accessories such as expectancy—आकाङ्क्षा, juxtaposition—सन्निधि and compatibility—योग्यता, knowledge of the relation of the word with its object शब्दग्रह, etc.

<sup>17</sup> The siddhāntin admits that even without inquiry, the Upaniṣadic passages can be understood with the knowledge of grammar and idiom, but the vicāra is intended to clarify the text by dispelling doubts and difficulties that may arise at the time of comprehending its import.

13. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Your argument is unsound. Where indeed on the hearing of a sentence more than one cognition arises irrespective of inquiry there one (of them only) must be regarded as having been truly produced by the sentence, because a proposition once stated is by rule capable of conveying only one meaning; the rest on the other hand are due to one's having observed the same words used in different contexts. (But then what purpose does the inquiry serve?) There (*i.e.*, where different cognitions arise) when the inquiry is carried on in conformity with the significative potencies of words as commonly accepted, one gets to know that one particular jñāna is truly produced by the words (composing the Vedāntic text) and then one comes to the conclusion that its (jñāna) viṣaya is the meaning of the Vedic (text in question) and as such one discards the rest, but (it is to be noted that) by no means does the śāstra (Uttaramīmāṃsā) function in the production of the determining jñāna, (here, the jñāna by which the Ultimate is comprehended). For instance though the eye has come into contact (with a tree) it may create doubt owing to a certain cause, whether it is a tree or a man, or it may create (owing to some other cause) the erroneous notion that it is a man and subsequently on the strength of other causes it produces the indubitable right knowledge. But this is not analogous. It is not that Śabda, before the inquiry is undertaken produces either doubtful or erroneous cognition and then again with the help of the inquiry produces the indubitable right knowledge; but on the contrary even before securing any support from the inquiry it (śabda) has by its own competency (to generate valid cognition) actually produced such knowledge.<sup>18</sup> To conclude the (Uttaramīmāṃsā) śāstra has not Brahman as its viṣaya.

---

It is the Vedānta that is mainly concerned with elucidating Brahman but doubt as to the correct meaning of Brahman arises when the significative potency of the word or the import of the passage in which it occurs is missed and it is to dispel such doubt that vicāra is indispensable. Hence Brahman becomes its viṣaya.

<sup>18</sup> The pūrvapakṣin animadverts against the assertion that śabda, when vitiated somehow generates wrong knowledge and that inquiry eradicates the defect in the śabda and enables it to produce right knowledge. He maintains that śabda is self-valid and by its very nature produces right knowledge. Wrong knowledge however is due to the defects either in the man, the sense-organs, or the object of cognition.

14. *Paramasiddhāntin*.—Here is the answer.<sup>19</sup> No doubt the cognition of the propositional import (vākyaṛtha) arises even before any support is had from the śāstra (Uttaramīmāṃsā). But still being confronted by a (different) cognition which manifests itself at the very time its import (*i.e.*, of the proposition or vākya) is being determined, which has arisen from the similarity (of the very words used in different contexts), which has as its viśaya something distinct (from the knowledge of unity), and which is fancied to be of equal validity with itself (*viz.*, the knowledge of oneness), it (the vākyaṛthajñāna) is reduced as it were to the plight of one who sinks and rises in water (*i.e.*, appears as though it were beset with doubt and error). And in this state, placed in the category of dubious cognitions (it vākyaṛthajñāna) gets support from the inquiry made in conformity with the significative potency of words, with the result that the hostile cognition does not arise and the doubt as regards its validity disappears (nimajjanābhāvāt) so that the inquiry is spoken of in a secondary sense, as if producing an unwavering and indubitable cognition; but it is not the direct cause of indubitable knowledge. This being so the mīmāṃsā (*i.e.*, the inquiry) serves by secondary signification as an auxiliary means in the understanding of the vedānta passages which expound Brahman (*i.e.*, which have Brahman as their viśaya); hence it is that the śāstra is spoken of as having the knowledge of Brahman for its content.

15. And this triad consisting of prayojana (benefit) viśaya (object) and sambandha (relation) has to be rendered explicit at the commencement of the treatise as integral to the hearer's

---

<sup>19</sup> अत्रोच्यते—What follows is the statement of the siddhāntin proper—परमसिद्धान्ता, as distinguished from the pūrvavādin, the intermediary who argued against the pūrvapakṣin. His view coincides with that of the pūrvavādin in respect of the self-validity of śabda and of the subsidiary function of vicāra in removing the obstacles to śabda serving as the determining factor of knowledge. But, he maintains that śabda when beset by contradictory notions loses its capacity to dispel ignorance. It is then that vicāra conducted on approved lines will enable one to perceive what exactly the vedānta texts import. Hence the vicāra performing this function of removing wrong notions is by way of figure spoken of as bestowing on śabda the capacity to determine the sense. Vicāra is not the direct means in the determination of the sense. In this way, vicāra should be understood as having Brahman as its viśaya.



pravṛtti (*i.e.*, one's undertaking the study of the śāstra). No doubt from the very fact of our regard for the author we presume that the śāstra is purposeful; but yet what specific purpose it is, we cannot understand from its mere knowledge (*i.e.*, from our respect for the author) if it is not explicitly stated. [Page 70] Hence it has to be indicated. Even when attention is drawn to it (*viz.*, the specific phala or prayojana) a person may think that the śāstra is incapable of revealing such phala and so his ardour having abated he will not undertake (the study of Mīmāṃsā); as such it is necessary to point out the sādhyā.<sup>20</sup> (Again) even when one has the knowledge that this can denote the fruit, pravṛtti does not arise in case this result is seen to accrue from some other means. Hence it is also necessary to show the impossibility of its being revealed by any means (other than the śāstra). And this trial is found together and also separately in one and the same context.<sup>21</sup> Let not the topic be prolonged.

IV. 16. The Bhāṣyakāra, by the statement ['Brahman, we maintain, is known', etc.] has shown that universal experience vouches for the existence of Brahman and that as such having discarded the view that Brahman is unknown he has maintained that because the nature of Brahman is possible of being expounded (by the śāstra) there exists the relation (of expounder and expounded, pratipādyā-pratipādaka sambandha between the śāstra and viśaya, *viz.*, Brahman). (It may be asked) 'how'.<sup>22</sup> As for

<sup>20</sup> निर्दिष्टेपि.... The first sūtra has no doubt intimated the fruit—prayojana, yet the relation between the Uttaramīmāṃsā śāstra and the prayojana has not found a definite mention as one of expounder and expounded—प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकसंबन्ध. Hence the relation has to be specifically stated.

<sup>21</sup> तेदत्तत्रयमेकत्र समवेतं विभक्तं च उपलभ्यते. Here Brahman is viśaya, liberation is prayojana, the one (śāstra) being the expounder and the other (Brahman) expounded, is the relation, sambandha—thus these can be expressed as distinct. Similarly Brahman-knowledge is the prayojana, relationship appertains to that only since it is expounded by the work, उत्तरमीमांसा and finally that itself is the content—विषय since it cannot be established by any pramāṇa other than that, *viz.*, śabda. Thus these can be expressed in their aggregate character.

<sup>22</sup> कथम्?—The pūrvapakṣin finds fault with the assertion—अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म—Brahman is beyond perception's range being void of colour and shape; nor can it be the content of inference for the latter presupposes perception; nor again is the Veda capable of revealing

the word Brahman (we say, that it is not used in the sūtra (athāto Brahmajijñāsā) in any one of the senses—(Brāhmaṇa) caste, individual soul, the creator (lit. one who is seated on the lotus), and the Veda (lit. assemblage of words), because it has been pointed out that such an interpretation fits ill (with the definition of Brahman, as given in the second sūtra. Hence it is seen that the word is in reality used to denote some other entity in view. As such on the analogy of the meanings of words like svarga, apūrva, devatā, it becomes evident that there exists some (special) meaning solely on the ground that it is used (in the Śruti and sūtra).<sup>23</sup>

17. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—That is jejune. A word does not produce immediately the knowledge of a thing not previously comprehended as does the eye, etc. (if otherwise, *i.e.*, if the word could produce such cognition) we would be in a position to know by the mere use of the word the meaning of a thing which was neither comprehended before nor avouched by any other pramāṇa. And even (the meanings of) entities like svarga, etc., are not determined by the mere use of the words.

18. *Siddhāntin*.—We will answer. Suppose in some sentence with the exception of a single word the meaning of other words is well-known, we put this question—do you abandon that (*viz.*, the well-known import) because of the offence of non-comprehension of a single word or would you attempt to somehow comprehend the meaning of that word though unknown before on the strength of the fact that many words (there), have their significance previously ascertained? In such a case (tatra—when we have a sentence of this description) on the strength of

---

it since its real significance is undetermined. But even when the meaning of the word Brahman is known it cannot generate the propositional import—शाब्दबोध for isolated words can only recall their primary sense. Supposing the meaning of the proposition arises when the word Brahman is found as a part of the sentence, it may mean Brāhmaṇa caste, Hiraṇyagarbha, etc., and we may fail to determine its real sense here.

<sup>23</sup> The objection is that the word Brahman cannot, as supposed by the siddhāntin, convey a non-empirical sense—अलौकिक because the primary significance of Vedic words is in conformity with that of secular words. Words bear the same meaning whether found in sacred or profane literature. The Siddhāntin answers that not the whole of the Vedic usage is in conformity with secular usage.

nigama, nirukta, and vyākaraṇa which serve as the means of ascertaining the relation of such meaning (*i.e.*, the relation of the distinctive sense of the unknown word with the rest of the words) we should establish the connection and understand the import of the proposition (vākyārthāvagati).<sup>24</sup> This is the right course. What is well comprehended is not to be set aside by what is not comprehended. The rule is that on the strength of the comprehended the non-comprehended even should be rendered explicit.

19. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, if the relation of the meanings (of words) is made to depend on nigama, etc., it would somehow be possible to understand such relation of meanings as existing everywhere and there would be chaos as regards the meanings of words, with the result that the vākyārtha (propositional import) would be left undetermined.

*Siddhāntin*.—If so Nigama, etc., are meaningless.

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—(Nigama, etc.,) are significant in contexts where with the main object of elucidating the vākyārtha a word is used in a sense even different from its own: in such a situation when we inquire how that word could denote this (altered sense) we come to know that it is owing to the relation of the meaning of a single constituent element of that word with this (altered) significance.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> निगम—What 'nigama' denotes is that when the root-meaning of a word composed of the root and the termination, is in harmony with the context that meaning alone should be regarded as the one denoted by the entire word. In the bhāṣya—बृहत्तेषां तोरार्थानुगमात्—it is clearly stated that from the etymology of the word Brahman 'brh'—to be great, the all-pervading Brahman alone is meant. From that root-meaning, निगम we also understand what the chief attributes of Brahman are, *viz.*, eternal purity, eternal knowledge and eternal freedom.

<sup>25</sup> विनियोगात् प्रयोगः—The word 'Brahman' is found in association with other words constituting a sentence and the sentence-import will be incoherent unless 'Brahman' is taken in a specific sense. Here Nigama comes to our aid. When from its root-meaning Brahman is understood to mean all-embracing, there the vākya, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म will yield a coherent sense. Eternal existence, knowledge and limitlessness cannot be attributed to Brahman if it should be particular caste, Hiraṇyagarbha, etc.

*Siddhāntin.*—Then it comes to this that for determining one (definite) meaning (discarding the rest) you seek the support of prayoga (*i.e.*, the use of an indeterminate word in association with words of ascertained sense), we say (on the other hand) that even where there is not that prayoga, the nigama, etc., function in determining the (one among the several senses of a word). As such there is no blemish of any kind.

20. Therefore (since the distinctive sense can be ascertained on the basis of nigama discarding the conventional sense) when we trace to the root, the word Brahman (occurring in the śūtra and vedānta, *i.e.*, when the derivation of the word is taken into account) we find that the meaning of the root 'Bṛh'—'to be great' is connected with (Brahman).<sup>26</sup> Because of the absence of relation with (a special meaning indicated), and because if the word 'Brahman' should have some other significance (say, ākāśa)—cosmic space, it would denote relative greatness which as such is unacceptable, we infer that from the word Brahman an entity possessed of unexcelled magnitude (alone) is fit to be associated with the (sense of the) other members of the sentence (Satyam, Jñānam, Anantam—absolute existence, consciousness, infinite). [Page 71] Hence, because of the absence of alpatva (smallness—restrictedness) due to the delimitation caused by time, some entity that is constant and therefore eternal is intimated by the term Brahman.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> The pūrvapakṣa is that where the conventional sense of a word say, Brahman ill-assorts with the meanings of other words in whose company it appears in a propositional statement, nigama solves the difficulty on the basis of arthāpatti; but the siddhānta ignores the conventional sense, for in the case of Brahman no conventional sense is possible being incapable of corroboration by any other pramāṇa. It is its association with words of definite significance that necessitates us to resort to the root-meaning, nigama. The word प्रयोग is used twice; the first means प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्याहार and the second, रूढि.

<sup>27</sup> ततश्च कालकृत, etc.—What alpatva means is the limitation caused by place, time and object. The absence of limitation constitutes the unsurpassed greatness of Brahman. Such greatness is denoted by the very word Brahman provided it is not used with any qualifying adjunct or in any specific context.

कालकृत points to the limitation caused by time; रूपान्तरसद्भावे, etc., that caused by vastu or object; देशकृतेऽपि that caused by space. The use of the word नित्य in the bhāṣya नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुखसमावम् is to intimate the absence of these three limitations.

Even so, if an entity distinct (from Brahman) did exist restrictedness would result due to its absence in Brahman. And that (contingency) is avoided by the very word Brahman. Hence the knowledge of a homogeneous, non-dualistic entity is conveyed by the word 'Brahman'. From this (very fact, *viz.*, absence of limitation caused by time and object) it must be understood that the limitation caused by space also is negated. It is only when another entity exists we could say that this entity as distinguished from the other has its existence limited only to thus much space and does not extend beyond, being excluded by that other. That being absent there arises no idea of circumscription.

21. That Brahman is (pure) consciousness also results from the connection of the root-meaning only (with Brahman). How ? All that is other than consciousness falls under the category of the experienced. Hence as compared with the experiment it is inferior, being subordinate to him. Consciousness on the other hand is subordinate to none. Hence from its connection with the meaning of *Bṛh* only, we arrive at the notion of some entity which is the most excellent of all and is of the nature of consciousness.<sup>28</sup> 'Freedom' also (is ascertained from the same root-meaning). The person who is under the sway of nescience (*avidyā*), lust (*kāma*) and karma (rites) being pulled this way and that by them like an animal (in his case driven from earth to *svarga* and back again and so on indefinitely) becomes a despised being. The word 'Brahman' on the other hand by investing some entity with its sense (*i.e.*, the root-meaning, *viz.*, *mahatva* or greatness) makes us cognisant of its transcendental greatness, and freedom for ever from *avidyā*, etc., which constitute the seed of the world-cycle.

22. That ["that entity is endowed with omniscience and omnipotence"] is known from the word 'Brahman' alone. It may be asked 'how' ! If there should be something unknown to it (entity), or if its potency were to turn back frustrated from any act, then its excellence would be relative (and not absolute). But that (relative excellence) is inappropriate in relation to an entity not established by any other (*pramāṇa*) but whose nature is vouched for by the very use of the word (*viz.*, Brahman). If the

---

<sup>28</sup> This is the idealistic standpoint. The word 'Brahman' points to perfection or absoluteness in every respect since there is no reason to restrict that perfection to a particular aspect.

word Brahman is applied to a thing previously given in other pramāṇas (like perception, etc.), the greatness (mahatva) of that thing is perceived only to the extent that is warranted by the pramāṇa which has avouched it. If from the word only we cognise the relation of its meaning (with the rest of the vākya in which it occurs) we have to admit that its meaning is unfettered (suffers no limitation).

23. To conclude, the meaning of the root ('br̥h' will be complete if the whole of the universe lies directly in the path of (Brahman's) consciousness (sarvajñatva) and is under (Brahman's) control (sarvaśaktitva). What has been demonstrated so far is thus expressed (by Śamkara)—[“There certainly exists Brahman characterised by eternal purity, consciousness, and freedom and endowed with omniscience and omnipotence; if indeed we consider the etymological sense of the word Brahman, we come to know that eternal purity, etc., are the attributes of Brahman since the meaning of 'Br̥h' is in consonance thereof”].

V. 24. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, even on this (procedure), that is, by keeping close to the derivative sense there is just the possibility of getting an idea of the existence of an entity possessing such qualities (as eternal purity, etc.); but from this alone Brahman is not indubitably established for the mere word (*viz.*, Brahman) is not a valid means of knowledge.

*Siddhāntin*.—It is just so. But it is for that very reason (namely) that as regards the knowledge of Brahman endowed with such qualities as purity, wisdom, freedom, etc., there is only probability and not certainty, there is room for inquiry as in the case of Dharma whose existence is vouched for by empirical judgment which has the semblance of pramāṇa. What follows is the statement of another reason to prove the existence of the entity denoted by the term 'Brahman'.

25. (And that is rendered explicit in the Bhāṣya)—[“Every one is aware of the existence of ātman (*i.e.*, his own self) and no one says 'I am not (existing)'; if the existence of ātman were unknown everyone (without exception) would think 'I am not' (existing). And Atman is Brahman”].

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—But how (do you maintain that) ātman is (identical with) Brahman?

*Siddhāntin*.—[Page 72] Because of the fact that in the Vedānta texts the word Brahman is used to denote ātman. And it is that ātman only (of which the Veda speaks) which is desig-



nated the ego (aham) in the world. Hence as the idea conveyed by the 'ego' is known to be Brahman only there is no room for the doubt whether Brahman is known.<sup>29</sup>

VI. 26. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—[“ But if Brahman is understood by all as the self then the same objection holds good that because it is known there is no occasion for inquiry. ”] Thus he argues against there being any object (viśaya) of inquiry (at all). ‘It is only an unknown thing whose nature has to be ascertained that constitutes an object (of inquiry). But if already ascertained it is not again (attempted to be) ascertained, so that there exists no viśaya for this (Uttaramīmāṃsā) śāstra.

27. *Siddhāntin*.—[It is not so; (though all are aware of the existence of ātman) differences of opinion exist as regards its specific nature.] As such, viśaya and sambandha are established —(to explain)—it is true that the notion of ego points to ātman and ātman is (no other than) Brahman, but it is there only that a conflict of opinions arises (some averring that) it is this (*i.e.*, of this description; some again averring that) it is this (*i.e.*, of a different description). Those (conflicting views) in reality are with reference to the meaning of the word ‘Brahman’ only because both Brahman and ātman denote identically the same thing. Hence though a matter of universal experience (that which is the content of the ego-notion) its specific nature is not indubitably established; as such, it is as good as not established so that the viśaya (of the śāstra) is secured for the reason the specific nature (of ātman) has to be determined. Because it is known in a general way it is possible to investigate into its specific nature. Hence the śāstra becomes the means of ascertaining its specific nature; the relation (between the śāstra and Brahman or *viz.*, one of exponent and expounded, pratipādaka—pratipādyā) is also thereby proved to exist.

28. How opinions conflict is shown in [“ mere body, etc.”]. As when the word ‘go—cow’ is used amidst a variety of notions suggested such as the individual configuration (ākṛti), class (jāti) movement (kriyā), quality (guṇa), dewlap, etc.; jāti as the primary

<sup>29</sup> तदेवं, etc.—From the derivative significance of the word ‘Brahman’ as also from universal experience, Brahman becomes a known entity and the enquiry consequently is of the known Brahman,—प्रतिपन्नब्रह्म. It is such Brahman that is the content of the inquiry and not a thing altogether unknown.

sense (of the word cow) is admitted by some, individual (vyakti) by others, and so on ; similarly when the ego-notion arises in the presence of the aggregate of the body and the senses endowed with intelligence, its content (*i.e.*, what it stands for) is taken to be something by some (and something else by others or in other words the import of the ego-notion, aham-pratyaya is variously understood). And this is expressed in the Bhāṣya—[“ The ignorant as well as the materialists consider that the body only endowed with intelligence is ātman].

29. To illustrate—In “ I am a man ” the characteristic of man is attributed to ātman; in ‘ I go ’ movement is attributed (to ātman). Such attribution will be appropriate (only) if the ego-notion has the body as its content. By the phrase ‘ the mere body—‘ dehamātram ’ what is to be understood is the bodily aggregate including the head is meant. By the word ‘ mere ’ ‘ mātra ’ what is pointed out is that there is no independent intelligence distinct from the body nor is intelligence (caitanya) attributive to something other (than the body) but that intelligence is no other than what is comprised in the four elements which have evolved into the contexture of the body.<sup>30</sup> By the word ‘ ātman ’ is meant that which is denoted by the ego-notion— aham-pratyaya;<sup>31</sup> by the word ‘ prākṛtāḥ ’ is meant those whose minds are untutored for lack of śāstraic instruction, that is, those who without deliberation act merely on what appeals to their senses. The Lokāyatikas (materialists) are well known, as the upholders of the reality of (only) four elements.

VII. 30. [Likewise others (think) that the sense-organs only endowed with intelligence constitute ātman.] On the ground that there arises no knowledge of colour, etc., in the absence of the sense-organs ranging from the eye to the mind even though the body exists they believe that to them (*i.e.*, the senses) only in their individual capacity is intelligence attributable and also

<sup>30</sup> The Sāmkhyas and the Vedāntins admit that caitanya is an independent entity. The Naiyāyikas say that it is attributive to ātman which is distinct from the body. Both these views are animadverted against by the materialists. Intelligence according to them is not a separate category but is involved in the four elements.

<sup>31</sup> In the context relating to the different views regarding the meaning of the ego-notion the word ātman should be taken to mean the content of the ego-notion—अहंप्रत्ययालम्बन.

that they are the content of the ego-notion. Further (they are of the view that each sense) in turn subserves the other on the analogy of a number of suitors.<sup>32</sup> As such the ego-notion is perceived as the substratum of the qualities pertaining to the senses, for instance (we say) 'I am deaf', 'I am dumb', etc.

31. [Others are of opinion that the 'mind' alone is ātman] and is the content of the ego-notion. [Page 73] And pointing to the fact that in the state of dream though the ten senses are quiescent the mind by itself in the place of the ego (aham) generates all activities they assert (that what is denoted by 'aham' is the mind).

32. [Others maintain that the self is a mere momentary idea—vijñāna.] The word 'mātra—mere' is intended to denote that apart from what the three letters, 'a, h, m (in aham)' express (*viz.*, vijñāna) nothing else is manifest as otherwise, *i.e.*, if anything else were manifest it could have been conceived as the object denoted by the ego-notion. Hence these others hold the view that vijñāna itself which is liable to destruction by its very nature, which arises in ceaseless succession, which is the abode of all life's activities (*lit.* all that constitutes life's journey), and with reference to which the other theory, as contradicting experience, stands condemned, rightly constitutes the ego (aham—self).

33. [Others maintain that the ego-notion is the void (śūnya).] In the state of deep slumber there is not the least trace of vijñāna (consciousness); the ego-notion is perceived to arise (immediately after waking) from sheer accident, and absolute reality cannot be asserted of that which has arisen without a cause and is (therefore) accidental so that these others declare that the ego manifests only non-existence or the void.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> When a number of suitors are in search of a wife, when one succeeds, the others withdraw. Similarly when the perceptive sense is active the other senses are quiescent; when the tactile sense is active the others are not prominent and so on. This is in answer to the objection that there would be conflict and confusion when cognising the objects of sense if each sense was independent of the rest. The VPS., p. 181, explains the passage somewhat differently. When there are several men in a family at the marriage of each the others are mere accessories—यथा एकास्मिन् गेहे बहूनां पुरुषाणां एकैकस्य विवाहे अन्येषामुपसर्जनत्वं, तथा इन्द्रियात्मनामपि एकैकस्य उपभोगकाले अन्येषामुपसर्जनत्वम्.

<sup>33</sup> The nihilistic argument of the Mādhyamika Buddhist is that since vijñāna actualised as object-forms is totally absent in the state

VIII. 34. [Others hold that there exists one who is distinct from the body, who is the migratory soul, agent and enjoyer (of the fruit of action).] Nowhere (they urge) is the capacity for enjoyment perceived in a thing that is not denoted by the ego; that which is the enjoyer (bhoktā, *i.e.*, aham) must be of a permanent nature because of its being the object of recognition and no cause is known marking the limit of what is permanent; hence (ātman is) an enduring entity.<sup>34</sup> Because enjoyment is incompatible with what does not suffer change, because change is the result of action, and agency (kartṛtva) can be attributed only to that with which action is in intimate relation, because a transmigratory life, is possible only in the case of one who corresponds to this description, and (finally) since capacity for enjoyment cannot in reason be predicated of the body, etc., ranging up to the mind, (therefore) one different from them, who is a transmigratory being, agent, and enjoyer (must be admitted) to be the viṣaya (object) denoted by the ego-notion (aham-pratyaya). This is what others think.

of deep slumber, the ego-notion stands for mere emptiness. The vijñānavādin might contend that there are two kinds of knowledge—determinate and indeterminate; determinate in waking and dream, and indeterminate in sleep, that the determinate cognitions only have objective counterparts and not the indeterminate and as such vijñāna alone exists in sleep. The nihilist—śūnyavādin says there is no rule that some cognitions should be determinate and others indeterminate and that if vijñāna existed in sleep it would be recollected after waking, but as a matter of fact it is not. Hence he concludes that non-existence only is the content of the ego-notion.

<sup>34</sup> The Naiyāyikas affirm that ātman as distinct from the body, senses, mind, consciousness, and void, does exist for the reason that what is denoted by the ego, *viz.*, body, senses, etc., is not spoken of as 'aham'. We do not use such expressions as 'I am body', 'I am touch', etc. The distinction between the ego and what it denotes is indicated by the possessive termination, *e.g.*, 'my body', 'my sight', etc. In such usages as 'I am blind', 'I am lame', 'I am pleased', etc., there is apparent identity between the two but it is due to ignorance. Moreover recognition would be inexplicable if the senses were regarded as ātman—we say for example—'I who slept am now awake'. अवधिहेत्वनुपलब्धेः नित्यत्वम्—no cause is found to show that the self reaches a stage when it loses its permanence; hence it is eternal. Destruction is neither inherent nor *ab extra*. This is to meet the view of the Buddhist who thinks that all things carry seeds of their own destruction—*vide* V.P., 190.

How do they entertain the view that a being exists who is different from it (*viz.*, body) ?

It has been stated that it is because (capacity for) enjoyment is incompatible with it.

35. How again is enjoyment incompatible ?

Well, it is thus—the aggregate of the elements constitutes the body. Now, enjoyment (*bhokṛtva*) might be conceived to belong to the elements taken either disjointedly or conjointly, simultaneously or *seriatim*. Anyway, such ascription (of enjoyment) is impossible. If the disjointed are supposed to possess the capacity for enjoyment simultaneously, then each would be functioning for its sake and as such the relation of principal and subordinate (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*) could not be thought of. And without the relation of principal and subordinate the conception of the ‘aggregate’ is untenable. Hence there could be no simultaneous enjoyment in the case of disparate elements.

Let there then be enjoyment in succession on the analogy of a group of suitors (for a maiden’s hand) since simultaneity is ruled out.

Even this is untenable, for there the object of enjoyment belongs exclusively to one (*asādhāraṇa*); and *asādhāraṇatva* means the restriction of (marriage) to this or that person individually. Here on the other hand it is exactly the opposite (*i.e.*, common, not restricted to one or the other); when in the presence of several (enjoyers) objects of common enjoyment exist and there is nothing to indicate precedence, (there is no ground to suppose that enjoyment takes place in succession).

36. Let then (*bhokṛtva*—gratification) belong to the aggregate (*samūha*); sentience-contact becomes manifest (in the aggregate) as does the flame in a quantity of sesamum (and not in single seeds).<sup>35</sup> Let *bhokṛtva* be denied to disjointed elements either taken simultaneously or *seriatim*.

It is not as you suppose. Aggregation is not possible on the basis of enjoyable objects.

---

<sup>35</sup> तिलज्वालावत्—The *pūrvapakṣa* may be stated thus—flame is caused when a quantity of sesamum seeds is thrown on fire though there exists no relation of principal and subordinate between the different seeds. On this analogy let the elements though on a par combine together in the act of enjoyment and let no separate entity—*ātman* be posited.

How impossible ?

Primary—prādhānya, should be ascribed to the enjoyer as against the object of enjoyment.

Well, even in enjoyment aggregation is perceived as in the case of man and wife.

The reasoning is vapid, because it is a matter of doubt if here the gratification is of the samghāta or of something distinct from it (*viz.*, the self). As regards the flame caused by the sesamum it is just the opposite; in an act produced by the aggregate it is right that the individuals composing the aggregate should take a subordinate place (guṇabhāvitva).

37. [Page 74] Then let enjoyment be specifically of one (only among the elements).

No, (that is not possible), for there again it remains undetermined as to which one among them enjoyment belongs.

What need for such determination? Even without it the intended object (namely, the negation of the enjoyer distinct from the body) is secured.

If that be so, it being untenable that any one of them (*viz.*, the elements) could be secondary to the rest since all of them are on a par, (aggregation) is out of the question as between these elements which are of the nature of kārya; (the four elements are regarded by the materialists as produced naturally). The same argument holds good against the view that the senses (kāraṇa) constitute the self since the elemental nature (bhūtatva) is common to both (*viz.*, the senses on the one hand and earth, water, light and air on the other).<sup>36</sup> If again it be held (as some Cārvākas do), that the aggregate constituted by both (kārya and kāraṇa, *i.e.*, the gross body and the senses) is the self, the argument is similar, (*i.e.*, the same defects as pointed out in the other cases apply here also). Therefore (the Naiyāyikas) conclude that there exists an entity which is distinct from the body and which is the object of the ego-notion.

IX. 38. *Śāmkhya* view.—[‘He is enjoying only and not acting.] This Bhāṣya means that the object of the ego-notion

---

<sup>36</sup> If the senses are regarded as ātman the question will be whether each sense is the product of a single element or of all the four elements. In the first case recognition is not possible; we cannot say ‘I who saw the hill yesterday am climbing it to-day’ or ‘I who saw the fruit then am tasting it now’. In the second case aggregation fails since all the elements are of equal grade.



is only the enjoyer; with this (assertion) some come to the fore-holding that action is incompatible with the nature of that same entity described above as being distinct from the body, etc.; not always is the ego-notion (ahampratyaya) in association with action and expressed as 'I act'. 'I know' and 'I enjoy'. Hence this is not denotative of it. If however the ego-notion did denote it then that notion would not arise dissociated from them (*viz.*, action, etc.).<sup>37</sup>

Well then, He is not the enjoyer even, since such (enjoyment) is not manifest (when the ego is manifest).

It is not so, because the ego manifests itself as consciousness (cetana); and because all things are for its sake, enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) is of the nature of cetana (intelligence). Hence they maintain that it is but right to regard ātman as enjoyer only.<sup>38</sup>

39. [Some maintain that there exists a Being who is distinct from that (the individual soul), who is the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent.] Different from that, *i.e.*, from that which is distinct from the body, etc., and is the object of the ego-notion (*viz.*, the Jīva), is the One who is the Ruler of all and as such is cognizant of the entire being of everything under His sway and who is endowed with powers of control (over all). Because of the variegated forms inconceivable even by the mind of human

---

<sup>37</sup> Agency—कर्तृत्व, implies association with action, and action means movement or change. Because ātman is all-pervading and impartite there can neither be movement nor change in it. It may be urged that agency pertaining to the intellect may be appropriated by ātman, but that is out of the question since according to the Sāmkhyas there is no super-imposition. They hold the akhyāti doctrine like the Prābhākaras. The second reason for ātman's not being the agent is that its association with action strays—व्यभिचरति (*vide* text).

<sup>38</sup> तदर्थं ज्ञातुं चेत्—In the system of Sāmkhyas the self is mere experiment—भोक्ता. The prakṛti which evolves into the manifold is intended for the benefit of cetana, the sentient principle termed puruṣa. Contrast this with the Vedānta doctrine in which the experient is not the pure consciousness. Bhoktṛtva there means the awareness of pleasure and pain and this awareness is of consciousness conditioned by avidyā.

It may in passing be noted that investigation into the nature of the individual self—स्वपदार्थ has been so far made. Next begins the inquiry into the nature of Īśvara—तत्पदार्थ.

beings, because it is a creative act embracing (manifold) bodily organisms and worlds, and because such a universe is impossible unless it be the handiwork of a mighty thinker, (the existence of Īśvara) is patent, very like the existence of a potter inferred from a pot which is an effect. That object, of relative magnitude reach an ultimate limit is well known. And knowledge (we know) admits of degrees. Hence when it has reached its *ne plus ultra* somewhere, it comprehends everything; as such Īśvara being the locus of jñāna becomes the all-knower and eternally existing. That such Īśvara is what is meant by the word Brahman is maintained by some (Yogins).<sup>39</sup>

Now, everyone understands the ego (aham) to mean ātman; and ātman is Brahman; so that when dispute arose as to the nature of ātman, which as the content of the ego-notion is of the nature of Brahman it was undertaken to show the conflicting opinions held in regard to it (ātman which is the same as Brahman). Then why should any controversy be introduced as to whether Brahman

---

<sup>39</sup> शरीरिणो मनसाऽपि—The existence of a supreme Being is attempted to be proved by some schools thus:—

- (i) *The Vaiśṣṇikas*: The universe with all its variety is the work of a Being whose knowledge should be such as would enable him to comprehend the means with which He creates and the purpose for which He creates. The analogy is that of an architect who designs a mansion. They argue that a single supreme Being, the All-wise must be the creator of the universe.
- (ii) *The Yogins*: Our limited knowledge, and prowess must derive their being from a source which is the fountain of limitless knowledge and prowess. Human knowledge, etc., are relative characterised by 'less' and 'more'. Hence by contrast there must be one whose sway is unlimited. They advocate a personal God.
- (iii) *The Naiyāyikas*: The world in which we live is the outcome of man's karma and what falls to one's lot is the gift of One whose knowledge is all-comprehensive, including the nature of karma, the reward it yields, the person to whom it is meant and the means by which it has to be performed. The reward does not eventuate immediately karma is performed. There must be One therefore to keep an account of man's doings and reward him at the right moment. The analogy is that of master and servant.

means Īśvara who is not the content of the ego-notion and is not ātman <sup>240</sup>

This is the reply—Since what is undertaken to show is the differing connotations of Brahman (it is found necessary to determine the nature of Brahman—whether it is identical with pratyagātman which is what the ego-notion denotes, and in this connection the view held by some that Īśvara is distinct from pratyagātman has to be stated, for they hold that Brahman is Īśvara). Even though the opposing views regarding the ego-notion are pointed out it is as good as showing the opposing views regarding the nature of Brahman, indirectly. The reason is this, that no purpose is served by (merely) directing attention to the differing views held regarding the object denoted by the ego. Hence the appropriateness of that (*viz.*, the Bhāṣya statement—‘*asti tadvyatirikta Īśvaraḥ*, etc.).

40. *Vedāntin.*—[Page 75] [Others are of opinion that, the Lord is the ātman or the self of the enjoyer (*viz.*, the individual soul).] To explain—that conscious being which becomes manifest as the ego is the enjoyer (experiencer) and he is Brahman—this is how it is understood by some (the Vedāntins). Of the individual soul (*tasya*) the *bhoktṛtvābhāsa* (*i.e.*, the manifestation as the experient) is evident from the ego-notion; it is illusory only and is the play of the primal nescience which is indefinable and beginningless. In reality however, He who is omniscient, the

---

<sup>40</sup> The criticism proceeds thus—are not the opposing views in relation to the meaning of aham (ego)? It has been stated that the ego-notion denotes ātman and that ātman is identical with Brahman. Hence it must be clear that when doubt arises as to the nature of ātman it tantamounts to doubt regarding the nature of Brahman. The dispute centres round the concept of ātman which is the same as Brahman. Physical body, senses, mind, consciousness, utter blank, etc., are each in turn held to be the significance of the ego-notion. The conflict is in reality between these views and the Vedāntin's view that ātman (Brahman) is what is denoted by the ego-notion. When it is presumed by the Yogins for example, that Īśvara is distinct from ātman, the individual soul, how could any doubt arise whether Brahman means Īśvara? Īśvara is neither *jīva* (pratyagātman) nor Brahman and is not the *viśaya* of aham pratyaya, so that in regard to the controversy, Īśvara is not on a par with body, senses, etc., and cannot therefore be regarded as one of the alternative equivalents of ātman.

Supreme Ruler (Īśvara), who is not implicit in the ego-notion (like the body and the senses) and who is not determined by any other pramāṇa (except Vedānta) is his (bhoktā's) very self (svarūpa). On this (hypothesis only, viz., the identity of jīva and Īśvara) does Īśvara acquire the etymological significance of the word Brahman, being related to the meaning of the root Bṛh.<sup>41</sup> Otherwise (i.e., if jīva is a distinct entity) not being one with the individual soul (lit. deprived of the relation of non-distinctness from jīva) Īśvara's greatness will not be unrestricted so that no longer will the primary sense of (the word) Brahman be Īśvara.

X. 41. [Thus are there many disputants relying (for maintaining their individual doctrines) upon reason partly, verbal (i.e., scriptural) statements partly and often on what are but semblances of these]—thus the commentator (Śamkara) concludes (this topic).

Thus in the manner aforesaid some understand by Brahman some one entity (say body, senses, consciousness, blank, etc.). Does it all emanate from a mere pet wish of theirs? No, (says Śamkara). By careful reasoning which supports the pramāṇas in determining the correctness of what they denote, and which is synonymous with the word 'tarka'<sup>42</sup> and also (by carefully considering) the vākya (the Scripture) which corroborates the view that every Vedāntic text is devoted to a just exposition of the nature of Brahman, (they contend that Brahman is a particular entity). It is the discerners of truth who with the aid of reasoning and verbal testimony decide in favour of the last alternative, viz., that Īśvara is the very self of the 'bhoktā' (individual soul). The rest (of the contestants) on the other hand depending upon reasons, which are but semblances of reason and not reasons

---

<sup>41</sup> If Īśvara be an entity distinct from the individual soul he would suffer limitation caused by the jīva standing apart वस्तुपरिच्छेद. As such there arises one of the three kinds of limitations, वस्तुपरिच्छेद, कालपरिच्छेद and देशपरिच्छेद. Īśvara's characteristic is unrestricted greatness subject to the limitation of neither time, nor object, nor space.

<sup>42</sup> तर्क—This is indirect reasoning intended to secure unassailable certitude to what is given in inference. If one should object to the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke and come out with the poser, let smoke be there without the fire; it amounts to this that smoke cannot be produced by fire, which is *reductio ad absurdum*. Tarka is a powerful instrument in the hands of a reasoner.

in reality and accepting verbal statements which are but semblances of verbal statements, and which are not valid pronouncements since they do not support (these opposing) views, hold contrary doctrines. That the reasoning pursued is spurious was indeed to some extent pointed out by those who argued the existence of ātman as distinct from the body, etc. And that the other reasons are also spurious in their character, we will point out in their proper context. And this has been to some extent already shown when the reason was assigned why of the several views the succeeding one was to be preferred to the preceding one. Concerning the misinterpreted (lit. the specious statements—vākyābhāṣa) sentences however we will point them out when expounding the true doctrine as each section is taken up.<sup>43</sup>

42. [In these circumstances if a person should, without due investigation, accept someone (among the contending doctrines) he will be debarred from the highest bliss (liberation), nay, he will court disaster.] (The Pañcapādikā proceeds to explain this bhāṣya passage)—tatra,—(when there exist such diverse views), evam sthite—(it being so), mumukṣuḥ—(one desirous of the highest beatitude through the knowledge of Brahman), avicārya—(neglecting the study of this śāstra, the Vedānta), pravartate—(if he should follow anyone of the doctrines that precede the last one), tadā—(then), mokṣasya samyak jñānaphalatvāt—(since Freedom is the outcome of true knowledge), tasya ca atathābhāvāt,—(since the knowledge embraced in the opposing views is not the right one), niśreyasāt pratihanyeta—(he will be debarred from obtaining the fruit of mokṣa—Freedom), anarthaṇa pratipadyeta—(and not only that, he will also meet with spiritual ruin). The Śrūti corroborates this view—“Those among men who have slain their souls enter into the boundless tracts of gloom” (Īśa. Up., III and IX). It is the belief in what is not really ātman, thereby rendering the existence of ātman almost nugatory that constitutes the slaying of the soul (ātmahanana). Because killing of the soul is effected in this manner (spiritual ruin will be the lot of one who misconceives the self). In no other way is ‘self-murder’ possible. Physical death is not to the present purpose

<sup>43</sup> This refers to V.S., III. iii—another indication of Padmapāda’s having commented or projected to comment on the whole of the Uttaramīmāṃsā sūtras.

(i.e., everyone that dies—he may be a yogin—does not go to the region of darkness).

43. [Page 76] [Hence prefacing with a discussion on Brahmajijñāsā, the disquisition of the Vedānta texts having as its aid conformable logic (lit. reasoning not conflicting with it) and having as its end liberation (from recurring births) is begun.] (The Pañcapādikā explains the passage thus)—The discussion on the meaning of the Vedānta passages implied as it is in the word jijñāsā, is begun on the plea of expounding Brahmajijñāsā.<sup>44</sup> Or (to interpret the passage differently), when the (acquisition of the) desired knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a duty, it is per force implied from the sūtra that the Vedānta proposes to explain the nature of such knowledge for the sake of those who are engaged (in the pursuit of Brahmajñāna); and for that purpose the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta-texts is begun.<sup>45</sup> With what end

---

<sup>44</sup> व्यजिन . . . आरभ्यते—The desire for the knowledge of Brahman—ब्रह्मज्ञानेच्छा is discussed as a preliminary; it is the inquiry into the Vedānta that is intended and it begins from the second sūtra. The aphorist is not so much concerned with Brahmajñāna, for one who is equipped with the fourfold discipline does begin the inquiry into Brahman and that need not be enjoined.

<sup>45</sup> The first sūtra directly enjoins the inquiry into Brahman. The phrase 'Brahmajijñāsā' means desire for the knowledge of Brahman. But since injunction is incompatible with desire, jijñāsā should be taken in a secondary sense to denote something that can be accomplished and is fit to be enjoined, and that is, inquiry—vicāra. It is therefore evident that the sūtra is meant to inculcate inquiry only and the Vedānta appropriately constitutes the content of vicāra. The sūtra has therefore to be construed thus—the study of the Vedānta from which arises the knowledge of Brahman has to be undertaken in order that Freedom may be attained.

An alternative interpretation is also possible. From the sūtra we understand that desire for knowledge has to be undertaken, which amounts to saying that jñāna which is the thing desired is the sādhyā or what is to be achieved. But it is evident that jñāna cannot directly be the sādhyā but its sādhana or the means can, and that is vicāra resulting from arthāpatti or presumptive evidence.

What is the difference between the two interpretations? In the first the word jijñāsā itself is taken in a secondary sense to denote vicāra. In the second it is not taken in the secondary sense but both the knowledge desired and the obligation to acquire it are understood



in view and with what means (is this inquiry associated) ? Here is the answer—it has as its auxiliary, logic that is not hostile to it (Vedānta) and the highest beatitude (mokṣa or freedom) is its end (prayojana). To explain—tadvirodhi, etc., taiḥ—to the Vedāntic texts, avirodhi—not hostile, tarkaḥ—reason, upakaraṇam—aids, auxiliaries or itikartavyatā (like the fore-yāgas which are aids to the principle or pradhāna yāga) or in other words—auxiliary means (sahakārikāraṇam). Or ‘tarka’ anumāna (inference) which is not in conflict with Vedānta and which in reality serves as a corroborative evidence by strengthening the conviction got from the (study of) the Vedānta—this is what it means.

*Here ends the Fourth Varṇaka of the Pñcapādikā*

---

from the primary significance of the phrase so that the duty to undertake the vicāra is derived from arthāpatti pramāṇa and not from śabda. ‘Jijñāsā kartavyā’, amounts to ‘vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ’.

## VARṆAKA V DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

I. 1. [It has been stated that the knowledge of Brahman is to be desired.] The meaning of this Bhāṣya is, “This śāstra is to be studied by one who is desirous of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman”—so it is said.<sup>1</sup> When this statement was made then only lakṣaṇa—definition of Brahman, pramāṇa—valid means of knowledge, yuktiḥ—conformable logic, sādhana—aids to realisation and prayojana—fruit, all these (it must be understood) the Bhāṣyakāra proposed to expound. Amongst these (tatra), the nature of Brahman (lakṣaṇa) has to be first indicated because of its primary importance.<sup>2</sup> [Of what nature then is that Brahman? Such a question arising (iti), answering that (ataḥ) the revered aphorist propounds (the following second sūtra)—“From whom the origination, etc., (*i.e.*, the origin, subsistence and destruction) of this (world are effected)?”]

2. Yukti also it may be presumed to have been indicated for validating the definition.

(In the sūtra—‘Janmādyasya yataḥ’), [janma means, origin and of the three (*viz.*, origin, subsistence and destruction) it (janma) is the beginning—this is the meaning of the dissolved compound of the class of tadguṇasamvijñāna].<sup>3</sup> The resolution of the sen-

---

<sup>1</sup> ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा—The desire to know Brahman. This is the sense that is patent on hearing the phrase. But neither jñāna nor icchā (desire) which are its two elements is fit to be enjoined. Hence jijñāsā should be taken to mean inquiry—vicāra in its secondary sense, and the sūtra should be construed as—‘inquiry should be undertaken for acquiring the knowledge of Brahman.’

<sup>2</sup> Inquiry into Brahman includes lakṣaṇa, pramāṇa, yukti, sādhana and phala. Here Brahma-lakṣaṇa or the definition of Brahman has first to be stated as without it the elucidation of the other four is not possible.

<sup>3</sup> तदुणसंविज्ञान—The attributive compound (bahuvrīhi samāsa) is of two kinds—tadguṇa and atadguṇa-samvijñāna. In the first the attributive element also gets into the predicative relation along with the aggregate (samastapada); in the second it enters into no such relation. For example take ‘लम्बकर्णं देवदत्तमानय—bring Devadatta with the long ear’; here लम्बकर्ण—long-eared, the attribute of the aggregate, ‘one

tence into its constituent parts (padaccheda), the meaning of the words, and the resolution of the compound into its components—all these three which are indispensable in comment have been secured, *i.e.*, rendered explicit (by the Bhāṣyakāra). The object of taking the compound 'janmādi' as tadguṇasamvijñāna is explained as ['janma, sthiti, bhaṅgam and samāsārthaḥ', *i.e.*, the three should be taken in the aggregate, (otherwise janma or origin would be left out)]. The use of the third gender (*i.e.*, the neuter) is to show that the meaning of the aggregate stands prominent in the compound (janmasthitibhaṅgam).

3. The word 'ādi' (beginning) implies that it is associated with the antecedent non-existence (pūrvakāla-koṭimat) but that (prāgabhāva or antecedent non-existence) being absent in the case of the world (for the world is beginningless though having an end) how can one speak of 'ādi'? A doubt such as this arising, the Bhāṣyakāra says ["That the origination (of the world) as being the first in the series is based on the authority of the Vedic text and also on the way a thing develops"]. The Vedic text which proceeds to describe that very Brahman which has been defined in this sūtra has therein, origination as first mentioned; hence its primacy (in the sūtra). This is evident from the nature of things also—no object exists after having come to an end, nor existing is it born; nor does it suffer destruction with its very origination for the doctrine of the momentariness has already been refuted.<sup>4</sup> Hence having originated, and having existed it

who has the long ear' is related to the predicate (vidheya), ānaya (bring). But in 'चित्रगुं देवदत्तमानय—bring Devadatta of the brindled cow', we have the atadguṇa-samvijñāna; for in the compound, 'citrāguṇa' (the brindled cow) is not in relation with the predicate—ānaya. Where the meaning of the parts (guṇāvayava) is in attributive relation, we have 'tadguṇa-samvijñāna' but if it is only upādhi or upalakṣaṇa we have atadguṇa-samvijñāna. The compound 'janmādi' is tadguṇa variety. Here the aggregate, as in all cases of bahuvrīhi, points to something distinct—अन्यार्थ. It has to be resolved thus—जन्म-आदि-यस्य—that which has janma—origination, as the first of the group, the other two being sthiti—sustention, and bhaṅga—destruction. Janma is viśeṣaṇa, *i.e.*, an integral part of the aggregate. Hence the Bhāṣyakāra says that janmādi is tadguṇa-samvijñāna bahuvrīhi.

<sup>4</sup> नन्वादि etc.—Objection is taken to the order mentioned here. The word beginning implies a state in which the world did not exist. But the world has not started from any point of time. The objection loses its ground when confronted with the Śruti—यतो वा इमानि भूतानि

comes to an end—thus has this world (of perception) origination to begin with (and then follow existence and destruction).

4. [Page 77] In the bhāṣya beginning with [‘asya, etc.,] what is shown is the meaning of ‘idam’ (this) which is a part of the word (asya) and is a mere prātipadika (*i.e.*, its uninflected form). To explain:—Everywhere the pronoun on the strength of (external causes such as) the context, etc., and (of juxtaposed words) stands for a certain limited number of objects. But in their absence it stands by its very nature for everything that is in any way the object of a pramāṇa. Hence says (the Bhāṣya-kāra), [“By the word ‘idam’ is meant the dharmin (*i.e.*, the world which is the substrate of qualities) revealed in perception, etc.<sup>5</sup> The use of the genitive case (asya) is to show the relation that the world has to the attributes, origination, etc., and it is meant here to denote relation in general and is not to be regarded as restricted to any one relation in particular. [“Yataḥ—(from which) points to the cause of (the Universe.”)] showing thereby that the ablative is significative of the causal sense and none other.<sup>6</sup>

जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति; यत्प्रयन्त्याभिसंविशन्ति.—Tait. Bhṛguvalli. Here the order is origination, sustention and withdrawal, all having their substratum in Brahman. The sūtra which is based on the text noted above cannot but follow the Śruti if only to avoid a conflict. The natural order of things also is identical.

नापि जिनत्वेन लीयते—This refers to the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness which has been already rebutted. If objects perished, the moment they were born, priority and posteriority would be out of the question.

Origination is mentioned first following common usage, *cf.* VPS., p. 195—यद्यप्यनादौ संपरि न जन्मन आदित्वम्; तथापि जन्तुत्वा, स्थित्वा, प्रलीयत इति व्यावहरिकी लोकप्रसिद्धिसुप्रजाव्य, ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते,’ इति श्रुतौ जन्मनः आदित्वानर्देशः ।

<sup>5</sup> A pronoun—सर्वनाम as the name implies stands for all nouns unless its scope is limited either by the context or by its association with some limiting adjuncts. Here the pronoun ‘this’—इदं is used in its unrestricted sense. धर्मिणः-प्रपञ्चरूपधर्मिणः, of the objective world. प्रमाणविषयमात्र—all that is given in any pramāṇa, *i.e.*, all prameyas—all objects of knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> यत इति, etc.—The pronoun ‘yataḥ’ should in the present context relate to Brahman only but the bhāṣya says that it denotes cause (यत इति कारणनिर्देशः), the object being that from the ablative we must understand that Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause, for the word kāraṇa is a general term.

II. 5. The bhāṣya beginning with the words ['of this world'] proceeds to expound the svarūpalakṣaṇa of Brahman which is the lakṣya or the subject of the definition. Definition is of two kinds—'upalakṣaṇa' or indicative definition and 'viśeṣalakṣaṇa' or descriptive definition. Of these the lakṣaṇa here pointing as it does to the attributive adjuncts of the world stands outside only, of (Brahman) and yet denotes Brahman by indirect characterisation and not by the description (of its nature).<sup>7</sup> Hence as distinct (from its characterisation as the source of the origination, subsistence, and dissolution of the world) Brahman's descriptive definition has to be stated. (This svarūpalakṣaṇa is that Brahman is of the nature of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss, and it will be expounded later on.)

6. [Of the world differentiated by names and forms];—Some philosophers in some way conceive the objective world (lit. the world which is a product) under certain categories each according to his own technique. As against such classifications,

---

This bhāṣya therefore points out that the origin, etc., of the world is to be regarded not as the definition of Brahman, but only as being the cause of the world-origination, etc. Even there causation so far as the Absolute is concerned is 'taṭasthalakṣaṇa' or 'upalakṣaṇa' qualification *per accidens*, and this is merely the descriptive definition of 'Sabala' or Māvā-associated Brahman. It must be understood that in the taṭasthalakṣaṇa are comprised both varieties—material and instrumental causes. If Brahman is regarded as the material cause only, we should posit Īśvara to serve as the instrumental cause; if only instrumental, we have to posit a material cause like clay for the potter. Both are incompatible with the significance of the word 'Brahman'.

<sup>7</sup> द्विविधं हि लक्षणम्—The pūrvapakṣa or the opponent's view is that the definition of Brahman as given in the second sūtra is neither 'taṭasthalakṣaṇa' nor 'svarūpalakṣaṇa'. It cannot be svarūpalakṣaṇa because Brahman is nirapekṣa—non-relational or akhaṇḍa while the definition presumes the association of Brahman with the world—sāpekṣa. Nor is taṭasthalakṣaṇa appropriate, for if it, *i.e.*, the world, is real non-duality would cease and the word 'Brahman' would lose its significance and the defined itself would be annulled. If on the other hand, the definition be false it ceases to be indicative of Brahman like the misty emanations which resemble smoke and yet do not suggest the presence of fire.

The answer is that it is taṭasthalakṣaṇa only and is illusory and as such it cannot bring about the annulment of the defined—lakṣya, *viz.*, Brahman.

the Bhāṣyakāra on the strength of the Śruti which restates (and confirms) the generally accepted view, dichotomizes the world and accordingly uses the expression, 'differentiated by names and forms'.<sup>8</sup> The instrumental case (nāmarūpābhyām) is used adverbially (itthambhāve—in this manner, *i.e.*, as names and forms). It is indeed self-evident that an individuated object is brought into existence only after one has previously thought of what constitutes its form and the name involved in it.<sup>9</sup>

7. ["Having many agents and enjoyers"]—this phrase points out that agency and enjoyment also being of the nature of names and forms are comprised in the world (*i.e.*, come within the world-order). [Which is the abode of the rewards of one's action, which rewards will eventuate in specific places and time and on specific causes being fulfilled]—that is, for the enjoyment of the fruit of every action, a place is defined, for instance for the reward of svarga (to result), the top of mount Meru and this mundane globe for the reward of a village. As to time also, it is after the fall of the body that the reward of Svarga and it is after the boyhood stage is passed that the reward of a son, will come to pass and as to the fulfilment of a specific cause, one's death during the summer-solstice.

8. [The structure of whose constituent parts cannot even be mentally conceived.]—One of limited vision cannot even conceive of the manner in which the external world is designed as

---

<sup>8</sup> कार्यप्रपञ्च—The Advaita-vedāntins conceive the objective world as constituted by names and forms; the Bhāṭṭas—substance, quality, action, genus, species, samavāya (inherent relation); the Jains—jīva, āśrava, samvara, nirjara, bandha, mokṣa; the Prābhākaras—substance, quality, action, genus, species, śakti and pāratantrya, niyoga; the Naiyāyikas—the sixteen categories such as pramāṇa, prameya, etc.; the Sāmkhyas—five intellectual senses, five active senses, five subtle elements, five gross elements, mind, egoism, mahat, avyakta and puruṣa.

<sup>9</sup> *cf.* the Śruti—तन्नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियते—Bṛh. Up. Nāma is the world of names; rūpa is the world of forms. The objective world is divided into two categories—names and forms. व्याक्रियमाणम्-स्थूलीक्रियमाणम्—the world which was in a subtle condition became gross in these two ways, names and forms. अभिधेयरूपम् अभिधेयात्मकम्-नाम is अभिधा and रूप is अभिधेय, both being inextricably fused. स्वनामगर्भम्—each object has its own name in intimate union. A potter makes a pot only after he has thought of its name and form. So also the world-maker.



also of the bodily organism constituted as it is of limbs and nervous filaments each of which performing its defined function. How then is it possible for him to create such world? [The omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the origin, subsistence and dissolution (of the world) take place—that is Brahman—these (last two words) have to be understood as completing the sentence.]—By thus commenting (the Bhāṣyakāra) shows that the words desiderated in the sūtra-statement have been added and also points to the descriptive definition of Brahman indicated (in this definition, viz., that from which, etc.),<sup>10</sup>

III. 9. Well, there are other states of existence such as modification, etc. Why are they not included (in the sūtra)? Raising this objection the Bhāṣyakāra says, ["anyeṣāmapī, etc.,] of other "forms of existence". [Page 78] Nowhere is the particular state (viz., growth and modification) of an object possible without its undergoing destruction nor even destruction possible, of a thing which has not taken its birth and is not existing. Hence, since they are subsumed under these three only, they are not separately mentioned (Buddhi and pariṇāma come under janma, and apakṣaya under vināśa).

10. Well, the Nairuktas speak of six stages of existence (lit. the changes that things undergo—bhāvavikāras) and if they

<sup>10</sup> उपलक्षितब्रह्मस्वरूपं च दर्शयति—What is the definition of the real nature—स्वरूपलक्षण of Brahman whose indicative definition, तदस्थलक्षण, has been given in the aphorism 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः'. The svarūpalakṣaṇa must be given as otherwise the Sāmkhyapradhāna might claim equal status in the creation of the world. The svarūpalakṣaṇa is the viśeṣalakṣaṇa or the specific definition which excludes without exception all that is not Brahman. To one who has not seen the moon we may call his attention to the celestial entity by pointing to the branch of a tree above which it shines; this is the indicative definition but then among the celestial bodies we have innumerable stars and to exclude them the svarūpalakṣaṇa must be given, viz., the moon is the celestial body which emits abundant light. Now the svarūpalakṣaṇa is given by Śamkara in the bhāṣya—"यतः सर्वज्ञात्-सर्वशक्तेः कारणात्-भवति that omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the world takes its birth etc.,—that is Brahman". Here the word 'sarvajñatva—omniscience' is the svarūpalakṣaṇa of Brahman. Pradhāna, atoms and other supposed causes of the world cannot be said to possess sarvajñatva. The sarvajñatva should be understood in the sense of svaprakāśatva—self-refulgence. Knowledge is the essence of Brahman and not its property.

are accepted there need be no effort to point out the subsumption (of other vikāras under origination and dissolution). Presuming this objection the Bhāṣyakāra says—[“As regards the six states enumerated by Yāska, *viz.*, origination, subsistence, etc.”]<sup>11</sup> When earth, water and light (*i.e.*, the three subtle elemental forms—*sūkṣmabhūtas*) have evolved into the organised world, they (the six states as enumerated by Yāska) hold good only in regard to the objects constituted by the elements. Hence if that (*viz.*, Yāska’s division) is accepted the doubt would arise that they would alone (*viz.*, the three subtle elements from which the world has evolved) are defined here and not Brahman and that is indefensible. Hence in order that the sūtra (*janmādi*, etc.), may become truly significant the origination, etc., as pointed out in the Śruti (*cf.* *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc., *Tait. Bh. guvalli*) alone, we admit, for the object of the sūtras is to determine its (Śruti) meaning. Hence that entity depending on which the entire world manifests itself is alone the prime cause, namely, Brahman—this is the meaning of the Sūtra.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> यास्कवारपठितानान्तु—According to Nirukta, I. 2, the six bhāva-vikāras are:—origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease and destruction. Even Yāska could not have perceived the changes which the elements undergo. All the changes which he mentions relate to things created from the elements according to the doctrine of quintuplication—पञ्चकीरणमैतिक. Hence if Brahman is taken as the cause of things evolved from the elements, the five elements themselves would be in the place of Brahman. But if the aphorism should follow the Śruti we must accept what is stated in the Śruti—यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, etc., *i.e.*, the cause of the entire universe including the elements is the unrelated Brahman. Hence Yāska’s division is unacceptable.

<sup>12</sup> विवर्तने—Some advocate what is known as *pariṇāmavāda* according to which Brahman only has evolved into the world-form. The word ‘vivarta’ is used to refute that view. The *vivartavāda* maintains that the world is but a manifestation—*vivarta* of Brahman and not its evolute. We have *vivarta* when a thing without losing its essence appears as something else, *e.g.*, the shell appearing as silver; we have *pariṇāma* when a thing loses its identity and is changed to something new, *e.g.*, clay appearing as a pot.

The evolution-hypothesis is objected to on the following grounds:

- (i) Relying on the creation-Śrutis if we admit the world-evolution, Brahman’s very nature, *viz.*, partlessness, homogeneity, vastness, etc., would be destroyed.

Well, the sūtra would be emptied of its meaning if what the Śruti points out (*viz.*, that the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world proceed from Brahman),<sup>13</sup> is accepted. We indeed do not see this earth coming into existence, nor water, nor light; then how can the sūtra presume that they are existing things (effects) and define Brahman as their origin, etc.? Here is the answer:—As for light its origin is seen when fire is kindled by rubbing one stick against another and its extinction with the extinction of the faggots; the origin of water also in the moon-stone, etc., and its gradual desiccation; as regards the earth even, we infer its origin and dissolution because we see its parts being joined and parted—samyoga and vibhāga which point to their (origin and dissolution). Even now it is perceived in particular instances (say lumps of clay) that their origin and destruction are due to samyoga and vibhāga (conjunction and disjunction). And the origin and destruction of air, ether, time, quarter ('dis') must be admitted on the principle to be enunciated in the sūtra<sup>14</sup>—“yāvadvikāram tu vibhāgo lokavat” (—as is seen in the world, things which are disparate (like pot, dish, etc., are the vikāras of, *i.e.*, produced from something, say—clay. So also vāyu, ākāśa, etc., being disparate, *i.e.*, distinct from one another must necessarily have originated from a single being).

---

(ii) It may be urged that the creation-texts are neutral; they do not affirm either that the previous state is altered or unaltered. They merely indicate a change of form—अन्यथाभाव. Brahman appears as the non-sentient world. But though those texts are not decisive we must admit that the previous state is unchanged on the authority of texts like—अज आत्मा महान्ध्रुवः; न जायते म्रियते; निष्क्रियं निष्कलम्, etc.

(iii) We have also the text इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते—which points clearly to the fact that Brahman (इन्द्र) has attained this world-variety through māyā so that the manifold is only the outcome of māyā and not that it has actually evolved from Brahman.

<sup>13</sup> The definition of Brahman as the cause of world-creation is untenable, since it is not established that the five elements are effects. We perceive that all material things comprising the world are derived from the elements. Hence Brahman cannot be presumed to be the cause of the origination of the world.

<sup>14</sup> वक्ष्यमाणेन न्यायेन—*vide* VS., II. iii. 7. Padmapāda is perhaps anticipating his commentary on the bhāṣya referred to here.

IV. 12. The Bhāṣyakāra (Śamkara) in the bhāṣya—[“na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya—of the origin of a world possessing such attributes as have been stated cannot, etc.,”] points out that this very sūtra—“From which the origin, etc., of this” contains also the ground for determining the nature of Brahman—that ground being furnished either by ‘tantra’ or ‘āvṛtti’.<sup>15</sup> ‘Of the world with its fourfold qualification’, viz., differentiated by names and forms, having many agents and enjoyers, the home of fruition of actions performed in prescribed places, times and occasions, and the nature of whose design (*i.e.*, disposition of its contents) is beyond even mental conception—of such a world, the origin, etc., cannot possibly be ascribed ‘leaving out Īśvara possessing the enumerated qualities’, *i.e.*, having set aside the Lord Who is omniscient and omnipotent, to any other source imagined by the opposite schools, such as the insentient Pradhāna or the sentient Hiranyagarbha<sup>16</sup> whose knowledge and activity are of restricted scope and who is subject to transmigration.

13. As for the origin of the world from an insentient thing, it is out of the question because of the very fact of insentiency. Even a sentient source (Hiranyagarbha) is untenable because of limited cognitional and conative potency. As for the view that non-existence—abhāva, (is the cause of the origination of the world), not only on the ground of insentiency is it untenable but

<sup>15</sup> तन्त्रेण-आवृत्त्यावा ; उभयोद्देशेन सकृदुच्चारणं तन्त्रम्, पृथगुच्चारणमावृत्तिः. A single pronouncement to indicate two ideas is ‘tantra’, a separate pronouncement is āvṛtti. Bādarāyaṇa has framed the sūtra with this object in view, viz., that the origin, etc., of the world is due to Brahman (Īśvara) and that this world cannot come into existence from any entity other than Brahman. For us repetition (āvṛtti) of the sūtra twice is necessary to arrive at this dual significance, the first denoting the lakṣaṇa and the second excluding any other entity like Pradhāna. For a fuller description of ‘tantra’ see the present writer’s translation of Śāstra Dīpikā (Tarkapāda)—Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, Vol. 89, p. 229.

<sup>16</sup> Hiranyagarbha though a highly evolved being belongs to the category of the jīvas. His powers are therefore limited. In the yoga system Hiranyagarbha is regarded as the cause of the world. This view finds support in the āgamas. The Sāmkhyas attribute the origin of the world to Pradhāna or Prakṛti constituted by the three guṇas, the Vaiśeṣikas to the atoms and the Naiyāyikas infer Īśvara as the primal source of the Universe.

on the ground also of its incompetency to be the viṣaya (content) of the notion of 'existence—asti'.<sup>17</sup> (Again) since (according to the śūnyavāda) not even the residual impressions of past creation are left, no valid means of knowledge could support the position that the present creation also is exactly similar to the past. If it be held that all the events of life (vyavahāra) are accidental then no law or order would prevail anywhere.

14. Nor is the creation self-positing (*i.e.*, without an external cause) since it is perceived that specific places, times and causes are utilised (for producing the things needed).<sup>18</sup> [Page 79] What the term 'svabhāva' means is the non-requirement of any other, (*i.e.*, the repudiation of any external principle governing the occurrences in the world); as such the requirement of an external cause (in the origination of an object is unjustified); then where is there any possibility of determining the order of things? Hence, *i.e.*, since we have rebutted even on the basis of reasoning, the possibilities of other entities (like Pradhāna, atoms, etc.), serving as the cause (of the origination, etc., of the world) it is established residually that Īśvara, whose attributes have been already stated, is alone the cause (of the universe).

V. 15. [This very argument]—The argument (yukti) just now advanced, *viz.*, that the origination, etc., of the world cannot possibly take place from any entity other than Īśvara possessing such attributes as have been stated, they say, is the anumāna (inference) which independently (without the aid of the Śruti,

<sup>17</sup> अभावात्पुनः—The Bauddhas uphold the doctrine of a void or śūnya. All effects according to them originate from non-existence. We do not know the previous state of pot; hence that state must be śūnya. निरुपाख्यत्वात्, अस्तित्वादिधर्माभावात्—lacking in the very quality of existence. Hence non-existence cannot even be conceived as the cause of the sensible world. उपाख्या च-अस्तीति धीविषयत्वम्—*vide* A. S., p. 271.

<sup>18</sup> स्वभावतः—The 'svabhāvavāda' denies the existence of an over-ruling Providence and even of individual souls. It is pure materialism. Things come into being prompted by their very nature—svabhāva. It comes to this therefore that there is no cause behind the world. Creation is causeless.

The one effective refutation of this doctrine is that there would be no definite order in the origination of things. Nothing but chaos would reign in the world.

For a fuller statement of this doctrine—*vide* O.I.P., p. 104.

serves as the valid means of establishing a Lord and also of establishing His Omniscience and Omnipotence; where then therefore is the use of the Vedāntic texts?—thus think Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika) and others who maintain that Īśvara is the cause of the world, and who assert the statements—‘That from which these beings are born, (that by which when born they live, that into which they enter after death—that, be desirous of knowing; that is Brahman—Tait. Up., III. 1)—the meaning of which is implied in the aphorism “That from which the origination, etc.,” amount to the formal syllogistic reasoning (parārthānumāna).<sup>19</sup>

16. [Well, even here (*i.e.*, the second sūtra) the same anumāna as leading independently to the correct sense of the Upaniṣadic passage referred to) is expressed], just as a particular kind of smoke has its origin in fire lit up with ‘agaru’ (fragrant aloe-wood) so has this world of unique (variety and) design, as its originating cause, an entity endowed with the attributes of omniscience, etc.

*Siddhāntin.*—[No. the object of the aphorisms (sūtras) is merely to string together the meanings (the flowers) of the Vedānta passages].<sup>20</sup> It is true that that very argument (which is taken as

---

<sup>19</sup> पराथानुमान—Inference is of two kinds—svārtha and parārtha. Literally, the former means intended for oneself and the latter intended for another. In parārthānumāna we employ a formal argument to convince another. This necessitates the employment of all the five members of the syllogism—*vide* TSA., p. 283 ff.

Those who maintain that Īśvara as the Creator of the world could be established by argument only, without requiring any Scriptural authority employ the following inferential process:—

Every effect (कार्य) is the product of one who is cognizant of its nature (स्वरूप), of the materials of its composition (उपादान), its auxiliaries (उपकरण), for whom it is intended (संप्रदान), the use it serves (प्रयोजन), and its fitness to serve a purpose (सामर्थ्य). Therefore being a composite structure the world must be the creation of one who is all-wise.

<sup>20</sup> The object of the entire body of the aphorisms is to enunciate the principles by which to determine the sense of the Vedāntic texts. The anumāna on which you depend no doubt is helpful in producing the notion of probability—संभावना, regarding the nature of Brahman, but not certainty.

It is pointed out that mere argumentation—yukti—generates only a notion of probability. Anumāna, on the other hand, produces the notion of certitude—*cf.* VPS., p. 212.



inference by you but as 'yukti' by us) is stated because it serves as an aid and not because it leads to the knowledge of the real purport (of the Vedānta). The real object of the aphorisms however is to connect together the meanings of the Vedic passages (i.e., Vedānta). The same idea is expanded (by the Bhāṣyakāra) —[(As a matter of fact) the Vedānta texts (are referred to in the aphorisms and discussed)]. It is with the aid of the nyāyas (syllogisms) arrived at, from a due consideration of the aphorisms commencing from the samanvaya sūtra (V.S., I. 4) and by closely adhering to the significative potency of words, that the knowledge of Brahman (sākṣātkāra) as the purport of (all) the Vedānta texts, is effected, and it is not brought about by other pramāṇas such as inference, etc.

17. ["While there are Vedāntic passages (declaring the source of the origin, etc., of the world")] inference also as long as it does not contradict the scriptural texts becomes the right means of knowledge and as such is not discarded, because scripture itself approves of argumentation as an (indispensable) aid. To explain:—'Ātman is to be heard and thought on (B.h., II. iv-5)'—just as from this Śruti, śravaṇa (inquiry into the texts) is stated to be the means in the acquisition of Brahma-knowledge, even so is manana or yukti restated premising it to be the indubitable means of the cognition of Brahman. Likewise another Śruti—"One learned and reflecting, etc.", "A person having a teacher to instruct him obtains knowledge"—(Ch. and. Up., VI. xiv, 2) declares that human reasoning aids Scripture. When the confirmation of the knowledge obtained (from Vedānta) is secured for his pupils by the teacher's adducing instances from 'the crystal, etc.,' which are in conformity with Śruti, then that is restated in the text—'the person having a teacher obtains knowledge.'

VI. 18. ["Not as in the case of inquiry into the nature of Dharma (religious duty)]—from this, the reason for the employment of argumentation is stated. Śruti (in 'Śrutyādayaḥ') is the word (śabda) which (in the elucidation of meaning) requires no other word. From the word 'ādi', are to be understood līṅga, vākya, etc., being the different forms of the word (śabda-prakāras).<sup>21</sup> It is not that they only (viz., the six pramāṇas) are

<sup>21</sup> Direct statement—श्रुति, potency of words—वाक्य, syntactical relation—लिङ्ग, context—प्रकरण, position—स्थान, name—समाख्या. These are the six modes of evidence in the cognition of Brahman.

the right means in the cognition of Brahman, but on the contrary also experience, etc., in corroboration of which the bhāṣya says—[“ Because anubhava (intuitive perception or sāksātkāra) is the culmination of the knowledge regarding Brahman, and because that knowledge has as its object an accomplished (existing) entity”]. (To explain) because experience is possible of a thing that already exists and because the annulment of the desire for Brahma-knowledge has experience as its terminus, (*i.e.*, it is sāksātkāra or intuitive perception that satisfies one's longing to know Brahman).

19. Well, in the inquiry into Dharma, even without the need of experience, the knowledge obtained by strictly adhering to the significative potency of words (composing, say a mandatory statement like ‘Jyotiṣtomena svargakāmo yajeta’—one who desires heaven should perform Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice) desiderates no other aid and also brings about the final result and does not require even an iota of argumentation. Let it be so even here since there exists no difference between the Vedānta texts and those of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in regard to their validity as means of knowledge. The question thus arising the distinction is pointed out in the bhāṣya beginning with [“ If it were a thing to be accomplished—kartavyatve hi viṣaye, etc.,” and ending with “the knowledge of Brahman is altogether dependent on the thing because its object is an accomplished entity (*viz.*, Brahman)—Brahmajñānamāpi vastutanrameva bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt”].

20. [Page 80] How? (It may be asked where the distinction lies). Indeed a thing that is enjoined as a duty to be accomplished is of the nature of an unaccomplished (unoriginated) object because of the very fact that it is yet to be accomplished and (as such) it cannot be an object of direct experience. It follows therefore that no desire (for anubhava—realisation) arises. Here, on the other hand, the accomplished entity (*viz.*, Brahman) is taken as the object of immediate illusory cognition (*cf.* aham paśyāmi—I see; it is pratyakṣabhrama where the act of seeing is attributed to the self; *i.e.*, illegitimately transferred from the intellect—buddhi, to the self—ātman) and the rise of such illusory cognition cannot be prevented except by valid immediate perception; such is our experience as regards the perception of the ‘double Moon’.<sup>22</sup> Merely because the two portions of the Veda

<sup>22</sup> द्विचन्द्रादिषु—Owing to some defect we perceive the double Moon; this is immediate illusion and it can be eradicated only by the

(the ritualistic where something is enjoined to be accomplished, and the Vedānta where an existing entity is the viṣaya) resemble each other in so far as their inherent validity is concerned it cannot be supposed that there is resemblance even as regards their method of exposition (avabodhana).<sup>23</sup> If there should be (such resemblance) then Brahman would be an entity to be brought into existence also by man's wish (*i.e.*, it would be at one's option to bring it into being or not). As such injunction and prohibition—vidhi, pratiṣedha, alternative and combination—vikalpa-samuccaya, general rule and exception—utsarga, apavāda, annulment and augmentation—bādha, abhyuccaya, settled and unsettled—vyavasthita and vikalpa; all these would have their place (in the case of Brahman as in that of Dharma).<sup>24</sup>

21. This is inappropriate in regard to an existing entity since it would result in the negation of its very nature. For instance, the alternative notion that arises in a single object, *viz.*, whether it is a pollard or a man will not be a valid cognition as is that of the oblation of an alternative ingredient (in a sacrifice); as regards the final truth it is the single notion—this is a pollard only (that can stand the test) because the knowledge of an accomplished thing (siddhavastu) is dependent on the nature of the thing and it is not that the thing is dependent on the knowledge. If it were so, even the notion of shell-silver would be like that (*i.e.*, would be samyagjñāna or valid cognition). But as regards the knowledge of a thing (yet) to be accomplished it is right knowledge

direct perceptive cognition of the single Moon; even so the immediate illusory knowledge as evidenced in such statements as 'I am happy', 'I am grieved', can be eradicated only by the direct intuitive perception of reality—साक्षात्कार.

<sup>23</sup> The opponent argues that since both Brahman and Dharma constitute the viṣaya of the Veda, manana, nididhyāsana and anubhava need not be regarded as means to the knowledge of Brahman as they are not required in the case of Dharma where verbal cognition alone is required, or if they are insisted upon there is no reason, he would say, to omit them in regard to dharma. The answer is given in —न हि कर्तव्य, etc.

<sup>24</sup> If the method of exposition be the same Brahman would be the content of an injunction—*cf.* सोमेन यजेत and would be the content of prohibition—*cf.* न कलङ्गं भक्षयेत्; again just as rice or barley can with impunity be used in a sacrifice Brahman or Sthāṇu, an insentient object can be the means of mokṣa, etc.

only even when it relates to something other than itself. This is pointed out in Chānd. Up., V. viii-1: 'Woman, O ! Gautama is the sacrificial fire, etc.' ('The sentence denotes meditation on woman as fire—this is meditation on what is other than itself, viz., woman and yet the knowledge of that meditation is right knowledge). [Because it is so (*i.e.*, since the knowledge of all things depends on the nature of the things themselves) the knowledge of Brahman also is dependent on the thing itself since its viṣaya (content) is an accomplished thing (*viz.*, Brahman itself)]. To conclude, it is appropriate that in the inquiry into Brahman, reasoning should find a place as well as the need of experience and not elsewhere (namely, in the inquiry regarding karma or active religious duty).

VII. 22. Some one objects thus: [since (Brahman) is of the nature of an existing object, etc.]—this is what it (the Bhāṣya of which a portion is quoted here) means:—If reasoning should find a place here, as the matter relates to an existing thing, then what is the purpose served by investigation into the meaning of the Vedāntic texts? Let the argument of those who by inference deduce Īśvara's agency (in the origination of the world) hold good so that let the first sūtra (*viz.*, 'athāto Brahmajijñāsā) set forth the thesis (pratijñā) and this (*viz.*, janmādyasya yataḥ), the reason (hetu).

23. The answer is given (in the bhāṣya):—[“ No, (*i.e.*, what you say is not tenable); since (Brahman) is not the object of the senses, no relation can be perceived, etc. (*i.e.*, between the sādhyā—Brahman and hetu—kāryatva)]. The senses have the world alone as their object and not its cause (Brahman). If they could bring that also (*viz.*, the cause of the universe) within their purview then there would be no use in your setting out the inferential argument. Even the inference known as 'sāmānyato drṣṭa' cannot serve as a valid means of knowledge in regard to Brahman which transcends the scope of the senses.<sup>25</sup> Hence concludes (the Bhāṣya-kāra)—[“ Therefore the sūtra—‘ That from which the origination,

<sup>25</sup> It has been shown that Brahman cannot be established from Viśeṣānumāna since it is not the object of the senses. The opponent, say the Naiyāyika, might urge that Brahman could be deduced from that variety of anumāna known as sāmānyatodrṣṭa, *e.g.*, यद्यकार्यं तत्सर्कृतकम् यथा-वदः—where with the support of what is found in the sphere of sensuous objects, we reason about parallel cases in the sphere of the

etc.,’ is not intended to set forth an inference (as the means of understanding the nature of Brahman) but on the other hand it is to make known a Vedāntic text.] And it has already been said that the sūtra indicates that reasoning is an auxiliary to the Vedānta as helping in the realisation of what it imports (*viz.*, Brahman).

24. [Page 81] Well, if that be so, how can reasoning incompetent as it is to have Brahman as its object serve as an auxiliary to Vedāntic statements dealing with (the nature of) Brahman?

Here is the answer—In elucidating the nature of Brahman reasons are adduced on the analogy of clay, etc. (Chānd. Up., VI. i-4). And just as the laudatory and condemnatory passages (arthavādas) are desiderated by the statements of injunction and prohibition to prompt one to action or dissuade one from it, those (reasons) assuming the position of arthavādā importing probability are desiderated by the Vedānta passages describing the essential nature (of Brahman) till fruition, *i.e.*, liberation is attained. It is therefore said that they (reasons) fulfil their part by serving as auxiliaries to the scriptural statement.<sup>26</sup>

25. [“Which then is the Vedāntic text which the sūtra indicates as having to be expounded (in order to determine the nature of Brahman)”?] Now, since the word ‘Brahman’ occurring in whichever Vedānta passage is not significative (because Brahman

---

supersensuous. The Siddhāntin points out that this kind of inference also is incompetent to establish Brahman. The Naiyāyikas admit Brahman as possessing eternal knowledge but the eternity of knowledge is rebutted by the counter-argument—अद्यज्ञानं-तन्मनोजन्यम् and what is a जन्य or a product is non-eternal.

From the pot-inference we can only infer a creator but not a creator possessing omniscience.

<sup>26</sup> Reason no doubt is incompetent to determine Brahman which is bliss, knowledge and inner light, but yet, it points to the probability of its existence. In the Śruti—‘It is one only without a second’ what is intended is that Brahman is the material cause of the universe; the clay-illustration is apt here for we do not perceive the effect, *viz.*, pot apart from the cause, *viz.*, clay. The crystal-red illustration points to the illusory nature of agency—kartṛtva; the ‘mirror-reflection’ example points to the identity of the individual soul with the universal soul, and the pot-ether example brings home the relationlessness of Brahman.

is an unknown entity), it is not possible to fit in, its meaning either as a substantive or as an attributive in the import of a proposition (vākya-rtha)—such is the objection.

In that section of the Veda which one has to commit to memory, in whatever order the Vedānta texts are found juxtaposed, for the elucidation of Brahman, in that very order the first two sūtras are intended to bring out the nature of Brahman. With this object is given, the illustration—"Bhṛgurvai Vāruṇiḥ".<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> येषां वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्—The pūrvapakṣin argues that the Vedāntic texts containing the word 'Brahman' cannot be the lakṣya of the sūtras owing to the unknowability of Brahman. The answer is given in the statement—येषां वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्. It may be expanded thus:—Do you hold that Brahman in its special nature is unknown or in its general nature? If the first, we do not contend it for we admit that we are ignorant of the specific nature of Brahman, and that without inquiry we cannot know Brahman as the Real—सत्य, as Knowledge—ज्ञान, as Bliss—आनन्द, as the Inner Soul—प्रत्यगात्मा and as secondless—अद्वितीय. If you say that Brahman is not knowable even in its general nature we do not agree with you. Brahman in its literal sense of vastness is known. Hence on that basis we get to know its specific nature from the juxtaposition of other words, viz., satya, jñāna, etc., so that statements like—सत्यं ज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म,—become competent to expound the nature of Brahman. The Vivaraṇa answers another objection: It is this:—If we follow the order of words as found in the text—Tait. Up., II. 1 to be memorised (viz., सत्यं, ज्ञानम्, etc.,) we fail to get at the meaning, but we have to follow the reverse order in order to understand that Brahman is the cause of the world. The rule is from the known to the unknown. The text can be rightly understood if it be construed thus: यस्मादाकाशः संभूतः, तत्सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म:—That from which space is born is Brahman which is of the nature of reality, knowledge and bliss. The text however is in this order—सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म.. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः—etc. Here, first, Brahman is defined as being, intelligence and bliss and then it is said that from this Brahman space (ākāśa) arose, from space vāyu, etc. Hence the objector questions the appositeness of the text adduced, viz., भृगुर्वै वारुणिः, etc., as it does not bring out the nature of Brahman.

The answer is contained in तथैवोदाहरणमाह, etc. The Bhāṣyakāra no doubt concedes the rule that we must proceed from the known to the unknown—प्रसिद्धानुवादेन अप्रसिद्धं विधीयते; but he points out that the objection raised on that ground is irrelevant here. In the passage given as illustration what is to be noted is that Bhṛgu goes to his father as one anxious to know Brahman. He is a 'mumukṣu', one



26. From the reasoning pointed out when explaining the word 'atha' (in the first sūtra), the text (*viz.*, 'Bhṛguvai Vāruṇiḥ—Bhṛgu the son of Varuṇa') should be taken to illustrate the first sūtra, and the text 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni' 'from which these beings', to illustrate the sūtra beginning with 'Janma' origination, etc.

How (can it be argued that the Entity from which these beings are born is Brahman)?

Since the origin, etc., of the earth, etc., is, from the proofs adduced already, a matter of experience and since in the determination of its cause, evidence is lacking by which to ascertain which of the two, *viz.*, unitary causation or plural causation is to be apprehended and when all that is known is only that the precedent causal entity is some intelligent Being, the singleness of cause is rendered explicit by the text 'From whence (yataḥ) proceed these beings'; because the word denoting the cause (yataḥ) is in the singular number and because the purpose (of the text—Yato vā imāni) is to denote only that (*viz.*, *ekatva*), the distinctive cause, *viz.*, that the Being whence the world originated is all-knowing and all-potent, is by presumption (*arthāpatti*) understood from the text itself (*viz.*, *yato vā*, etc.). Again (we have) the text "That, have the desire to understand, (Tait. Bhṛguvalli)"—this is a restatement—*anuvāda* having reference to what has gone before. (It is followed by the statement), "That is Brahman"; because here the word 'Brahman' is used, what is ascertained by taking it in its (literal) sense of vastness, is that the Being which is the cause of the world is characterised by freedom from all limitations.

27. The determinative sentence of that (world-cause) is, "For indeed from bliss only (beings are here born, when born they live by bliss and on death they enter into bliss).—Tait. Up.,

---

wishing to learn, and unless there has first sprung in him the desire for knowledge, the question 'what is that Brahman', *i.e.*, 'what is its specific nature' does not arise. Hence the order in the Vedāntic passages, *viz.*, Bhṛgu—Vāruṇi approached his father Varuṇa and asked 'Teach me Brahman'.... 'That, surely, from which beings are here born, etc.'—Tait. Up., III Valli.

It may be noted that here the thing to be defined—unknown, is mentioned first and then follow the description of its specific nature. This is justified on the ground mentioned above. Hence there is no need to reverse the order of the Upaniṣadic texts.

III-6). Since it is associated with the particle 'hi' which points to something well known it is right to suppose that it points to bliss as the essence (of Brahman). If indeed a thing that is of the nature of non-bliss be the world-cause the word 'Brahman' will not be applicable to it. By the application of its meaning (*viz.*, *bṛhatva* or vastness) to what deserves (only) neglect, it will cease to be truly significant. Hence in the text relating to Brahman, (*viz.*, "Whence these beings are born, etc."), since the aggregate of the attributes beginning with 'origination, etc.,' defines Brahman only by indirect indication and (as such) does not establish its contact with Brahman (it is evident that), Brahman is Omniscient, Omnipotent and Supreme Bliss. It is thus established that the real nature of Brahman is what is defined in the sūtra beginning with 'origination, etc.'

*Here ends the Fifth Varnaka of the Pañcapādikā*

## VARṆAKA VI

### THE OMNISCIENCE OF BRAHMAN

I. [Page 82] ["From its being the source of Scripture"]. This sūtra lays down another reason in support of the omniscience of Brahman which is the cause of the world.<sup>1</sup> Since the śāstra, termed the Veda (whose study demands) the aid of several branches of knowledge, dealing with innumerable and varied topics, falls within the world-order, its source is from Brahman only (tata eva). And there is no proof for the existence of any thing that is not its (Veda) content. Hence because it embraces everything it is omniscient. The use of the termination "Kalpa" in the Bhāṣya (sarvajñakalpasya) is to indicate that Scripture, because it lacks consciousness, falls a little short of perfection (in the matter of omniscience). As such, its cause (viz., Brahman) is understood to be able to comprehend much more than what forms its subject-matter. It is common knowledge that authors of śāstras are so even now (i.e., their knowledge is of wider range than that covered by their works).

II. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—If it be so the Veda would be dependent upon human authorship since its composition presupposes an intelligent understanding (of its purport with the aid of other pramāṇas).<sup>3</sup>

*Siddhāntin*.—No, it would not, since like Brahman it is without a beginning and unalterably constant; (lit. unchanging like the anvil).

---

<sup>1</sup> अयमपरः सर्वज्ञत्वे हेतुः—Regarding the all-knowingness of Brahman, jagatkāraṇatva—the fact of its being the cause of the world—was adduced as one reason in the second sūtra. Here is given another, viz., śāstrayonitva—being the source of the Veda.

<sup>2</sup> उपबृंहित—supported. A proper study of the Veda requires a knowledge of Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, etc., cf.

पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्रांगमिश्रिताः । वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥  
(Yājñavalkya)

<sup>3</sup> नन्वेवं भवति—If it be stated that the Veda is a mere utterance of Īśvara, then He would not be omniscient for we see that the Vedic teacher even to-day repeats the Veda as ever before but he is not all-wise. Or if it be stated that Īśvara has composed the Veda having previously thought out its sense then the Veda would be of human origin and lose its character as the unfailing valid means of knowledge. This is the pūrvapakṣa and the PP. meets the objection in these words न स्यात्, etc.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—How then (could it be maintained) that its origin is from Brahman (seeing that the Veda is unalterable and beginningless)?

*Siddhāntin.*—Because it (Veda) is dependent upon that (*viz.*, Brahman), like the rope-serpent.<sup>4</sup> Even thus is the śruti—‘This (Veda) is breathed by Him’. Just as among men the act of breathing is spontaneous, even so in regard to the Veda and as such that (supposed) defect, *viz.*, that it is dependent on other *pramāṇas* does not exist.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—If it be so, (*i.e.*, if it is not admitted that it is composed after due thought) how do you maintain the omniscience of Brahman?<sup>5</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—The world of names is constituted by the manifestation of the knowledge-giving power of that (Brahman) only. Even of the world of forms the manifestation is dependent upon that (Brahman) and as such it has its origin in it (Brahman).<sup>6</sup> There is no origination of a non-existent entity.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Here is pointed out the difference between the unalterableness of the Veda and of Brahman. The Veda is not eternal since it belongs to the world-order, nor is it unoriginated. It is *vivarta* or manifestation of Brahman like the silver in the shell. Without Brahman there could be no universe as without rope there would be no serpent. Its eternality coexists in its similarity as regards the verbal order from cycle to cycle. The Śruti also vouches for its origin from *Īśvara*—  
अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्चसितं एतत्.

<sup>5</sup> To avoid the human origin of the Veda it is stated that the Veda is the manifestation or *vivarta* of Brahman and as such Brahman is the *vivartopādānakāraṇa* of the world like the rope in the rope-serpent illusion. Then the Pāṇinian example is out of place. Not being the author in the sense that Pāṇini is, Brahman cannot be said to possess transcendental knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> The phenomenal world is differentiated by names and forms. Brahman is the ground of their existence and manifestation—*सत्तास्फूर्ति*. As the material cause Brahman possesses vastly superior knowledge as compared with the object world (*रूपप्रपञ्च*) and the world of names (*नामप्रपञ्च*), which latter includes the Veda. Hence answering the query the PP. says—*तस्यैव नामप्रपञ्चस्य ज्ञानशक्तिविवर्तोत्पत्तत्वात्*.

<sup>7</sup> Because names and forms which constitute the world derive their being and manifestation from Brahman it is wrong to suppose that the origination of the world proceeds from non-existence as maintained by the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists.

## VARṆAKA VII

### BRAHMAN—ESTABLISHED ON THE AUTHORITY OF VEDĀNTA

I. ['Or else Ṛgveda, etc., as stated above']—commencing with this Bhāṣya the Bhāṣyakāra says that the (third) sūtra bears another meaning, viz., the enunciation of the pramāṇa (or the valid means of knowing the real nature of Brahman), inasmuch as this second interpretation is a necessity.<sup>1</sup>

*Query.*—How could a single aphorism bear a double sense ?

*Answer.*—Only because it is a sūtra, as witness the Paurāṇikas —“what the knowers of the meaning of ‘Sūtra’ say is that a sūtra should consist of a minimum number of letters, be free from doubt, should contain the quintessence of the thing, should admit of more than one sense, contain no unnecessary letter, and be free from erroneous terminology”. By the word ‘Viśvatomukha’ is meant that it bears more than one sense. Hence it is indeed an embellishment to the sūtra that it yields diverse meanings.

*Query.*—Well, in explaining the previous aphorism (second sūtra) the Bhāṣyakāra adduced as illustration the pertinent Scriptural passage—“From whence all these beings are born, etc.,” and as such purposed to show that the Śāstra itself points to Scripture as the valid means of knowing the nature of Brahman.

*Answer.*—It is true; on the strength of this (third sūtra) that (Śruti—‘yato vā, etc.’) was adduced in illustration. Otherwise owing to the absence of any reference to the Vedic text (in the second sūtra) it would lead to the supposition that inference only was intimated for establishing the nature of Brahman.

---

<sup>1</sup> The third sūtra ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ admits of a double interpretation. The compound may be resolved either as शास्त्रस्य योनिः = शास्त्रयोनिः, तस्य भावः, शास्त्रयोनित्वम् ; तस्मात्—that which is the origin (of the Śāstra, viz., Brahman) or as शास्त्रं योनिः यस्य तत् = शास्त्रयोनिः तस्य भावः शास्त्रयोनित्वम्—तस्मात्—(Brahman) which has the Śāstra as its pramāṇa. The phrase here has to be construed in the second way. What it means is that the Śāstra beginning with the Ṛgveda is the pramāṇa or the valid means, of proving Brahman’s existence. It is through Scriptures apart from reasoning that Brahman is known as the cause of the origin, etc., of the world. The sūtra therefore may be taken as enunciating the pramāṇa for establishing Brahman.

Such contingency arising the Bhāṣyakāra has stated that [‘the omniscient, and omnipotent cause from which the origination, etc., of the world take place, is Brahman—and that this is complementary (to the aphorism)’]; and this statement which reinforces (the Brahman’s being the world-cause, denoted by ‘yataḥ’) would be without any valid ground (if there were no sūtra to indicate that the śāstra alone is the valid means of knowing Brahman). Since it is also possible that separate entities in the objective-world may be produced from separate causes, omniscience and omnipotence of the world-cause will not eventuate; and since in the empirical world it is not seen that the word ‘Brahman’ is used to denote the cause of the world (the Bhāṣya, ‘omnipotence, etc.,’ would be groundless). [Page 83] Hence in order to remove the supposition that by inference alone Brahman could be understood the second sūtra might take this from—‘That from which there is the origination, etc., of the world is known from Vedic testimony’. (That Brahman has Śāstra as its pramāṇa no doubt results from the Sūtra when expanded thus, but ‘that Brahman is omniscient because it is the cause of the Veda’ does not result from the single Sūtra as framed above. Hence the need of a separate sūtra). The framing of the separate sūtra is for denoting by means of an alternative interpretation (vyākhyāntara) that the omniscience of Brahman could be easily established since Brahman is the cause of the Śāstra also, which Śāstra comes under the same category as the world (i.e., it is a kārya, not nitya as held by the Mīmāṃsaka).

*Here ends the Seventh Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā*



## VARṆAKA VIII

### VEDĀNTA—INTIMATES AN EXISTENT ENTITY

I. 1. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—[How can it be maintained that the Śāstra (Vedānta) is the valid means of ascertaining the nature of Brahman since it has been shown that the Śāstra has reference to *kriyā* or action as borne out by the statement, 'the Veda is denotative of action and as such what is not so denotative serves no purpose' (Jai. I. ii-1)? Hence the Vedānta texts possess no value because of their non-injunctive character].<sup>1</sup>

2. No doubt the texts quoted in the Bhāṣya, viz., "From which all these beings originate, etc.," declare Brahman characterised by such attributes as omniscience, etc., to be the cause of the universe. Still as there is scope also for perception, etc., to reveal an existing object, they (the Vedānta texts) cannot partake of the nature of a *pramāṇa* in relation to Brahman uncorroborated as they are by them (perception, etc.).

3. *Siddhāntin*.—Well, since the Veda is not the work of man, the knowledge that arises from it desiderates no other *pramāṇa* in the determination of the object denoted by it, and as such how could it be invalid (*i.e.*, how could its claim to convey valid knowledge regarding an accomplished object be denied)?<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> From the second sūtra the indicative definition (definition *per accidens*) of Brahman—तदस्यलक्षण, viz., that it is the cause of the origination, etc., of the world, as also the determinative definition (definition *per se*) of Brahman that it is consciousness, and bliss, is stated. The third sūtra sets forth that the Vedānta is the valid means of establishing Brahman so defined. Here the doubt arises how Brahman could be established on verbal testimony (Śāstrapramāṇa), since Brahman is an existing entity (Siddhavastu). The evidential character of verbal testimony, is impugned on the authority of Jaimini Sūtra—I. ii. 1.

This is the Mīmāṃsā demurrer. The point of the objection is that the entire Veda including the Vedānta has action as its *viṣaya* (content) and the Vedānta if it should reveal only an existing entity is valueless. परिनिष्ठतवस्तुनि-अभूत्, अस्ति, भविष्यति इत्यवगम्ये वस्तुनि. An existent object has reference to time—past, present or future, or it may mean a thing that is not the product of action—असाध्य.

<sup>2</sup> अपौरुषेयत्वात्—Statements made by men have often to be tested by other *pramāṇas* to ascertain their validity, but since the Veda is non-personal in origin its validity is absolute, requiring no corroborative evidence.

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—It is true; but still just as the visual cognition of the depression and elevation in a picture that is the object of the sense of touch, is invalid being uncorroborated by it (*viz.*, the tactual sense), even so here also (*i.e.*, in the case of knowledge arising from the Scripture) it would be (invalid).<sup>3</sup> Again, the Vedāntic texts are invalid also for the reason they signify nothing that is of value to man. What indeed constitutes human value (*puruṣārtha*) is the attainment of happiness and riddance of sorrow. And those (happiness and sorrow of which happiness is the object of attainment and sorrow of riddance) will not result in regard to that which is an existing entity and is not related to action, since it (Brahman) is an accomplished being. Hence (the Bhāṣya)—[‘nowhere has the significance of the Vedic statements been seen or found to be intelligible except in so far as they are associated with an injunction (either directly or remotely)].

4. Moreover, in regard to an object which is not given in perception, etc., śabda as a whole, (when not injunctive) fails to serve as a *pramāṇa*. The nature of the Śāstra is this, that it is explicative of things which are not cognised (by other *pramāṇas*).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Even in the case of independent *pramāṇas* we find that one contradicts the other. A picture that presents an even surface—*समता*—to the touch, appears as consisting of depressions and elevations to visual perception. Hence the invalidity of visual cognition. Even so the Vedānta text which declares the identity of Brahman with the individual soul is contradicted by what is given in perception (experience), *viz.*, that the body (*parāk*) which is subject to birth, growth and destruction is identical with the inner being (*pratyak*—individual soul) as witness the usage—*अहं मनुष्यः*—‘I am man’. The Śruti intimates the identity of *jīva* with Brahman while *pratyakṣa*, that of *jīva* with the body—TD.

<sup>4</sup> *किञ्च प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषये*, etc.—An aggregate of words not injunctive in character cannot denote an object which is not given by some *pramāṇa* other than śabda because of the absence of relation between such an aggregate and the object it signifies. It is a known fact that without the cognition of relation there arises no knowledge of the import of a proposition—*शब्दबोध*. As such the Vedānta ceases to be a valid means of conveying knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). This is known as *अर्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावरूपं अप्रामाण्यम्*—invalidity due to the failure to convey sense. The other two cases of invalidity are *अधिगतार्थबोधकत्वरूप*—that which makes known the known, and *प्रयोजनशून्यार्थबोधकत्वरूप*—that which intimates what serves no useful purpose. A valid means of

On the other hand, it is only in the manifestation of such objects as are understood by other *pramāṇas* that the capacity of *Śabda* is perceived but not in the manifestation of objects not so understood. Hence the Vedānta portions are purposeless; their validity in the revelation of Brahman is nought. It is, on this ground, therefore, that (we hear) the nauseating utterance of some that the Vedānta portions are the "barren tracts of Veda".

5. Now what the commentator (*Śamkara*) has stated (when adverting to the *Mīmāṃsā* view), namely, that if for fear of there being difference in the contexts, the Vedānta texts are not accepted as supplementary to the ritualistic injunctions by revealing the nature of the agent (in the ritualistic act) and of the deity (invoked in the ritual), they may denote the act of meditation explicit in their own *vākyas* (sentences)—that does not stand to reason.<sup>5</sup> Even though the Vedānta portion is (admitted to be) supplementary to injunctions of meditation, owing to lack of corroborative evidence, a Being endowed with omniscience, etc., as the cause of the world-creation cannot be established.

6. [Page 84] It is true (says the upholder of the latter view); when on the basis of inference is understood some world-cause undifferentiated by any attribute, qualifications are superimposed on it (*i.e.*, the world-cause) and from such (attribution) the injunction of meditation will be found to be justifiable.<sup>6</sup> In fine what

---

knowledge is defined thus—अनधिगताबाधितप्रयोजनवदर्थबोधकत्वं प्रामाण्यम्—Validity is constituted by its revelation of what is not known, what is not sublated, and what denotes something that will serve a purpose.

<sup>5</sup> यत्पुनः भाष्यकारेण—*Śamkara* states the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s alternative argument in support of his view that the Vedāntic texts import meditation. He would argue thus—If you (referring to the Vedāntin) say that the two contexts—the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, one of ritual and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, one of knowledge, are distinct and as such neither agent nor deity should here be the topic, I maintain that Vedānta texts subserve meditation mentioned in those very texts.

स्वाक्यगत, etc.—Statements contained in the Vedānta portion as contrasted with those of the *karmakāṇḍa*. It should be noted that meditation also is action, only mental, so that the subsidiariness of the Vedānta to action is as the *Mīmāṃsaka* thinks established. His point is that the Vedānta should be regarded either as being subordinate to *karmakāṇḍa* or as enjoining acts of meditation.

<sup>6</sup> सत्यम्-अनुमानतः—The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues thus: 'Both of us admit on the basis of कार्यलिङ्गकानुमान—(inference of cause from the effect,

is meant is (says the pūrvapakṣin), “that the Vedānta portions whose study follows from the injunction relating to the recital of one’s branch of the Veda (adhyayanavidhi) will not by any means be purportless”. And the fruit therein should be understood as resulting from the laudatory statements.<sup>7</sup>

III. 7. [That, however (*viz.*, Brahman is to be ascertained from the Vedānta Śāstra) since the Vedānta texts are congruent in having it (Brahman) as their purport.] In this aphorism the proposition that Brahman (tat) having the attributes of omniscience, etc., is known from the Vedānta śāstra as set forth and the probans (hetu) is stated in the words ‘because they are congruent—‘samanvaya’ which means that as regards their purport the Vedānta texts are in agreement.<sup>8</sup>

*e.g.*, the world is a product, it must have a cause), that some specifically undetermined cause, is the source of the world. We merely superimpose on that kāraṇa qualities which are not there for the purpose of meditation. Hence the Vedānta may be admitted as relating to the meditation of Brahman thus superimposed. Such an entity does not require corroboration from other pramāṇas.

<sup>7</sup> फलं च तत्र कल्प्य-आर्थवादिकम्—This sentence has dropped out of the text. It means that the fruit of meditation should be presumed to be that which is stated in the laudatory passages. The Siddhāntin points out that the Vedānta passages like ‘Existence, knowledge and bliss constitute Brahman’ do not contain any word denoting meditation nor do those passages occur in a meditation context. Hence, he argues, that they have no connection with meditation and are not supplementary to injunctions of meditation. He adds that notwithstanding, they are purposeful, since the knowledge of ātman—आत्मज्ञान—purporting from those texts is itself the phala.

The pūrvapakṣin’s answer is this—on the basis of injunction relating to Vedic study—अध्ययनविधि. The Vedāntic texts like ‘Existence, Knowledge, etc.,’ are studied. Therefore they should point to a prayojana as the ritualistic texts do. It is evident that mere knowledge of ātman does not confer the desired reward, *viz.*, immortality—अमृतत्व. The statements of the Vedānta denoting existing objects would become purportless unless associated with injunction—विधि. As such the laudatory passage should be construed thus—one who desires immortality should meditate on Brahman endowed with existence, etc., अमृतत्वकामः सत्यादिविशिष्टं ब्रह्म उपासीत.

Understand—फलं च तत्र कल्प्य-आर्थवादिकम् (*vide* V).

<sup>8</sup> तात्पर्येण, etc.—All the Vedāntic texts are accordant as much as they have for their purport the omniscient, omnipotent Brahman

‘Samanvaya’ means intimate connection (samyak anvaya). Here the question is ‘What is it that constitutes the intimacy of the connection’? It is the connection of words, which convey no mutually related meanings (*i.e.*, unlike the words which denote the relation of *kriyā* and *kāraka*), which desiderate none other (say, *niyoga*) along with the meaning which is a single unit (conception, unlike ‘blue-lotus’), which is homogeneous and which relates merely to the import of the *prātipadika* (uninflected substantive).<sup>9</sup>

as the cause of the origin, sustentation, and dissolution of the universe.

In the aphorism ‘तन्तुसमन्वयात्’ we find the probans *समन्वयात्* and the subject *तत्* (Brahman). The probandum *वेदान्तशास्त्रात्प्रतीयते* has to be understood. *तत्र-सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणके ब्रह्मणि*, in Brahman possessing omniscience, omnipotence, etc., *समन्वयात्*—‘Samanvaya’ means relation, which relation here is one of the manifestor and the manifested—*प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादक*. The Vedānta manifests the nature of Brahman. But that itself is the thesis set forth or *sādhya*. Hence there arises the defect of the identity of the probans and the probandum. To avoid this, ‘Samanvaya’ has to be understood in the sense of ‘*tātparyavatva*’ (having the purport). The syllogism may be stated thus:—

*Subject*.—Brahman—*तत्*.

*Probandum*.—Is revealed in the Vedānta—*वेदान्तशास्त्रात्प्रतिपाद्यते*.

*Probans*.—Because the Vedānta has Brahman as its purport—*वेदान्तशास्त्रतात्पर्यात्त्वात्*.

The *Pañcapādikā* completes the probans by supplying the word *तात्पर्येण* so that the sentence will read thus—*तात्पर्येण वेदान्तवाक्यानां समन्वयात्*.

<sup>9</sup> पदानां . . . कथनेन पदानां of the words contained in the texts—*तत्त्वमसि अहं ब्रह्मास्मि* :—

- (1) *परस्परानवच्छिन्नार्थानां*—mutually unrelated unlike the relation existing between *kriyā* and *kāraka* as for example in *सौमेन यजेत*.
- (2) *अनन्याकांक्षणाम्*—not desiderating *kārya* or *niyoga* or *vidhi*, as is required in ‘*उद्धिदा यजेत*,’ where *उद्धिद* is only the name of the *yāga* and is not *kāraka*.  
(1) and (2) are attributes to the words contained in the texts.
- (3) *अव्यतिरिक्त*—quite distinct from the relation existing between *kriyā* and *kāraka*.
- (4) *एकरस*—not like the non-difference-*cum*-difference as found in *नीलो घटः*.

8. It (the connection) is like the one between the words 'sah' and 'ayam' composing the sentence—(soyam Devadattaḥ) and like that between the words 'prakṛṣṭa' and 'prakāśa', (in the sentence—(prakṛṣṭaprakāśaś candraḥ) where the meaning conveyed is the same as when designated by the single term 'candra'.

(5) प्रातिपदिकार्थ— the meaning of the bare substantive, not desiderating kārya or niyoga or vidhi as required in 'उद्भिदा यजेत'.

(6) मात्र—undifferentiated by gender or number.

The attributes (3) to (6) refer to the meaning.

The relation of the words characterised by the attributes (1) and (2) with the meaning characterised by the attributes (3) to (6) is what is known as सम्यक् संबंधः or in other words the relation between the impartite vākya with the impartite sense.

सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्यस्थपदानामिवेतत्, etc.—the words here denote the impartite sense, i.e., the undifferentiated Devadatta. This is given to bring home the impartite sense conveyed by the Mahāvākya 'That Thou art'.

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशशब्दयोरिव—This is to illustrate the avāntara vākya—सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म.

The statements अयमात्मा, तत्त्वमसि, denote the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute by the secondary sense termed जहदजहलक्षण, i.e., by the partial rejection of the primary significance. All the Vedic texts relating to the cause of the origin, etc., of the world denote the Absolute only either by primary signification—मुख्यवृत्ति or by the partial rejection of the primary signification जहदजहलक्षण or by the 'conditioning adjunct'—उपाधि, e.g., the terms jñāna and ānanda denote Brahman by their primary significance; by the total rejection of the primary sense—जहलक्षण, for 'eka' should be taken to mean भेदाभाव—negation of the other; 'That thou art'—तत्त्वमसि by partial rejection; and the terms omniscience, etc., सर्वज्ञत्वादि, by the conditioning adjunct, viz., अनिर्वचनीयप्रपञ्चोपाधि for they will be inapplicable to the Absolute unless the world-creation stands over against it.

The Pañcapādikā adduces two empirical illustrations such as सोऽयं देवदत्तः and प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः, to substantiate the doctrine that the Vedāntic texts like तत्त्वमसि denote by lakṣaṇa the impartite homogeneous Brahman—अखण्डैकरस.

**Question:** How is the sentence, 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' ('this is that Devadatta') illustrative of तत्त्वमसि ('that thou art')? How does it end in denoting the bare, relationless object?

**Answer:** In 'this is Devadatta' we have an instance of recognition. It means that Devadatta who is present here and now, is the same Devadatta who was present there and then. But since there can be no



To explain—by some one who wishes to know which particular object is known by the (uninflected) word Candra the question is put, 'which in this luminous firmament is designated Candra?' The answer to that question is 'that which shines the brightest is Candra'. Thus only will it be the (right) answer if what is denoted by the word Candra is denoted likewise by these two words (*viz.*, *prakṛṣṭa* and *prakāśa*).<sup>10</sup> This being so even such

identity between Devadatta qualified by that place and that time with Devadatta qualified by this place and this time, we have to admit the identity of Devadatta on the basis of *upalakṣaṇa*—qualification *per accidens*. The differences of time and place are not attributive since they are not an integral part of Devadatta. Their function has ceased with pointing to Devadatta as such. Hence सोऽयं देवदत्तः is a mere identity-judgment. On this analogy we have to construe the Vedāntic statement, 'That thou art'—तत्त्वमसि. The word 'thou'—त्वं should be stripped of its associations like limited knowledge—किञ्चिज्ज्ञात्वं and the word 'that'—तत् of its associations like 'non-immediacy'—पारोक्ष्य; then 'thou' in its secondary sense of द्रष्टा—cogniser, and 'that' in its secondary significance of 'Brahman' will both denote the identical being. It should be noted that the sentence 'That thou art' restates the identity (*anuvāda*) of the individual soul with the Absolute, since while clarifying the meanings of the words *jīva* and Brahman, it establishes that identity and yet the *vākya* does retain its claim to be a valid means of knowledge—प्रामाण्य. Though the *vākya* is *anuvāda* its validity as a *pramāṇa* is not imperilled since it dispels the illusion that the *Jīva* and Brahman are distincts—*cf.* Comment on Advaita Vedānta Paribhāṣā—तत्त्वमसि वाक्यस्य पदार्थैकरूपज्ञानार्थे बोधकत्वेन अनुवादकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यम्, जीवब्रह्मणोः भेदभ्रमविरोधित्वात्.

This is what is known as सफलानुवाद.

Another objection raised is that since the statement, 'That thou art' has for its content nothing more than what is signified by the words composing it, *viz.*, 'that' and 'thou' it is no *vākyārtha* that we get, *i.e.*, there is propositional import. This is admitted by the Vedāntin. It is not *vākyārtha* but *avākyārtha* or *padārtha*, word-import. But we have to note the difference. In the case of *padārtha* it is the primary significance—*vākyārtha*, and in *vākyārtha* it is *lakṣyārtha*—secondary sense.—*cf.* N.S., III. 2.

<sup>10</sup> प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः—This is another instance to corroborate the view that the statement 'tatvamasi' points to a single entity. Now the word 'prakāśa' through its generic sense points to a particular object—व्यक्तिविशेष, *viz.*, the moon; and the word 'prakṛṣṭa' through its secondary sense resides in *prakāśa* indicating abundance. Here, neither the word 'prakṛṣṭa' which denotes quality nor *prakāśa* which denotes *jāti*

relation as exists in 'blue-lotus' where the two terms are in inseparable association, mutually delimiting, and connected as adjective and substantive (*i.e.*, attributive and attributed) is not found (in prakṛṣṭaparakāśa and alike in Satyam jñānam, etc.). How could then, the relation of the nature of kriyā and kāraṇa which are distinct (entities) exist in 'Satyam Jñānamanantam Brahma'.

IV. 9. (Hence) he (Śamkara) adduces as illustrations statements like 'Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning' (Chānd., VI. ii-1) which are of that description (*i.e.*, non-relational in character:—*cf.* above--padānām parasparānavacchinnānām, etc.).

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, validity should be pointed out from those texts only which have been adduced, as illustrations under the aphorism relating to the creation, etc. (of the world); what then (is the purpose of adducing different illustrations)?

*Siddhāntin.*—It is true; the commentator however has some object in view. There (in commenting on the second aphorism), the idea being that a definition of Brahman should be given, such sentences as based upon accidental features of Brahman, were adduced in illustration (*i.e.*, definition *per accidens*); here, on the other hand since the Vedāntic texts like 'That thou art' find their fulfilment in generating the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, and not merely in demonstrating that (Brahman), as the passive agent only, is the cause of the world-origin, sentences of that description only as "existence alone, my dear one, this was in the beginning" are adduced in illustration.

10. Again it was argued that an existing entity is cognisable by perception, etc., and that in its (perceptive cognition) absence, suspicion arising that it is unreal, it (Vedānta) loses its title to validity. Such an objection has been met by the statement that since Brahman is devoid of form, etc., it cannot be the object of the senses.<sup>11</sup>

---

(generic sense) can be significative of Candra. Hence having abandoned both the quality (प्रकृष्ट) and the class idea (प्रकाश) we relate them to their locus—Candra with which they are in inseparable union. It is therefore evident that प्रकृष्टप्रकाश and चन्द्र relate to the same object.

<sup>11</sup> यत्पुनः सिद्धे वस्तुनि, etc.—The opponent's objections may be stated thus:—

(i) The Vedāntic statements are incompetent to give us a knowledge of Brahman—an existing Being, because they require

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, we have said that because of the very fact of its non-apprehension by the senses and in consequence its not being an object of perception, etc., śabda as a whole loses its claim to be a valid means of knowledge in relation to it (Brahman).

11. *Siddhāntin*.—We will answer: it is no doubt seen that the use of words (i.e., verbal expression) as a whole is only with reference to an object which is the content (viśaya) of perception, etc. But we have to consider how a learner of language acquires (the significance of words). Evidently, it is the behaviour of the hearer (of the mandatory statement) that is the basis of children's acquisition of the significance of words. And that behaviour unalloyed from dependence on any other jñāna (pramāṇa) of the hearer serves as the cause in the learner's understanding of the significative potency of words. [Page 85] Hence at the time of understanding the potency of the word (to convey a particular

no pramāṇa for corroboration. If they do give us a knowledge of an existing Being they lose their character as valid means of knowledge having to depend on another pramāṇa.

- (ii) The whole body of the Veda has a purpose to serve—प्रयोजन. If the Vedānta which forms part of the Veda should intimate Brahman, it would be barren of results.

The answer to the first objection is found in the Bhāṣya statement—इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन संबन्धाग्रहणात्—Since Brahman is not an object of the senses it has no relation with those other means of knowledge, I. i. 2; cf. also V.S., II. i. 4 and II. iii. 7. A pramāṇa is not invalid merely on the ground that what is given in it is not also corroborated by another pramāṇa. The answer to the second objection follows later on.

उच्यते यद्यपि—If Brahman is not the object of the senses, it is pointed out there would be no relation established between Brahman and śabda for the object is something unknown—अप्रसिद्ध. The objection may be met as follows: Is it your contention that the relation that we cognise is only of śabda with an object that has been apprehended by some other pramāṇa or that the content of śabda is not only the object which it denotes but pramāṇāntara as well. We admit the first alternative though there are some cases where even objects not denoted by other pramāṇas do form the content of śabda (Veda), i.e., yūpa, the sacrificial post—cf. यद्यपि, PP., p. 84. Even as regards statements like सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तब्रह्म the words सत्यम्, etc., first get related to the differentiated Brahman—शबल and then by secondary implication—लक्षण they denote pure consciousness—शुद्ध.

meaning) the learner has no idea of the association of a separate pramāṇa with the cognition of the sense (of the sentence he has heard from his elder). Without at all having the knowledge (of the co-existence of a distinct pramāṇa) the boy comprehends the significative potency of the words. And in the manner in which the meaning is apprehended, in that very manner it comes to be associated in his mind (vijñāna) with the corresponding word. But when once he has understood the meanings of words and himself wishes to make a statement for conveying its sense to another, then he does so with the consciousness that the content of that statement has been directly cognised by him with the aid of some other pramāṇa; he (now wrongly) thinks that these two, viz., the fact of having been cognised by some other pramāṇa and the wish to convey the sense, were there when he understood the potency for the first time, but they are of no avail in producing that knowledge (i.e., the potency). Hence at the time the import of words is being grasped, the potency of śabda as manifesting an object presented by another pramāṇa is not cognised; but like the visual sense, etc., śabda generates cognition without desiderating anything else and in conformity with the acquired significance of the words. As such the fact of the prameya being the object of perception, etc., serves no purpose (i.e., is irrelevant) in śabda conveying its sense.

V. 12. And further how could any suspicion of non-validity arise as regards śabda (scriptural testimony) which is of non-personal origin and which like the eyes desiderates nothing else in the generation of knowledge?

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, the reason for doubt has been already stated: it is the invalidity of the visual cognition of the height and depressions seen in a picture (say of a landscape) which is apprehended by the tactile sense, because it (the visual cognition) is uncorroborated by it.

*Siddhāntin.*—That statement of yours is untenable because as an instrument of knowledge this (śabda) is free from defect, and as regards that (viz., the visual organ) there is its absence (i.e., the absence of aduṣṭakāraṇatva—non-defective instrumentality). To explain—as for śabda, it is free from defect since it is of impersonal origin.

13. As regards the prameya (the object of cognition) again, there exists no pramāṇa (anvaya vyatireka) to show that it serves as the cause of jñāna (i.e., the cognition of the propositional

import), because, śabda by itself is the cause of the knowledge since its purport is with reference to its own prameya. As for the picture which falls within the aggregate of causal factors (sāmagrī) in perceptive cognition, the juxtaposition of darker (and lighter) lines is the defect (*i.e.*, it causes an illusory vision of the picture). In its absence there arises a correct vision as when the eye is free from timira (*i.e.*, some eye-disease). Hence (*i.e.*, because of the absence of illusion-producing light and dark lines in the picture) the pramāṇa (*viz.*, the tactile sense) though it should proceed (to test what is given in perception), only corroborates it, and does not render it (the perceptive cognition) invalid. And (it should be noted) that the criterion of validity is not corroboration in the opinion of those who are proficient in the technique of pramāṇa but the revelation of objects (the presumption being that such revelation is valid).

Hence, as in the case of mandatory statements (in karma-kāṇḍa) where their validity is (unquestioned) in regard only to what they denote (*viz.*, action), even so in the case of statements denoting the nature of existing objects, for both (karmakāṇḍa and Vedānta) have in common the determination of a thing that is previously unknown (and as such each in its sphere is a valid means of knowledge).

VI. 14. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, it is but right that validity is only of mandatory statements since the Veda (Āmnāya) has action as its subject-matter.

*Siddhāntin*.—No, for it will lead to the fault of 'mutual dependence'—if indeed it be established that mandatory statements alone are the valid means of knowledge, then it could be established that the Veda has action for its subject-matter; again if it be established that the Veda has action for its subject-matter, validity could be of them only (*viz.*, mandatory statements) and as such it would be (a case of) mutual dependence. Indeed neither of these two can be established by something other.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> न ह्येकमपि, etc.—Neither of these two, *viz.*, action being the content of the Veda, and the validity of only mandatory statements, can be established by anything different from either of these two. If to avoid the fault of mutual dependence the Pūrvapakṣin should urge that on the authority of Jaimini Sūtras the Veda as a whole intimates action without presupposing the validity of mandatory statements, we may confront him with the equally authoritative statement of

As such what the Veda intimates, that is its meaning.<sup>13</sup> Hence just as the mandatory section by intimating *kārya*, has *kārya* (action) as its content, the Vedānta section also, by intimating the unity of the self, becomes fit to have that (*viz.*, the unity of the individual self and the absolute) as its content (*artha*). [Page 86] For credibility is the outcome of cognition and as for cognition, it is the same as regards both *kārya* (action) and the unity of the self. Even in the case of perception, etc., what sets the stamp of authoritativeness is that something not known before is revealed by them.<sup>14</sup>

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—(The *Pūrvapakṣin*) says (as follows): as for perception, etc., their authoritativeness as means of knowledge is intelligible because of the absence of anything else desiderated. But in regard to the Veda the study of which is undertaken in accordance with the mandate (that one should learn one's branch of the Scriptures), its object will not be fulfilled unless it satisfies some human end (*puruṣārtha*) as otherwise it will result in the futility of Scriptural injunctions. Hence it is unreasonable to suppose that the statements relating to the unity of the Self have only their own (literal) sense to intimate.<sup>15</sup>

---

Bādarāyaṇa that the Vedānta has an existing being as its content. Hence the fallacy of mutual dependence cannot be obviated.

<sup>13</sup> If 'having action alone as content' is the criterion of validity, texts intimating existing objects would become purposeless; if on the other hand the latter alone should be deemed valid the other texts would go without a purpose. Hence we must conclude that what import is special to the text, be it action or an existing entity, is verily its content.

<sup>14</sup> The *Mīmāṃsaka* considers that the Veda acquires its validity as a *pramāṇa* by the fact of its denoting action, *i.e.*, it is dependent on *prameya* or content. The *Siddhāntin* rightly points out that it is cognisability—*avabodha*, and not action that determines validity. The Veda acquires its validity because of its revelatory character, whether the revealing be of *kārya* or an existing object. Even *kārya* to be *prameya* should depend on *avabodha*. As such the certitude of the Vedānta as a *pramāṇa* depends upon its revealing the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with the Universal. This is the doctrine of *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, *i.e.*, that the truth is self-proved and not as the *Naiyāyikas* think dependent on corroboration *ab extra*—*cf.* A., p. 350.

<sup>15</sup> आह, etc.—The view that the authoritativeness of the Veda as a *pramāṇa* is because of its revealing some new knowledge, is



*Siddhāntin.*—It is thus answered: A person, as is well known, desires only so much—‘may good come to me, may evil not approach me’; and not thus—(*i.e.*, may the desired object result from action, and the riddance of pain from inaction) or other than thus—(*i.e.*, may the desired object result from inaction, and the riddance of pain from non-inaction). And of this (fruit or phala) he is not the arbiter (*e.g.*, he cannot make the impossible possible). In two ways does he desire to achieve his good; in regard to something that is possible of accomplishment (*sādhya* or *prāpya*), *e.g.*, reaching a village, etc., or through illusion in regard to something though already accomplished (*siddha* or *prāpta*), *e.g.*, the forgotten gold (ring) on one’s own finger (lit. gold, etc., kept in one’s hand). Evil also he wishes to get rid of in two ways (*i.e.*, under the following circumstances)—where a thing can be actually avoided (*sādhya*), *e.g.*, (falling into) a pit, etc., or where something though avoided (*parihṛta*) is attempted to be avoided as when—he attempts through delusion to avoid rope, etc., apprehended as serpent, etc. There (*i.e.*, of these two kinds of *puruṣārtha*) when a man’s object is of the nature of something that is fit to be achieved or fit to be avoided, injunction and prohibition are of significance since its achievement is dependent on the knowledge of the means (to be adopted). As regards the other two (*viz.*, that which is possessed and that from which one is really freed), since it is only the delusion that is the estranging element nothing other than its removal, is desired as one’s highest object. And as for its removal, it is accomplished by the knowledge of Reality and in no other way. Achieved even thus (*i.e.*, by the instrumentality of knowledge)

---

challenged. In those cases of perception, etc., where no action is meant it may be admitted that the knowledge imparted (अवबोध) is the *hetu* of *prāmāṇya*. But as regards the Veda the study of which is enjoined by the mandate, ‘one should learn one’s branch of the Veda’—it must denote some purposeful activity which can be achieved only by either engaging in action or desisting from it. Hence it must be admitted that the Vedic statements have for their content either incitement to action or dissuasion from it. Authoritativeness of the Veda therefore depends upon *pravartaktava* and not *bodhakatva*. The *Vedārthas* as forming an integral part of the Veda cannot therefore have an existing entity devoid of association with action, as its content.

the eradication of delusion, a person regards as puruṣārtha, nay he much applauds it.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed what is dependent upon (action as its) means might be obtained with toil, but in what is dependent on knowledge even toil (miserics that beset man) is eradicated. Hence of him who is deluded, thinking—as though his self is defiled by manifold ills, the highest human end will be attained only when the real nature of ātman which is void of all evils, is unfolded, and as such there arises no contingency that the scriptural injunction will be rendered futile, even if the identity statements end in declaring their own import.<sup>17</sup> Hence is concluded that the Śāstra is the valid means of the knowledge of Brahman as defined.

*Here ends the Eighth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā*

---

<sup>16</sup> सुतरां चाभिनन्दति.—Not only is the destruction of nescience a puruṣārtha but it is the highest. Hence the attribution of excellence to what is accomplished by knowledge as contrasted with what is accomplished by action. The latter involves much physical labour, while the former removes all the miseries that beset man. Hence the Vedānta holds out puruṣārtha without enjoining any action and as such the contention that because the Vedānta has for its content an existing entity it is purposeless, is vitiated by the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha, i.e., where the hetu is absent in the subject (pakṣa).

<sup>17</sup> It is on the ground of purposelessness that the Mīmāṃsaka attempted to refute the claim of the Vedānta as a valid means of knowledge, but the Siddhāntin has now shown that the Vedānta serves a supreme purpose, viz., the removal of illusion. If the ritual-section of the Veda is purposeful, so also is the knowledge-section. While in the one the means to attain the short-lived happiness of svarga, etc., is enjoined, in the other the way is pointed out for the attainment of eternal bliss. Hence both karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa have a purpose to serve.

## VARNAKA IX

### IS BRAHMAN THE OBJECT OF THE INJUNCTION OF MEDITATION ?

I. 1. ["Here some others come forward with this objection."] No doubt,<sup>1</sup> from the scriptures (only) is Brahman understood and yet it is in association with an injunction and not without it. Why so? (It may be asked). Otherwise communication by speech will be unintelligible. The employment of words is, it is evident, the outcome (*i.e.*, external manifestation) of a man's will. And that (will) has as its object the acquisition of what is desired and the avoidance of what is undesired. The desired and the undesired will not happen by excluding even their indirect relation with pleasure and pain. Unlike the attainment of pleasure and the riddance of pain (respectively) after one becomes aware of the forgotten gold and of the rope on which the serpent is superimposed, they are not perceived when similarly from the scriptures the nature of Brahman is understood. Even as before the flux of life appears (to continue). [Page 87] Also

---

<sup>1</sup> यद्यपि—Kumārila Bhaṭṭa admits that in empirical usage, words have the potency to intimate their sense having come into compatible relation with other words; *e.g.*, in 'घटमानय'—'bring the pot', the word 'घट' is potent to reveal its meaning having got into relation with the objective termination 'अम्'. It is not incumbent that the sense should be *kārya* only. The other requisites are its corroboration by a different *pramāṇa*, say, perception—*pramāṇāntarasamvāda* and serviceableness—*prayojanavatva*. His contention is that if the Vedānta intimates only an existent entity it loses its claim to be a valid means of knowledge as there is no *pramāṇāntarasamvāda*; neither perception nor any other *pramāṇa* can vouch for the existence of such an entity as Brahman. The Veda is *apauruṣeya* and as such there is no scope for ordinary *pramāṇas* here.

In this section is examined the doctrine of Vṛttikāra (with whom Prabhākara agrees) who urges that 'śabdavāda' whether empirical or Vedic must intimate as its import what is inseparably related to action.

It must be noted that in his attempt to disprove that the Scriptures reveal the existence of Brahman, Bhaṭṭa virtually disbelieves in the existence of Brahman. The Vṛttikāra on the other hand admits as the Vedāntin does, that Brahman is revealed by the śāstra but maintains that without association, with some action no statement whether empirical or Vedic is significant.

because of the fact that following the acquisition of jñāna by the study of the Vedānta śāstra, contemplation (nididhyāsa) is prescribed. Hence though it may perhaps be conceded that in empirical usage statements have as their final import some human end (puruṣārtha) even if they do not convey any injunction, in the Veda, when not injunctive in character they cannot have that (*viz.*, puruṣārtha) as their fruit.

2. Hence though in reality between the inquiry into the nature of Dharma and of Brahman there exists difference in what is to be attained, because of the fact that the content of the one (*i.e.*, of the latter) is an accompanied object and that of the other, what is yet to be accomplished, yet when injunctions, 'He is to be sought out', 'He is to be inquired into', etc., exist the question 'who is this ātman?' arises; and then the whole assemblage of words (padasamanvayaḥ) relating to the nature of Brahman will be found useful in its delineation; but (that contexture of words) is not capable of expounding Brahman independently (*i.e.*, except as subsidiary to an injunctive statement). Hence what is to be understood is that Brahman is revealed as being in the objective relation to the enjoined jñāna. Again (what is to be understood) from the bhāṣya ['Hence it follows that the śāstra can be accepted as the valid means of knowing. Brahman only in so far as it (Brahman) is the object of an injunction relating to pratipatti'], is that it is the conclusion of the opponent's view. There, the word 'pratipatti' is to be understood as denoting every mental activity whether it is of the nature of pramāṇa (pramā) or otherwise (say a meditative act) which is assumed by some to be enjoined in some manner, with Brahman as its object—(the word 'pratipatti' in the concluding bhāṣya) is to be understood as standing in brief for all that (*i.e.*, both pramāṇātmaka and itara).

II. 3. *Siddhāntin.*—Here is the answer: Of what nature is that knowledge which having Brahman as its object, is enjoined? It is not however what is conveyed by śabda (*i.e.*, it is not verbal knowledge) for that is attained by the mere study of one's own branch of the Veda. It may be said that the continuous recalling to mind of that very knowledge produced by śabda is enjoined, but then we do not perceive any good resulting from it.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, it is perceived that a continuous thought of a desired object does serve as the cause of an uninterrupted succession of pleasurable sensations (sukhasantāna—here it is happiness of the nature of mokṣa or liberation).

*Siddhāntin.*—If it be so, verily as in the other, injunction is purposeless (*i.e.*, even without injunction recollection of a pleasant experience induces happiness).

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—But now this is our view, that the injunction relating to the knowledge-series (*i.e.*, mandate enjoining continuous recalling of the identity—knowledge arising from śabda) is laid down for 'sākṣātkāra' (*i.e.*, final psychosis which removes the primal ignorance).

*Siddhāntin.*—That does not stand to reason. A mandate having a perceivable end will not be such, without the probability at least (of that result being an object) of direct experience. An object of inferential knowledge (say fire whose knowledge is inferred from the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire) will not be the content of immediate perception even though the knowledge arising from the līṅga (middle term or hetu) is repeated a thousand times.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Let not sākṣātkāra result only from verbal knowledge constantly recalled. It will result from a separate cognition arising from it (*viz.*, from smṛtisantāna—stream of recollections).<sup>2</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—There is no evidence that such is the case.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, be it admitted then that what is enjoined is the mental act termed 'dhyāna' (meditation) on the object cognized from śabda (*i.e.*, verbal testimony) in the very manner in which one has cognized it.

---

<sup>2</sup> तज्जन्मनो ज्ञानान्तराद्भविष्यति—The Vṛttikāra's contention that the Vedānta passages have as their purport the enjoining of either a continuous recalling of the Brahma-cognition arising from the comprehension of the pertinent texts or the enjoining of meditation as vouched for from the statement 'nididhyāsitavyaḥ' has been rebutted. Now he shifts the ground and asserts that a distinct type of jñāna is produced by meditation and that the aspirant is enjoined to acquire that jñāna. The question then will be which is the content of that jñāna and which is the means by which it is to be acquired? The means, it may be said, is prescribed in Bṛh. UP., IV. iv. 22; then the objection is that the Vedic injunction related to this particular jñāna and not to that of identity which latter is what the Vṛttikāra is trying to maintain. Maṇḍana, a Vedāntin of old, was a staunch advocate of such a view. For a concise but clear exposition of the different views held on the subject—*vide* 'Introduction to N.S.', p. 22 ff.

*Siddhāntin.*—With what purpose is it (meditation) enjoined ?

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—It is for the immediate perception (sākṣātkāra) of the object of meditation.

*Siddhāntin.*—That will not result (*i.e.*, there is no possibility of the intuitive perception of the object of meditation resulting from meditation). An object of contemplation which is beyond the range of perception is not seen to become the content of intuitive perception.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—Well, it is a matter of experience that when one is assailed by lustful passion, etc., the object of constant thought though beyond the range of perception is seen to come within one's immediate vision.

*Siddhāntin.*—Your reasoning is not valid. What is meditated upon (*viz.*, wife and child—say) does not become (as object of immediate perception). But it is the outcome of nescience (and as such it is illusory knowledge); if it were otherwise it would not be sublated.

4. *Pūrvapakṣin.*—(In the Bṛh. Up., II. iv. 5, we have the passage—‘This self is to be seen—draṣṭavyaḥ,—heard about,—śrotavyaḥ, cogitated upon—mantavyaḥ, meditated upon—nididhyāsitaḥ’). Here from the word ‘draṣṭavyaḥ’ which means ‘with the object of darśana’ (immediate perception—sākṣātkāra), meditation which has darśana as its fruit is enjoined as vouched for by the word ‘nididhyāsitaḥ’.

*Siddhāntin.*—It has already been said that an injunction having a perceivable end will not be such without (at least) having a probable phala (*vide, ante*). [Page 88] Nowhere indeed has meditation been found to be the cause of the immediate perception of the object of meditation. Even admitting that the immediate perception of the object of meditation results from meditation, what evidence is there that the object of meditation is real (*i.e.*, of that character, *viz.*, identity of the Jīva with Brahman)? The dhyeya or the object of contemplation may be something imaginary. As for śabda (verbal testimony), it stops at decreeing meditation as the means of securing sākṣātkāra and does not teach that the dhyeya is an actuality (*i.e.*, it cannot also have the additional function of denoting real identity as the content of meditation. A single sentence cannot bear two meanings).

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—It is true; but still the truth (*i.e.*, the identity of the individual soul with the supreme spirit) does become evident



on the analogy of the principle to be set forth later in (establishing) the embodiment of the deities.<sup>3</sup>

*Siddhāntin.*—The analogy stated is inappropriate. There (in that context) indeed, because of the absence of a distinct *pramāṇa* either corroborating, or annulling what it (Śruti) actually imports, it is so understood by those who adhere to what the words actually convey (lit. by those whose refuge is the knowledge as conveyed by the words). But it is not so here; perception, etc., are adverse to the conception that all is *ātman*. And meditation is intelligible even when the object of meditation is assumptive. Even as regards the injunctions of knowledge mentioned before, this very course has to be followed in rebutting (the claim) that the injunction of *jñāna* is for establishing reality as it is.

III. 5. Again it is said by others that as distinct from a knowledge of the import of *śabda* there arises a distinct non-empirical cognition and that is what is enjoined in the Vedāntic texts as one's duty to acquire (*vide, ante*). As regards that (view) we ask, 'well then, which is the means (*i.e.*, *pramāṇa* by which such cognition is proved) and which is the content (*viśaya* of that cognition) ?—these questions have to be answered. No cognition which has not a known content in the objective relation can possibly be enjoined. And when that (*viz.*, the content of immediate perception—*aparokṣa-jñāna*) is known, the injunction will be purposeless.

6. Again the means of acquiring it (cognition) is not enjoined and without it the injunctive sentence desiderating (here, lacking in the answer to the question, 'by what means is that cognition to be acquired ?), would convey no meaning.

If it be averred that, from the text—(Brh. Up., IV. 4-22), 'such a one the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by a recital of the Vedas, etc.,' the means (for the knowledge of Brahman) constituted by the Vedic recital is certainly enjoined, then Upaniṣadic testimony

<sup>3</sup> वक्ष्यमाणेन देवताविग्रहत्वन्यायेन—This reference to V.S., I. iii. 26 points to Padmapāda's commentary (?) beyond I. i., i—4. Mantras and arthavādas become finally significant only in relation to injunctive statements; yet they convey their own sense inasmuch as they, for example, denote the corporeality of Gods—देवताविग्रह, etc. Similarly, says the pūrva-pakṣin, Vedic passages may bear a double sense—the Vidhi primarily is with reference to the unique *jñāna* but secondarily to the unity of *ātman* and Brahman—ब्रह्मात्मैक्य.

becomes the means (of the knowledge) of another pramāṇa (the *tertium quid*) and not of the true self; and that does not stand to reason. Indeed the validity (of knowledge) is known from Kārya (i.e., pramāṇaphala) and not from vidhi (injunction); (and in support) this may be cited—"or by secondary implication (at least) the sense of a word would be understood, since the relation (between the word and its meaning) is not brought about by the śāstra—Jai. III. ii-4)." Hence this contention that Brahman is established by Vedic testimony only when in association with an injunction (niyoga) is baseless.<sup>4</sup>

IV. 7. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Thereafter (atha) when on the basis of the text—"now, the light which shines higher than the distant heaven", Brahman which transcends the universe is admitted, the rule pertaining to the assumption of forms by the deities applies (here also) and as such (we must conclude) that meditation on Brahman is enjoined on one who aspires for liberation.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> अयुक्तेतद्विधिसमन्वये शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वं ब्रह्मणः—'No doubt' says the Siddhāntin, 'in ordinary intercourse we see a master ordering his servant to do something as tethering a cow'. Here, in the form of command the master expresses his wish to prompt the servant to action. But such a procedure is out of place in the Vedic utterances since the Veda is of non-personal origin. If 'niyoga' means kārya, i.e., the knowledge that arises in one that it is one's duty to undertake something, we should ascertain whether 'kārya' implies, (i) association with action, or (ii) something fit to be undertaken, or (iii) something non-empirical, distinct from an act (क्रिया), causal correlate (कारक) and fruit (फल). It is not (i) because association with action—प्रकृति-संसृष्ट means कार्ये which is the cause of प्रकृति a case of self-dependence—आत्माश्रय; not (ii), for even a thing that brings about an evil is fit to be undertaken—कृतिसाध्य; not (iii) for a thing which is non-empirical—अलौकिकपदार्थ is non-perceptive and therefore niyoga expressed from terminations such as liñ, etc., will not be significant.

It cannot be said that efforts to action would be impossible if niyoga or kārya is not the purport of Vedāntic texts, for what is fit to be striven after and is the means of achieving the object of one's desire is certain to prompt activity. It is इष्टसाधनज्ञान,—the knowledge that good will result that incites one to action—*vide* VPS., p. 237.

<sup>5</sup> अथाप्यथ यदन्तःपरोज्योतिः—Chānd. Up., III. xiii. 7. Others hold the view that the individual soul and Brahman are distinct and that meditation on the text 'aham Brahmāsmi'—'I am Brahman' where the non-difference of Brahman is superimposed on the jīva, is

To this effect is the Vedic text—‘from Vidyā (*i.e.*, meditation) they attain that (*i.e.*, Brahman)’. Nor can it be contended that because it (*i.e.*, liberation) is something produced it has termination (*i.e.*, not eternal), for from the verbal testimony, ‘he does not return again’ (Chānd., IV. xv-6; VIII. xv-1; Bṛh., VI. ii-15) cessation from recurrent births is ascertained. It is not to be ascertained from reasoning, for if it had been so (if the nature of liberation were possible of ascertainment from reasoning) its real nature could have been determined by reasoning (*tarka* or *ratio-cination*). As to him who thinks that of what is to be known from śabda<sup>6</sup> its real nature is to be determined from śabda only, the Bhāṣyakāra (Śāṅkara) replies as follows:—[“No, what you say is not valid, because of the difference in the nature of the benefits to be had from action on the one side and the knowledge of Brahman on the other.”]

---

enjoined, and from that contemplation mokṣa is secured as svarga from ‘yāga’. They argue that Brahman (ज्योतिः) has no contact with jīva and dwells outside the world.

But Śāṅkara has already stated that meditation which is action, yields a fruit distinct from that accruing from Brahmajñāna. देवता-विग्रहत्व-याय, *i.e.*, when a Vedic statement does not repeat what has been vouched for by some other pramāṇa, nor is contradicted by other pramāṇas that statement must be taken to mean what it actually denotes. This rule is applicable here. Brahman is described as of the form of light and as such meditation on such Brahman should be understood as having been enjoined—this is what is urged by the Pūrvapakṣin.

<sup>6</sup> शब्दगम्यत्वात्—Now there is conflict between Śruti and anumāna as to the nature of mokṣa. The Scriptural statement—‘there is no return hither (न च पुनरावर्तते)’ points to the eternality of liberation reached by meditation, while the *tarka*—whatever is a product is ephemeral (यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम्) points to the opposite conclusion. Hence it may be urged that there is room for uncertainty (संशय) but the Pūrvapakṣin argues that doubt may arise only when two arguments are of equal weight, as between ‘sādhakānumāna’ and ‘satpratipakṣa’, *i.e.*, when one *hetu* leading to a particular conclusion is paralleled by another *hetu* leading to an opposite conclusion, but when the reasoning (तर्क) contradicts the scriptural statement (शब्द), the former is overruled by the latter. Hence he concludes that mokṣa though attained by the act of meditation is eternal on the strength of the Śruti—न च पुनरावर्तते.

8. This is the abridged statement of the topic (under consideration, *viz.*, the difference in the nature of fruits). Of this alone the elaboration is contained in the comment ending with, ["therefore the teaching regarding Brahman cannot in reason be supplementary to action (lit. what is enjoined)"]. In brief this is what it means—since both on the strength of Vedic authority and reasoning it is admitted to be eternal, liberation is not an effect of action. How? (It may be asked). If like the meditation (on the resplendent deity) at sunrise and sundown, which is mental, the meditative act having Brahman as its content is also mental and enjoined for the fruit of liberation, (then it would be enjoined) like yāga (jyotiṣṭoma) which yields the fruit of svarga (the abode of gods. [Page 89] Then the fruit would be for the enjoyment of an embodied being only, with the result that the enunciations of liberation as disembodiedness and also of the absence of contact with the pleasing and the displeasing appropriate (in an embodied state) as stated in the text 'neither the pleasing nor the displeasing touches one who is in a disembodied state' would both be baseless. And it cannot be argued that disembodiedness itself is the effect of dharma (*i.e.*, meditative act) for it exists in itself (and is not produced by any other agency; it is eternal—the state of liberation). Hence disembodiedness termed mokṣa (liberation), is distinct from the fruit possible of attainment by effort, and is self-established and as such its eternality is indubitable.

9. And even there (even on the supposition that it is nitya), if mokṣa were somehow of the nature of pariṇāmīnitya (*i.e.*, eternality consistent with transformation like clay which is constant though changed into pot) then perhaps it might possibly have been the effect of dharma (*i.e.*, meditative act).<sup>7</sup> But this Brahman of the nature of immutable eternality the cognition of whose essence is understood as constituting the jīva's liberation, is the subject of the present inquiry. And now rejecting (the true)

---

<sup>7</sup> तथापि कथं चित्, etc.—The point to be decided is whether disembodiedness—अशरीरत्वं which is mokṣa, is natural and pristine or occasional, brought on by some external agency. It is to be noted that between the body and the self there exists no real connection. Hence non-embodiedness is natural and embodiedness is but illusory. And the cognition of such illusory relation cannot be removed by acts like meditation nor is modification by medication possible in the case of ātman which is disembodied and immutable (*vide* V.P., 254).

mokṣa which, like the forgotten gold kept in one's own hand, is concealed only by illusion, if mokṣa of the nature of some specific pleasure capable of being enjoyed, be conceived as resulting from a meditative act having Brahman as its content, very like yāga, etc., performed to propitiate a deity, then this (mokṣa) also would become identically one among those very pleasures which are the fruit of yāga and are subject to gradation (*i.e.*, different degrees of pleasure). Then mokṣa would partake of the nature of non-eternality as may be inferred from the maxim (*viz.*, yat kṛtakam tadanityam—whatever is a product, that is inconstant), which has the support of the corroborative text—"as here on earth, objects of enjoyment earned by works are destroyed, even so, there, objects of enjoyment earned by merit are destroyed"—(Chānd., VIII. 1-6). And it is not so admitted by those who advocate mokṣa. Hence the teaching of Brahman cannot reasonably be regarded as auxiliary to duty (*i.e.*, the enjoined meditation)—this is the conclusion.

V. 10. The statement again, that it is not proper to refute by logic the eternality (of mokṣa) apprehended from the text, 'He does not return to mundane life'—(Chānd., VIII. 15-1) is wrong. From the use of the present tense (*āvartate*) the need for pramāṇa to substantiate its being so (*i.e.*, mokṣa effected by meditation being eternal) is evident; (for 'na ca punarāvartate' is only a laudatory statement and therefore it is no pramāṇa). There is no pramāṇa to validate the eternity of what is an effect. The analogy that the quality of colour produced by heat in atoms is eternal does not hold good, for it finds support only in the technique (of the Vaiśeṣikas).

11. Again (we have) the scriptural texts—"For them there is no return hither" (Chānd. Up., VIII. 15). "(They who proceed by it) return not to this world of man caught in saṃsāra (the wheel of life and death)"—Chānd., IV. 15-5; here the qualifying words 'here—iha' and 'this—imam' point to non-reversion in this cycle and not to limitless non-reversion. Again on the supposition (for argument's sake) that Brahman admits of association with action, it was stated that liberation would be liable to the defect of non-eternality, but the fact is that the congruence of sense yielded by the words composing the Vedānta passages does not tolerate (Brahman's) association with action. Even so scriptural texts such as, 'The knower of Brahman becomes verily Brahman'—Muṇḍ., III. 9, which promise liberation immediately

after the cognizance of Brahman, repel the interposition of any action, since simultaneity of time as to the cognizance and the attainment of Brahman is specified. Hence Brahman cognised (from verbal testimony) is not related (as object) to (a meditative) act.

12. Likewise (we have the text), “seeing this, indeed the seer (ṛṣi) Vāmadeva obtained (the universal self-hood)”—Bṛh. Up., I. iv-10; here since it is pointed out that the knowledge of Brahman is synchronous with the attainment of universal self-hood, the participle affix ‘śatṛ’ (in paśyan) wards off the intervention of a separate act (*viz.*, that of meditation); [Page 90]. As witness, “when one action is the remainder of another action, the root of the verb denoting ‘remainder’ or ‘cause’ takes the ‘śatṛ’” (present participle)—(Pāṇini, III. ii-126) and since *kriyā* is the cause (*hetu*) of another *kriyā* (product or *phala*) nothing should intervene. Compare the analogous passage ‘standing he sings’ where we find that between the standing and the singing there is no action (of the same agent) intervening; there the act of singing is not accomplished merely on the strength of the action of standing but results from a distinct effort, and the analogy is applicable only in so far as no word in the sentence (standing he sings) denotes the intervention of any action between those two (*viz.*, the standing and the singing). Here, on the other hand, for the realization of the universal self-hood, there appears no need of any distinct effort apart from the knowledge of Brahman.

13. Again, the Śrutis like “To him (Nārada) who is rid of all impurities, he (*viz.*, Sanatkumāra) shows the further shore of darkness”—Chānd., VII. 26-2, point merely to the removal of darkness, that is, the illusory knowledge which intercepts liberation; and (they do not point to) liberation as the result of action.

VI. 14. From this also (*viz.*, that the removal of nescience from the knowledge of reality and not from meditation) is confirmed—other rationalistic thinkers (Gautama-Nyāyasūtra, I. i-2) also point out that liberation which is no other than the absence of misery follows immediately on the removal of wrong knowledge. [“And the removal of wrong knowledge results from the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ātman”]; not from action.

*Pūrvapakṣin.*—How is this known?

*Siddhāntin.*—‘Indra by his māyik powers assumes many forms’ (Bṛh. Up., II. v-19), from this text it is only perceived that



the apprehension of difference is illusory only, and that it is removed by the apprehension of non-difference which is its opposite.<sup>8</sup>

VII. 15. Let it be what you say; (even then) the knowledge of identity has not as its content the thing as it really is (*i.e.*, it does not denote absolute identity for no such identity exists); if it had such a content, then the apprehension of difference which is illusory in character would have been dispelled by it. On the other hand (it denotes) an imagined form, etc. (*sampadādi*) enjoined to be meditated upon by one who so desires. What 'sapat' means is meditation on a great object even in a small thing as its substrate by merely perceiving some common characteristic (between the two). And from that (fancied identity, etc.) there results the fruit (sought for). The fruit either, may be imagined; to explain: from the common feature of the endless psychoses (mental modifications) meditation on the endless *Viśvedevas*—the All-gods, is resorted to, which results in the conquest of the endless worlds—(*vide*, *Bṛh. Up.*, III. i-9). Similarly since the individual soul possesses the common feature of intelligence, having imagined Brahman-feature in it (and so meditating, the aspirant) attains the fruit of Brahmahood—(*Brahmaphala*).

16. Meditation on mind, sun, etc., none of which is Brahman, imagining them to be Brahman, is superimposition; similar is the meditation on the individual soul imagined as Brahman. Making prominent that which is to be meditated upon (*i.e.*, the imagined object) and regarding the ground (say mind) as if non-existing, is what constitutes 'sapat' (imaginary identification); in superimposition (*adhyāsa*) on the other hand it is the constant dwelling of the mind on the locus making that itself prominent. Meditation on mind as possessed of the quality of 'gathering up' because it gathers up unto itself fire, etc., is (known as) *kriyāyoga*. Similar is the meditation of the individual soul identifying it with Brahman since it (*jīva*) is associated with the meaning of the root 'bṛh'. It is ceremonial purification to conceive as Brahman the

---

<sup>8</sup> इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते; इन्द्रः—परमेश्वरः, from the root (इदि परमैश्वर्ये), मायाभिः—अनन्ताभिः मायाभिः, पुरुरूपः=आकाशवाय्वादिरूपः, ईयते—विवर्तते.

It is the potency of primal nescience with which the Supreme projects the world-spectacle with all its variety, and this nescience can disappear only with the rise of *Brahmajñāna*.

individual self who occupies a subordinate position in some kārya (yāga) much like the act of looking at the clarified butter.<sup>9</sup>

VIII. 17. *Siddhāntin*.—Here is the answer. (If the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ātman were admitted) as referring to 'sampat' (*i.e.*, fancied combination), etc., (it would be going counter to the texts which purport to intimate identity). [Page 91] Then (*i.e.*, if meditation is what is meant), the connected sequence of words in the (Vedāntic) texts, 'That thou art' and the like, which denotes in no figurative sense, the knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman would, without any cause and most arbitrarily, be imagined to refer to sampat, etc. And it would be suppressing one's own actual experience of the fruit of the nature of the attainment of Brahman resulting from that cognition (*viz.*, of identity) preceded by the cessation of ignorance and which is similar to the discovery of the forgotten gold that is in (one's own) hand. Also the Śruti, 'variety here is none' (Bṛh., IV. iv-19; Kāṭha., IV-15), which intimates the non-existence of difference, would be contradicted.

18. Hence the knowledge of Brahman is, unlike sampat, etc., not dependent on man's activity, but it should be admitted that like the cognition arising from perception, etc., it has as its content the object (*i.e.*, Brahman) in its mere essence, which is unrelated (as content) either to (the act of) eschewing or possessing.

19. When that is so, how could Brahman, after its knowledge has arisen, be construed as being in the objective relation? How could its cognition (*i.e.*, the knowledge of Brahman from verbal testimony) either, be the content of injunction seeing that it brings on (without any injunction) the fruit of self-realization? Hence it is illusory only—this cognition of difference (*i.e.*, the multiplex

---

<sup>9</sup> The Pūrvaśakṣin disputes the claim that Brahman and the individual soul are in reality one. He says that the so-called identity may be explained in one of the four ways: (i) sampat, fancied identification; (ii) adhyāsa—superimposition; (iii) kriyāyoga—connection of things viewed as identical with some special activity as in the passage—'air is the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber' (Chānd. Up., IV. iii. i-3); jīva is Vibhu and hence it acquires the meaning of the root 'bṛh' in Brahman; (iv) Samskāra—ceremonial purification, just as in yāga the ghee is purified by the look of the sacrificer's wife, so the self of the man who meditates on Brahman is purified by the cognition of its being identical with Brahman.

world of sense); and its sublation is from the cognition of non-difference which is its opposite. Therefore it is evident that both on the authority of the Scriptures and reasoning liberation is only the eradication of illusory knowledge.

IX. 20. Well, Brahman indeed becomes the object of the verb 'to know', so that when its relation with action is feasible, there is room for injunction; anticipating this objection (the Bhāṣyakāra) says: ["Nor, again, as being the object of the act of knowing can Brahman be related to action" ?]

Says (the pūrvapakṣin): And this (*viz.*, the negation of the objective relation of Brahman to the act of meditation) is (on a par with) raising the devil in the act of exorcising it—in repudiating Brahman's association with action (in general) you have repudiated its association as content of even the act of knowing (*i.e.*, the act of meditation); and thereby only, is, for sure, repudiated its (Brahman's) source also—the śāstra, and this is expressed in the bhāṣya); ["if Brahman is not the content (of speech, mind, etc.), the śāstra cannot possibly be the source of Brahman"].

21. *Siddhāntin*.—Here is the answer: ["No, your contention is baseless, because (the object of the śāstra is to repudiate all distinctions which are) the creation of nescience".] Indeed the śāstra is the valid means in the knowledge of Brahman as the empirical sentence, 'This is that' is (in the recognition, say, of Devadatta).<sup>10</sup> To explain: In the sentence 'This is that', by

<sup>10</sup> शास्त्रं हि सोऽयमित्यादि, etc.—The Scripture bears evidence to the identity of Brahman-ātman on the analogy of the empirical statement, 'this is that man'. In the sentence, 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' it is admitted by all schools of thought that Devadatta divested of all limiting adjuncts is the prameya, *i.e.*, the object of knowledge conveyed by the sentence, but it is by the elimination of delimiting adjuncts of space and time which relate to the past and the present, which are subversive of the non-difference between Devadatta seen before and seen now. It is by ignoring these limitations that we get rid of the notion of difference and apprehend identity as expressed in the sentence. Even so is the validity of the Vedāntic statement, 'That thou art'. It is to be noted that the Mahāvākya 'तत्त्वमसि', generates the final *psychosis*, 'वृत्ति' of the form of the pure impartite Brahman—विज्ञानघन which destroys the notion of difference between the individual self and Brahman, as wrongly held by the world. Brahman is self-luminous. The function of the Scriptures consists only in the removal of the obscuring nescience and not in manifesting Brahman.

the removal of the cause of distinction, *viz.*, space and time, non-distinction is cognised. Similarly (the individual)—the meaning of the word 'Thou' also believing himself to be of the nature of the individuated ego, cognises, on (hearing the text) 'That thou art' his oneness with what the word 'That' stands for (*viz.*, Brahman), just as (he understands oneness) from the sentence 'This is that (Devadatta)'; and that (*i.e.*, the import of 'the that') is pointed to (by the Mahāvākya) as no other than the luminous 'not-this', which is conditioned by the world constituted by the notions of the known, the knower and the knowledge, the result of the 'This' aspect of ego-consciousness, which is sublated by the implicit capacity (of that which is the object of the final psychosis, *viz.*, Brahman or the not-this element). Even that (*viz.*, the conditioned not-this element) when the limiting adjunct (*viz.*, notion of knower, etc.), is destroyed as the result of the destruction of nescience parts at the very moment with its aspect (as the conditioned) and attains (its pristine state) free from all determinations. Hence though all at once the quartet of knower, etc., (object of knowledge, act of knowing and means of knowledge) perishes, the fruit of self-realization (anubhavaphala) conditioned by that (*viz.*, the quartet) depends upon verbal testimony.<sup>11</sup> Therefore it is that the learned in the Veda have concluded that the bliss of liberation (or in other words the unqualified Ātman) is known only from the Veda. As such, in the bhāṣyas are mentioned 'Mantra' and 'Brāhmaṇa' statements which reveal the function of the pramāṇa (śabda) of this nature. In the result, ["since (the Mahāvākya) shows that release is of the nature of the eternally liberated ātman it (mokṣa) is not liable to the defect of non-eternality".]

X. 22. [Page 92] In the bhāṣya beginning with ["For him (Vṛttikāra) to whom liberation is something to be effected"],

<sup>11</sup> The fruit of verbal testimony (*viz.*, Mahāvākya) is the final psychosis—चरमवृत्ति in which is reflected the pure consciousness (Brahman) and this Brahman as conditioned thus has the capacity (अर्थात्) to destroy the obscuring avidyā and even while avidyā which is the hetu of the notions of the knower, etc., is eradicated Brahman manifests itself in its self-luminosity rid of all determinations. Hence it is said that Brahman is known only from the knowledge which the pregnant statements of Vedānta convey. Indirectly therefore they are the means of imparting the cognition of identity.

and ending with ("Therefore here (*i.e.*, as regards mokṣa) not even in the slightest degree is it (liberation) connected with action apart from its sole connection with knowledge"], what is pointed out is that for one who having abandoned the conception of liberation as identical with the eternally liberated ātman which results from the removal of nescience, imagines its (liberation) connection with action—even to him—there can be no such possibility (of release being connected with action). 'How?' (it may be asked). When liberation is regarded as something to be produced or modified, there no doubt it is reasonable to hold that it admits of association with action but then it was pointed out from the bhāṣya, "No, the fruit of action on the one hand and the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman on the other hand are quite distinct, etc.," that non-eternality would certainly follow.

23. But, in order to obviate (the contingency of) non-eternality, if it be said that what already exists only (and not the effected or modified) is the thing to be obtained, even that is untenable. It is against reason (to suppose) that what is of the nature of a person's self is something to be obtained preceded by kriyā (*i.e.*, the act of meditation—jñānakriyā serving as its cause). Even on the basis of its (liberation or Brahman) being distinct (from one's self), its attainment is not dependent on action since it is omnipresent and as such is eternally present like (the all-embracing) ether.

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, though not resident in (*i.e.*, unrelated to) the manifested world (vikāra—illusorily transformed world) Brahman (is seated above) as witness the Scriptural text—"Now, the light which is higher than this heaven (svarga), etc.," and as such there is need for action for its attainment.<sup>18</sup>

*Siddhāntin*.—No; even in the illusory world, since Brahman's connection with the manifested world is absent, there is nothing to differentiate (between the state of Brahman in two regions and as such Sarvagatatva or all-pervadingness is not annulled).

<sup>18</sup> अथ विकारावर्तिनः (PP.); the other reading is 'विकारवर्तिनः'. Here the first reading is followed. What the pūrvapakṣin urges (if we take the second reading) is that ubiquitousness—सर्वगतत्व of Brahman mentioned above is only figurative, since Brahman is described as occupying a region higher than the Heavens—Chānd. Up., III. xviii-7. Hence both readings make good sense.

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, (we say), that Brahman is by no means connected with the illusorily-manifested world and does not exist in the illusorily-manifested region (but resides in a distinct region). Hence the need for action for its attainment.

*Siddhāntin*.—Well then (we ask), ‘Does that attainment tantamount to the jīva’s becoming identical with it (Brahman) or to its existence there (i.e., in the Brahma-region) in its own state (i.e., without losing its identity)? If the first alternative, then, it (jīva’s) individual nature is destroyed. If on the other hand it is the second, since conjunction must end in disjunction return (from that bourn is inevitable).<sup>14</sup> And the Śruti text, viz., “He does not return hither again”, denoting an action (i.e., returning) relating to the present time desiderates another valid means (pramāṇa) to substantiate that it is so (i.e., that the liberated person does not return) and as such does not itself become pramāṇa in this behalf.<sup>15</sup>

.24. Nor is it maintainable that release is something to be purified for neither the addition of any excellence nor the removal of any taint is possible there. It may be urged that the purification is for the manifestation of what exists (viz., Brahmanbhāva) as in the case of a mirror (whose natural brightness becomes manifest by the act of rubbing). This again does not hold good, for the self is void of action. Again it (the self) is not the content of (i.e., related to) action having its abode in something different, since it is the inward being (and is therefore unrelated to anything extraneous).

<sup>14</sup> स्वरूपनाशः—If the jīva becomes one with Brahman, the Dvaitin must admit that its distinguishing features admitted by him, viz., its atomic size, its agency, etc., would perish. If on the other the jīva should retain its identity in heaven then in accordance with the rule that samyoga must end in viprayoga, the jīva’s association with Brahman must be followed by dissociation: Hence the non-eternality of liberation.

<sup>15</sup> वर्तमानापदशात्—It is patent that simultaneous attainment of the Higher Region and return to mundane life is an impossible notion and need not therefore be denied. Hence the Śruti ‘न च पुनरावर्तते’ is only anuvādārthavāda. The use of the present tense—‘आवर्तते’ points to the simultaneity of attainment and return which is a palpable contradiction. It is to be noted then that the vākya ‘न पुनरावर्तते’ is not a pramāṇa in regard to what it imports but is only a laudatory statement.



25. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, there does result the removal of taint from meditation on Īśvara just as darkness, the obscuring veil of a jar, is removed by the light of a lamp.

*Siddhāntin*.—We ask, whether this taint existing in reality (is removed) or having (only) an illusory existence? If being existent in reality (it is removed) then it is not possible to remove it without its abode (*viz.*, the self) undergoing change. But the self suffers no change as evidenced from the Śruti intimating the unchangeability (of ātman). If however the taint is illusorily conceived then its removal is not possible unless it be with the rise of perfect knowledge in one who is under (the sway of) nescience, for such is the common experience (*i.e.*, ignorance as removed only by knowledge), and is not perceived otherwise (*i.e.*, the removal of ignorance is not perceived to result from action). And purification is not possible as (it is) by the act of bathing, etc.; for there the purification is only of the 'this' element of the ego—the agent (in all cognitions and actions).

26. The (bhāṣya) concludes thus: ["Therefore Release is not something to be purified either."] And yet anticipating a possible doubt that there exists some other result of action by which means release might be connected with action (the (Bhāṣya-kāra) says, ["anything other than these, etc."] [Page 93] Indeed it is not possible for any one to show either visible or invisible result of action which is other than the set of four beginning with origination (the others being āpti, vikāra and saṃskāra). To conclude, Release is possible of attainment only by knowledge, and not by action.<sup>16</sup>

XI. 27. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, by you, (quoting the bhāṣya) "nor again, as being the object of the act of knowing, can Brahman be related to action" (*Cf.*, Kena Up., I. 3); it was asserted that Brahman was not the content of knowledge even (*vide, ante*).

*Siddhāntin*.—Yes, it is true, (Brahman's) objective relation to knowledge was condemned, but it was not said that knowledge served absolutely no purpose. And in fact in that context only the way it fulfils its purpose was pointed out in the bhāṣya: ("No, your contention is baseless"), because the object of the śāstra

<sup>16</sup> Hence no one is able to show any other way by which connection between liberation and action could be established—अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुम्—Bhāṣya.

(i.e., of the knowledge arising from the śāstra) is to repudiate all distinctions which are the creation of nescience, etc.”).

28. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Do not, then, aver, “It is out of the question that here action could have access, even to the slightest extent” (i.e., Release could have no connection whatsoever with action). [“Is not knowledge a mental act?”]

*Siddhāntin*.—[No, is our answer, since the two are of a distinct nature.]

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—How, of a different nature?

*Siddhāntin*.—Because the phala (i.e., the result of knowledge) is not something that originates (afresh). The non-origination-character of the result has been discussed in the comment of egoity (*vide* 1st Varṇaka).

29. Here is another distinction (between knowledge and action). Knowledge is the result not of an injunction but as is well known it is the object that gives rise to it; and as for the object, it exists in its own right even before its knowledge arises. Hence knowledge is dependent on that and it is not possible for the knowledge to effect any change in that (*viz.*, the object).

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Even granting it (the doubt) remains still; it may be that perceptive cognition originates from the object; how in the case of inference, etc.?

*Siddhāntin*.—Even there the dependence is on the probans, etc., and injunction has not scope there<sup>18</sup> Moreover knowledge that arises from injunction is not always determinative of the object (as it really is); for we find the injunction laid down for the meditation on woman (Chānd. Up., V. vii-1 : viii-1), etc., as fire, etc. Hence knowledge having an (existent) object as its content, though partaking of the nature of action (kriyā) is not the effect of an injunction and is not dependent on man’s effort, but on the other hand it is dependent on pramāṇa and viśaya. Thus is the intelligibility of true knowledge (possible) like the knowledge of fire in the fire (unlike that knowledge in woman). This being so, since even the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the self has for its content an object such as it really is, it does not

<sup>18</sup> Even in the case of inference and verbal testimony knowledge arises from pramāṇa—liṅga or probans in the case of inference, and śabda or scriptural testimony, in the case of kriyā like jyotiṣṭoma or Brahman, an accomplished entity. No codanā or injunction is needed for jñāna. We may include arthāpatti, upamāna and anupalabdhī.

originate from injunction. As such injunction has no place here (*i.e.*, in Brahma-knowledge).

30. Hence though mandatory statements exist (referring to the knowledge of Brahman) their function is impeded in relation to the knowledge that is dependent entirely on the valid means of proof and the existent object, since they are ineffective.<sup>19</sup> Therefore the Vedic texts such as 'ātman is to be seen, heard about, thought over and meditated upon' look like injunctions, because as laudatory passages they extol the knowledge of (the identity of) ātman (with the absolute), because they divert the mind towards it (*i.e.*, the knowledge of Brahman), and because by inhibiting one's outward-bound activities which are prompted by natural propensities they possess something of the nature of action that is enjoined.

31. Similarly, by the term 'śravaṇa' is meant the inquiry into the import of the Vedānta passages for the comprehension of ātman, as also the inquiry into the nature of the self. By 'manana' is meant concentrated thought on the illustration of the 'great drum, etc.' (the 'duṇḍubhi' drowns every other sound) adduced in support of the scriptural statement (*viz.*, 'That thou art' etc.), importing the reality (*viz.*, identity of the self with Brahman), on the laudatory passages relating to the origination, sustention and destruction (of the world), and on the (Upaniṣadic) text that the manifested world is mere verbal distinction;<sup>20</sup> (Manana) also

<sup>19</sup> अतः . . . . कुण्ठीभवन्ति—The objection may be raised that reasoning cannot go counter to such Vedic texts as 'Atman is to be seen' which are clearly injunctive in character. But this objection is void. The Vedic texts serve as valid means of knowledge where their application is appropriate and not where they are not. If their validity is accepted as infallible in all cases and no exceptions are permitted then validity has to be admitted even of the statement, 'Prajāpati disembowled his own entrails'—such statements are to be taken as only laudatory in character. Even so the texts—'ātman is to be seen, etc.' are intended to extol the knowledge of the self. They have no validity of their own. Imperative statements referring to the knowledge of Brahman are to be regarded as ineffective as a razor when used against a stone.

<sup>20</sup> The illustration of the drum is intended to show that all mind-begotten (क्लृप्त) cognitions are dissolved in the cognition of the substrate, *viz.*, Brahman (Brh. Up., IV. V. 8); "from which these beings are born, born from which they live by it, that into which when deceased they enter (Tait. Up., III. i)," this is noted to show that nothing exists

means the consideration of the syllogistic arguments not hostile to the import of the propositional statement (*viz.*, the identity of *jīva* with Brahman). By 'nididhyāsana' is meant the strengthening of the conviction regarding the meaning of the identity proposition which has been firmly grasped by *manana* (and not the *nididhyāsana* of what is enjoined), for *nididhyāsana*, otherwise termed 'upāsana' which is enjoined (*i.e.*, which is the content of a Vedic mandate) yields no fruit. 'Darśana' is the intuitive experience as the result of firm conviction in the *vākyārtha* of the unity of the homogeneous mass of sentiency rid of the entire world of illusory manifestation.

32. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—[Page 94] Which then is the laudatory passage ?

*Siddhāntin*.—This is what is expressed in the context there—It is for (the benefit) of Maitreyī who had renounced all love of worldly life (constituted as it is) of action, agent and fruit, and who was longing for freedom, that (Yājñavalkya) desirous of expounding the knowledge of the self which is the means of attaining freedom, declares, 'Lo, not for the love of the husband is the husband loved, etc.,'—thereby precluding the desire for the husband (as the end in itself) and emphasising that the self is the supreme object of desire (Bṛh. Up., IV. 5. 6 ff).

*Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, it is not the desire of *ātman* that is declared as the most coveted object, but it is only the husband, etc., who are as objects of desire, declared for the sake of *ātman* (the self) as witness, 'for the love of *ātman* does the husband become dear'.

*Siddhāntin*.—No, your contention is wrong. If that (*ātman*) is not a thing wished for, we would not covet that which procures it, (*viz.*, love of husband, etc.). Hence through this means (*i.e.*, by the example of one's love for one's husband) is declared that *ātman* only is the thing wished for. If that is the object of desire the text 'to be seen, to be heard about' is (indeed to be regarded as) a laudatory statement. All this is implied in the first sūtra and expounded also in the *bhāṣya*.<sup>21</sup>

apart from Brahman; "all changes are mere verbal distinctions, a mere name, the real thing is only, 'clay'," (Chānd. Up., VI. 4). This points to the unreality of the manifested world of sense.

<sup>21</sup> प्रथमसूत्रेणैव सूत्रितम्-विवृतं च भाष्ये:—Atman's being the object of desire; the non-mandatory character of the knowledge of *ātman* because it is

33. Moreover this termination 'tavya' (belonging to the kṛtya group of terminations) does not denote injunction.<sup>22</sup> In what sense then is it used? In accordance with the rule 'kṛtya' and trc in the sense of 'worthiness', kṛtya (here the 'tavya' termination falling under that order) denotes worthiness. From this it is to be understood that the texts like 'meditate on ātman only'; 'meditate only on ātman the blissful' (lokam), which are but semblances of injunction are (as good as) explained. Hence it is only by the cognition (intuitive) of Brahman, having nothing to do with either the avoidance or the pursuit of an object that one's duty is perceived as accomplished. Scripture and traditional treatises also are corroborative in this respect.

34. Hence (the Bhāṣya) concludes with the statement ['Therefore Brahman is not to be regarded as the object of injunction (of meditation)']. What it signifies is that Brahman has no connection with any cognitive activity relating either to valid knowledge or other, assumed to be injunctive in character.

XII. 35. The (Bhāṣya) statement ['And that which some maintain, etc.,'] (has to be considered). This is its purport:—

---

the subject; application of vidhi to inquiry (vicāraavidhi) which is auxiliary to śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana undertaken for jñāna;—all this is implied in the first sūtra—अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा.

In that sūtra the phrase 'Brahmajijñāsā' means 'desire for the knowledge of Brahman' and by extension of the sense it amounts to this that inquiry has to be made for the knowledge of Brahman. Now since the sūtra sets out with the resolve to undertake the inquiry the pertinent Vedic text has to be mentioned. Otherwise there would be no connection between the sūtra and the Śruti—śrutisaṅgati is vital to the aphorisms. Hence the source should be sought in 'ātman is to be seen, heard about, etc.' And because of the identity of sense between the source and that which depends upon that source, viz., the first sūtra, the injunction enjoining inquiry—vicāra, must be regarded—as contained in the sūtra.

<sup>22</sup> अपि च नैवायं विधौ कृत्यः—So far, the text 'आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः', has been explained as intended for the laudation of ātman, taking for the sake of argument the 'tavya' termination of the four words in the text to denote injunction. The fact is it has no injunctive character. It denotes 'worthiness'—अर्हार्थत्व. The 'tavya' termination belonging to the 'kṛtya' order in द्रष्टव्यः, etc., does not convey the sense of injunction but denotes अर्हत्व. Hence the passage means that ātman is worthy of being seen—द्रष्टव्यः, etc.

If there should be any section of the Veda devoted also to the elucidation of mere existent things then this, what has been said before (by the Vedāntin) would gain confirmation. Otherwise (*i.e.*, if no part of the Veda denotes a mere existing entity) what has no connection with action would only denote something unscriptural.<sup>23</sup>

36. *Siddhāntin.*—Here is the answer: Your view is erroneous. [“The puruṣa—the individual soul, which forms the subject-matter of the Upaniṣads, is not complementary to anything else”:]—this is the brief statement of the subject, and its own elaboration (is contained in the bhāṣya), [“That which is to be understood from the Upaniṣads only, etc.”]. This is what it means—that which is different from the self which is the object of the ego-notion and is related to works, (this is jīvātman), is uniform and the one amidst all (transitory) things, being the witness of even the ego-notion—that is not established by any pramāṇa (other than the Upaniṣad) as, had it been so established it might have got into relation with action. It is evident that what is not established by a different means of knowledge (pramāṇa) cannot be pointed to as having any connecton with action. Nor is it right to say that (because the whole of the Veda is concerned with laying down injunctions) that Being is impossible of comprehension, since it has been shown that the Upaniṣadic texts are all accordant in the elucidation of that Being (as the one homogeneous unity). Hence only it is, that the attribute of its being comprehended from the Upaniṣads and not from any other (is

---

<sup>23</sup> यदपि केचिदाहुः, etc.—It is admitted that liberation is the thing sought for (vidheya) and on reflection it is found that the text (śabda), “Existence, knowledge and bliss,” is the pramāṇa for knowing Brahman without requiring any specific injunction. This point was rendered explicit in the second Vārṇaka. That the Vedānta has the sole evidential value in the elucidation of Brahman was pointed out in the first Vārṇaka. The contention that the Vedānta portion of the Veda inculcates vidhi like the ritualistic portion was proved to be untenable by discussing the nature of Brahman, of knowledge, and of liberation. It was pointed that considered in whatever way vidhi is out of the question.

Now in the present context the discussion turns on the view held by both the objectors, that the Veda if it should denote anything other than injunction or something supplementary to it, would cease to be the Veda.



appropriate). And that (*viz.*, the epithet, *aupaniṣadatva*) is intelligible as denoting that the principal topic of the Vedānta passages is Brahman; (if the Vedānta relates to injunction then the epithet 'aupaniṣadatva' will be inappropriate). [Page 95] It cannot be said that though it (*Puruṣa* or Brahman) is known (from the Upaniṣads) it (*i.e.*, the cognition of that Being) is illusory, like that of the silver in nacre, because of the absence of negation. There is an additional reason why it cannot be argued that the knowledge of Brahman is illusory,<sup>24</sup>—in relation to that *Puruṣa* only there is corroboration from the Upaniṣadic text: "That self is not this, is not this" where the word 'ātman' is used. And of the ātman there is no possibility of negation (as witness the Bhāṣya), ["he who denies the ātman cannot avoid the contingency of himself being the ātman".<sup>25</sup>]

At no time does there occur its destruction for it is not the object of the causes which bring on destruction. And destruction is not without (having something as its antecedent) cause, because the doctrine of flux is discarded owing to the constant homogeneous refulgence of consciousness. Hence in that (ātman) which is void of the three particularising adjuncts (space, time and object-limitations) and is self-luminous everything perishes everything up to (and exclusive of) the *Puruṣa*, finds its effacement

<sup>24</sup> इतश्च—The objection against accepting the transcendent Brahman is that being an unknown entity no predication is possible. If the subject (उद्देश्य) were known then we could predicate non-duality, supreme knowledge and bliss, of that subject. But we have no knowledge of Brahman. Hence, says the *pūrvapakṣin*, such knowledge as is vouched for in the Upaniṣads must be illusory. The answer is furnished in the Śruti, "That self is not this, is not this"—Bṛh. Up., III. ix. 26. Here the pronouns सः and एषः denote the inner self (ātman) which is implied in the ego-notion. And this inner ātman is itself Brahman so that the predicates (विधेय) of non-duality, etc., relating to a known subject can be ascribed.

<sup>25</sup> य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वप्रसङ्गात्—We have to suppose here an alternative—Does there exist one who is the denier of ātman or does he not exist? In the first alternative the contingency of 'ātman's being the very self of the denier cannot be escaped; the denier exists, and existence—*sattā* is itself ātman. One cannot will away one's own existence. In the second alternative, since there exists no denier, the act of denying itself exists not. Then how could the non-existence of ātman be asserted?

(as borne out by the scriptural text—Kāṭha. Up., I. iii-2), “He is the limit, He is the final destination”. Therefore (this is the conclusion of the topic under consideration) when there are grounds such as these, how can it be maintained that the Vedic section (*viz.*, the Vedānta) is not elucidative of the non-transmigratory ātman which is not to be understood from any other means of valid means of knowledge and which is known from the gist of the Vedāntic texts? How again can that which is revealed therein be denied?

XIII. 38. *Pūrvapakṣin*.—Well, ‘Since the Veda has action as its purport, those passages which do not refer to action have no sense to convey’ (Jai., Sut., I. ii-1); the learned interpreters of the Śāstra say that statements which do not import action are void of sense. Hence (the Vedānta texts) which declare something which neither impels one to action nor dissuades one from it are purportless (*nirālambana*) and as such there can be no cognition of an existent object from it (*i.e.*, the Vedānta). And what knowledge arises from Vedic passages merely on the ground of the universal (*vākyatva*) is illusory. Hence no verbal knowledge is possible of anything that neither helps in the impulsion to action nor desistance from it. For this reason also, *viz.*, that there is not any other means of proof even (apart from verbal testimony) in corroboration of the existence of such an object (*i.e.*, having no connection with action or inaction) it is right to regard that (*i.e.*, the cognition that has arisen somehow) as false. It may however be questioned how verbal knowledge is not possible of an object that (neither helps one to engage in action nor to desist from it). The answer is that śabda-śakti (*i.e.*, the power of denotation) is not perceived therein. And the mere word when its significative potency remains unknown fails unlike the sense of perception to generate knowledge.<sup>26</sup> And it is from the cognitive

<sup>26</sup> न चागृहीतसामर्थ्य एव, etc.—It is not essential that the significative potency of a word should be known, prior to verbal knowledge. In inferring the specific fire on the hill we first comprehend the universal concomitance of smoke with fire and then of fire on the hill. Even so the verbal cognition (शाब्दबोध) of the word ‘go’—cow, may first be comprehended as associated with the act, say, of bringing and then its denotation of the unassociated object, *viz.*, the mere existent ‘cow’ may be understood—no, says the *pūrvapakṣin*—न चागृहीत, etc. This is a negative analogy. चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणानां संबंधग्रहणं विनैव प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वम्. We need not know that the eye has come into contact with pot. It is

act that the existence of śakti (the denotative power) has to be inferred. And knowledge (*i.e.*, śābdabodha) has for its content a thing associated (with action) and it arises from activity in relation to that something. When such activity is absent (as in the case of existent objects) whence could the denotative power of śabda be understood? And how could a word whose significance is undetermined generate any knowledge of a thing that is unrelated to action?

39. *Siddhāntin*.—We will answer: Neither what the aphorist (Jaimini) and the commentator (Śabara) mean, nor the empirical (process of) reasoning (in construing a sentence) has been clearly understood by you. (Prabhākara.) Now you consider this—whether in the sentence—“Devadatta, drive the white cow with the stick,” the words ‘Devadatta’, etc., which are distinct from action-prompting word ‘drive’ and which are expressive of existent objects and do not therefore prompt action, are known from the very sentence enjoining action to possess the significative potency (śakti) in relation to existing objects also or not. If known (*i.e.*, if from mandatory sentences, the words denoting existing objects are ascertained to possess significative potency), then the word ‘ānarthakya’ (in ‘āmnāyasya kriyārthatvādānarthakamatadarthānām’) may be construed as ‘serving no purpose’ but not as lacking in content (śakya). And this is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (Śamkara) [‘again, since action is the purport of the Scripture’, etc.]

40. And the fruit (prayojana) consisting either in the acquirement of happiness or the riddance of misery accrues either directly following (action) or indirectly (when adṛṣṭa holds the fruit in store for a distant future.) [Page 96] Hence ‘ānarthakya’, (*i.e.*, fruitlessness) may be admitted in the case of sentences composed of such words as ‘he howled, etc.’ which do not subserve that object (*viz.*, the fruit, say, securing svarga). But (says the Siddhāntin) how could statements (like ‘that thou art’) which generate the knowledge of the identity of the individual with the supreme self having as their fruit the highest human end, be purposeless?<sup>27</sup>

enough if there is contact between the eye and the object. But as regards inference, postulation and comparison, knowledge presupposes the comprehension of sambandha.

<sup>27</sup> *Vide* Chap. VII of Śāstradīpikā (G.O.S.) on the import of propositions. The anvitābhīdhanāvāda of Prābhākara is criticised from the view-point of the Bhāṭṭa school.

XIV. 41. *Prābhākara*.—Well, this is what we hold as the right view.—It may be that even from a sentence prompting action the significative potency of words expressive of existing things also is known, but still such cognition is not possible from (words relating to) bare existing objects (*śuddha*), because the cognition (of the meaning) arises only as associated with an action (at the time of first learning its meaning). From the word 'go—cow' what is cognized at the time its primary sense is grasped is the *jāti* (cowhood) of an animal-with-a-dewlap. If now the word is to be interpreted in another sentence it cannot be regarded as either the unqualified (*i.e.*, unspecific) or as qualified otherwise, say as an animal having a mane.<sup>28</sup>

42. *Siddhāntin*.—Your discourse is irrelevant.<sup>29</sup> A variety of significative potencies of the word 'go' is perceived to exist

<sup>28</sup> तथापि, etc.—V.: ननु भूतार्थे सामर्थ्यं प्रतीयते चेत् भूतसंसर्गोऽपि प्रमीयतामिति ; नेत्याह तथापि नाप्रतिपन्नभूतार्थावगतेः संभवः.

The question to be put to *Prābhākara* is that if the words have the potency (*śakti*) of signifying existing objects, why not they be understood as capable of getting into suitable associations with one another and denote the import of the proposition? But *Prābhākara* while admitting that words are expressive of existing objects, maintains that they cannot do so unless related to a word prompting action (*Niyogasamsṛṣṭa*), for *śaktigraha* has arisen thus only.

The *Bhāṭṭa*, on the other hand, maintains that even without *niyoga* words may express the propositional import in the empirical sphere by getting into appropriate syntactical relation. In the *Veda*, however, he thinks that no purpose is served if merely existing objects are denoted, and that such *vidhi* or *niyoga* is essential.

The *Vedāntin* disagrees with both and maintains that a *Vedic* sentence is competent to denote an existing object and is also purposeful seeing that the highest human end—*paramapuruṣārtha*, is achieved by the comprehension of the import of such texts as 'That thou art'.

<sup>29</sup> विषय उपन्यासः.—Since the word 'go' is used in different contexts there is no impelling necessity that the genus cow (*गवाकृति*) which is its primary significance should invariably be associated with the verbal idea (*कार्ये*). On the other hand, we perceive it in association with quality—*guṇa*, substance—*dravya*, action—*kriyā*, causal correlate—*kāraka*, etc. Take the sentence 'bring the white cow'—*शुक्लां गमानय* here the quality 'white' is perceived as associated with the *dravya* in the genus 'cow' (*गवाकृतिसंपृक्तद्रव्यसंबधतया*), the *dravya* in association with the meaning of the case-termination, *dravya* in conjunction with *kāraka* in association with *kriyā*; bringing (*kriyā*) with the *niyoga* (*kārya* or

as other words (not importing action only) get unto relation with its meaning (*viz.*, an animal with the characteristic marks of cow). Hence (to avoid indetermination—*avyavasthā*) it is but right that the cognition (that arises from 'go') should be the same throughout (as you have pointed out). When, however, words signifying other things are conjoined with it as a result of divergence in the form of statements due to difference in terminations and difference in the things mentioned the import is seen to be divergent, and as such at the very time the sense of 'go' is understood, the import of the proposition (*samanvaya*) is cognized as determined by the insertion and removal (of the words that are in relation to the word 'go'). Hence with the words expressive of substance, quality and action and associated with such case-terminations as point to their fitness for getting into relation (with each other) propositions are employed each denoting its individual sense and as such it is clear that at the time of cognising the specific significance of the word, relation is not positive (*i.e.*, it may be action or an existing thing that is related).

43. Even so (of the Vedic statements), "The first offer of food (*viz.*, soma) is to him (the priest) who utters the formula 'vaṣaṭ' in offering an oblation"; "Pūṣā (sun) has the bolled meal as his share", the import is evident even though they contain no word expressive of action. As for the contention that its connection with action is secured with the word 'kartavyaḥ'

---

*apūrva*). It is therefore evident that the association of the word 'go' with *kārya* is not direct (but *vyavahita*). Hence to secure immediate consecution of relation the primary significance (*शक्ति*) should be understood as resident in "*anvitasvārtha*", *i.e.*, as associated with some other factor and not invariably with *kriyā* (*कार्यनिवृत्त*). This is known as "*Itarānvitavāda*" as distinguished from the "*abhihitānvayavāda*" of *Bhāṭṭa* and "*kriyānvitavāda*" of *Prābhākara*.

Again if 'śakti' is admitted as residing only in the meaning of the word associated with action, then the word denoting action—'*ānaya*' in the sentence under consideration would be left unrelated owing to the absence of another word denoting action; on other grounds also the *kāryānvita* has to be dispensed with. The primary significance of words as associated with any other words can be made out by looking up the dictionary and grammar.

The *Vivaraṇa* therefore concludes that the '*Itarānvita*' doctrine alone is the one meant by *Padmapāda*—तस्मादन्यसंसृष्टस्वार्थे शब्दसामर्थ्यमिति सिद्धम्—page 278.

understood, it must be noted that the connection is the sequel of śābdabodha (propositional import) and not that śābdabodha is its sequel. (It is true that) Jaimini has framed the sūtra—"The uninterrupted utterance of words which are implied in them (is for the purpose of enjoining action)."<sup>30</sup> But even there (we must understand that) the consecutive expression (lit. utterance) of words (samanvaya) denoting existing objects like colour, etc., is with the object of pointing out that the relation between the words is one of 'samānādhikaraṇya', etc. (*i.e.*, relation to an identical object). This is so because it has been shown that verbal knowledge (samanvaya or śābdabodha) is possible even where the relation is one of substantive and attributive. The mention of the word 'kriyārthena' (in the sūtra), however, is accordant with the present context where the discourse on Dharma is begun. As such the Bhāṣyakāra (*viz.*, Śābara) also in his comment, "The meaning of the word (*i.e.* the assemblage of words of the Scripture including Vedānta) is the direct result, which is instruction in karma", that is, instead of merely saying that the Veda has a meaning to impart (arthāvabodha) has mentioned 'instruction in karma as its object' since it serves the purpose on hand (*viz.*, the inquiry into Dharma).<sup>31</sup>

44. And this same view is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (Śamkara): ["As regards the passages cited relating to the views of men well conversant with the purport of the śāstra (it must be supposed that they point to that part of the śāstra which consists of injunctions and prohibitions)"]. It is because from the preceding 'tantra' (*i.e.*, śāstra, *viz.*, Pūrvamīmāṃsā) this matter (*viz.*, the nature of the self, an existent entity) has not been under-

<sup>30</sup> "यत्तु तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समान्नायः"—Jai. Sūt., Chap. I, xxv. "The utterance of the words which are implied in the meanings is with the object of an action (*i.e.*, for the purpose of enjoining an action) because the meanings of words in 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकर्मो यजेत', are the pramāṇa for the vāk्यārtha, *viz.*, yāga which is the Dharma serving as the means to svarga". Here it is definitely stated that the words have their significative potency only when in conjunction with a word denoting action. This is the contention of the opponent—*vide* S.D., G.O.S., 89, p. 217.

<sup>31</sup> Śābara's use of the expression 'कर्मावबोधनम्' is justified on the ground that Dharma with which the topic is concerned is something to be achieved by action. The consecutive expression of words is only to denote the relation of the meanings they imply, and not for elucidating their meanings as associated with action.



stood (there is justification for) commencing the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā (*i.e.*, the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts. 'Śārīraka' literally means, that concerning the embodied soul whose nature is explained in the Vedānta). Indeed there (*i.e.*, in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) the credibility of the intended sense of the Veda, its self-evidential character, and (the eternal potency of the word to generate the cognition of its meaning) all this is understood. The juxtaposition of the phrase 'for instruction in action', is to indicate that such juxtaposition is in harmony with the declared object of inquiry into Dharma.

45. Here, on the other hand, in the sūtra (I. i. 4): "And that (Brahman is to be known from the Scripture), because it is in harmony (with the Vedāntic texts)," discarding the identity-relation of the attribute and the attributed, and also the figurative identity—relation in the text, 'That thou art', the single impartite entity is pointed out. [Page 97] Even so, the revered Pāṇini lays down the rule that the first case suffix (nominative) denotes what is not distinct; that is, its use is confined to the mere stem (uninflected substantive) and does not extend to (anything) beyond it such as its being the agent of the action 'asti' (is). And therefore it is that the view held by Kātyāyana that the root 'asa' with the 'lat' termination (is always there even though not expressed) is not admitted. And we come across such sentences as 'These fruit-yielding trees', 'This is the king's man', where the import is conveyed in the absence of the verb 'asti'. It is not intended that even here the sentences should be completed as 'These fruit-yielding trees are', 'He, the king's man is'. But the sentence (as it stands) determines the relation only (between the terms) as may be expressed thus—'These trees in fruit', 'This man of the king'.

46. Similarly it is evident that the sole purport of the Vedānta texts consists in pointing to the relation of the entity which in its universal aspect (as existence) is established as the world-cause with its own nature as omniscience, etc.; and also in pointing to the identity with Brahman of that which is denoted by the word 'Thou' (in 'That thou art'). There is no importation here of the verb 'asti' (is) even though it forms the integral part of the thing itself; much less scope surely for it (*viz.*, the existential act, in the case of) what is beyond it; as such verb denoting external acts, are far removed.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> वस्तुस्वरूपान्तर्बर्ति—What is essential to the thing; without being or existence the thing is *non est*. But in the vākyaṛtha (propositional

XV. 47. Again in construing a negative sentence like, 'A Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed', neither action nor means to action is cognised, but it is the abstention from action that is invariably manifest. In the performance of rites like 'Prajā-pativrata', however, where certain vows are enjoined such as 'the rising Sun should not be seen' because of the connection of the word 'vrata' (with the other words in this sentence), the mental act of the observance of non-perceiving is manifest. As such the injunction, 'observe—non-perceiving' should be construed as 'take the resolution thus—I will not look (at the Sun, etc.)'; merely on the ground that the negative particle is juxtaposed in the sentence (there is no apprehension of an act of vow); for its (*i.e.*, of the negative particle) function consists in negating what is denoted by the word with which it is connected.

48. The meaning of the bhāṣya ["Nor, again can the act of killing, expressed by the verb 'is to be killed', which action is prompted by natural motives, etc.], is this—"by the promptings of one's nature only" (svabhāvata eva) under the influence of passion, etc., not depending on any Vedic injunction; when the act of murder thus resulting (if the verb) is conjoined with, *i.e.*, is qualified by, the negative particle 'not', then it amounts (in sense) to abstention from killing. As such the import of the sentence, ('a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed') will be, 'make a resolution of not-killing', and it is not that the phrase 'killing is not to be done' means mere absention from the act of murder—a passive state. Hence the determination (that a Brāhmaṇa) is not to be killed which is a mental act, not revealed (anywhere else except in the Veda) is intimated.

49. *Siddhāntin.*—This does not stand to reason, for the function of 'not' is to altogether obliterate what is connected with it. As for (the injunction) of 'not seeing' we have said that such import is possible on the strength of the word 'vow' (vrata), and not on the strength of 'not'.

---

import) of 'That thou art' even the act of 'being' (अतिक्रिया) is void of connection with the other terms of the proposition—उपासनक्रिया. The other variety of kriyā is that which is related to something external and not involved in the thing itself; *e.g.*, act of eating, etc. There is no room here for verbs denoting external acts such as the act of meditation—उपासनक्रिया.

50. *Prābhākara*.—Well, in prohibitive sentences (we maintain) that what the negative denotes is connected with niyoga (apūrva or kārya). Hence niyoga is to be effected (sādhya) by performing what is denoted by 'not' as in the case of the performance of yāga, etc., (to fulfil niyoga). How can it be said then that cessation from action which is a state of passivity is apprehended (from the negative sentence) ?

*Siddhāntin*.—This is a statement empty of content. It is indeed evident that what the 'not' indicates is not action nor is it the means of action, but on the other hand it denotes the negation of that with which it is conjoined, and is not the cause in its (niyoga) production. As such, it is established as a fact that prohibitive propositions are other than vidhi (injunction). [Page 98] Otherwise (*i.e.*, if even negative sentences are construed as denoting vidhi), mandatory would be all (sentences in the empirical sphere and there would be the contingency of the absence of all prohibitory statements). Hence the prohibitive proposition points to the negation of that with which the 'not' is connected; and not even a trace of injunction exists there.

51. What is coveted as the fruit of the forbidden act (*viz.*, killing) which is the meaning of liṅ, etc., of the prohibitive sentence is conjoined with the negative particle 'not' because the other senses of the termination ('tavya' here) like vidhi, nimantraṇa, āmantraṇa, adhīṣṭa, sampraśna and abhyanuñā are absent (*i.e.*, out of the place) here.<sup>33</sup> Hence (*i.e.*, since the 'not' goes with iṣṭasādhana, *i.e.*, contributoriness to a (desired

<sup>33</sup> संसृज्यमानं, etc.—So far, the explanation of the negative sentence 'a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed' rested on the assumption that the negative particle is conjoined with the base, प्रकृत्यर्थे, *viz.*, 'hanana' (killing), and it was pointed out that its purport was only the negation of the action as indicated by 'hanana'. Now the 'not' is assumed by the opponent to be conjoined with the suffix 'tavya' but even there it is shown that niyoga is not its purport. The meaning of 'tavya' is 'iṣṭasādhanaṭva', capacity to serve as a means of bringing about the desired end. When 'not' is joined to that termination the sentence means that the killing of a Brāhmaṇa will not be the iṣṭasādhana. The other senses of 'tavya' such as vidhi, etc., do not fit in here, because there is none other than the person who is the niyojya, *i.e.*, the niyojaka, the one from whom vidhi, etc., proceed is absent here just as in the case of perception, inference, etc.—*vide* Pāṇini, 3-3-161 for the definition of vidhi, nimantraṇa, etc.

end) the meaning of the negative sentence (*viz.*, 'a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed') is its (*viz.*, *iṣṭasādhana*) negation; and that (negation) is antecedent-negation which is self-established, (which amounts to saying that it is not a thing to be brought about by one's effort). Therefore, even when the cause (*viz.*, the delusion that the act of killing a Brāhmaṇa is the means to gratify one's desire) incited by passion is imminent, its obstruction has to be brought about by main effort. And that (*viz.*, obstruction) no doubt is a thing to be accomplished (*sādhya*); but even then it is known from positive and negative concomitance (*i.e.*, common experience) and not from verbal testimony, because there is no word specifically indicating it (*viz.*, the obstruction of the passion prompting one to murder a Brāhmaṇa). And further in a single sentence the import of the proposition is constituted only by the meaning of the words in syntactical relation and not as apart from this. Hence whatever import is apprehended from *arthā-pattipramāṇa* (*i.e.*, implication or it may be inference as here), that is not the import derived from *śabda* (Vedic injunction). As for the negative sentence it is plain that it denotes a sense involving no action, and nothing to be accomplished does stand in the objective relation to it for its function is fulfilled in remaining passive only (after denoting the negation of contributoriness to happiness by the act of killing).

52. But still you (referring to Prābhākara) may persist in urging that even in a negative sentence that which is related to the denotation of the negative particle, *viz.*, *niyoga* is what the sentence imports. Granted; even then that (*i.e.*, *niyoga*) is established as the result of the abandonment of the forbidden act and the motive for undertaking the act (of killing) is only the longing to reap its fruit (*i.e.*, the notion that killing is contributory to the desired end), so that when its cause is baulked (as when the 'not' is taken with *iṣṭasādhanatva*), the effort (which is prompted by passion) ceases and *niyoga* results.<sup>34</sup> And that

<sup>34</sup> तथापि प्रतिषिध्यमान, etc.—Prābhākara's contention is that the *apūrva*, the unseen potency is what the termination 'tavya' (or *liṅ*) indicates and that as such it is not possible to deny that the negative sentence has *apūrva* as its import. Now the question is whether in ordinary usage *niyoga* or *apūrva* is known from the termination or that is so in the Veda. In the empirical world *apūrva* is not seen, so that the termination has not *niyoga* as its primary significance. If *niyoga*

(viz., the niyoga-relating to the negation of killing) is determined by the law of positive and negative concomitance and as such it (viz., the meaning of the negative particle) does not deviate from the way it has been explained before. Such being the case even though it is understood that the usage of elders should alone be followed in construing a sentence, Brahman known from the (Vedāntic) texts is not like Dharma, known from 'codanā' (i.e., a mandatory statement). When in a general way (Brahman) is established as the world-cause, Vedāntic texts such as 'From which these beings are born, etc.', and 'That thou art' which cohere therein (i.e., in manifesting Brahman's special nature) are also adduced for enabling one to understand its (Brahman) specific nature.

XVI. 53. Again it has been alleged that since even the person who has the knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman is perceived to belong to the transmigratory world as before (i.e., before his acquiring the knowledge of identity, no purpose is served (by its describing the nature of Brahman) as (witness to the contrary) when information about the rope is given (when under illusion the rope is mistaken for a serpent); and that as such the sentence ('That thou art', etc.) cannot be said to end by merely referring to (the pure and unrelated Brahman).

Here is the answer:—"Not of the person who has understood that Brahman is the self, etc.].". This is its meaning—the connection of the self with the body is not due to karma, for otherwise it would lead the logical fault of mutual dependence and there is the additional reason that ātman itself (caitanya) is devoid of (any connection with) action, etc. If it be held that

---

is admitted in the domain of the Veda and if it is urged that it is what is signified by the termination it will be on a par with the adage known as 'bakabandha'. To explain: If one should say that to catch a crane a lump of butter has to be placed on its head so that the melted butter may blind its eyes one forgets that all this presupposes catching the crane. To one desirous of svarga the performance of yāga is indispensable, but then yāga does not last till the fruit is secured. Hence on the basis of 'implication from words'—श्रुत्यर्थोपपत्तिः apūrva is premised. When this apūrva is already established it is purposeless to urge that it is the primary significance of the suffix 'tavya'. Hence the appropriateness of the adage.

(this mutual dependence) is retrogressively beginningless, we say that based as it is on no valid ground it is on a par with an endless succession of blind men (one trying to lead the other). And even if the relation of the self with the body be accepted as due to karma then one's love of one's body could only be figurative as it is in the case of the bodies of one's sons, etc. Because experience contradicts it, because of the absence of similarity with any well-known case of figurative usage, and because of the contingency of even one's own body ceasing to be a factor when one is an agent in the act of knowing, just as one (is not the agent in the act of knowing) with the body of one's sons, etc. (*i.e.*, the father is not the knower in the act of the son's knowing), residually, we must conclude that the relation of the body with the self is due to avidyā. And when that (*viz.*, avidyā) is sublated and as a consequence its connection (*i.e.*, of the body with the self) is sublated how could there be causelessly, the experience of pleasure and pain as before? (There could be none.)

54. [Page 99] To this effect Śruti and Smṛti statements which denote that for a knower of Brahman there is the total riddance of all connection with mundane existence are given in illustration in the bhāṣya. Hence there is no transmigratory existence as before, to one who has the consciousness of his identity with Brahman since it (*viz.*, ātman-realization) is subversive of all attachments to it (migratory life).

As for the apparent consciousness of the objects of sense which present themselves to one's experience in so far as one continues in life, it must be regarded as due to a small fraction of the residual karma operating in the present life; it is just like the appearance of the double moon when one is affected by an eye-defect (timira). Reflection and meditation, as has been already said, are not posterior to the knowledge of Brahman but like Vedāntic study (śravaṇa) they pre-exist as the means of knowledge.

XVII. 55. To sum up—(Brahman), an accomplished entity because it is unknown in its real nature becomes (necessarily) the object of a pramāṇa (other than the Veda), *i.e.*, it stands in need of such a pramāṇa being known and as such it is the prameya (or object of knowledge other than Vedic testimony). If however (Brahman) is admitted to be in the objective relation to an action that is enjoined, then since a casual correlate has to be established by some other evidence (say perception), its (*i.e.*,



Brahman's) attainment through it (Vedānta) becomes unintelligible. The contingency of sentence-split will arise (if it be based on the very sentence enjoining meditation), and the analogy of the 'devatādhikaraṇa' does not hold good as going counter to perception, etc.<sup>35</sup>

Even granting that the entity (*viz.*, Brahman) having been previously established by a different text, becomes the object of an action, it should be pointed out that none of the four kinds of effects admitted to be produced in what serves as the object of an action, is possible there (*i.e.*, in Brahman).<sup>36</sup>

If liberation resembling svarga as the fruit of meditation with (Brahman) as its object be premised (by you, referring to the Mīmāṃsākas) on the analogy of sacrifices offered to a deity then there arises the contingency of its (liberation) impermanence very like that (*viz.*, Svarga).

From statements like 'who knows Brahman becomes Brahman only, etc.,' which demonstrate the absence of interval between the knowledge of Brahman and the fruit of liberation, the interposition of action betwixt (knowledge and liberation) is implicitly negated.

From a consideration of texts like 'The knower of ātman crosses (the bounds of) sorrow' it is evident that the fruit of ātman-knowledge is only the removal of the obstacle to liberation, and

<sup>35</sup> विधीयमानक्रियाकर्मत्वे तु—If Brahman is admitted to be in the objective relation to karma having posited the injunction—meditate on Brahman—'आत्मानमुपासीत' the following defects cannot be avoided:—

- (i) The doctrine that Brahman is known only from the Vedānta—ओपनिषदं ब्रह्म will be upset.
- (ii) When ātman is established on the deliverance of the Vedānta, only, to suppose that ātman-identity is the result of meditation would lead to 'sentence-split'—वाक्यभेद.
- (iii) If on the analogy of Devatādhikaraṇa—it be said that the vidhi on meditation has the intermediate purport—अवान्तर तात्पर्य of Ātman-identity and the chief support (महातात्पर्य) of the meditative act, the inapplicability nādhikaraṇa is apparent since the intermediate sense, *viz.*, identity is contradicted by the experience (pratyakṣa), 'I am not Brahman'.

<sup>36</sup> चतुर्विधस्यापि कर्मकारकस्य तत्र असंभवात्—The four modifications effected by action in a thing that is in the objective relation are origination—उत्पत्ति, getting—आप्ति, change—विकार, purification—संस्कार, none of which is possible in Brahman. Hence Brahman is not in the objective relation to any action.

as such there being nothing else to be effected, the interposing of action does not stand to reason.

The knowledge of ātman as Brahman (taught) in the context of absolute identity does not admit of (being explained) as involving an assumption (conceit) as in the case of sampat.<sup>37</sup>

Since Brahman is not regarded as being in the objective relation to jñāna though it has arisen from a valid source (*viz.*, the Veda), far removed is the possibility of its (*i.e.*, Brahman's) being the object of an enjoined meditative act.<sup>38</sup>

Though (Brahman) is not in the objective relation to the act of knowing, its being the import (*viṣaya*) of the sentence (say, 'tatvamasi') is intelligible on the ground that the sentence (*i.e.*, its knowledge) serves to dispel the illusory ascriptions and by that means reveals that the eternally-existent consciousness (ātman) is of the real nature of Brahman.

Even granting that Brahman is the content, (*viṣaya*) of the act of knowing, it (*viz.*, *vedanā*—knowledge) is not dependent on injunction.

The passages which appear as if injunctive in character since they are understood as laudatory are extrinsic to it. And (lastly) the liberation from the transmigratory existence as the result of Brahma-knowledge is a matter of actual experience.

(For these reasons) we conclude that Brahman independently, without depending upon any injunction, is indubitably propounded in the śāstra, for all the Vedāntic texts are concordant in this respect.

56. Such being the case, since apart from the knowledge that is produced from the mutual connection of words (constituting the Vedāntic texts, 'That thou art', 'Existence, knowledge, 'Eternal is Brahman', etc.), no prompting to action is intimated, very like the eye, etc., which reveal the object but do not prompt action, it is appropriate that a different śāstra having that (*viz.*, inquiry into the Vedānta) as its subject should be begun. Otherwise, that is, if even here it be admitted that over and above the

<sup>37</sup> संपत्-संपन्नम् अल्पे वस्तुन्यालम्भने सामान्येन केनचिन्महतो वस्तुनः सम्पादनम्  
Sampat is a fanciful combination, *e.g.*, Bṛh. Up., III. i-9; Chānd. Up., III. 18—1, etc.

<sup>38</sup> प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानस्यापि ब्रह्म न विषयः ; किमु वक्तव्यं विधिविषयोपासनस्य तत् (ब्रह्म) अविषय इति ? When Brahman transcends the realm of logic how can it become the subject of meditation which is essentially volitional in character ?

imparting of knowledge, it (the Uttara-mīmāṃsā) prompts action, then a different śāstra would not be commenced, since the śāstra concerned with injunctions has already been commenced with (the Jaiminiya first sūtra)—“Then, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma.” But still it may be urged that since it (Brahman) is to be achieved by non-external means, supplementation to that (*viz.*, the śāstra dealing with rituals) is necessary.<sup>39</sup> Then, in that case (the Sūtra-kāra) would have taken the resolve to begin the new śāstra with the first aphorism worded thus: ‘Then therefore inquiry into the remaining part of Dharma’; for the inquiry relates to a distinct injunction (*i.e.*, that which is connected with meditation).

57. [Page 100] Therefore, since (the knowledge of the identity arises in the manner aforesaid), all talk of injunctions, objects of injunction, valid means of knowledge, and the objects of knowledge is (appropriate) only prior to the knowledge of Brahman. But after that, owing to the absence of the knowing subject and also of any object of injunction, their (*i.e.*, of the knower, means of knowledge, etc.), existence has no significance. [To this effect they have made the declaration.] (To explain)—Because it is universally held by the knowers of Brahman, they have summarised the view set forth above in the stanzas beginning with, [“Figurative, illusory, etc.”] The transference of the ego-conception to children, wife, etc., is to be taken in a figurative sense because the relation is one of possession (*i.e.*, the relation between the self on the one hand and wife and children, etc., on the other can be denoted by ‘mine’). Hence that is the figurative self (gauṇātmā). The transference of the ego conception (aham kartā) to (objects) commencing with the body up to (and including) the ‘this’ aspect (or the objective counterpart) of the ego-notion is to be regarded as due to error, because of the superimposition of the (real) self on the non-self. Hence that is the illusory self (mithyātmā). But when both of them are eliminated by the knowledge of the primary (mukhya) and eternal (paramārtha) self and the sublation of the notions of children and body,

<sup>39</sup> अथापि अब्रह्मसाधनत्वात्—The case for vidhi is again urged on the ground that in the Vedānta internal means should be enjoined as external means are enjoined in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Action is either bodily or vocal or mental and of these Jaimini has elaborately discussed the first two and the third which is mental relating to meditation is enjoined by Bādarāyaṇa. This is controverted by Padmapāda.

etc., grounded therein (*i.e.*, having the real self as their substratum) following, scriptural injunctions enjoining action and bodily enjoyments (both) depending as they do upon their postulation (*viz.*, of the figurative and the illusory self) would at no time (thereafter) arise, because of the disappearance of the cause.

58. Emphasizing this very point it is stated that [‘ the ātman is to be sought after ’.] It is only before the rise of the knowledge of the oneness of the self with Brahman which is characterised by the total riddance of transmigratory existence and which is expounded in the text beginning with (the phrase) ‘ That is to be sought after ’, that the inner consciousness is misconceived to be the cogniser. But when the knowledge of its real nature is restored like the forgotten gold (necklace), then that very self which had been (falsely) regarded as the agent in (the act of) cognition attains freedom from the evils of transmigratory life. Hence whence could there be agency and enjoyment for the self ?

If the ordinary usage of expressions like ‘ I am the knowing subject, ’ etc., beginning with the ‘ I ’ is based on mere assumption, the question is how can any validity be ascribed to it at present (*i.e.*, in the empirical sphere) ? Meeting this objection it is said “ As the notion of ātman” being the body (is assumed by you to be valid in the empirical sphere).<sup>40</sup> To explain:—just as in the body the relation of the ego-notion of the individual self, which is quite distinct from it (*viz.*, the body) is, though fancied the cause of the knowledge as it appears in so far as the activities pertaining to ordinary worldly transactions, and also of scriptural injunctions depending as they do on its connection (*i.e.*, of the fancied identity-relation of the self with the body) so also this (*i.e.*, the ordinary source of knowledge like perception, inference, etc.) though assumed, must be held valid until the real nature of the transcendental self is apprehended because it gives rise to indubitable knowledge and there is not the perception of its sublation.

*Here ends the Ninth Varnaka of the Pañcapādikā*

*Thus is concluded Śrī Padmapādācārya’s  
Pañcapādikā on the Bhāṣya of  
Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, comprising  
Vedānta Sūtras I-IV*

<sup>40</sup> In concluding the bhāṣya on the fourth sūtra Śaṅkara quotes three stanzas (see the *conspectus*) attributed to one Sundara-pāṇḍya.

## CONSPECTUS

### FIRST VARṆAKA

(N.B. References are to the Edition, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series 1891.)

#### I SECTION

From युष्मदस्मत् to सुखप्रतिपत्तये वर्णयति, इति न दोषः ।

*Topic.*—Deals with the Bhāṣya on illusion in general.

The objection that the Bhāṣya on illusion between the self and not-self being outside the purview of the Sūtra does not merit commentation is met.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From युष्मदस्मत् to प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।
2. ,, अत्राह ,, भाष्येण ।
3. ,, उच्यते ,, भाष्यस्य ।
4. ,, तथा चास्य ,, तद्गुणसारत्वादित्यादिना ।
5. ,, यथेवमेतदेव ,, इति न दोषः ।

#### II SECTION

From ननु च to भाष्यकारः ।

*Topic.*—The second objection that the lack of preliminary benediction in the Bhāṣya is against accepted tradition is met.

*Paragraphs.*—

6. From ननु च to प्रवृत्ते ।
7. ,, अत्र उच्यते ,, भाष्यकारः ।

#### III SECTION

From कोऽयं विरोधः to अप्रतिसङ्क्रमत्वात् ।

*Topic.*—Now begins Padmapāda's comment on the section of Bhāṣya relating to the opposition between ātman and anātman, i.e., the reciprocal superimposition of the substrates dharmins.

*Pratīka.*—

(युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः) विषयविषयिणोः तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः  
इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् ।

*Paragraphs.*—

8. From कोऽयं विरोधः to वेदितव्यम् ।
9. ,, उच्यते ,, अप्रतिपत्तिसङ्क्रमत्वात् ।

*Note.*—Portions of the Bhāṣya not commented upon but subsumed under the particular section are enclosed within brackets.

## IV SECTION

From तद्धर्माणामपि to युक्त इत्यर्थः ।

*Topic.*—Defends the *prima facie* view—pūrvapakṣa, against the probability of Illusion—adhyāsa, between the attributes of the self and the not-self—dharmādhyāsa. Here ends the pūrvapakṣa on adhyāsa.

*Pratīka.*—

तद्धर्माणामपि सुतराम् (इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिरिति) अतोऽस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके (युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य) तद्धर्माणां च (अध्यासः) तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च (विषये अध्यासः) मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।

*Paragraphs.*—

10. From तद्धर्माणामपि to पृथग्धर्मग्रहणम् ।
11. ,, तद्विपर्ययेण ,, न दोषः ।
12. ,, अध्यासो नाम ,, युक्त इत्यर्थः ।

## V SECTION

From यद्यप्येवं to तदुपादान इत्यर्थः ।

*Topic.*—Comment on a few of the words in the Bhāṣya establishing Illusion. This is a reply to the pūrvapakṣa on the basis that the adhyāsa is beginningless—naisargika.

*Pratīka.*—

तथापि अन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतां अन्योन्यधर्माश्च अध्यस्य, इतरेतरा—विवेकेन, अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य अइमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकः अयं लोकव्यवहारः ।

*Paragraphs.*—

13. From यद्यप्येवं to मनुष्योहमित्याभिमान इत्यर्थः ।
14. ,, सत्यानृते ,, द्रष्टव्यम् ।
15. ,, मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः ,, तदुपादान इत्यर्थः ।

## VI SECTION

From कथं पुनः to न विरुध्यते ।

*Topic.*—Here is considered the apparent contradiction in describing the adhyāsa in question as both Naisargika and mithyā-jñānanimitta. What follows is only an amplification of what has gone before.

*Paragraph.*—

16. From कथं पुनः to न विरुध्यते ।



## VII SECTION

From अन्योन्यधर्माश्च to वेदान्तमीमांसारंभ उपपद्यते ।

*Topic.*—Establishes that the two-fold adhyāsa (dharmī and dharma) is a matter of common human experience and on the ground that adhyāsa does not taint the substratum adhiṣṭhāna, the utility of Vedānta is shown.

*Paragraphs.*—

17. From अन्योन्यधर्माश्चेति to दर्शयिष्यामः ।

18. ,, ननु ,, उपपद्यते ।

## VIII SECTION

From आह, कोऽयमध्यासो नाम to पृथक् कथनीयः ।

*Topic.*—This points out the necessity in the present case for defining adhyāsa and showing its probability as well, before proceeding to its establishment.

*Paragraphs.*—

19. From आह to विभागः

20. ,, यद्येवं ,, सद्भावः कथनीयः

21. ,, नन्वेवमपि ,, कथ्येत

22. ,, सत्यमेवं ,, कथनीयः

## IX SECTION

From तदुच्यते to समुद्भवः

*Topic.*—Explanation of the definition of adhyāsa.

*Pratīka.*—

आह, कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । (उच्यते)—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः ।

*Paragraphs.*—

23. From तदुच्यते to एष एव व्याख्याप्रकारः

24. ,, स्मृतिरूपः ,, समुद्भवः संभवति

## X SECTION

From अपर आह to व्याख्यातौ द्रष्टव्यौ

*Topic.*—Statement of objection against the definition of Superimposition by the akhyātivādins—the Prābhākara School of Pūrvamīmamsa; and setting forth of the akhyāti view.

*Paragraphs.*—

25. From अपर आह to उत्पन्नभ्रमः

26. ,, ननु अनास्वादित ,, द्रष्टव्यौ

## XI SECTION

From उच्यते to अध्यासः

*Topic.*—Refutation of akhyātivāda by the Naiyāyika Anyathākhyātivādin.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                 |                               |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| 27. From उच्यते | to ज्ञानपरामर्शिनी            |
| 28. ,, अपि च    | ,, न स्वतः स्मरणाभिमानात्मकता |
| 29. ,, नापि     | ,, फलत्वात्                   |
| 30. ,, यः पुनः  | ,, किंतु अध्यासः              |

## XII SECTION

From नन्वेवं सति to स्मृतिप्रमोष एव अवतिष्ठेत.

*Topic.*—Rebuttal of anyathākhyāti and of ātmakhyāti by the akhyātivādin.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 31. From नन्वेवं सति    | to न स्यात्             |
| 32. ,, अथ तथारूपावभासनं | ,, नैष पक्षः प्रमाणवान् |
| 33. ,, अथ शुक्तेरेव     | ,, अवतिष्ठेत            |
| 34. ,, ननु कमलमुकुल     | ,, बाधप्रतीतिः स्यात्   |
| 35. ,, अथ पुनः          | ,, तत् प्रसंगात्        |
| 36. ,, ननु किमिति       | ,, अवतिष्ठेत            |

## XIII SECTION

From ननु स्मृतेः to निरस्यमानविषयज्ञानवच्च

*Topic.*—Substantiation of anirvacanīyakhyāti.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 37. From ननु स्मृते     | to रजतावभासस्य        |
| 38. ,, उच्यते           | ,, ज्ञानं एकफलं जनयति |
| 39. ,, तस्य च           | ,, बाधाभावात्         |
| 40. ,, भिन्नजातीय       | ,, वक्तव्यम्          |
| 41. ,, अयमेव च          | ,, यथार्थमेव अवभासः   |
| 42. ,, इह तु            | ,, रूपे               |
| 43. ,, मायामात्रत्वे तु | ,, विषयज्ञानवच्च      |

## XIV SECTION

From ननु न व्यापकमिदं to न परत्रेति विरुध्यते

*Topic.*—Objection that the definition of Illusion does not apply to the dream illustration is met.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |          |                  |    |                        |
|----------|------------------|----|------------------------|
| 44. From | ननु न व्यापकमिदं | to | संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वात् |
| 45. „    | अत्रोच्यते       | „  | विवर्तते               |
| 46. „    | नन्वेवं          | „  | अपरो दोषः              |
| 47. „    | नैष दोषः         | „  | न प्रकाशीभवत्येवं      |
| 48. „    | यः पुनः          | „  | विरुध्यते              |

XV SECTION

From कथं तर्हि to पूर्वदृष्टावभास इति

*Topic.*—Conclusion that the definition of Illusion is immaculate and is not open to the further objection that it is overpervasive in names. Note that this objection is based on the ambiguity of the word *adhyāsa* as used in Advaita. See Śamkara on Vedānta Sūtra III. iii. 9.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |          |                 |    |                           |
|----------|-----------------|----|---------------------------|
| 49. From | कथं तर्हि       | to | इच्छा तु प्रवेशानुपपत्तेः |
| 50. „    | ननु स्मृतिज्ञान | „  | इच्छायाः                  |
| 51. „    | तस्यात्         | „  | अवभास इति                 |

XVI SECTION

From तं केचित् to इत्यभिप्रायः

*Topic.*—Explanation of the definition of superimposition as comprehending *ātmakhyāti*, *anyathākhyāti*, and *akhyāti* and *asatkhyāti*.

*Pratīka.—*

तं केचित् अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति; केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद् विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति । अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीत-धर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते इति । सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति ॥

*Paragraphs.—*

- |          |             |    |              |
|----------|-------------|----|--------------|
| 52. From | तं केचित्   | to | इति वदन्ति   |
| 53. „    | केचित्तु    | „  | अनुषङ्गः     |
| 54. „    | अन्ये तु    | „  | आचक्षते      |
| 55. „    | सर्वथापि तु | „  | इत्यभिप्रायः |

XVII SECTION

From तत्र स्मृतिरूप to तथात्वे प्रतिभासायोगात् ।

*Topic.*—From the use of the word ‘*paratra*’ in the definition of superimposition the *asatkhyātivāda* of the Mādhyamika School of Buddhists is refuted. It is also maintained that there is

no illusion without a real ground and that even the so-called illusory object cannot be wholly unreal.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                                    |                      |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 56. From तत्र स्मृतिरूप            | to परत्रेत्युच्यते   |
| 57. ,, कथं निरूपपत्तिकोऽयं पक्षः,, | नानवस्थादोषमतिवर्तेत |
| 58. ,, अपि च                       | ,, अधिगतावधिरेव      |
| 59. ,, अथवा                        | ,, प्रतिभासायोगात्   |

### XVIII SECTION

From ननु सर्वमेवेदं to तस्मात्साधूक्तं परत्रेति

*Topic.*—Attribution of asatkhyāti view to siddhānta by the nihilist, is refuted.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                             |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 60. From ननु सर्वमेवेदं | to असामर्थ्याद्वाक्यस्य     |
| 61. ,, नार्थापत्त्या    | ,, तस्मात्साधूक्तं परत्रेति |

### XIX SECTION

From यद्येवं to लक्षणमस्तु

*Topic.*—The object of using the two words ‘Smṛtirūpa’ and ‘pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsa’ is explained.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                      |                         |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| 62. From यद्येवं     | to अध्यासत्वमित्युक्तम् |
| 63. ,, यद्येवं तावत् | ,, लक्षणमस्तु           |

### XX. SECTION

From तथा च to इति दर्शितं

*Topic.*—Elucidation of the two illustrations of shell-silver and double-moon given in the Bhāṣya and of their respective significance to Advaita. Here is clinching of the matter by reference to common experience.

*Pratīka.*—

तथा च लोके अनुभवः—शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते एकश्चन्द्रः स द्वितीयं वदिति.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                             |                   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| 64. From तथा च लोके         | to रजतवदवभासत इति |
| 65. ,, ननु न शुक्तिका       | ,, द्रष्टव्यं     |
| 66. ,, तत्र शुक्तिकोदाहरणेन | ,, इति दर्शितम्   |

## XXI SECTION

From ननु बहिरर्थे to न प्रत्ययस्तथा वक्ष्यते

*Topic.*—Objection to the superimposition of non-ātman on ātman is stated and answered. Objection—ātman is partless and as such there is the absence of particularity विशेष; being relationless ātman is void of all blemish—दोष; it is of the very essence of knowledge—ज्ञान and is eternal. The superimposition of one object on another is intelligible; the superimposition of anātman on ātman is not.

Objection met: nescience अविद्या is itself the blemish; the parts are its creation and they are obscured by nescience; the psychosis वृत्तिज्ञान is non-eternal; hence the superimposition of non-ātman on ātman is feasible.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                             |                     |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 67. From ननु बहिरर्थे       | to तदयोगात्         |
| 68. „ ननु ब्रह्मस्वरूपं     | „ भास्यमानत्वात्    |
| 69. „ उच्यते                | „ निसर्गत एवास्तीति |
| 70. „ ननु न जीवः            | „ अभ्युपगन्तव्यम्   |
| 71. „ तथा च स्मृतिः         | „ तदेति             |
| 72. „ ननु प्रमाणान्तरविरोधे | „ वक्ष्यते          |

## XXII SECTION

From कथं पुनर्भोक्ता to अध्यासलक्षणव्याप्तिरिहाप्युपपद्यते

*Topic.*—Establishment of the possibility of superimposition of non-ātman on ātman by rebutting the *prima facie* view पूर्वपक्ष that identity conveyed in the expression 'I am man' अहं मनुष्यः is only figurative and not illusory.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                           |                           |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 73. From कथं पुनः         | to भाष्यकार एव वक्ष्यति   |
| 74. „ नन्वहमिति           | „ मनुष्यत्वाभिमानः        |
| 75. „ उच्यते              | „ हत्वादिसंभेदः           |
| 76. „ अथ पुनः             | „ नावकलेषत                |
| 77. „ जिज्ञासोत्तरकालम्   | „ युक्तः                  |
| 78. „ न युक्तः            | „ पृथक्त्वात्             |
| 79. „ ननु महदतत्          | „ न गौण इति               |
| 80. „ बाढं                | „ प्रत्ययो गौणः           |
| 81. „ तदेवं स्वयंजोतिष एव | „ व्याप्तिरिहाप्युपपद्यते |

(End of *Lakṣaṇa Bhāṣya*)

## XXIII SECTION

From कोयमध्यासो नमेति to किमुक्तलक्षणो न वेति.

*Topic.*—The improbability of superimposition on what is not objective and has no parts; the answer thereto based upon the fact of self-consciousness.

*Pratika.*—

कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषये अध्यासो विषयतद्दर्माणाम्, सर्वो हि पुरोवस्थिते विषयान्तरमध्यवस्यति, युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनो विषयत्वं ब्रवीषि; उच्यते — न तावदयमेकान्तनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् ॥

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                            |                       |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| 82. From कोऽयमध्यासो नात्र | to विषयतद्दर्माणामिति |
| 83. ,, बाढमेवम्            | ,, संभवी वा           |
| 84. ,, उच्यते              | ,, उक्तलक्षणो न वेति  |

## XXIV. SECTION

From ननु किमत्र to अहंकारो युज्यते

*Topic.*—Prabhākara's view that ego-notion अहंकारः is not to be identified with the 'this' notion इदमेशः, i.e., that the ego-itself is ātman.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                     |                    |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| 85. From ननु किमत्र | to अनुसंधीयते      |
| 86. ,, ननु नायं     | ,, प्रमात्रंशस्य   |
| 87. ,, नैतद्युक्तम् | ,, अहंकारो युज्यते |

## XXV SECTION

From उच्यते to मतमागमयितव्यं

*Topic.*—Refutation of the doctrine of Prabhākara and the affirmation of the view that ātman is self-luminous and distinct from the ego.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                    |                              |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| 88. From उच्यते    | to चेतयतिक्रियानवस्थाप्रसंगः |
| 89. ,, द्वितीये    | ,, प्रदीपयोरिव               |
| 90. ,, तृतीयेऽपि   | ,, अभ्युपगन्तव्यम्           |
| 91. ,, बाढं अत एव  | ,, किमिति न भवेत्            |
| 92. ,, नन्वहमिति   | ,, न स्मर्येत                |
| 93. ,, नन्वस्त्येव | ,, इति हि दृश्यते            |
| 94. ,, यस्पुनः     | ,, मतमागमयितव्यम्            |



## XXVI. SECTION

From तदुच्यते to लोहितिमा

*Topic.*—The ego-notion अहं पदार्थः its constituents, its nature, proofs in its support, its effects, and the reason why it is not manifest in sleep are dealt with.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| 95. From तदुच्यते | to अनादिरविद्या |
| 96. ,, तस्याः     | ,, कुतस्य       |
| 97. ,, न चैवं     | ,, लोहितिमा     |

## XXVII SECTION

From कथं पुनः to ग्रन्थिरिति गीयते

*Topic.*—On the analogy of the illusoriness of the red-crystal, the illusory character of the ego—a complex of ātman and the internal organ is demonstrated.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                        |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 98. From कथं पुनः      | to कचिदुपलब्धपूर्वम् |
| 99. ,, ननु अभिजातस्यैव | ,, तथारूपप्रसंगात्   |
| 100. ,, अभ्युपगम्य     | ,, ग्रन्थिरिति गीयते |

## XXVIII SECTION

From तत्र जडरूपत्वात् to मिथ्येति दर्शयितुम्

*Topic.*—The 'this' in the ego (अहंकार) is illumined by the 'not-this' part of the ego. By usage (प्रतीति) the ego is identified with ātman, or the 'not-this' (अस्मदंश), by its characteristic feature (लक्षणतः) viz., being illumined by the 'not-this' (अवभास्य) it is of the 'this' nature (इदमंश). As such the double nature of the ego is evident. Again from the illustration of the image and the proto-type it is pointed out that the 'not-this' is identical with Brahman.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                            |                          |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 101. From तत्र जडरूपत्वात् | to सएवेदमिदमात्मको विषयः |
| 102. ,, अत एव              | ,, स इत्यभिहितं          |
| 103. ,, यत्पुनः            | ,, दर्शयितुम्            |

## XXIX SECTION

From कथं पुनः to चतुरा हि सा

*Topic.*—Points out the identity of the image and the proto-type in contradistinction to what obtains in shell-silver. The ego-complex in this respect is not parallel to the shell-silver since it is not sublated entirely.

## Paragraphs.—

104. From कथं पुनः	to तथैव अवतिष्ठेत
105. „ न खलु	„ न च तथा उपलभ्यते
106. „ यः पुनः	„ परिणामहेतुरस्ति
107. „ अत्राह	„ तत्प्रसंगात्
108. „ ननु	„ रजतमस्तीतिवत्
109. „ किंच	„ गतमिति
110. „ यस्तु	„ न पराक्रम्यते
111. „ कथं पुनः	„ चतुरा हि सा

## XXX SECTION

From ननु सत्येव to रज्जुसर्पमुदाहरन्ति

*Topic.*—It is contended that if the individual soul is regarded as the reflection of Brahman it should be insentient like all reflections in the world and that like all the proto-types, बिंब, Brahman should be error-ridden and not be the locus of the knowledge that dispels ignorance. It is shown that no such contingency arises. It is further pointed out that the rope-serpent illustration met with in Śāstraic works is intended to bring home the fact that there is a second kind of illusion, viz., nirupādhikabhrama. The superimposition of the ego-notion on ātman is not mediated through the mental mode (वृत्ति), i.e., not through the modification of the internal sense (अन्तःकरण), in other words it is direct-nirupādhika.

## Paragraphs.—

112. From ननु सत्येव	to चेष्टते (इति)
113. „ यस्य हि	„ मिथ्यात्वापगमः
114. „ ननु तत्र	„ रज्जुसर्पमुदाहरन्ति

## XXXI SECTION

From ननु तत्रापि to प्रायुक्तत्वात्

*Topic.*—What is determined here is—

(i) that ātman though in reality is unrelated appears as if related through upādhi like pot-ether,

(ii) that ātman, as a matter of fact, is not established on the strength of the several illustrations given, viz., the red crystal, the mirror-image, the rope-serpent and pot-ether, but is established on the strength of the Scriptures, reasoning, and intuition, the illustrations serving only to dispel the notion of improbability regarding the existence of ātman, i.e., that which is pure, non-distinct from Brahman, etc.

The phrase अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् is explained as अहंकारे व्यवहारयोग्यत्वात्. The vyavahāra or empirical activity of ātman is tenable only in its complex aspect, *i.e.*, ego-sense. The objection that there exists the fallacy of mutual dependence between fitness for empirical activity and superimposition is met by the statement that the two are beginningless—*anādi*.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                       |                               |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 115. From तनु तत्रापि | to विभ्रमहेतुर्विद्यते        |
| 116. „ तत्र यद्यपि    | „ स्वगता दृश्यन्ते            |
| 117. „ एतच्च सर्वम्   | „ साक्षात् सिद्धये            |
| 118. „ तदेवम्         | „ अनादित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् |

Prakaraṇas XXIV to XXXI are an exposition of the Bhāṣya अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् pointing to the knowability of the self, *i.e.*, in self-consciousness.

XXXII SECTION

From तत्रैवंभूतस्य to गन्तृसंबंध इव ग्रामस्य

*Topic.*—Here is explained the Pratikarmavyavasthā. Though ātman is all-prevading its capacity to cognise is in conformity with the order and regularity immanent in the world. It is not hap-hazard. This is possible because ātman is conditioned by the internal organ. This paragraph further purports to explain how the self can be knower, *i.e.*, agent in knowing, the process of knowing, etc.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 119. From तत्रैवंभूतस्य | to चैतन्यस्य अवच्छेदकम्  |
| 120. „ कर्मकारकमपि      | „ इत्युच्यते             |
| 121. „ तत्र च           | „ गन्तृसंबंध इव ग्रामस्य |

XXXIII SECTION

From तनु नीलादिविषयोपि to निपुणतरं प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः

*Topic.*—(i) From the statement स्वव्यापारविशिष्टम् चैतन्यविवर्तत्वात् it is urged that the object and cognition becoming identical, there is affinity with the vijñānavāda of Buddhist Philosophy. The Siddhāntin points out that the two are poles asunder, since the one (object) varies while the other (cognition) is constant.

(ii) Rebutting the doctrine of momentariness the eternal nature of knowledge is demonstrated.

(iii) Practical efficiency is proved to be possible without the presupposition of momentariness.

(iv) Since the object (विषय) is the indicator (व्यञ्जक) of consciousness it is immediately perceived; hence it is argued that the inferentially cognised also should be of a immediate perception. This is repudiated.

*Paragraphs.—*

122. From	ननु नीलादि	to	व्यावृत्तं सिद्धम्
123. „	नैतत्	„	न च स्थायित्वमस्ति
124. „	यदेवं	„	व्यामोहसिद्धिः
125. „	स्पादेतत्	„	पूर्विकैव सा
126. „	अथान्ते	„	कश्चिद्विशेषः
127. „	अथ मन्येत	„	सादृश्यनिबन्धनेति
128. „	उच्यते	„	स्वस्यार्थक्रिया
129. „	यत्पुनः	„	तद्विशेषम्
130. „	यस्तु मन्येत	„	जनने अनवस्था
131. „	अथ मतम्	„	कार्योपयोगादपेक्षेत
132. „	अथ मतं क्षणिकोपि	„	न विशेषं पश्यामः
133. „	तदेवं	„	प्रसाधितः
134. „	ननु नानुमेयादिषु	„	प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः

#### XXXIV

From तदेवं अहङ्कारग्रन्थि to गीयते

*Topic.—*Here PP. comments on the Bhāṣya, “अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्”.

*Paragraphs.—*

135. From तदेवम् to गीयते

#### XXXV SECTION

From किञ्च to अध्यासयोग्यः

*Topic.—*Here PP. comments on the Bhāṣya, अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः

*Pratīka.*

अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः ।

*Paragraph.—*

136. From किञ्च to अध्यासयोग्यः

#### XXXVI SECTION

From ननु न कश्चिदपरोक्षमात्रे to तथा दर्शयिष्यामः

*Topic.—*Here PP. comments on the Bhāṣya beginning with न चायमस्ति नियमः to the end of अनात्माध्यासः. On the analogy of the common notion that the ākāśa is blue, etc., though it is not presented, the need for objective presentation is denied in the case of the ground of superimposition.

*Pratīka.*—

न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति ।  
अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यध्यस्यन्ति । एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्य-  
नात्माध्यासः ।

*Paragraph.*—

137. From ननु न कचिदपरोक्षमात्रे to तथा दर्शयिष्यामः

### XXXVII SECTION

From ननु ब्रह्मविद्याम् to प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत

*Topic.*—Here PP. comments on the Bhāṣya beginning with तमेवं लक्षणं to the end of अणुमात्रेणापि न संबध्यते. What is rendered explicit is that nescience, i.e., its aspect as a projecting entity is the cause of the manifold ills of life; and that the qualities of the superimposed object do not in the least affect the substrate.

*Pratīka.*—

तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पाण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते । तद्विवेकेन च वस्तु-  
स्वरूपाधारणं विद्यामाहुः । (तत्रैवं सति) यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन  
वाऽणुमात्रेणापि स न सम्बध्यते ।

*Paragraph.*—

138. From ननु ब्रह्मविद्याम् to अविद्येति मन्यन्ते

139. „ तद्विवेकेन „ वदन्ति

140. „ यद्येवं „ हीयेत

### XXXVIII SECTION

From एवं तावत् to स एवासमीचीनः प्रत्ययोऽनान्य इति ।

*Topic.*—Superimposition of the non-self on the self is established on the basis of inference. The knowledge of things through pramāṇas is not possible to a knowing agent—pramātā, without the presupposition of adhyāsa.

The following Bhāṣya is commented upon:—

*Pratīka.*—

तमेतं अविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-  
व्यवहाराः लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि.  
कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति—उच्यते—  
देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानराहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः—  
न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय (प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति—न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रि-  
याणां व्यवहारः संभवति ; न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते ; न चैतस्मि-  
न्सर्वस्मिन्नसति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते ; न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाण-  
प्रवृत्तिरस्ति ; तस्यादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि, शास्त्राणि च) ।

*Paragraphs.—*

141. From एवं तावत्	to पृथक् क्रियते
142. „ कथं पुनः	„ आक्षेपः
143. „ उच्यते	„ प्रसङ्गात्
144. „ अपर आह	„ मुख्याभिमानाभावादिति
145. „ नैतत्	„ यत्किञ्चिदेतत्
146. „ अतः	„ नैसर्गिके दोषबुद्धिः
147. „ तथा हि	„ नान्य इति

## XXXIX SECTION

From इतश्चैतदेवं to समान इति

*Topic.*—Even the behaviour of discerning men is the outcome of nescience. From the effect the cause is inferred.

*Pratīka.*—

पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात् ; (यथाहि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति, शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते ; यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमयमिच्छतीति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रत्यभिमुखीभवन्ति ; एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नाचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते, अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः ।) पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धोऽविवेकपूर्वकः (पुरस्सरः) प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः । तत्सामान्यदर्शनात् व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति (निश्चीयते) ।

*Paragraphs.*—

148. From इतश्चैतदेवं	to समानो युक्तः
149. „ ननु पश्वादीनामपि	„ सर्वः संप्रतिपद्येत
150. „ ननु गोपालाङ्गनादयः	„ समान इति

## XL SECTION

From एवं तावत् to परलोकसंबंधं अधिक्रियते इति

*Topic.*—Because ātman is distinct from the body, doubt is raised that activity enjoined by the scriptures is not based on superimposition though empirical activity presupposes it.

*Pratīka.*—

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वाऽऽत्मनः परलोकसंबन्धमधिक्रियते ।

*Paragraphs.—*

- |           |                         |                      |
|-----------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 151. From | एवं तावत्प्रत्यक्षादीनि | to अधिक्रियते इति    |
| 152. „    | ननु फलनैयमिक            | „ भाष्यकारः          |
| 153. „    | तथा च                   | „ उपयोगभावात्        |
| 154. „    | भगवांस्तु               | „ पराक्रान्तवान् तेन |
| 155. „    | सत्यं विनापि            | „ अधिक्रियते इति     |

## XLI SECTION

*Topic.*—The doubt raised in the previous section is cleared.

*Pratīka.*—

तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यं अशनायाद्यतीतं अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदं असंसार्यात्म-  
तत्त्वं अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते, अनुपयोगात् अधिकारविरोधाच्च ; प्राक्च तथाभूतात्म-  
विज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रं अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते ; तथाहि—“ ब्राह्मणो  
यजेत ” इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोवस्थादि विशेषाध्यासमाश्रित्य  
प्रवर्तन्ते

*Paragraphs.—*

- |           |                       |                       |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 156. From | तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यं | to दर्शयति            |
| 157. „    | प्राक्च               | „ अविद्यावद्विषयत्वम् |
| 158. „    | तदेव दर्शयति          | „ जीवनाध्यासः         |

## XLII SECTION

From एवं अध्याससद्भावम् to कामादयः

*Topic.*—The definition of superimposition as between self and not-self stated above is supported by reference to mediated adhyāsa.

*Pratīka.*—

अध्यासो नामातस्मिस्तद्वृद्धिरित्यवोचाम् । तद्यथा—(पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु  
सकलेषु वा), ‘अहमेव विकलः सकलो वे’ति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति ।  
तथा देहधर्मान्—(‘स्थूलोहम्’ कृशोहं, ‘गौरोहं’, ‘तिष्ठामि’ गच्छामि,  
लङ्घयामि चेति । तथा—इन्द्रियधर्मान्—मूकः, काणः, क्लिबः, बधिरः, अन्धोह-  
मिति । तथान्तःकरणधर्मान्—कामसंकल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्

*Paragraphs.—*

- |           |                    |                            |
|-----------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| 159. From | एवं अध्याससद्भावम् | to पुत्रभार्यादिष्वित्यादि |
| 160. „    | ननु न पुत्रादीनाम् | „ युष्मदर्थस्याध्यासः      |
| 161. „    | अस्मदर्थश्च        | „ कामादयः                  |



## XLIII. SECTION

From एवं अहंप्रत्ययिनं to योजयन्तो भ्राम्यन्ति

*Topic.*—The exposition of the mutual superimposition of the internal sense अन्तःकरण, etc., and the self आत्मन्. Illustrations of the superimposition of attributes, धर्माध्यास were given in the Bhāṣya beginning with पुत्रभार्यादिषु and ending in विचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्.

Here are given examples of the mutual superimposition of substrates—धर्म्याध्यास.

*Pratīka.*—

एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य, तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |           |                     |    |                                   |
|-----------|---------------------|----|-----------------------------------|
| 162. From | एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमिति  | to | निरुपचरितस्वरूपत्वात् तत्राध्यस्य |
| 163. „    | तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं | „  | न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम          |
| 164. „    | नन्वन्तःकरण एव      | „  | भ्राम्यन्ति                       |

## XLIV SECTION

From एवमयमनादि to तं निगमयति.

*Topic.*—Conclusion of the Bhāṣya on superimposition to which, to start with, objection was taken and which was met by defining it and proving its existence by adducing pertinent pramāṇas.

*Pratīka.*—

एवं अयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व-प्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः ।

*Paragraphs.*—

- |           |                      |    |             |
|-----------|----------------------|----|-------------|
| 165. From | एवमयमनादिः           | to | नचाधिकावापः |
| 166. „    | ननु भवेदनादिः        | „  | निश्चीयते   |
| 167. „    | मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूप इति | „  | निगमयति     |

## XLV SECTION

From एवं तावत् to नापि ज्ञानान्तरसमुत्पन्नमिति विशेषः

*Topic.*—It is argued that since nescience is not as a matter of fact destroyed by the knowledge of the distinction between the self and the body such knowledge is valueless. This is not by pointing out that though the differentiating knowledge is incapable of eradicating nescience the final knowledge of Brahman (which is enveloped by ajñāna) arising from the

mahāvākya is competent to bring about its destruction. The fruit of Brahman-knowledge is also indicated here.

*Pratīka.*—

अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय (आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता  
आरभ्यन्ते)।

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                            |                  |
|----------------------------|------------------|
| 168. From एवं तावत्        | to आत्यंतिकी यतः |
| 169. „ नन्वनर्थहेतुरध्यासः | „ अविकलो वर्तते  |
| 170. „ नायं दोषः           | „ इति विशेषः     |

#### XLVI SECTION

From ननु निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म to पुरुषाकाङ्क्षया एवास्तु ।

*Topic.*—It was shown that the fruition of Vedāntic inquiry was the eradication of the source of evil, viz., nescience but then the Scripture declares that the attainment of bliss is the fruition. How is it, asks the pūrvapakṣin, that the Bhāṣyakāra omits to mention the attainment of bliss as the fruit of inquiry? If it be urged that the eradication of evil also finds a place in the scripture as witness तरति शोकमात्मवित्, etc., then he should have mentioned both as constituting the end of Vedāntic inquiry.

The objection is met thus: From the statement of the subject-matter of Vedāntic inquiry, viz., knowledge of the unity of the individual self with the supreme, the fruit of bliss is as good as stated, for the unity of the self and bliss are identical. Hence it need not find a separate mention. But since the eradication of evil is outside the content—cognition of identity—though its knowledge supervenes that of identity the Bhāṣyakāra makes an express statement of it and has omitted to specify the attainment of bliss as the phala.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                             |                         |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 171. From ननु निरतिशयानन्दं | to पुरुषार्थत्वाच्च     |
| 172. „ न वक्तव्यं           | „ ब्रह्मात्मरूपात्      |
| 173. „ अनर्थहेतुप्रहाणमपि   | „ तथा निश्चीयते इति     |
| 174. „ यद्येवं              | „ तत्त्वमवसाययति        |
| 175. „ ननु च                | „ अनुभवविरोधाच्च        |
| 176. „ तदेवं                | „ रजतमित्यनुवादः        |
| 177. „ अत एव                | „ बाधस्य                |
| 178. „ तदेवमशाब्दं          | „ पुरुषाकाङ्क्षयैवास्तु |

## XLVII SECTION

From नहि विद्या गवादिवत् to विद्याप्रतिपत्तये इति

*Topic.*—It is enough, says the pūrvapakṣin, if 'आत्मैकत्वविद्यायै' is used and there is no need for the insertion of the phrase प्रतिपत्तये for as soon as jñāna arises (विद्या) the knower gets into relation with jñāna both in its aspect as an object and as something known or in other words we have the container-contained relation आश्रयाश्रयिभाव and the relation of awareness ज्ञातता. Hence प्रतिपत्तये, i.e., 'for obtaining' is redundant.

The answer is that this rule applies to cases of perception in general but not in the case of Brahman. The mere rise of Brahma-knowledge does not effect the eradication of evil—अनर्थ, but it is effected by pratiṣṭhā—stabilisation, which means that both the final psychosis चरमवृत्ति and Brahman should simultaneously become manifest अपरोक्ष्य. And the pratiṣṭhā is secured by reflection. As such what is intended to be expounded here is the Vidyā-Pratiṣṭhā and not merely the rise of jñāna. Hence the appropriateness of the word 'pratipatti'.

## Paragraphs.—

- |                       |                         |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 179. From न हि विद्या | to तर्कं सहायीकरोति     |
| 180. „ अत एव          | „ प्रत्ययः              |
| 181. „ नन्वेवं        | „ न संभावयति            |
| 182. „ ततः प्राक्     | „ विद्याप्रतिपत्तये इति |

## XLVIII SECTION

From नन्वात्मैकविद्याप्रतिपत्ति to न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नमस्ति

*Topic.*—It is pointed out that the knowledge of identity between ātman and Brahman is on a par with the knowledge of the distinction between the body and ātman and because the latter knowledge is not seen to sublate the motions of egoity, etc., the former also is in the same predicament. This objection does not hold; for it is only the knowledge of the identity which is positive and not difference which is negative that destroys the notions of agency, etc. Mere intellectual conviction does not bring about the desired end.

## Paragraphs.—

- |  |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| 183. From नन्वात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तिः | to उदेति        |
| 184. „ ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानात्                | „ अनुपपन्नमस्ति |

XLIX SECTION

From ननु न सर्वे वेदान्ताः to न विरुध्यते

*Topic.*—Fault is found with the statement that all Vedāntic texts expound the knowledge of Brahman since there are texts enjoining meditation on Brahman. The Siddhāntin says that all texts point to the undifferentiated Brahman only. The meditation texts are contextual प्रासङ्गिक. The knowledge of the qualified Brahman is indispensable for the knowledge of the unqualified Brahman and it is as such that meditation on the qualified Brahman is enjoined. The process of attaining the pure Brahman is by first ascribing qualities to it and then sublating them; cf., अध्यारोपापवादाभ्याम् निष्प्रपञ्चं (i.e., Brahman) प्रपञ्चते. The sublation can only be of something that is known. Here there exists no fault.

*Pratīka.*—

आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।

*Paragraphs.*—

185. From ननु न सर्वे वेदान्ताः to लक्षितं

186. ,, अस्यां चावस्थायां ,, न विरुध्यते

L SECTION

From नन्वब्रह्मोपासनान्यपि to शारीरकाभिधानम्

*Topic.*—Though it may be admitted that there is nothing inconsistent in prescribing meditation on the qualified Brahman for the attainment of the knowledge of identity between ātman and Brahman, how is it consistent to enjoin meditation on 'Breath—prāṇa', etc., which are insentient? asks the pūrvapakṣin. The answer is that even the texts on prāṇopāsanā do not conflict with those on the undifferentiated Brahman since meditation on prāṇa (Samvargavidyā) leads to the region Hiraṇyagarbha and therefrom to Brahman-realisation.

*Pratīka.*—

यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।

*Paragraphs.*—

187. From ननु अब्रह्मोपासनान्यपि to अभिधानादिति

188. ,, यथा चायमर्थः ,, शारीरकाभिधानम्

## LI SECTION

From सुमुञ्च्ये सति

to व्याख्यामारभते

*Topic.*—The objection is that the Bhāṣyakāra has stated the subject-matter and the purpose of Vedāntic study—items not found in the sūtra. The reply is that though not expressly stated in the aphorism they are derived from presumptive reasoning—arthāpatti—hence the comment.

*Pratīka.*—

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् ।

*Paragraphs.*—

189. From सुमुञ्च्ये सति

to विषयो निर्दिष्टः

190. „ तदेवं सुमुञ्चत्वानन्तरं

„ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति

191. „ अयमस्यार्थः

„ प्रतिपदं व्याख्यामारभते

## VARṆAKA II

### I SECTION

From सिद्धैव

to अभ्यधिकाशङ्काभावादिति

*Topic.*—As the pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini has traversed the whole range of the Veda, the objection says, that Bādarāyaṇa need not have composed the Vedānta Sūtras separately, with the object of inquiring into the nature of Brahman.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From सिद्धैव

to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि

2. अभ्यधिकाशङ्काभावादिति

### II SECTION

From अत्र केचित्

to न ज्ञातव्यमित्यभिप्रायः

*Topic.*—A school of Vedāntins admitting the mandatory character of the Veda as a whole justify the separate composition of the Vedānta Sūtras. They point out that the Saktu-nyāya also does not apply, for the purified ātman does not serve as an instrumental agent in effecting something that is coveted.

*Paragraphs.*—

3. From अत्र केचित्

to इत्येवमादिषु

4. „ यत्रापि

„ स्मर्यन्ते

5. „ तथापि

„ असंस्कार्यत्वम्

6. „ अतः—आत्मानं

„ निवर्तयतीति

7. „ एवं तर्हि

„ न ज्ञातव्यमित्यभिप्रायः

### III SECTION

From कर्माभिधायिनोऽपि

to संसारहेतुभूता

*Topic.*—What this section means is that even when the emphasis is on the object (accusative) in an injunction the imperative import is not absent. In the present case the carrying out of the mandate also serves a definite purpose, viz., the removal of nescience.

*Paragraphs.*—

8. From कर्माभिधायिनोऽपि

to गन्तव्य इतिवत्

9. यत्तूक्तम्

„ हेतुभूता

### IV SECTION

From अपरे पुनरेवमारभन्ते

to शास्त्रमारब्धव्यमिति

*Topic.*—A class of critics justify the commencement of the Śāstra on a different ground. Brahman can become the content of perception being an existing entity and not of Veda which

enjoins action; but because Brahman is a transcendental Being perception, etc., have no scope. Therefore the conclusion arises that the inquiry into the meaning of the Veda closes with the Samkarṣa kāṇḍa of Jaimini and in consequence Brahman remains unestablished by any pramāṇa. Hence to refute such a view and to show that the Vedānta also is related to action this inquiry into its meaning is undertaken by Bādarāyaṇa.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                       |                 |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 10. From अपरे पुनरेवं | to प्रतिज्ञातम् |
| 11. „ इहापि           | „ आरब्धव्यमिति  |

#### V SECTION

From अत्रोच्यते to कार्यत्वासम्भवेन प्रत्युक्तम्

*Topic.*—The mīmāṃsaka who maintains that the śāstra need not be begun, in contradistinction to the two Vedāntins who on different grounds advocate its commencement, avers that no additional problem arises which would justify the undertaking of the Uttaramimāṃsā.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                          |                         |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 12. From अत्रोच्यते      | to किञ्चित्             |
| 13. „ ननु चतुर्विधस्यापि | „ चेतः समाधानं भविष्यति |
| 14. „ यत्पुनः            | „ किंविधिना             |
| 15. „ यदपि मतान्तरं      | „ प्रत्युक्तम्          |

#### VI SECTION

From अपरं मतं to कल्प्यतां विधिः

*Topic.*—In answer to the critic who contends that the Vedānta aphorisms are a superfluity, a third critic says that the Vedāntic texts not only reveal an existent object but also enjoin the knowledge of that object as a thing to be undertaken, and that though the mandate (jñāna-vidhi) is not found in them it has to be understood.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                   |                   |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 16. From अपरं मतं | to विषयः          |
| 17. „ कथं तत्     | „ कल्प्यतां विधिः |

#### VII SECTION

From किं प्रतीते विध्यर्थे to विधिकल्पना भवेत्

*Topic.*—The anārambhavādin rejoins that no injunction is possible of postulation and that the analogy of understanding a vidhi (Vidhikalpanā) in the case of offering of the kneaded flour to the sun is inapplicable.



*Paragraphs.—*

- |                              |                         |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 18. From किं प्रतीति         | to प्रमाणकौशलम्         |
| 19. „ ननु अश्रूयमानविधिष्वपि | „ कार्यपरता कल्प्यत इति |
| 20. „ ननु अत्राप्यात्मपदम्   | „ विधिकल्पना भवेत्      |

VIII SECTION

From अथापि भवतु नाम विधिः to निष्पन्नत्वात् ज्ञानस्य

*Topic.*—Mere terminations like 'tavya' cannot be postulated; we must premise the roots along with them and construe the text under consideration thus—इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा कर्तव्य or ज्ञातव्य. But such construing is inappropriate in as much as the inert nature of the universe cannot be eradicated thereby. As for jñāna-vidhi or injunction of knowledge in its logical sense it is purposeless since the knowledge of the Vedic texts arises at the time of learning to recite them. This is the view-point of the anārambhavādin.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| 21. From अथापि     | to अनर्थकं स्यात्         |
| 22. „ अथ ज्ञातव्यः | „ निष्पन्नत्वात् ज्ञानस्य |

IX SECTION

From पुनः कर्तव्यतया to वैरूप्यप्रसङ्गात्

*Topic.*—The upholder of the Uttaramīmāṃsā śāstra argues that the knowledge arising when chanting the Veda is distinct from that which leads to liberation and is therefore enjoined in the Vidhi—'idam sarvam yadayamātmā jñātavyaḥ'. He advances 'mantra' in point which yields one sense at the time of chanting and another when uttered at a sacrifice, useful in the generation of apūrva or transcendental result, for the rule is that for securing apūrva the meaning of the mantra should be remembered by actually uttering the mantra मन्त्रैरेव मन्त्रार्थः स्मर्तव्यः अपूर्वाय.

The anārambhavādin rebuts this view.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                          |                     |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| 23. From पुनः कर्तव्यतया | to विधायकः          |
| 24. „ ननु मन्त्रेषु      | „ नैष दोषः          |
| 25. „ अन्यार्थमपि        | „ भविष्यति          |
| 26. „ तदेतत्             | „ वैरूप्यप्रसङ्गात् |

## X SECTION

From नन्वेवं सति to आत्मलाभाच्च परं विधीयते इति स्मृतेः

*Topic.*—The anārambhavādin points out that if vidhi is accepted in the texts like 'idam sarvam, etc.', the same sentence will have to convey two meanings, one opposed to the other. The ārambhavādin disagreeing with him advances the analogy of mantras which in his view bear a double sense. Likewise he instances guṇakarmas or subsidiary acts where also it is no blemish for a single sentence to denote two senses. The anārambhavādin rejects both as being untenable.

Ārambhavādin—the contingency of double sense can be avoided by splitting up the sentence into two, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा, which merely denotes the object and ज्ञातव्यम्, which is the injunction of knowledge.

Anārambhavādin—If the sentence is thus cut up it loses all validity.

Ārambhavādin, brings in the analogy and laudatory sentences.

Anārambhavādin.—They are only auxiliaries to vidhi and have no meaning of their own; this is the mīmāṃsā view.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                    |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| 27. From नन्वेवं        | to ज्ञानं विधीयते  |
| 28. „ तस्मादत्र         | „ प्रमाणत्वायोगात् |
| 29. „ अथार्थवादपदानामिव | „ इति स्मृतेः      |

## XI SECTION

From अथ पुनः शाब्दज्ञानात् to हेतौ प्रवर्तते

*Topic.*—The ārambhavādin varies his argument and says that liberation does not result from mere verbal knowledge but from intuition—aparokṣya, and that knowledge—jñāna should be enjoined in order that āparokṣya may result. The opponent answers that such jñāna is indeterminate and as such cannot be the content of a vidhi and he also refutes the view that vidhi is in relation to knowledge-series, jñānasamtāna.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                           |                        |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| 30. From अथ पुनः          | to इत्युक्तम्          |
| 31. „ अथ पुनस्तदेव ज्ञानं | „ ज्ञानसन्तानो विधीयते |
| 32. „ ननु किमत्र          | „ हेतौ प्रवर्तते       |

## XII SECTION

From यत् पुनर्निर्दर्शनम् to तस्येति वैषम्यम्

*Topic.*—The ārambhavādin to substantiate his contention has pointed out the analogy of (i) a water-course which serve

the double purpose of irrigation and quenching one's thirst; (ii) statements relating to the fore-sacrifices such as prayājas which denote the order of sacrifices as well as the respective padārthas; (iii) the organ of sight which revealing colour also reveals substance. The anārambhavādin rejects all these as besides the point.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |          |              |    |                       |
|----------|--------------|----|-----------------------|
| 33. From | यत् पुनः     | to | संभवतीत्युक्तम्       |
| 34.      | अदपीदमुक्तम् | ,, | वस्तुतत्त्वमवबोधयतीति |
| 35.      | यत्पुनः      | ,, | तस्य वैषम्यम्         |

### XIII SECTION

From आह मा भूज्ज्ञानद्वयम् to मनोरथ एव

*Topic.*—"Let not the sentence 'idam sarvam, etc.', says the ārambhavādin, "denote its sense—prameya, let it denote only the injunction, the former being ascertained from presumptive evidence 'śrutyarthāpatti'." The rejoinder is that this violates all rules of interpretation. To abandon what the sentence actually gives, viz., the world pervasion of ātman—prameya, and to construe it as denoting injunction is objectionable,; nor is there any necessity that an injunction regarding jñāna should imply a real fact as its object, for artificial or fictitious meditations are quite conceivable.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |          |                |    |                 |
|----------|----------------|----|-----------------|
| 36. From | आह मा भूत्     | to | वाक्यार्थवित्ता |
| 37.      | ,, न च नियोगतः | ,, | मनोरथ एव        |

### XIV SECTION

From अतोहंप्रत्ययावसेयः to प्रयुञ्जीत

*Topic.*—The anārambhavādin or the Mīmāṃsaka concludes his argument here. He maintains that what is denoted by the ego-notion or ahampratyaya is itself the ātman and none exists apart from it. He asserts that texts like 'He is Ātman, and That Thou Ārt'—स आत्मा, तत्त्वमसि enjoin meditation on ātman as possessing actual fancied qualities (according to circumstances) for the sake of liberation मोक्ष. Hence he sums up by pointing out that all the Vedāntic texts denote action of the nature of meditation and since Jaimini has made an exhaustive inquiry into all the Vedic statements denotative of action, there exists no justification for any additional treatise. Uttaramīmamsa therefore is purposeless.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |          |                        |    |            |
|----------|------------------------|----|------------|
| 38. From | अतोहंप्रत्ययावसेयः     | to | युक्तम्    |
| 39.      | ,, अतः कार्यानुरक्तस्य | ,, | प्रयुञ्जीत |

## XV SECTION

From उच्यते-स्यादेतदेवं to ज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः

*Topic.*—As against the four contestants, viz., the three who advocate the commencement of the Uttaramīmāṃsā Śāstra promising Vidhi and the one who sees no object in it, the accepted conclusion परमसिद्धान्त, is that there is justification for the new Śāstra on the ground that in the first aphorism of Jaimini, the word *Dharma* and not the word *Veda* is used, so that it is evident that that part of the Veda, viz., the Upaniṣad which relates to the self-existent entity has been left uncommented by Jaimini. As such it calls for a distinct inquiry.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 40. From उच्यते   | to न वस्तुतत्त्वनिष्ठः |
| 41. „ तथा हि      | „ विवक्षित इति         |
| 42. „ एवमाशङ्किते | „ गम्यते               |
| 43. „ तत्कथम्     | „ ज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः    |

## XVI SECTION

From यत्पुनर्धर्मस्य to वेदभागमविचारितमसूचत्

*Topic.*—In the first aphorism—अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा the emphasis is laid on the word *Dharma*, similarly in the second aphorism चोदनालक्षणार्थो धर्मः, the emphasis is laid on the word *Codaṇā* which means *Vidhi* or injunction to action. It therefore excludes the inquiry into the entity devoid of any connection with action. Otherwise to obviate all doubts Jaimini would have framed the second sūtra as वेदलक्षणार्थो धर्मः. Because he has not done so it must be concluded that he admits the inclusion in the Veda of something that is not the content of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                          |                         |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 44. From यत्पुनर्धर्मस्य | to मन्यते               |
| 45. „ ननु चोदनाग्रहणस्य  | „ कथयितुमिति            |
| 46. „ नैतत् सारम्        | „ लोकेपि विद्यमानत्वात् |
| 47. „ अथ वेदाधिकरणे      | „ असूचत्                |

## XVII SECTION

From ननु दृष्टो हि to वाक्यान्युदाहृतानि

*Topic.*—The anārambhavādin relies on the following texts. दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम् (Śabara), तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन, आप्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्—(Jaimini); all these seem to indicate that the Veda has action as its theme and where it speaks of an existent entity it means that the text in question should be construed with

passages prescribing action. He takes āmnāya to mean Veda in general and comes to the conclusion that every section of Veda has come under the purview of Jaimini's investigation of Pārvamīmāṃsā. The Siddhāntin's contention is that it is untenable to hold that all parts of the Veda are related to action. The sentence दृष्टो हि is intended to show that the Veda has a specific sense and not to exclude reference to an existing entity. As regards the sūtra आन्नायस्य, etc., it is true that statements like सोरोदीत् are purposeless unless they are conjoined with texts denoting action but that does not warrant the supposition that a purpose is served only when there is association with action. The Upaniṣadic texts are all purposeful but they are not ancillary to mandatory texts.

*Paragraphs.—*

48. From तनु दृष्टो हि	to दर्शितम्
49. „ सत्यम्	„ भाष्यकृतः
50. „ यत्पुनः	„ अशक्यत्वात्
51. „ यानि पुनः	„ वाक्यान्युदाहृतानि

### XVIII SECTION

From यदपि केचित् to विचारयितुमिदमारभ्यते—अथातो  
ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति

*Topic.*—Prabhākara, a leader of an important school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā explains the word Dharma as Vedārtha. He makes no division of the Veda into two parts, one relating to action and the other to an existing object. His contention is that inquiry—vicāra, is for the purpose of determining what exactly is the teaching of 'Veda' (for its statements engender doubt), while according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the leader of the rival school, inquiry is to determine what is dharma, whether it is agnihotra, etc., or caityavandana.

The Siddhāntin says that even according to Prabhākara not the whole of the Vedārtha is indicated but only that section which is concerned with enjoining action, for the word used in the aphorism is Dharma and not Vedārtha.

*Paragraphs.—*

52. From यदपि केचित्	to शास्त्रारंभ इति
53. „ तत्रापि	„ संदिग्धत्वाच्च
54. „ तथा चोत्तरमपि सूत्रम्	„ आपयेत्
55. „ अथापि	„ विचारयितुमिदमारभ्यते—अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति

## VARNAKA III

### I SECTION

From तत्र अथशब्दः to अनधिकार्यत्वादिति

*Topic.*—The objection is raised that the Bhāṣyakāra by construing the word 'Jijñāsā, in the sense of 'Desire for knowledge' has stated that the word 'atha' does not mean commencement; and that this is untenable since the accepted meaning of 'atha' is commencement. This is met by pointing out that where the etymological sense authorised by grammar is admissible, the conventional sense has to be ignored.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                           |                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. From तत्राथशब्दः       | to अनधिकार्यत्वात्  |
| 2. „ अयन्तु जिज्ञासाशब्दः | „ जात्यन्तरमिति     |
| 3. „ धर्ममीमांसा          | „ जिज्ञास्येते इति  |
| 4. „ इहापि                | „ वेदितव्यमिति      |
| 5. „ उच्यते               | „ कल्पना युक्ता     |
| 6. „ ननु न वयं            | „ अनधिकार्यत्वादिति |

*Pratīka.*—

तत्राथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते, नाधिकार्यार्थः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात् ।

### II SECTION

From नन्वेवमपि to कदाचिदपि गौतमेति

*Topic.*—Because desire—इच्छा is something that cannot be commenced at one's will you say that the word 'atha' cannot appropriately be understood to mean 'commencement'—आरम्भाय. This is wrong, for it is not merely 'desire' that is meant by 'जिज्ञासा' but it points, in a secondary sense—लक्षणा to inquiry as the means to the acquisition of the desired knowledge. The phrase जिज्ञासा denotes 'inquiry' which is a proper subject for undertaking and as such it is appropriate to take 'atha' to mean 'commencement'.

It may be noted that the opponent admits that the aphorism conveys the sense of 'desire' but since it is not a fit subject of 'commencement' he urges that it should be taken to mean 'inquiry' in its secondary significance.

The rejoinder is that if 'atha' is not taken to mean immediate succession signifying subsequence to the acquisition of the four-fold qualification, but if taken to mean 'commencement', then the enjoined inquiry would not be undertaken for want of an agent, अधिकारी. If it be argued that one desirous

of the fruit प्रयोजन as constituted by Brahma-knowledge or liberation characterised by supreme bliss is the agent, it must be pointed out that few desire either Brahma-knowledge or liberation which as taught in the Upaniṣads is of a super-empirical character and therefore altogether unfamiliar to man.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                                |                          |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 7. From नन्वेवमपि              | to कस्याधिकार उच्यते     |
| 8. „ ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रयोजनं | „ कृतस्तत्र प्रवृत्तिः   |
| 9. „ नन्वानन्दरूपतापि          | „ ब्रह्मज्ञाने प्रवर्तेत |
| 10. „ ननु परितृप्तरूपतापि      | „ कदाचिदपि गौतमेति       |

III SECTION

From सा भूत्

to सकलवेदार्थविचारः

*Topic.*—The pūrvapakṣin contends that the agent can be secured without 'atha' being construed as 'subsequence'. The inquiry into the meaning of the Veda is prompted by the injunction of Vedic study, viz., स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः and since Vedānta also is a part of the Veda the inquiry into its meaning is also prompted by the same vidhi or injunction; so that whoever is the fit agent in the Vedic study अध्ययन is also the agent in the Vedāntic inquiry. The knowledge of the Vedic import is the fruit of अध्ययन and such knowledge cannot be had without inquiry. It cannot be said that the memorising of the bare text is the fruit, for that serves no purpose. Hence the word 'atha' must mean commencement of a new topic and not immediate consecution.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                  |                             |
|------------------|-----------------------------|
| 11. From सा भूत् | to फलप्रयुक्त एव अर्थावबोधः |
| 12. „ अपि च      | „ अध्ययनस्य विहितत्वात्     |
| 13. „ ननु        | „ वेदार्थविचारः             |

IV SECTION.

From अत्रोच्यते

to अर्थावबोधसिद्धिः

*Topic.*—The rejoinder to the above is that the injunction to Vedic study has not as its fruit the comprehension of the meaning of the Veda, the reason is that before the injunction is known one is not aware that the Veda purports to have a specific sense and it is only what is so known that helps to determine agency. Hence since inquiry is not instigated by the injunction to Vedic study there will be no agent to undertake the inquiry and the agent can be secured only by taking 'atha' to mean 'subsequence'.



*Paragraphs.—*

14. From अत्रोच्यते

to अर्थावबोधसिद्धिः

## V SECTION

From यद्येवम्

to इति वाच्यम्

*Topic.*—The injunction to Vedic study does not explicitly mention the adhikārin. The adhyāpana, no doubt, results in 'arthāva-bodha'. But that for reasons just assigned, cannot point to the adhikārin. Hence the injunction becomes futile for lack of adhikārin. When such an objection is raised by the advocate of 'commencement',—आरंभार्थं he is confronted by the Prābhākaras who deny agency as resulting from the injunction to Vedic study, अध्ययनविधि and transfer it to the injunction relating to the teaching, अध्यापनविधि. The siddhāntin in rebutting this view points out that the injunction to Vedic study is obligatory, नित्य whereas that relating to the teaching, अध्यापन is optional. How can what is optional entail the performance of the obligatory? Therefore the injunction to Vedic study of itself prompts one to undertake the study and does not depend upon the injunction to instruct.

*Paragraphs.—*

15. From यद्येवं

to अध्ययने प्राप्ता

16. „ अत्र केचिदाहुः

„ प्रयुक्तस्येति

17. „ तदयुक्तमित्यपरे

„ इति वाच्यम्

## VI SECTION

From ननु कथं आचार्यकरणविधिरनित्यः to प्रयोज्यत्वमुपपद्यते

*Topic.*—The Siddhāntin admits that in one sense, viz., in so far as the income that it brings is necessary for livelihood the injunction of preceptorship, आचार्यकरणविधि is obligatory,—नित्य but there is no śāstraic pronouncement—शब्दतः that it is obligatory. The mark of obligatoriness is the incurring of sin by neglecting the enjoined duty, say, the initiation of a Brahman lad in his eighth year. In the case of preceptorship, its phala, viz., income, can be got by other means as well and it does not amount to sin if one does not follow the profession of teaching. Hence the injunction relating to it is not obligatory and as such it would be wrong to suppose that it is productive of what is obligatory, viz., adhyayana.

*Paragraphs.—*

18. From ननु कथम्

to कथं अनित्यं स्यात्

19. „ भवेदेवम्

„ फलवशात् तत्कर्तव्यताप्राप्तपत्तौ

20. „ यद्यपि

„ प्रयोज्यत्वमुपपद्यते

VII SECTION

From ननु पितुः

to वृत्त्यर्थत्वेन प्राप्तोऽनूयते

*Topic.*—The pūrvapakṣa is that though instruction, अध्यापन is not obligatory it derives obligatoriness from its being ancillary to the injunction relating to the rearing of a male progeny which is obligatory. Hence it is urged that it prompts adhyayana. The Siddhānta is that the injunction to rear a family in the words, तस्मात् पुत्रं अनुशिष्टं लोक्यमाहुः is only arthavāda being ancillary to 'sampattikarma'; moreover on this view if the preceptor who has commenced tuition should die there would arise the contingency of the cessation of adhyayana for, as the pūrvapakṣin admits, another preceptor cannot take his place—the substitution of one teacher by another being disallowed. The agent (adhikārin) is never replaced. It is the means that may be replaced provided the agent continues to be there; what is intended to be impressed is that if adhyayana is made to depend upon the adhyāpana vidhi, the death of the preceptor puts a stop to the study for he is the agent intended in the vidhi. If on the other hand, adhyāpana is the outcome of the adhyayana vidhi, the loss is only of an aid, and it may well be replaced. How can an injunction connected with a subordinate agent, it may be asked, be preferred to the principal agent? The answer is as in ग्रामकामो यजेत.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                     |                  |
|---------------------|------------------|
| 21. From ननु पितुः  | to न भवेत्       |
| 22. „ उच्यते        | „ अनुवदति        |
| 23. „ किं तदनुशासनं | „ अनुशासतीति     |
| 24. „ तथा च लिङ्गम् | „ इति वाच्यम्    |
| 25. „ किं च         | „ प्राप्तोऽनूयते |

VIII SECTION

From अत्रैके

to मनः खेदयितव्यमिति

*Topic.*—In statements like “cause the yāga to be performed by one who desires to own a village, ग्रामकामं याजयेत्” since we have a causative verb we perceive two functionaries—the active agent, and the subordinate agent. But in such cases the injunction relates to the active or the principal agent since the subordinate functionary, the officiating priest acts only with the object of eking out a livelihood and not under śāstraic obligation.

True, but in the statement ‘initiate a Brāhman’, ब्राह्मण-मुपनयीत, there is no causative termination so that there is no

double function. It is only of the preceptor—the prayojaka-kartā. Hence, says the advocate of adhyāpanavidhi implying adhyayana, that the injunction cannot relate to the pupil माणवक.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 26. From अत्रैके | to अभिधानम्         |
| 27. „ इह पुनः    | „ मनः खेदयितव्यमिति |

#### IX SECTION

From उच्यते to यजेतेति यथा

*Topic.*—The Pūrvapakṣin's contention is met thus—True, in 'initiate' उपनयित, the pupil's duty is not directly indicated while the preceptor's function is indicated. Yet it is obvious that the act of initiation is undertaken by the preceptor because of his calling, वृत्ति, but not so in the case of the pupil. An injunction must embrace that which is not yet known, अप्राप्त and not that which is प्राप्त, from some other source. Hence it comes to be the pupil's duty माणवकव्यापार that is enjoined though indirectly through reference to the activity of the preceptor.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                       |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 28. From उच्यते       | to विधेयमिहास्ति     |
| 29. „ ननु माणवकस्यापि | „ सामान्यतः प्रतीयते |
| 30. „ तस्य च          | „ यजेतेति यथा        |

#### X SECTION

From नन्वेवमपि to कारणान्तरादिति

*Topic.*—It is urged that the mandate 'one should study one's branch of the Veda स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' does not bring to light who the agent is that is competent for study. This mandate is nityakāmya. It is nitya since its non-performance results in sin and it is kāmya for the fruit is the acquisition of the knowledge of the meaning अर्थविबोध. Though nitya, the agent is not indicated by any qualificatory adjuncts. To this the Siddhānta reply is that the age and caste specifications as seen in the injunction 'initiate a Brahman in his eighth year अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयति' bring to light the agent in the initiation ceremony उपनयन, and this ceremony necessarily implies Vedic study, so that whoever is the agent in the one is the agent in the other. The fruit according to the siddhāntin is the mastery over the text and not the knowledge of the Vedic import.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                    |                    |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| 31. From नन्वेवमपि | to न्यायविदः       |
| 32. „ किं च        | „ संस्कार्यत्व इति |
| 33. „ तदेवं        | „ कारणान्तरादिति   |

## XI SECTION

From ननु चैवं to जिज्ञासाऽनुपपन्ना

*Topic.*—The vṛttikāra quotes Śabara in support of the view that the injunction of Vedic study itself serves to prompt inquiry and opines that the understanding of the sense is the fruit of Vedic study. The Siddhāntin admits that Śabara intends that the knowledge of the sense is the fruit of Vedic study but says that it is only in reference to a particular context (*i.e.*, obligatory duties and also optional duties according to the Vivaraṇa). The person who has studied the Veda with its accessories सांगाध्यायी, gets a vague notion of the injunctions relating to the several religious duties to be performed by him and its clarification demands decisive knowledge; as such he has to undertake the inquiry. The steps are, first Vedic study—अध्ययन, then an indistinct understanding of the injunctions pertaining to the obligatory duties and the desire to perform them which in turn requires careful investigation.

But Brahmajijñāsā, says the Siddhāntin, does not desiderate inquiry—विचार for no such obligation exists in its case. One may remain without such knowledge and yet incur no sin.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                           |                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 34. From ननु चैवं         | to गीयते            |
| 35. „ न तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानम् | „ जिज्ञासाऽनुपपन्ना |

*So far the refutation of आरंभवाद.*

## XII SECTION

From मङ्गलस्यापि to आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकादिति

*Topic.*—Here is refuted the view that the word 'then'—अथ, has 'auspiciousness'—मङ्गल as its sense. The word no doubt bears the meaning of 'maṅgala', but that meaning cannot be syntactically connected with the rest of the sūtra. Nor does the word refer to any other antecedent circumstance, unless it stands for what we shall mention soon.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                      |                          |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| 36. From मङ्गलस्यापि | to नाधिकारार्थं इति      |
| 37. „ ननु            | „ किमिति न गृह्यते       |
| 38. „ उच्यते         | „ आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकादिति |

*Pratīka.*—

(i) मङ्गलस्य (च) वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् । (अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव हि अथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति) ।

(ii) पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात् ।

### XIII SECTION

From सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे to निष्पादक इत्यर्थः

*Topic.*—Here is criticised the view that, on the analogy of inquiry into Dharma—धर्मजिज्ञासा, where Vedic study is the correlate (precedent condition—प्रतियोगी) of inquiry, Vedādhyaṇa—Vedic study, is the correlate of subsequence—आनन्तर्य, for Vedic study is the common precedent condition to those who investigate into the meaning of Dharma as well as those who long for Brahmajñāna. When we conclude that ‘atha’ means ‘immediate sequence’, we should point to some antecedent which is both necessary and sufficient for the Brahman-inquiry. To represent adhyayana as that antecedent would be repetition for it has already been mentioned in *Jai. Sūt.* I. i. Further Vedic study or adhyayana may be a necessary condition, but it is by no means sufficient.

*Paragraphs.*—

39. From सति च to प्रक्रियते

40. „ स्वाध्यायाध्ययनन्तु „ इत्यर्थः

*Pratīka.*—

सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेन अपेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम्. स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम् ।

### XIV SECTION

From नन्विह to अतो न कर्माविबोधापेक्षोऽप्यथशब्दः

*Topic.*—When the word ‘atha’ is understood to mean ‘subsequence—आनन्तर्य’, the question naturally arises which are the other possible precedent conditions following which—वाक्यार्थे Brahman-inquiry should begin? These antecedents may be—

1. Jaimini’s 1,000 nyāyas with which to determine the meaning of the Vedic texts.
2. The settled import of the various adhikaraṇas—वाक्यार्थे arrived at from applying these 1,000 nyāyas.

Two in particular of these 1,000 nyāyas, viz.,

(a) Knowledge of the nyāya which points to the fact that the object of the Vedic study is to comprehend the sense.

(b) Knowledge of the nyāya pointing to the fact the Veda is self-valid—स्वतःप्रामाण्य;

(a) and (b) are no doubt essential for Brahman-inquiry but they are not sufficient like svādhyāyādhyayana (see Sec. XIII).

3. Gradual acquisition of competency for Brahman-inquiry by performing acts of religious duty beginning with the simplest like offering prayers to the sun and proceeding to the more complicated;

(b) acquiring detachment through satiation after enjoying pleasures even up to, and including Hiranyagarbhaloka. This is कामप्रध्वंसवाद.

None of these, it is pointed out, can serve as the antecedent of Brahmajijñāsā. There is no direct causal relationship.

*Paragraphs.—*

41. From नन्विह	to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रति इति
42. „ अत्राह	„ अभिप्रायः
43. „ कथम्	„ अभिहितः
44. „ यत्पुनः	„ तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दः
45. „ यत्पुनः स्वाध्यायस्य	„ अथशब्दः
46. „ यः पुनः	„ संबन्धानिरूपणात्
47. „ अतः कर्मणामुपयोगः	„ प्रमाणाभावात्
48. „ अथ कामोपहत	„ ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां करोति
49. „ कर्मानुष्ठानानन्तर्यम्	„ सह सिद्धं चतुष्टयमिति
50. „ तस्मात् सर्वत्र	„ कामोच्छेदो भवतीति
51. „ ननु कामावाप्तौ	„ अथ शब्दः

*Pratīka.—*

नन्विह कर्मावबोधनान्तर्यं विशेषः; न धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अर्थात् वेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः ।

XV SECTION

From भवतु तर्हि to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति

*Topic.—*Mental purity, says the Pūrvapakṣin, is attained by the performance of karma and then only is one fit for Brahman-inquiry. The answer is that it may have been accomplished in a previous birth so that Karmāvabodha (i.e., Karmānuṣṭhāna) in the present life is not a necessary precondition of Brahman-inquiry. This also furnishes the answer to the argument based upon the necessity for the prior discharging of the triple debt.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                     |                            |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| 52. From भवतु तर्हि | to अश्ववदिति च             |
| 53. „ सत्यमेवम्     | „ युज्यते                  |
| 54. „ एतेन          | „ ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति |

## XVI SECTION

From अथापि स्यात् to धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः इति

*Topic.*—The Pūrvapakṣin shifts the ground. Let not karma—performance of the enjoined acts, as the immediate precedent cause of a Brahman-inquiry be admitted, but says he, let it be a mere antecedent, *i.e.*, let it merely denote that Brahman-inquiry follows Dharma-inquiry without implying any causal relation as in the cutting of the heart, then the tongue and then the breast of the sacrificial animal. The Siddhāntin shows the inapplicability of the analogy adduced.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                       |                 |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 55. From अथापि स्यात् | to वक्षस इति    |
| 56. „ तदप्ययुक्तम्    | „ जिज्ञासयोरिति |

*Pratīka.—*

यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात् न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः, शेषशेषित्वेऽधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात्, धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः

## XVII SECTION

From अथापि स्यात् to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपादिश्यत इति

*Topic.*—The six yāgas constituting Darśapūrṇamāsa yield in the aggregate a single result—फल, necessitating as such a single performer—कर्ता, who has per force to observe definite order in the performance of these yāgas. Again, krama or order is to be observed in studying the twelve chapters of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā for the phala is one; similarly in studying the four chapters of the Uttaramīmāṃsā. On these two analogies it is urged that the order of precedence is to be admitted since the content of inquiry—जिज्ञास्य is identical in both Dharmamīmāṃsā and Brahmanmīmāṃsā and the agent—कर्ता is one and the same.

The Siddhāntin points out the inherent opposition between Dharmajijñāsā and Brahmajijñāsā. In the case of the former, it is mere prosperity here or elsewhere that is the fruit, in the case of the latter it is spiritual freedom. The former is concerned with that which is yet to come into being, the latter with what already exists. There is therefore no singleness of agency and so no room for precedence.



*Paragraphs.—*

57. From अथापि स्यात्	to इत्याशंक्याह
58. „ फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च	„ तन्त्रद्वयस्य
59. „ जिज्ञास्यं पुनः	„ जिज्ञास्यम्
60. „ किं च	„ व्याख्यायेत
61. „ अत उपसंहरति	„ उपदिश्यत इति

*Pratika.—*

फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च—अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानं तच्च अनुष्ठानापेक्षम्—निश्रेयस-फलं तु (ब्रह्मवि)ज्ञानं न च अनुष्ठानानन्तरापेक्षम्—(भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्; इह नु भूतं ब्रह्मजिज्ञास्यं नित्यत्वात् न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्)—चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च—या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणं सा स्वविषये नियुज्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति, ब्रह्मचोदना (तु) पुनः पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलं, अवबोधस्य चोदनाऽजन्यत्वात् न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते; यथाक्षार्थ-सन्निकर्षणार्थवबोधे तदुत—तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोप-दिश्यत इति.

## XVIII SECTION

From उच्यते

to साधनसंपत्त्यनन्तर्यं उपदिश्यत इति

*Topic.*—Here is established the antecedence of the four-fold discipline—साधनचतुष्टय, both on the authority of the Scriptures and of strict logic. Further it is emphasised that of these prerequisites, viz., perception of distinction between the eternal and the transcient, aversion for the enjoyment of the goods of this and other world, the practice of sādhanasatka (*vide* note 70), and longing for freedom, the preceding one is indispensable for what follows immediately. These four disciplines constitute the hetu of Brahman-inquiry and as such it is evident that they, as cause or necessary conditions must precede the inquiry.

*Paragraphs.—*

62. From उच्यते	to प्रवृत्तिरिति
63. „ तस्मात्	„ यावन्न जायते तावद्विरक्तो न जायते इत्यध्याहारः
64. „ यावच्चाभिमुखं	„ भोगाद्विरक्तः (तावन्मुमुक्षत्वं ना- लंबते)
65. „ ततो मुमुक्षत्वं	„ बहिरेव अभिनिविशमानः
66. „ तस्मात्	„ उपदिश्यत इति

*Pratīka.*—

उच्यते, नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थ(फल)भोगविरागः, शम-  
दमादिसाधनसंपत्, मुमुक्षत्वं च—तेषु हि सस्तु प्रागपि ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्द्ध्वं च  
शक्यते ब्रह्मजिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये, तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधन-  
संपत्त्यनन्तर्यं उपदिश्यते ।

Here ends the discussion of the meaning of 'atha'—अथ.

## XIX SECTION

From अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः to पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन निराक्रियते

*Topic.*—It is argued that the so-called four disciplines are out of the question, for one will not desist from performing rites such as the quarterly—चातुर्मास्य since they yield everlasting happiness. Moreover it is unintelligible that with the object of attaining the one changeless Being—कूटस्थ one would like to renounce this world and the next, for in the state of that eternal Being though there is absence of pain and suffering, there is no positive happiness. That state cannot be taken as the highest end of man—परमपुरुषार्थ. Hence though karmaphala is not unmixed good it will be sought for.

This arrangement is met by the observation that the fruit of quarterly rites is impermanent as declared in the Scriptures rightly understood, and supported by reasoning. The text 'the knower of Brahman attains the Supreme'—ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् reveals that the attainment of the Eternal Brahman is the highest human end and other texts bring home the blissful nature—आनन्दस्वरूप of Brahman. Hence one who cultivates the qualities embraced in the four-fold discipline necessarily enters upon Brahman-inquiry.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                             |                     |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 67. From अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः | to श्रवणात्         |
| 68. „ अतः                   | „ अतःशब्दः          |
| 69. „ कथं                   | „ मुमुक्षत्वे हेतुः |
| 70. „ यत्पुनः               | „ निराक्रियते       |

*Pratīka.*—

अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः

यस्माद्विद एव अभिहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानां अनित्यफलतां दर्शयति—  
'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते (इत्यादिः)'  
तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति—'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परं इत्यादिः' ।

तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या ।

Here ends the discussion of the meaning of 'atah'—अतः.

## XX SECTION

From ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा to कर्मणि षष्ठी

*Topic.*—Three points are made clear in this section:—(1) the compound Brahmajijñāsā is to be dissolved as Brahmano+jijñāsā and not as Brahmane+jijñāsā; (2) the meaning of the word Brahman; (3) the word Brahmajijñāsā involves an objective genitive and not a genitive of possession. It is also shown that from the description of the word Brahman as given in the second sūtra it is evident that Brahman means the Lord who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe.

*Paragraphs.*—

71. From ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा	to दर्शितः
72. „ ब्रह्मशब्दस्य	„ आशंकितव्यमिति
73. „ ब्रह्मण इति	„ अनिर्देशाच्चेति
74. „ पुनः शेषषष्ठीवाद्याह	„ प्रयासः स्यादिति
75. „ ननु किमिति	„ इति चेदिति
76. „ स्वयमेव	„ सूत्रयितव्यानि
77. „ किंच	„ तस्मात् ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी

*Pratīka.*—

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा—ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणं 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति—अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थांतरमाशंकितव्यम्—ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि-षष्ठी न शेषे—जिज्ञास्यपेक्षत्वात् जिज्ञासायाः—जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च—ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, संबन्धसामान्यस्य विशेष-निष्ठत्वात्—एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्—न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत्—न, प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षिता नामार्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्—ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्, तस्मिन्प्रधाने जिज्ञासा कर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्मजिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि, यथा राजासौ गच्छतीत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति तद्वत्—श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म' इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति, तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति, तस्मात् ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी.

## XXI SECTION

From ज्ञातुमिच्छा

to कथितं भवति

*Topic.*—Having explained the words 'atha', 'ataḥ' and 'Brahman' found in the sūtra—'atha', to 'Brahmajijñāsā' the Bhāṣyakāra takes up the word 'jijñāsā' for comment. The root jñā in jijñāsā, it is pointed out, denotes the ultimate cognition which

is the immediate means of the fruit of freedom—mokṣa. Also by pointing out that the desired jñāna is not attained except through vicāra the commentator states that the word jijñāsā implied by means of inquiry also—vicāra.

*Paragraphs.—*

78. From ज्ञातुमिच्छा	to साक्षात्करणमित्यर्थः
79. „ तदेतत्	„ कथयितुमाह
80. „ तस्मात्	„ कथितं भवति

*Pratīka.—*

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा—(अवगतिपर्यन्तं) अपवर्गपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्या या इच्छायाः कर्म, फलविषयत्वात् इच्छायाः—ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म, ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः—(निःशेषसंसारबीजाऽविद्याद्यनर्थनिर्बहणात्)—तस्मात् ब्रह्म (वि)जिज्ञासितव्यम्.

## VARṆAKA IV

### I SECTION

From तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म

to संबन्ध आक्षिप्तः

*Topic.*—The Pūrvapakṣin argues that if Brahman is an already known entity there would be neither Viṣaya for inquiry nor prayojana for it, if unknown, Viṣaya may be there but neither prayōjana nor sambandha. The dilemma, he says, cannot be avoided.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From तत्पुनः

to प्रयोजनमप्याक्षिप्तम्

2. „ अथाप्रसिद्धम्

„ संबन्ध आक्षिप्तः

*Pratīka.*—

“तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्, यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यं, अथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति (उच्यते)”

### II SECTION

From अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म

to इति च प्रयोजनम्

*Topic.*—In the portion of the Bhāṣya beginning with ‘Brahman is known in a general way, etc.’, Viṣaya, sambandha, and prayojana are established. It is true that viṣaya, sambandha, and prayojana must be presumed to be there, since it is the work of an author of such eminence; yet a specific mention is necessary to induce effort for inquiry. It may be urged that in that case prayojana alone needs to be separately mentioned since its mention is enough to imply the other two. But a prayojana may be achievable by more means than one; and in that case, no effort in a definite direction can be expected to result. In order to secure such effort, it is necessary to specify the Viṣaya of the śāstra. Similarly in regard to sambandha also.

*Paragraphs.*—

3. From अस्ति तावत्

to किमनेन प्रयासेन

4. „ सत्यम्

„ अवगन्तुम्

5. „ एवमपि

„ घटावस्था प्रयोजनम्

6. „ सत्यम्

„ प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वेन

7. „ संबन्धोऽपि

„ सिध्यते विषयसंबन्धप्रयोजनानि

8. „ तानि च

„ इति च प्रयोजनम्

### III SECTION

From ननु ब्रह्म वेदान्तानाम्

to अलमिति विस्तरेण

*Topic.*—Brahman is the subject-matter, Viṣaya, of Vedānta and not of Uttara-mīmāṃsā Śāstra, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa's aphoristic

treatise. The latter is concerned only with interpretational principles—Nyāya, which are helpful in the exposition of Brahman, and as such Brahman is not the Viṣaya of this Śāstra nor is sambandha so, though the Śāstra may perhaps be taken as connected with prayojana mediately-paramparayā. The determination of Brahman is effected by the Vedānta itself. No doubt it may be thought that the mīmāṃsā by removing the doubts that may be entertained regarding the correct sense of the Vedānta also has Brahman as its viṣaya. But yet since the Vedānta does not owe its existence to any human source it is absolutely free from any defects and as such it conveys a knowledge of Brahman in its true nature without depending upon the aid of the mīmāṃsā—such is the pūrvapakṣa. The Siddhāntin admits that the Vedānta is self-valid, but as its sense cannot be apprehended unless the obstacles in the shape of doubts due to the suggestion of collateral meanings are removed, the Uttara-mīmāṃsā Śāstra doing this office, is indirectly helpful and it must therefore be conceded that it also has Brahman as its viṣaya. As such Vicāra or inquiry is not pointless.

*Paragraphs.—*

9.	From ननु ब्रह्म वेदान्तानां	to कामावाप्तिः
10.	„ नन्वाग्नेयादीनां	„ वैयधिकरण्यं स्यात्
11.	„ उच्यते	„ नापरमपेक्षते
12.	„ ननु	„ निर्णयहेतोर्विषयः
13.	„ नैतत् सारम्	„ तस्मात् न ब्रह्मविषयं शास्त्रम्
14.	„ अत्रोच्यते	„ शास्त्रमभिधीयते
15.	„ तच्चेदं	„ इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण

IV SECTION

From अस्तितावद्ब्रह्म

to ब्रह्मेतर्थातोरर्थानुगमादिति

*Topic.*—Brahman's existence, the Bhāṣyakāra shows, is not entirely unknown, and that there thus being scope for inquiry, the relation between the śāstra and the viṣaya is established. The pūrvapakṣin contends that the Veda does not vouch for the existence of Brahman—the Supreme reality, since the word Brahman occurring there admits of various connotations and further that it is only a complete sentence that can be a valid means of knowledge and not individual words like 'Brahman'.

To this contention the answer is that it is possible to determine the exact meaning of the unknown word 'Brahman' with the aid of nirukta, vyākaraṇa, nigama, etc., when that

word is in juxtaposition with words the significance of which is patent.

There are two other points in the text of this section:—

- (a) The etymology of the word 'Brahman' helps us to surmise the nature of the entity it denotes—that it is eternal, pure, etc.; (b) to a possible objection that on the basis of mere etymology we cannot deduce such transcendental features of Brahman, the answer is that the objection may hold in the case of words denoting objects knowable by other *pramāṇas* whose meaning is ascertained from usage, but not in cases where, as here, the meaning is determined by etymology exclusively. One must grant in such cases whatever the etymology may betoken.

*Paragraphs.—*

16. From	अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्मेत्यादिना	to	अवसीयते
17. „	नैतत् सारम्	„	पदप्रयोगादेव सिद्धः
18. „	अत्रोच्यते	„	इति न्यायात्
19. „	ननु	„	न कश्चिद्दोषः
20. „	तदत्र ब्रह्मशब्दे	„	न परिच्छिन्नबुद्धिर्भवति
21. „	बुद्धत्वं च	„	उत्कृष्टमहत्त्वमावेदयति
22. „	सर्वज्ञम्	„	अभ्युपेतव्यः
23. „	एवं च	„	बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमादिति

*Pratīka.—*

“अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म, (नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं), सर्वज्ञं, सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितं; ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि, व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धादयोर्धाः प्रतीयन्ते । बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात् ”

V SECTION

From नन्वेवमपि to विषयसंबन्धौ समर्थ्येते

*Topic.*—It may be said that the tracing the etymological meaning of the word 'Brahman' may give us an idea of its nature; but it cannot vouch for its reality or existence, for a single word by itself cannot constitute a *pramāṇa*. True; and that is the reason for the present inquiry into what has been empirically envisaged but not fully established. The existence of Brahman, it is further pointed out is vouched for by the fact that Brahman is the very self of all beings. If it be urged that the *Śāstra* would be emptied of content if Brahman is a patent fact it is argued that though the general sense of Brahman is comprehended its specific nature remains unknown and as such it is the fit content of the *Śāstra*.



*Paragraphs.—*

- |                      |                   |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| 24. From नन्वेवमपि   | to प्रसिद्धरिति   |
| 25. „ तदेव दर्शयति   | „ नाप्रसिद्धशङ्का |
| 26. „ यदि तर्हि लोके | „ समर्थ्येते      |

*Pratīka.—*

- (i) सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः  
(ii) सर्वो हि आत्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मीति । यदि (हि) नात्मा-  
स्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नाहमस्मीति प्रतीयात्, आत्मा च ब्रह्म  
(iii) यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति ततो ज्ञातमेवेति अजिज्ञास्यत्वं  
पुनरापन्नम्  
(iv) न तद्विशेषं प्रतिविप्रतिपत्तेः

## VI Section

From सत्यमहमित्यात्मा नि प्रलय to भूतचतुष्टयवादिनः प्रसिद्धः

*Topic.*—The materialist's view that the body alone is ātman is stated here.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                             |                       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| 27. From सत्यमहमिति         | to संबन्धोपि समर्थितः |
| 28. „ विप्रतिपत्तिं दर्शयति | „ प्रतिपन्ना इति      |
| 29. „ तथा हि                | „ प्रसिद्धाः          |

*Pratīka.—*

देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः ।

## VII SECTION

From एवं इन्द्रियाण्येव to इत्यपरे सङ्गिरन्ते

*Topic.*—The doctrines of those who severally contend that ātman is no other than the senses, mind, or momentary consciousness, or void, are stated.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                            |                    |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| 30. From एवमिन्द्रियाण्येव | to मूकोऽहं इत्यादि |
| 31. „ मन एव                | „ वदन्तः           |
| 32. „ विज्ञानमात्रम्       | „ अन्ये मन्यन्ते   |
| 33. „ शून्यमिति            | „ सङ्गिरन्ते       |

*Pratīka.—*

- |  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| (i) इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनानि आत्मैत्यपरे | (ii) मन इत्यन्ये   |
| (iii) विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके     | (iv) शून्यमित्यपरे |

VIII SECTION

From अस्ति देहादि to अहंप्रत्ययविषयं मन्यन्ते

*Topic.*—The Naiyāyikas and others of their way of thinking maintain that ātman is other than the body, the senses, etc., since the latter are incapable of being agents and enjoyers.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                       |                                  |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| 34. From अस्ति देहादि | to भोक्तृत्वानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम् |
| 35. „ कथं तस्य        | „ हेत्वसंभवात्                   |
| 36. „ अस्तु तर्हि     | „ गुणभावोपपत्तेः                 |
| 37. „ अस्त्वेकस्य     | „ अहंप्रत्ययविषयं मन्यन्ते       |

*Pratīka.*—

अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तृत्वपरः

IX SECTION

From भोक्तृत्व केवलं न कर्तृत्वेके to ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयः स्यात्

*Topic.*—Other doctrines are set forth. The Sāmkhyas maintain that the ego-notion has the individual soul—jīva as its content and the jīvas are only enjoyers and not agents. When the question arises whether the jīva is different from Brahman, the Naiyāyikas and others like the yogins in order to establish that the jīva is distinct, posit Īśvara with the attributes of omniscience, etc. For them Brahman and Īśvara are one. As against this the Siddhāntin hold that Brahman is the very essence of, i.e., fundamentally identical with the jīva.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                            |                    |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| 38. From भोक्तृत्व केवलं   | to युक्तं मन्यन्ते |
| 39. „ अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्तः | „ तस्मात्साध्वेतत् |
| 40. „ आत्मा स भोक्तृः      | „ अभिधेयः स्यात्   |

*Pratīka.*—

- (i) भोक्तृत्व केवलं न कर्तृत्वेके
- (ii) अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः इति केचित्
- (iii) आत्मा स भोक्तृरित्यपरे

X Section

From एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना to उपकरणमस्या इत्यर्थः

*Topic.*—This is the concluding portion of the meaning of the Bhāṣya. Of the various views, the last is the right one, being based upon a proper interpretation of the Vedānta and supported by reason. The rest are the result of a misunderstanding of the texts and of fallacious reasoning. To adopt

without scrutiny any of the latter would be not only to miss salvation but also to court positive evil. Hence the need for this inquiry.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                                 |                       |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 41. From एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्नाः | to प्रदर्शयिष्यामः    |
| 42. „ तत्राविचार्य              | „ प्रकृतानुपयोगादिति  |
| 43. „ तस्मात्                   | „ उपकरणमस्या इत्यर्थः |

*Pratīka.—*

- (i) एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्नाः युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः
- (ii) तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यमानो निश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत अनर्थं चेयात्
- (iii) तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधि तर्कोप-  
करणा निश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ॥

## VARNAKA V

### I SECTION

From ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यं      to नान्यनिबन्धनेति दर्शयति

*Topic.*—The first sūtra states that inquiry into Vedānta is to be undertaken by one desirous of knowing Brahman. It follows therefore that the definition of the nature of Brahman, valid means to its knowledge, conformable logic, way to its attainment and the fruit to be derived, are all necessitated. Here since Brahman (*i.e.*, its nature) is the most important its definition is set forth in the second sūtra. Brahman is described as the cause of the origination, etc., of the world. The rest of this section explicates the import of the words composing the Sūtra.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. From ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् | to जन्माद्यस्ययत इति |
| 2. „ युक्तिरपि                | „ समासार्थः          |
| 3. „ नन्वादिः                 | „ प्रपञ्चः           |
| 4. „ असेय्यादि                | „ दर्शयति            |

*Pratīka.*—

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमुक्तम्  
 किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मेत्यत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः “जन्माद्यस्ययतः”  
 जन्मोत्पत्तिरादिरस्येति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः  
 जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः  
 जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च  
 श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत् “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” इत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये  
 जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां कमदर्शनात् वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः  
 स्थितिप्रलयसंभवात्  
 अस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसांनिधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमनिर्देशः  
 षष्ठी जन्मादिसंबन्धार्था  
 यत इति कारणनिर्देशः

### II SECTION

From अस्य जगतः      to स्वरूपलक्षणं च दर्शयति.

*Topic.*—The Bhāṣya beginning with ‘of this world differentiated by names and forms’ up to ‘that is Brahman, has to be understood’ is explained. It also states that it is the definition *per accidens* of Brahman which is given here, *i.e.*, a definition where the differentia or the special mark mentioned does not actually characterise Brahman.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| 5. From अस्य जगतः      | to पृथक्स्वरूपलक्षणकथनम्                         |
| 6. „ नामस्वरूपाभ्याम्  | „ स्वसंवेद्यमेतत्                                |
| 7. „ अनेन कर्तृभोक्तृ- | „ मरणस्य   |
| 8. „ मनसापि            | „ जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं . . . . स्वरूपलक्षणं च दर्शयति |

*Pratīka.—*

- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| (i) अस्य जगतः ;   | (ii) नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य ; |
| (iii) अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य ;   |                                |
| (iv) प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य ;                                     |                                |
| (v) मनसाप्यन्विन्यरचनारूपस्य  |                                |
| (vi) जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः |                                |

## III SECTION

From नन्वन्येपि

to स्त एव जन्मविनाशौ

*Topic.*—There are no doubt other states of objects like change but they may be included under the three mentioned above. The six stages of existence enumerated by Yāska cannot be accepted as meant here, for the Śruti 'From which all these beings are born, etc.', declares only origination, subsistence and destruction. If Yāska's division is accepted, instead of Brahman's being the world-cause, the elements would become the cause because that division is meant to apply to elemental objects (and not to elements). This explanation points to Brahman as prime cause.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                    |                        |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| 9. From नन्वन्येपि | to पृथगुपन्यासस्तेषाम् |
| 10. „ ननु षड्      | „ इति सूत्रार्थः       |
| 11. „ ननु श्रुति   | „ स्त एव जन्मविनाशौ    |

*Pratīka.—*

(i) अन्येषामपि (भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेव अन्तर्भावः इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानां इह ग्रहणम्) “जायते अस्ति”

(ii) यास्कपरिपठितानां तु इत्यादीनाम् (ग्रहणे)

(iii) तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वात् मूलकारणादुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत, तन्मा शङ्कीति योत्पात्तिः ब्रह्मणः तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव गृह्यन्ते.

IV SECTION

From न यथोक्तविशेषणस्येत्यादिना to कारणमिति सिद्धम्

*Topic.*—The Bhāṣya न यथोक्त . . . निमित्तानामिह उपादानात् is explained.

The Sūtra suggests a rational basis for the view that Brahman is the source of the world for, being of the character described, the world cannot be the work of Pradhāna because it is insentient, or of Hiranyagarbha because he is of limited capacity or of Śūnya, etc., the inconceivability of any of these being its source is the indirect proof. Pariśeṣānumāna is suggested here.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                     |                        |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| 12. From न यथोक्त   | to संभावयितुमपि शक्यम् |
| 13. „ अचेतनात्तावत् | „ नियमोऽभविष्यत्       |
| 14. „ न च स्वभावतः  | „ कारणमिति सिद्धम्     |

*Pratīka.*—

- (i) न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य (जगतः)
- (ii) यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा
- (iii) अन्यतः (प्रधानादचेतनादणुभ्योऽभावात् संसारिणो वा)
- (iv) उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम्
- (v) न च स्वभावतः विशिष्टदेशकालं निमित्तानां इह उपादानात्

V SECTION

From एतदेवानुमानमिति to पुरुषो वेदेत्यनूद्यते

*Topic.*—The reasoning referred to above is put forward by rationalists like the Logicians as the independent proof for believing in the existence of Brahman and in its omnipotence, etc., and they represent the Scriptural passages cited in this connection as but clothing that reasoning in words for the sake of communicating it to others. The Vedānta sūtra however is really meant not to indicate the rational basis for the belief in question, but to show that a knowledge of Brahman as described is the result of properly interpreting all the relevant Scriptural passages—that such Brahman is their concordant teaching. But it is not that argumentation has no place in it. Scripture itself recognises the need of logic for re-inforcing the sense ascertained from the Vedic study.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                                |                         |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 15. From एतदेवानुमानमिति       | to इति वदन्तः           |
| 16. „ नन्विहापि                | „ प्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता |
| 17. „ सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु | „ पुरुषो वेदेत्यनूद्यते |

*Pratīka.*—

- (i) एतदेव अनुमानम् (संसारिव्यतिगि केश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते)
- (ii) ईश्वरकारणिनः
- (iii) नन्विहापि तदेव उपन्यस्तम् (जन्मादिसूत्रे)
- (iv) न वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्
- (v) वेदान्तवाक्यानि (हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते, वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिवृत्ता हि)
- (vi) ब्रह्मावगतिर्नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्ता
- (vii) सत्सु वेदान्तवाक्येषु (जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्यायानुमानमपि)
- (viii) वेदान्तवाक्यविरोधि प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्यते, शुलैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेयत्वात्
- (ix) तथाहि “श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः” इति (श्रुतिः)
- (x) पण्डितो मेधावी (गान्धारानेव उपसंपद्येतैवमेवेह)
- (xi) आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद, इति च पुरुषं बुद्धिसाहाय्यमात्मनो दर्शयति.

## VI SECTION

From न धर्मजिज्ञासा to अनुभवापेक्षा च नेतरत्र

*Topic.*—If it be urged that the need for reasoning should be allowed both in regard to Dharma and Brahman or rejected altogether it is pointed out that a vital difference exists between the two. The latter is an existent entity so that (1) it can be reasoned about, and (2) its direct realisation can be sought after. The former on the other hand is yet to be, so that neither (1) nor (2) is possible in its case. Hence while in the case of Dharma explicit statements in Scripture (śruti) are the only means open for ascertaining its character, in the case of Brahman other aids like direct experience are also legitimate.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 18. From न धर्मजिज्ञासा | to आकांक्षानिवृत्तिर्यतः |
| 19. „ ननु               | „ इत्यनेन भाष्येण        |
| 20. „ कथं               | „ प्रसज्येरन्            |
| 21. „ न च वस्तुनि       | „ नेतरत्र                |

*Pratīka.*—

- (i) न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव
- (ii) श्रुत्यादयः (एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां, किंतु श्रुत्यादयो अनुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम्)
- (iii) अनुभवावसानान्तत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य



- (iv) कर्तव्ये हि विषये (नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, पुरुषाधीन आत्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य, कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म, यथाश्चेन गच्छति, पद्मयामन्यथा वा न वा गच्छतीति; तथा 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति'; "उदिते जुहोति, अनुदिते जुहोति," इति विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चात्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पोऽसर्गापवादाश्च; न तु वस्त्वेवं नैवमास्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते; विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुध्य-पेक्षाः, न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुध्यपेक्षं; किं तर्हि वस्तु-तंत्रमेव तत्; न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषोन्यो वेति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति; तत्र पुरुषोन्यो वेति मिथ्याज्ञानं स्थाणुरेवेति तत्त्वज्ञानं वस्तु-तंत्रत्वात्, एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतंत्रम्).
- (v) तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतंत्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्.

## VII SECTION

From अपरः परिचोदयति to ब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षितमिति सिद्धम्

*Topic.*—If there is room for inference because Brahman is an accomplished object, let there be, says the opponent, no injury into the meaning of the Vedānta Texts, but let the inquiry be confined to reasoning only. The first sūtra states the proposition and this the second Sūtra sets out the probans or hetu. The Siddhāntin points out that since perception is incompetent to compass Brahman, inference based upon it also fails to comprehend Brahman. Moreover though mere agency may be inferred it is not possible to infer definitely whether that agent is one and not many. Hence it is only the Vedānta that is the valid means of knowing Brahman. This may seem to exclude reasoning altogether; but it does not, for reasoning is intended to support Scriptural teaching much as arthavādas are admitted to do in the case of ritual. Vedānta texts bearing on 'Tatastha lakṣaṇa, e.g., 'From which all these beings are born', and 'svarūpalakṣaṇa, e.g., 'From Bliss alone all these beings are born, etc.', are quoted.

### Paragraphs.—

- |                              |                                     |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 22. From अपरः परिचोदयति      | to अभिधानमिति                       |
| 23. „ उत्तरमाह               | „ सूचयतीत्युक्तम्                   |
| 24. „ नन्वेवं सति            | „ वर्तन्त इत्युच्यते                |
| 25. „ किं पुनः               | „ सूत्रद्वयमिति                     |
| 26. „ तथैव उदाहरणमाह         | „ ब्रह्मपदस्यार्थ इति गम्यते        |
| 27. „ तस्य च निर्णये वाक्यम् | „ ब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षितं इति सिद्धम् |

*Pratīka.*—

- (i) ननु भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे (ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्य-  
विचारणानर्थकैव प्राप्ता)
- (ii) न इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन संबंधाग्रहणात् (स्वभावतः विषयविषयाणीन्द्रि-  
यानि, ब्रह्म विषयाणि ; सति हीन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं  
ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत ; कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं  
ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किमन्येन केनचित्त्वासं बद्धमिति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्)
- (iii) तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थं, किं तर्हि, वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्श-  
नार्थम्
- (iv) किं पुनस्तद्वेद (वेदान्त) वाक्यं (यत्) सूत्रेणह लिलक्षयिषितं
- (v) ऋगुर्वै वारुणिः ('वरुणं पितरमुपससार, अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति',  
इत्युपक्रम्याह—यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि-  
जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व ; तत् ब्रह्मेति)
- (vi) तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यं 'आनन्दाध्येव खलु (इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते,'  
आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति ; आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति  
(तै. उ. ३-६); अन्यान्यप्येवं जातीयकानि वाक्यानि—नित्य-  
शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाण्युदाहर्तव्यानि)

## VARṆAKA VI

### I SECTION

From शास्त्रयोनित्वात्                      to शास्त्राणां तथाभावः

*Topic.*—The omniscience of the Lord has been pointed out in the second Sūtra on the ground that He is the cause of the entire Universe. This universal causation, it may be objected, is untenable since the Veda though within the world-order, is eternal and is therefore not an effect. But, says the Vedāntin, that Brahman is the source of the entire universe including the Veda and that as the Veda is all-revealing (sarvajñakalpa), its source or author is necessarily all-knowing.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From शास्त्रयोनित्वात्                      to तथाभावः

### II SECTION

From नन्वेवं सति                      to न असतः प्रादुर्भावात्

*Topic.*—If it is argued that since the Veda owns *Īśvara's* authorship its validity ceases to be absolute and becomes dependent, it is answered that the Veda does not originate in time but it is beginningless like Brahman himself. If it be said that Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot be the source of the Veda, the answer is that He is its cause in the sense in which Brahman is the cause of the manifold of sense, or as the rope is of the illusory serpent. If the Veda is not his composition in the ordinary sense (as Grammar is Pāṇini's) but merely a spontaneous emanation from him, its authorship, it may be thought, cannot signify his omniscience. But His omniscience is secured by the fact that the all-revealing character of the Veda is only the appearance (Vivarta) of his knowledge-phase.

*Paragraphs.*—

2. From नन्वेवं सति                      to न असतः प्रादुर्भावात्

*Pratīka.*—

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तं; तदेव द्रढयन्नाहः—“शास्त्र-  
योनित्वात्”. महतः ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्स-  
र्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म. न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्यैवेदादि  
लक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः संभवोस्ति. यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं  
यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात् संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि स  
ततोऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके. किमु वक्तव्यं अनेकशास्त्राभेदभिन्नस्य  
देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्ने-  
नैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिश्चासवत् यस्मान्महतो भूताद्योनेः संभवः; “अस्य महतो  
भूतस्य निश्चितमेतद्यद्वेदः” (बृहं. II, iv-10) इत्यादिश्रुतेः तस्य महतो  
भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं चेति ।

## VARṆAKA VII

### I SECTION

From अथवा

to कथयितुम्

*Topic.*—Now is given an alternative interpretation of the same Sūtra. The Śāstra is the valid means of knowing Brahman. That a Sūtra bears a double sense is one of its merits as shown by the definition of Sūtra. The objection is raised that since the Śāstra as the pramāṇa of Brahman, has been substantiated in the explanation of the second Sūtra itself, the present Sūtra as signifying the same is superfluous. It is admitted that the pertinent Śāstra has been adduced by the Bhāṣyakāra while expounding the second Sūtra, but owing to the absence of the word Śāstra there, it might lead one to the conclusion that the Sūtra is intended to point to an inference as the pramāṇa to establish Brahman. To obviate such a contingency a separate Sūtra explicitly stating that the Scripture is the pramāṇa becomes a necessity.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From अथवा

to कथयितुम्

*Pratīka.*—

अथ वा यथोक्तं ऋग्वेदादि (शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथा वस्वरूपाधिगमे ; शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते इत्यभिप्रायः ; शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे—“यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” इत्यादि. किमर्थं तर्हि इदं सूत्रम्, यावता पूर्वसूत्र एवैवं जातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम् ; उच्यते—तत्र पूर्वसूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्य अनुपादानात्, जन्मादि केवलमनुमानमुपन्यस्तमिति आशङ्क्येत ; तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वा’दिति ।)

## VARṆAKA VIII

### I SECTION

From कथं पुनः

to केषांचिदुद्धारः

*Topic.*—The criticism here relates to the authoritativeness of Vedānta; since all Veda should be denotative of action, Vedānta which merely points to an existing entity loses its character as an independent means of valid knowledge. Further it is a matter of common knowledge that an existing entity is the object of perception, etc., and as such Vedānta though it may convey a knowledge of an all-knowing entity ceases to be authoritative since its teaching is at variance with those pramāṇas or common experience. If it be argued that Vedānta needs no external corroboration in its own sphere, it may be pointed out that where one pramāṇa contradicts another even though they may have each its own specific object to reveal, one of the two loses its validity: compare how in a painting touch contradicts sight. Now the Śruti asserts that ātman and Brahman are one while perception contradicts it. Moreover the non-authoritativeness of Vedānta is evident from the fact that from knowing Brahman which it teaches, there is neither the acquisition of anything desirable nor the avoidance of anything evil. Hence, concludes the Pūrvaapakṣin, that both on grounds of its irreconcilability with pratyakṣa and fruitlessness of the knowledge it imparts, Brahman as understood by the Siddhāntin, cannot be established on the strength of Verbal testimony.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                     |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. From कथं पुनः        | to अक्रियार्थत्वात् |
| 2. „ यद्यपि             | „ प्रतिलभन्ते       |
| 3. „ ननु अपौरुषेयत्वात् | „ दृष्टोपपन्ना वा   |
| 4. „ किं च              | „ केषांचिदुद्धारः   |

*Pratīka.*—

(i) कथं पुनः ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता “आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थानाम्” (जै. सू. १-२-१) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् । अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यं, अक्रियार्थत्वात् । (क्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं, उपासनादिक्रियान्तविधानार्थत्वं वा । नहि परिनिष्ठितवस्तु-प्रतिपादनं संभवति, प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात्परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः । तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात् । अत एव ‘सोऽरोदीत्’ इत्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यं मा भूदिति ‘विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः’ जै. सू. १-२-७ इति

स्तावकत्वेनार्थं व त्वमुक्तम् । मन्त्राणां च 'इषेत्वा' इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभि-  
धायित्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वा मुक्तम् ।)

(ii) न कचि(दपि) वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टोपपन्ना  
वा । (न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति; क्रियाविषयत्वाद्विधेः ।  
तस्मात्कर्मोपेक्षितकर्तृस्वरूपदेवतादिप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम् ।  
अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयान्नैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम् ।  
तस्मान्न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वमिति प्राप्ते उच्यते—“तत्तु समन्वयात्” ॥ ‘तु’ शब्दः  
पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । तद्ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रा-  
देवावगम्यते । कथम्? समन्वयात् । सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैत-  
स्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि । “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । एकमेवा-  
द्वितीयम्” (छा. ६-२-१), ‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ (ऐत. २-१-  
१-१). ‘तदेतद्ब्रह्मा पूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्’, ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः’  
(वृ. २-५-१९), ‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्’ (मुण्ड. २-२-१२) इत्यादीनि । न च  
तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमानेऽर्थान्तरकल्पना-  
युक्ता; श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् । न च तेषां कर्तृस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरताव-  
सीयते; ‘तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (वृ. २-४-१३) इत्यादि क्रियाकारकफलनिराकरण-  
श्रुतेः । न च परिनिष्ठतवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः; ‘तत्त्वमसि’  
(छा. ६-८-७) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणानवगम्यमानत्वात् । यत्तु  
हेयोपादेयरहितत्वादुपदेशानर्थक्य इति, नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशून्यब्रह्मात्मताव-  
गमादेव सर्वक्लेशप्रहाणात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः । देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतो-  
पासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः, न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनाविधिशेषत्वं संभवति;  
एकत्वे हेयोपादेयशून्यतया क्रियाकारकाद्वैतविज्ञानोपासनादौपपत्तेः । न होकत्व-  
विज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति, येनोपासनाविधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः  
प्रतिपद्येत । यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्;  
तथाप्यात्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वाच्च तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्या-  
ख्यातुम् । न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यं, येनान्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनमपेक्षेत ।  
तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम् ।)

## II SECTION

From यत्पुनर्भाष्यकारेण

to आर्थवादिकं

*Topic.*—The Mīmāṃsaka concedes that Vedānta is not supple-  
mentary to karma as the two kāṇḍas are distinct. But he  
maintains that Brahman of the Upaniṣads is supplementary  
to meditation as prescribed therein. The Siddhāntin points  
out that even if Brahman's ancillary status be accepted it is  
not possible to establish Brahman who is omnipotent, omni-  
scient, etc., for meditation is quite possible on Brahman on  
whom omniscience, etc., are superimposed. The opponent  
(Mīmāṃsaka) says he has no disagreement with the Siddhāntin

in so far as Brahman possessing omniscience, etc., is not established for his main object is to prove that Vadānta in its entirety is denotative of action and is therefore not purposeless.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                 |                           |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| 5. From यत्पुनः | to न सर्वज्ञत्वादिसिद्धिः |
| 6. „ सत्यं      | „ भविष्यतीत्यभिप्रायः     |

III SECTION

From तत्तु समन्वयात् to संबन्धः

*Topic.*—First the general sense of the aphorism is given and then the phrase ‘samanvayāt’ is explained. The purport of the aphorism is that Brahman is to be understood from the Vedānta for all the texts are in agreement in elucidating the non-relational entity or Brahman as such—akhaṇḍārtha. That the major text (महावाक्य) ‘That thou art’ imports the unrelated Brahman is rendered explicit on the analogy of ‘This is that Devadatta’ and that the subsidiary text अवान्तरवाक्य ‘existence, knowledge, bliss, is Brahman’ also imports the relationless Brahman is rendered explicit on the analogy of ‘the brightest shining body is the moon’ प्रकृष्टप्रकाशः चन्द्रः. Hence such Vākyas do not signify things connected as substance and attribute or as action and its aids.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                         |                              |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| 7. From तत्तु समन्वयात् | to प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रान्वयः |
| 8. „ सोयमित्यादि        | „ संबन्धः                    |

IV SECTION

From तथाविधानि to शब्दस्य विज्ञानजनन उपयुज्यते

*Topic.*—Since the existence of Brahman is vouched for from passages such as ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ from which indeed are these things born, etc.,—the Bhāṣyakāra should have shown that those illustrative passages themselves import the non-relational Brahman अखण्डब्रह्म; instead, why for this purpose, should he have adduced passages like सदेव सौम्य, etc. ‘Existence alone, my dear, there was in the beginning? This objection is met by the observation that there the idea was to give merely the definition *per accidens* of Brahman. Here however it is intended to show the non-separateness of Brahman from jīva. Hence the necessity to deduce statements appropriate to such a purpose.

Now as regards the objection that an existent entity because it is the object of perception, etc., cannot form the



primary content of Śabda whose nature is to signify things already known otherwise. It may be that śabda, when addressed to others, refers to things as already known by some other pramāṇa, like perception, in virtue of the new associations which words have acquired by then in the mind of the speaker. But when the meanings of words are first caught by a child, while watching the elders conversing with one another, those meanings are apprehended independently of other pramāṇas: the eye, for example, does not depend upon other pramāṇas for apprehending its specific object. Hence for Verbal testimony to convey its sense, it is not necessary that the objects of which it speaks should have been otherwise known already.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |         |           |    |                           |
|---------|-----------|----|---------------------------|
| 9. From | तथाविधानि | to | आसीदित्येवमादीनि          |
| 10. „   | यत्पुनः   | „  | तत्र प्रामाण्यमित्युक्तम् |
| 11. „   | उच्यते    | „  | विज्ञानजनन उपयुज्यते      |

V SECTION

From अपि च to अनवगतार्थपरिच्छेदसामान्यात्

*Topic.*—The Siddhāntin concedes the necessity of a distinct corroborative pramāṇa in so far as the origination of right cognition from secular words is concerned, but he argues that as regards Scriptural statements no corroboration from other pramāṇas is necessary in the same way as no distinct Pramāṇa is necessary to vouch for what is given by the sense of sight. It was pointed out in Section I, that the evidence of the sense of sight is superseded by that of touch in the example of the picture, but it must be noted that non-corroboration by the sense of touch is due to the defect in the instrument of perception. The Veda however being apauruṣeya is free from blemish and as such no thought of invalidity can arise in regard to the knowledge it imports. Further the validity of a pramāṇa depends on its knowledge-giving capacity, i.e., whether or not it reveals its object and not on its corroboration by another pramāṇa.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |          |                |    |                     |
|----------|----------------|----|---------------------|
| 12. From | अपि च          | to | अपौरुषेयत्वाददुष्टः |
| 13. „    | प्रमेयस्य पुनः | „  | सामान्यात्          |

VI SECTION

From ननु विधिवाक्यानामेव to तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वम्

*Topic.*—It was urged that the Upaniṣads could claim no validity because of the dictum that the Veda intimates action and as

such injunctive statements denotative of action only are authoritative and not others. This proposition is subject to the defect of mutual dependence. If the Veda in its entirety intimates action, then injunctive statements importing action alone will be valid and *vice versa*. Hence whatever sense the scriptural texts intimate whether connected with action or with an existing entity that is the right sense. What confers validity upon a verbal statement is its capacity to convey meaning and not its capacity to prompt action as in the case of perception, etc. But it may be urged that as distinguished from perception words fail of their purpose unless they are intended to serve some and (*puruṣārtha*) to the person to whom they are addressed and this purpose cannot be achieved by him without either engaging in some act or withdrawing from it, particularly as *puruṣārtha* the aim for Vedic study is the result of the injunction to study one's branch of the Veda. And since the Upaniṣads intimate merely an existing entity no *puruṣārtha* as possible of achievement. In answer, it is pointed out that *puruṣārtha* may consist in attaining what has not been attained or by realising in thought what has been lost sight of and there is no rule that it is achieved only by following one of the alternatives mentioned. The *summum bonum* which is the aim of the Vedānta is reached by the removal of ignorance and that it is to be realised in thought and not in fact, constitutes its excellence rather than its drawback.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                                 |                      |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| 14. From ननु विधिवाक्यानां      | to यदनवगतमवगम्यते    |
| 15. „ आह युक्तं प्रत्यक्षादीनां | „ न युक्ता           |
| 16. „ उच्यते                    | „ शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वम् |

## VARNAKA IX

### I SECTION

From अत्रापरे

to सङ्ग्रहार्थो द्रष्टव्यः

*Topic.*—There is a class of critics who hold that Vedic statements though having an existing entity as their content are valid only as being auxiliary to kārya. Brahman therefore established though it be on the strength of Verbal testimony, is the object of meditation which is enjoined. That words acquire validity only when their import is action-related, is based on the following grounds:—(i) In our common experience it is perceived that the significance of words is cognised by the learner only when it either urges one to action or dissuades one from it; (ii) if Brahman, the existing entity is intimated no purpose is served since even with that knowledge there results no cessation of the metempsychosis; (iii) if Brahma-knowledge were the sole means of liberation there would be no need for injunctions on meditation उपासनाविधि. Hence though there is distinction between the subject-matter of inquiry in the two śāstras, ātman is denoted as the content of meditation enjoined in texts like 'He is to be sought out—सोन्वेष्टव्य. This is the view of the Vṛttikāra.

*Paragraphs.*—

1. From अत्रापरे

to तत्पर्यन्तता

2. तस्माद्यद्यपि

„ सङ्ग्रहार्थो द्रष्टव्यः

*Pratika.*—

(i) अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—(यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रामाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपत्ति-विधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते । यथा यूपाहुवनीयादीन्यलौकिकान्यपि विधिशेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते तद्वत् । कुत एतत् । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोचनत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । तथा हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविद आहुः “ दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं ” इति । “ चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनं ” तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः—(जै. सू. १-१-२०). “ तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः ” (जै. सू. १.१.२५) । “ आम्रायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शना ” (जै. सू. १-२-१) इति च । अतः पुरुषं क्वचिद्विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत्कुतश्चिद्विषयविशेषाच्चिन्वर्तयच्चार्थवच्छात्रम् । तच्छेषतया चान्यदुपयुक्तम् । तत्सामान्यद्वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । सति च विधिपरत्वे यथा स्वर्गादिकामस्याग्निहोत्रादिसाधनं विधीयत एवममृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम् । नन्विह जिज्ञास्यैलक्षण्यमुक्तम्—कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्य इह तु भूते नित्यनिवृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति । तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलादनुष्ठानापेक्षाद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति । नार्हत्येवं भवितुम् । कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् । “ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः ” (वृह. २-४-५) इति । ‘ य आत्माऽपहृतपाप्मा—सोन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः ’ (छान्दो. ७-७-१) ।

‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’ (बृ. १-४-७) । ‘आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत’ (बृ. १-४-१५) । ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (मुण्ड. ३-२-९) इत्यादिविधानेषु सत्सु कोऽसावात्मा किं तद्ब्रह्म इत्याकांक्षायाम् । तत्स्वरूपमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः—‘नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यवृत्तो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म’ इत्येवमादयः । तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यतीति । कर्तव्याविध्यननुप्रवेशे वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादानासंभवात्, सप्तदीपा वसुमती, राजासौ गच्छतीत्यादिवाक्यवद्वेदान्तवाक्यानामानर्थक्यमेव स्यात् । ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेपि रज्जुरियं नायं सर्प इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीतिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्, तथेहापि, असंसार्यत्म-वस्तुकथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्तिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । स्यादेतदेवं, यदि रज्जु-स्वरूपश्रवण इव सर्पभ्रान्तिः, संसारित्वभ्रान्तिर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तते । ननु निवर्तते, श्रुतब्रह्मणोपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादिसंसारिधर्मदर्शनात्, “श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” (बृह. २-४-५) इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोर्मनननिदिध्यासनयोर्विधिदर्शनात् ।

(ii) तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । (अत्राभिधीयते—)

## II SECTION

From अत्रोच्यते

to निराकार्या

*Topic.*—All possible ways in which Brahma-knowledge can be made, the subject-matter of meditative prescription are considered and dismissed as unsatisfactory in one way or another. The Siddhāntin points out that the Vṛttikāra who advocates Brahmajñāna as subsidiary to Niyoga cannot advance any pramāṇa to substantiate niyoga. The reason is that there is no Vidheya to determine the niyoga, i.e., the thing of which it is predicated. The knowledge relating to Brahman may result either from Śabda or bhāvanā (dhyāna) or sākṣātkāra, in none of which niyoga is permissible. As regards verbal knowledge one who studies the Scriptures acquires it without the necessity of any Niyoga provided one has a fair competence in the idiom and syntax of the language. There is no good enjoining bhāvanā for it does not yield the desired result. If like svarga the phala of bhāvanā or recollective series (स्मृतिसंतान) is eschatological then it desiderates karma and not jñāna; if on the other hand it is perceptive (प्रत्यक्ष) it must result immediately, but it does not; similarly niyoga is inapplicable to jñāna resulting in sākṣātkarā.

Nor does it stand to reason to suppose that from smṛti-santāna or uninterrupted meditation on Brahman intimated in the Upaniṣads, a distinct variety of jñāna arises which helps one to Brahma-realisation. Again injunction on meditation

in general and not on the recollection series is also untenable, for here the very subject-matter of meditation may be illusory.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                    |                                 |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| 3. From अत्रोच्यते | to बाधो न भवेत्                 |
| 4. „ नु द्रष्टव्यः | „ वस्तुतथात्वसिद्धिर्निराकार्या |

### III SECTION

From यत्पुनः to शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वं ब्रह्मणः

*Topic.*—Some other critics advance the view that an extra-empirical jñāna differing from verbal-knowledge is enjoined as the object to be striven after. But this is unsustainable. If such jñāna is to be enjoined we have to seek for extra empirical kāraṇa, and viṣaya. In case they are secured from such passages as 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः', 'तमेवं वेदानुवचनेन', it comes to this that this extra-empirical vijñāna is the valid means of establishing Brahman—ब्रह्मसिद्धि, and the Veda is the pramāṇa for vijñāna. But that the Vedānta Vākyas are a direct means of self-realisation is a matter of immediate perception. Hence no vidhi is possible of an extra-empirical knowledge which is the competent to yield the fruit of sāksātkāra.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                 |                              |
|-----------------|------------------------------|
| 5. From यत्पुनः | to विधानानर्थक्यम्           |
| 6. „ साधनमपि    | „ शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वं ब्रह्मणः |

### IV SECTION

From अथाप्यथ to इत्युपसंहारः

*Topic.*—Some others hold the view that Brahman and the individual soul are distinct, ascribe to Brahman all-pervadingness as well as residence in a specific region (heaven) and believe that from the enjoined meditation on the assumed identity of the self and Brahman as expressed in अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, the fruit of release is secured like the fruit of Svarga from Yāga. If that be so, Release being the Kārya of Upāsana would be evanescent like enjoyment in Svarga. Also texts declaring the disembodiedness of Release as vouched for in अशरीरत्वावसंतं would be set at nought.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 7. From अथाप्यथ  | to वैलक्षण्यादिति   |
| 8. „ वस्तुसंग्रह | „ नित्यमिति सिद्धम् |
| 9. „ तत्रापि     | „ इत्युपसंहारः      |

Pratīka.—

(i) न—कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात् । (शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यं, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' (जै. सू. १-१-१) इति सूत्रिता, अधर्मोपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणत्वाज्जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय । तयोश्चोदनालक्षणयोरर्थानर्थयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे, शरीर-वाङ्मनोभिरेवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे । मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यमनुभूयते । ततश्च तद्वेतोर्धर्मस्य तारतम्यं गम्यते । धर्मतारतम्यादधिकारितारतम्यम् । प्रसिद्धं चार्थित्वसामर्थ्यादि कृतमधिकारितारतम्यम् । तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनं, केवलैरिष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैर्धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनं, तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यं तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् "यावत्संपातमुषित्वा" (छांदो. ६-१०-५) इत्यस्माद्रम्यते । तथा मनुष्यादिषु नारकस्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवश्चोदनालक्षण-धर्मसाध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः । तथोर्ध्वगतेष्वधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्यदर्शनात्तद्वेतोर्धर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते । एवमविद्यादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादान-पूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यमनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् । तथा च श्रुतिः—"न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति" इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपमनुवदति । "अशरीरं वाव संतं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः" (छा.दो. ८-१२-१) इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्याशरीरत्वस्य प्रति-षिध्यत इति गम्यते । धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते । अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेन्न ; तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात् । "अशरीरं शरीरेष्व-नवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् । महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ (काठ. १-२-२२) "अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः" (मुण्ड. २-१-२) "असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः" (बृह. ४-३-१५) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । अतएवानुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम् । तत्र किञ्चित्परिणामिनित्यं यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते । यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्वादिनाम् । यथा च सांख्यानां गुणाः । इदं तु पारमार्थिकं, कूटस्थानित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यतृप्तं, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम् । यत्र यमोर्धर्मो सह कार्येण कालत्रयं नोपावर्तेते । तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम् । "अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मा-दन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् । अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च" (काठ. २-१४) इत्यादि-श्रुतिभ्यः ॥

अतस्तद्ब्रह्म, यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता । तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत, तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात् । तत्रैवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चित्शयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत । नित्यश्च मोक्षः सैवमोक्षावादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते । )

(ii) अतो न कर्त्यव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः । (अपि च) ॥

## V SECTION

From यत्पुनः

to क्रियासाध्यम्

*Topic.*—The opponent's contention that Liberation though effected by action is eternal as attested by the Śruti—'There is no returning to the mundane life'—*Chānd.* xv. 1, does not stand to reason. The use of the present tense 'āvartate' is to indicate mere laudation. *Chānd.* VIII. i. 6 'just as here on earth whatever accrues from action perishes, so does the merit in the other world accrued from works' supported by the well-understood rule 'that which is an effect is short-lived—'यत्कृतकं तदनित्यं' is subversive of the opponent's contention. It is true that *Chānd.* IV. xv. 5 declares that those who proceed by the path of light are rid of transmigratory life, but from the qualifying words 'iha' and 'imam' it should be understood that non-reversion is limited to the present cycle and is not limitless. Moreover, the text 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman', *Mund.* III. 9. makes it evident that no action intervenes between the knowledge of Brahman and Freedom, for the two are simultaneous. What is required is the eradication of the obscuring nescience.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                  |                           |
|------------------|---------------------------|
| 10. From यत्पुनः | to नानवधि कां अनावृत्तिम् |
| 11. „ अपि च      | „ विनियोगः                |
| 12. „ तथा        | „ विद्यते                 |
| 13. „ किंच       | „ मोक्षं न क्रियासाध्यम्  |

*Pratīka.*—

(i) 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' [(मुण्ड. ३-२-९) 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे' (मुण्ड. २-२-८) । 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् । न बिभेति कुतश्चन' (तै. २-९) : 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तेसि' (बृह. ४-२-४) । 'तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्थीति तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्' (वाजसनेयि ब्राह्मणोप. १-४-१०) । 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' (ईशा. ७)] इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यान्तरं मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति ।

(ii) तथा 'तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वाग्मदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' (बृह. १-४-१०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शनसर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तरवारणायोदाहार्यम् ।

(iii) यथा 'तिष्ठन्गायतीति' तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये (तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं नास्तीति गम्यते । 'त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकंमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि' (प्र. ६-८) 'श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु' (छान्दो. ७-१-३)] ।



(iv) 'तस्मै सृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः' (छान्दो. ७-१६-२) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति । तथा चाचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम् — "दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्ति-दोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः" (न्या. सू. १-१-२) इति ।

## VI SECTION

From इतश्चेतदेवम्

to इति गम्यते

*Topic.*—That the dispelling of ignorance results in salvation finds corroboration in rationalistic systems like the Nyāya. That system conceives mokṣa as resulting from the eradication of pain, birth, effort, blemish (as likes and dislikes), and false knowledge, the destruction of the subsequent effecting the destruction of the one immediately preceding (Gautama's second aphorism); according to the Bauddhas also freedom consists in the emergence of the final moment of pure consciousness (in the consciousness series) resulting from the eradication of illusory notions as the outcome of constant reflection on truth (tatvajñāna). But it should be noted that the Vedāntic conception of mokṣa is by no means the same as that of these two schools. The analogy holds good only in so far as they hold that false knowledge is dispelled by the knowledge of tatvajñāna whatever be its nature. Such dispelling of ignorance is through right knowledge which in the present case is that Brahman and ātman are not distinct.

*Paragraphs.*—

14. From इतश्चेतदेवम्

to इति गम्यते

*Pratīka.*—

मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति । (न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्वृत् । यथा—“अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वेदेवा । अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति” (बृह. ३-१-९) इति । न चाध्यासरूपं । यथा “मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत” (छान्दो. ३-१८-१) “आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः” (छान्दो. ३-१९-१) इति च मन आदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः । नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तं ‘वायुर्वाव संवर्गः’, ‘प्राणो वाव संवर्गः’ (छान्दो. ४-३-१, ३) इतिवत् । नाप्याज्यावेक्षणादिकर्मवत् कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूपम्)]

## VII SECTION

From अथापि

to आज्यस्येवावेक्षणम्

*Topic.*—The opponent maintains that the Vedāntic texts adduced to establish the identity of jīva and Brahman are in reality meant to enjoin meditation on Brahman which is an entity distinct from jīva, which meditation may be any one of the

following varieties: Sampat, adhyāsa, kriyāyoga, nimitta, samskāratmaka Brahmadṛṣṭi in jīva: (for an explanation of these terms, *vide* P.P.).

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                  |                        |
|------------------|------------------------|
| 15. From अथापि   | to ब्रह्मफलमवाप्यत इति |
| 16. „ अध्यासस्तु | „ आज्यस्येवावेक्षणम्   |

VIII SECTION

From अत्रोत्तरं to श्रुतिन्यायाभ्यां सिद्धम्

*Topic.*—If Upaniṣadic statements like ‘That Thou art’ are admitted to teach meditation on Sampat, etc., the unequivocal pronouncement therein of the identity of the individual self and Brahman would go in vain. The Śrutis denying variety as such would be purposeless. Liberation is no other than the eradication of ignorance and it is only the knowledge of identity that is the solvent of the obscuring nescience.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                      |                   |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| 17. From अत्रोत्तरम् | to उपरुध्येत      |
| 18. „ तस्मात्        | „ अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् |
| 19. „ तत्रैवं सति    | „ सिद्धम्         |

*Pratīka.—*

संपदादिरूपे हि [ब्रह्मात्मैकविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने “तत्त्वमसि” (छान्दो. ६-८-७), ‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ (बृह. १-४-१०) ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ (बृह. २-५-१९), इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत । ‘भियते हृदयग्रन्थिदिच्छयन्ते सर्वसंशयाः’ (मुण्ड. २-२-८) इति चैवमादीन्यविद्या-निवृत्तिफलश्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन् । “ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवाति” (मुण्ड. ३-२-९) इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादिपक्षे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन् । तस्मान्न संपदादिरूपम् ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम् । अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या । किं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवद्वस्तुतन्त्रा । एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचिद्युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुपवेशः कल्पयितुम् । ]

IX SECTION

From ननु विदिक्रियाकर्म to मोक्षस्य अनित्यत्वदोषः

*Topic.*—It cannot be maintained, the upholder of Vidhi urges, that Brahman is not in the objective relation to action since it is the viṣaya of the action denoted by the verb ‘to know’; *cf.*, ‘The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman only—‘ब्रह्मवित् ब्रह्मैव भवति’. Further it is urged that if Brahman is not a knowable entity, the declaration that Brahman is to be known from the Scriptures loses its significance,

The Siddhāntin points out that though Brahman being self-luminous does not require anything else for its manifestation, it becomes the subject-matter of the Śāstra in so far as it constitutes the reflection, informing the final psychosis or antahkaraṇavṛtti which dispels avidyā. When this vṛtti also disappears because it is a product of that avidyā, the Self remains by itself as it has ever been. Since thus *mokṣa* signifies but a restoration of the ever free self, to its original state, it cannot be said to have been produced.

*Paragraphs.—*

20. From ननु विदिक्रियाकर्म to अनुपपत्तिरिति चेदिति  
21. „ अत्रोत्तरम् „ अनित्यत्वदोषः

*Pratika.—*

(i) न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन [कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः, “अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि” (केन. १-३) इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात्, ‘येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्’ (बृह. २-४-१३) इति च । तथोपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोपि भवति—‘यद्वाचानभ्युदितं तेन वागभ्युद्यते’ इत्यविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य, ‘तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते’ (केन. १-४) इति ।]

(ii) अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् ।

(iii) न, अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न हि शास्त्रमिदं तथा विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति । तथा च शास्त्रम्—‘यस्याऽमतं तस्यमतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः । अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्’ (केन. २-३) ‘न दृष्टे द्रष्टारं पश्येः’, ‘न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः’ (बृह. ३-४-२) इति चैवमादि । अतोऽविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन ] ।

(iv) नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणाच्च मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः ।

**X SECTION**

From यस्य तु to गोचरो न क्रियायाः

*Topic.*—Any karma to be purposeful must originate something उत्पत्ति, secure something—आप्ति, bring about some changes—विकार, or effect purification. Now since karma is incapable of effecting mokṣa in any one of these ways there is no scope for it, i.e., there is not even the remotest connection of mokṣa with action.

## Paragraphs.—

- |                                 |                      |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| 22. From यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः | to इत्यादिभाष्येण    |
| 23. ,, अथानित्यत्वपरिहाराय      | ,, स्वयं प्रमाणीभवति |
| 24. ,, संस्कार्यत्वमपि          | ,, प्रत्यग्रूपत्वात् |
| 25. ,, नन्वीश्वराभिध्यानात्     | ,, संस्कार्यत्वात्   |
| 26. ,, तस्मात्                  | ,, गोचरो न क्रियायाः |

## Pratika.—

(i) यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, [तस्य मानसं, वाचिकं, कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम् । तथा विकार्यत्वे च तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य ध्रुवं अनित्यत्वम् । न हि दध्यादि विकार्यं, उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके । न चाप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा, स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात् । स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वं, सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मणः, आकाशस्येव । नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत । संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्याद्दोषापनयेन वा । न तावद्गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधियातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । नापि दोषापनयेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । स्वात्मधर्म एव संस्तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रियायात्मनि संस्क्रियमाणोऽभिव्यज्यते, यथाऽऽदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्करत्वं धर्म इति चेत् । न क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेरात्मनः । यदाश्रया क्रिया तमविकुर्वती नैवात्मानं लभते । यद्यात्मा क्रियया विक्रियेताऽनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । ‘अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते’ इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन् । तच्चानिष्टम् । तस्मान्न स्वाश्रया क्रियात्मनः संभवति । अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियायाः अविषयत्वान्न तथाऽऽत्मा संस्क्रियते । ननु देहाश्रयया स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतादिकया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः । न । देहादिसंहतस्यैवाविद्यागृहीतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेर्देहसमवायित्वम् । तथा देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चिदविद्ययात्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम् । यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातुसान्धेन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलं, अहमरोग इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । एवं स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतादिना अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते स संस्क्रियते । स च देहेन संहत एव । तेनैव ह्यहंकर्त्रार्हप्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते । तत्फलं च स एवाश्राति, ‘तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति’ (मुण्ड. ३-१-१) इति मन्त्रवर्णात् । ‘आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः’ (काठ. १-३-४) इति च । तथा च “एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च” (श्वतो. ६-११) इति । “स पर्यणाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमक्षविंशं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्” (ईश. ८) इति च । एतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः ।

तस्मात् न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः ।

अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुं ।]

(ii) तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रिया(या) गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ॥

XI SECTION

From ननु च ज्ञानस्यपि

to संस्पर्शो ब्रह्मण इति

*Topic.*—It is argued that since Brahma-jñāna is a mental act it is fit to become the content of an injunction and such jñāna, only as Vidheya, is related to Brahman and not independently. This argument is rebutted by a detailed exposition of the fundamental difference between jñāna and kriyā (i.e., Jñāna as a logical fact and jñāna as a psychological process) in their nature, logical implication and the result they yield. Even texts like 'ātman is to be seen, heard about, etc.,' are only injunctive in appearance but are really meant to extol ātma-jñāna. Hence the siddhānta is that jñāna can never be the subject-matter of a mandate.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                           |                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| 27. From ननु च ज्ञानस्यपि | to भाष्येण         |
| 28. „ मा तर्हि            | „ टीकायाम्         |
| 29. „ इदमपरं              | „ न विधेरन्नावकाशः |
| 30. „ अतः श्रूयमाणा अपि   | „ लक्ष्यन्ते       |
| 31. „ तथा च श्रवणं नाम    | „ अनुभवः           |
| 32. „ कः पुनः             | „ विवृतं च भाष्ये  |
| 33. „ अपि च               | „ प्रस्थितत्वात्   |
| 34. „ तस्मात्             | „ ब्रह्मण इति      |

*Pratika.*—

(i) ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया । न । वैलक्षण्यात् : (क्रिया हि नाम सा यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरेपक्षैव चोद्यते पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीना च । यथा 'यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात् तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्' इति । संख्यां मनसा ध्यायेत् । (ऐ. ब्रा. ३-८-१) इति चैवमादिषु । ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथाकर्तुं शक्यम् । पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयमतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यं केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न चोदनातन्त्रम् । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्ष्यम् । यथा च—“पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः” योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः (छान्दो. ५-७, ८-१) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति । केवलचोदना-जन्यत्वात्क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च । या तु प्रसिद्धेऽन्नावभिबुद्धिर्न सा चोदनातन्त्रा । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा । किं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतन्न क्रिया । एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुषु वेदितव्यम् । तत्रैवं सति यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् । तद्विषये लिङ्गादयः श्रूयमाणा अप्यनियोज्यविषयत्वात् कु.ठी-भवन्युपलादिषु प्रदुक्तश्रुतैर्लक्ष्यादिवत्, अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् । किमर्थानि तर्हि “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः” इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि ।

स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानीति ब्रूमः । योहि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूदिति, न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिक-पुरुषार्थवाञ्छितं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसंघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरादिसुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्म-स्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः” इत्यादीनि । तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तसाहेयमनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदिष्यते । “इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा” (बृह. २-४-६) “यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत् केन कं विजानीयात् विज्ञातारम-रे केन विजानीयात्” (बृह. ४-४-१५) “अयमात्मा ब्रह्म” (बृह. २-५-१९) इत्यादिभिः । यदप्यकर्तव्यप्रधानमात्मज्ञानं हानायोपादानाय वा न भवतीति, तत्तथैवैवमनुपगम्यते । अलंकारो ह्ययमस्माकं यद्ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्य-ताहानिः कृतकृत्यता चेति । तथा च श्रुतिः—‘आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः । किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्’ ॥ (बृह. ४-४-१२) इति । “एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत” (भ. गी. १५-२०) इति स्मृतिः ।

(ii) तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम् ।

## XII SECTION

From यदपि केचिदाहुः to निराक्रियेत

*Topic.*—The pūrvapakṣa (Prābhākara) is that no part of the Scriptures is denotative of mere existent things. The Veda serves as a valid means of knowledge only because it is throughout injunctive in character; otherwise it would cease to be a pramāṇa. Vedic statements become significant in relation to action, not otherwise. The Siddhānta makes it clear that distinct from the ego which is associated with action there exists the Sākṣin, the inner witness which, because it is revealed by no pramāṇa, other than scriptural testimony cannot be related to action. That witness is not illusory like the nacre-silver; it is never sublated. Nor can one will it away for it is one's own ātman and to will away oneself is impossible, for one who does so is himself the ātman. Nor finally is its destruction conceivable for the instruments of destruction cannot affect it. Rather it marks the limit at which all destruction ceases. It is the goal of everything—the *Ultima Thule*—cf., सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ।

### Paragraphs.—

- |                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 35. From यदपि    | to स्यादिति         |
| 36. „ अस्योत्तरं | „ आत्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् |
| 37. „ न च तस्य   | „ निराक्रियेत       |

### Pratīka.—

यदपि केचिदाहुः—

- (i) ‘प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो नास्ति’ इति ।

(ii) तन्न, औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् ।

(iii) योसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगतः (पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्म उत्पाद्यादिचतुर्विधद्रव्य-विलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थोऽनन्यशेषः, नासौ नास्ति नाधिगम्यत इति वा शक्यं वदितुं, “स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा” (बृह. ३-९-२६) इत्यात्मशब्दात्, आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्, य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात्, नन्वात्माहंप्रत्यय-विषयत्वादुपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्युपपन्नम् । न । तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा, अतः स न केनचित्प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यो विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम् । आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः । सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति । पुरुषो विनाश-हेत्वभावादविनाशी, विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः, अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त-स्वभावः । तस्मात् ‘पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः’ (काठ. १-३-१२) ‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’ (बृह. ३-९-२६) इति चौपनिषदत्वविशेषणम् । पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाशयमानत्वं उपपद्यते । अतो भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्ति इति वचनं साहसमात्रम् । ]

### XIII SECTION

From नन्वास्त्रायस्य

to कथं निष्प्रयोजनत्वम्

*Topic.*—On the strength of the text, “Since the Veda has action as its purpose, those passages which do not refer to action have no independent logical status”—*Jai. Sūt.* I. 2. 1, the pūrvaapakṣin, urges that passages which neither prompt one to action nor dissuade one from it are void of import and in consequence the knowledge of mere existent things must be only illusory, especially when, as in the present case, no appeal is possible to other pramāṇas in support of it. Śabdaśakti or the power of denotation is apprehended in no word that points to an object as such, unrelated to action. The Siddhāntin rejoins that experience is otherwise. In the sentence ‘Bring the cow, Devadatta’ the word Devadatta signifies an existent object though through an imperative statement. Hence it cannot be maintained that it is contentless—nirā-lambana. It can only be said that such sentences as refer to existent objects are purposeless. But the Vedāntic texts do serve a purpose which consists in their contribution to the realisation of the Supreme bliss. Hence passages relating to existing objects may lack independent validity when they are arthavādas (like सोऽरोदीत्) but not when they refer to the oneness of Brahman with the jīva.



*Paragraphs.—*

- |                        |                    |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| 38. From नन्वान्नायस्य | to विज्ञानं जनयेत् |
| 39. „ उच्यते           | „ भाष्येण          |
| 40. „ प्रयोजनं च       | „ निष्प्रयोजनत्वम् |

## XIV SECTION

From स्यादेतत् to दूरत एव बाह्यायाः

*Topic*—It is urged that Śabda whether empirical or Vedic must intimate as its import what is related to action. Unlike the Bhāṭṭas the Vṛttikāra admits that Vedic words may denote existing objects but then he maintains that they are meaningless unless in some way they are connected with action. He criticises the view that words become significant only in association with action in the early stages but later on they may express existing objects when conjoined with other words (itarānvita) and not necessarily with words denoting action. If this is conceded, he points out there will be the contingency of the word 'cow' meaning an animal with a dewlap to the boy who has just begun to learn the language, and an animal with a mane, say a horse, to him at a later stage.

As against the view that words can denote objects, only as related to action the Siddhāntin adduces instances where without any verbal idea meaning is conveyed from expressions. What all is required for a word to become significant is its association with other compatible words and not that it should always desiderate a word expressive of action.

No doubt one of Jaimini's Sūtras (I. i. 25) seems to justify the pūrvapakṣa view. But a careful consideration of Śabara's Commentary on it shows that it really does not. The allusion in the Sūtra to 'relatedness to action' is with reference specifically to the portions of the Veda dealing with the ritual. The Vedānta view is that verbal statements may point not only to related entities, unconnected with action, but also to 'reality itself' unrelated to anything—a view which has the support of Pāṇini.

*Paragraphs.—*

- |                         |                               |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 41. From स्यादेतत्      | to पिण्डधर्मत्वेन वा प्रतीयते |
| 42. „ विषम उपन्यासः     | „ तन्निमित्तस्समन्वयः         |
| 43. „ यत्तु तद्भूतानां  | „ प्रकृतोपयोगित्वेनैवोक्तवान् |
| 44. „ तदेतदाह भाष्यकारः | „ सन्निवृत्तम्                |
| 45. „ इह पुनः           | „ वाक्यम्                     |
| 46. „ एवं सामान्यतः     | „ बाह्यायाः                   |

*Pratīka.*—

यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणम्—(दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम् इत्येव-  
मादि, तद्धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वाद्विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम् । अपि च  
“आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्शानाम्” इत्येतदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां  
भूतोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद्वस्तूपदिशति  
भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थनित्यं भूतं नोपदिशतीति को हेतुः । नहि भूतमुपदिश्यमानं  
क्रिया भवति । अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात् क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति  
चेत् । नैष दोषः । क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिवर्तनशक्तिमद्वस्तूपदिष्टमेव । क्रियार्थ-  
त्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य । न चैतावता वस्तुवस्तुपदिष्टं भवति । यदीनाम उपदिष्टं किं  
तव तेन स्यादिति । उच्यते—अनवगतात्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति । तद-  
वगत्या मिथ्याऽज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोर्निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्यविशिष्टमर्थवत्त्वं क्रिया-  
साधनवस्तूपदेशेन । अपि च—“ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्येवमाद्या निवृत्ति-  
रूपदिश्यते । न च सा क्रिया । नापि क्रियासाधनम् । अक्रियार्थानामुपदेशोऽ-  
नर्थकश्चेत् “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादि निवृत्त्युपदेशानामानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् ।  
तच्चानिष्टम् । )

#### XV SECTION

From किंच ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः to तत्त्वमसीत्यादीनि च

*Topic.*—It has been (VIII) shown that the significative potency (Śakti) of words can be ascertained when they are in juxtaposition with other meaningful words which may not convey a verbal idea. Here is pointed out that even the advocate of kriyānvitaśakti, etc., has to admit that a connected meaning is possible in a negative sentence without the interposition of a verbal idea. The prohibitory passage—‘a Brāhman is not to be killed’ intimates no injunction to action; it only enjoins abstinence from action. The negative particle denotes the negation (prior to negation in the present case) of what the word to which it is syntactically joined imports. This is a further consideration which shows that Vedāntic texts may point to mere existing objects unrelated to action.

*Paragraphs.*—

- |                         |                                 |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 47. From किंच           | to समन्वीयमानार्थाभावकरत्वात्   |
| 48. „ न च               | „ अभिहिता स्यात्                |
| 49. „ न वैदद्युक्तम्    | „ सामर्थ्यादित्युक्तम्          |
| 50. „ ननु नञर्थे नियोगः | „ न विधिगन्धोपि विद्यते         |
| 51. „ तच्च संसृज्यमानं  | „ औदासीन्यमात्रावसितत्वात् तस्य |
| 52. „ अथ पुनः           | „ तत्त्वमस्यादीनि च             |

*Pratīka.*—

न च स्वभावप्राप्तहन्यर्थानुरागेण (नचः शक्यमप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं, हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यव्यतिरेकेण । नचश्चैष स्वभावो यत्स्वसंबन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयतीति । अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्यकारणम् । सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्मति । तस्मात् प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः । तस्मात्पुरुषार्थानुपयोग्युपाख्यानादिभूतार्थवादविषयमानर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यं । यदप्युक्तं—कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानमनर्थकं स्यात् “सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती”त्यादि वदिति, तत् परिहृतम् । रज्जुरियं नायं सर्प इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात् । ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणेऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनाच्च रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवदर्थवत्त्वमित्युक्तम् । अत्रोच्यते—

#### XVI SECTION

From यत्पुनरुक्तम्

to पूर्वकालतैवेत्युक्तम्

*Topic.*—The observation has been made that the Vedānta importing the nature of the accomplished something serves no purpose seeing that one who gets to know the reality through Vedāntic study continues to exist in the transmigratory world. It is pointed out in answer that samsāra—transmigratory existence—ceases altogether the moment the immediate unobstructed knowledge of Brahman arises. The continuance of common experience as distinguished from Brahman realisation so far as it continues—is because of prārabdha karma continuing to operate. As regards the point mentioned before, viz., that prescription of reflection—manana, and meditation—nīdīdhyāsana besides śravaṇa implies the inadequacy of the latter for Brahma-realisation, the reply is that they are also contributory aids and as such are anterior and not posterior to sāksātkāra or realisation.

*Paragraphs.*—

53. From यत्पुनरुक्तम्

to अनिमित्तसुखदुःखानुभवः

54. ,, तथा च

,, पूर्वकालतैवेत्युक्तम्

*Pratīka.*—

नावगतब्रह्मात्माभावस्य (यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुं वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात् । न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनो दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमाननिवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति । न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य

तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति । तदुक्तं श्रुत्या—“अशरीरं वाव संतं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः” (छान्दो. ८-१२-१) इति । शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात्, न जीवत इति चेन्न, सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् । न ह्यात्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वान्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । नित्यमशरीरत्वमकर्मनिमित्तत्वादित्यवोचाम । तत्कृतधर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमेति चेन्न शरीरसंबंधस्यासिद्धत्वाद्धर्माधर्मयोरात्मकृतत्वासिद्धेः । शरीरसंबन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोस्तत्कृतत्वस्य चेतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गादन्धपरंपरैषाऽनादित्वकल्पना । क्रिया-समवायाभावाच्चात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । संनिधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वमिति चेन्न, धनदानाद्युपाजितभृत्यसंबन्धित्वात्तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः । न त्वात्मनो धनदानादिवच्छरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिसंबन्धनिमित्तं किञ्चिच्छक्यं कल्पयितुम् । मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः । एतेन यजमानत्वमात्मनो व्याख्यातं । अत्राहुः—देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मन आत्मीये देहादावभिमानो गौणो न मिथ्येति चेन्न, प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः । यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तुभेदः, यथा केसरादिमानाकृतिविशेषोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाङ्मुख्योऽन्यः प्रसिद्धः, ततश्चान्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैस्संपन्नः सिद्धः, तस्य पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतो नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य । तस्य त्वन्यत्रान्य-शब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रांतिनिमित्तावेव भवतो न गौणौ । यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमित्य-गृह्यमाणविशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ, यथा वा श्रुक्तिकायामकस्माद्रजतमिति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ, तद्वद्देहादिसंघातेऽहमिति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययावात्मानात्माविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम् । आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानामजाविपालानामिवाविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः । तस्माद्देहादिव्यति-रिक्तात्मा स्तित्वादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव न गौणः । तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्यय-निमित्तत्वात्सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम् । तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः—“तद्यथाऽहि निर्व्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते । अथायममशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव” (बृह. ४-४-७) इति । ‘स चक्षुर-चक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव’ इति च । स्मृतिरपि च ‘स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा’ (भ. गी. २. ५४) इत्याद्या स्थितप्रज्ञ-लक्षणान्याचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसंबन्धं दर्शयति । तस्मान्नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम् । यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं नासाववगतब्रह्मात्मभाव इत्यनवद्यम् । यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात्पराचीनयोर्मनननिदिध्यासनयोर्दर्शनाद्विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणो न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति । न । अवगत्यर्थत्वान्मनननिदिध्यासनयोः । यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विविनियुज्येत भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम् । नतु तदस्ति, मनननिदिध्यासन-योरपि श्रवणवदवगत्यर्थत्वात् । तस्माच्च प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवतोऽत्यतः स्वेतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम् । एवं च सति “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” इति तद्विषयः पृथक्शास्त्रारंभ उपपद्यते । प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्वे हि ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासे’त्यारब्धत्वाच्च पृथक्शास्त्र-मारभ्येत । आरभ्यमाणं चैवमारभ्येत—‘अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासे’ति,

“अथातः कर्तव्यपुरुषार्थयोजिज्ञासा” (जै. ९-२-१) इतिवत् । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगति-  
स्त्वप्रतिज्ञातेति तदर्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारंभः—‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति तस्मादहं  
ब्रह्मास्मीत्येदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि चेताराणि प्रमाणानि . न ह्यहेयानुपा-  
देयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ निर्विषयाण्यप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्तीति ।

## XII SECTION

From तदेवं सिद्धस्य वस्तुनः to बाधानुपलब्धेश्चेति

*Topic.*—This is a recapitulation of the arguments of the last two Vārṇakas (V. p. 285). Here is criticised the view that the Vedānta enjoins meditation on Brahman—an existent entity. It is further pointed out that Brahman is established from the Śāstra irrespective of any need for Vidhi, i.e., Brahman does not stand in complementary relation to any injunction. Finally on the ground that the previous Śāstra has not dealt with the pure non-relational Brahman it is pointed out that there is justification for commencing the new Treatise.

The Vārṇaka concludes with the explanation of the three stanzas quoted in the Bhāṣya which are attributed to one Sundara Pāṇḍya.

### Paragraphs.—

- |                                 |                            |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 55. From तदेवं सिद्धस्य वस्तुनः | to समन्वयादिति सिद्धम्     |
| 56. „ एवं च सति                 | „ प्रवर्तकविशेषजिज्ञासनात् |
| 57. „ तदेवं ब्रह्मावगमात्       | „ न कथंचिदुद्भवेदित्यर्थः  |
| 58. „ तदेतद्द्रढयन्नाह          | „ बाधानुपलब्धेश्चेति       |

### Pratīka.—

- (i) अपि चाहुः ।
- (ii) गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् । सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत् ।
- (iii) अन्वेष्टव्या (त्मविज्ञानात्प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः । अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ।
- (iv) देहात्मप्रत्ययो (यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः । लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात् ॥ १ ॥

॥ इति चतुःसूत्री समाप्ता ॥

# INDEX

## A

Abode, 310  
 Absolute, 1, 2, 3, 76, 134, 210  
 Absolute identity, 330  
 Act, 212  
 Action, 113, 131, 172  
 Activity, 108  
 Adhikāra, 179, 182  
 Adhikārin, 186, 187, 188, 194, 196, 226  
 Adhyāpana, 190, 191, 196  
 Adhyayana, 171, 186, 187, 188, 191, 193, 201, 203, 205  
 Adhyāsa, 44  
 Adrṣta, 35  
 Affliction, 125, 174  
 Age, 199, 200, 201  
 Agency, 198, 199  
 Agent, 146, 195, 200, 211, 283  
 Aggregate, 98, 249, 259  
 Āgneya, 212, 235  
 Agnihotra, 118, 167, 168, 169, 173, 205, 218  
 Ahantā, 125  
 Air, 265  
 Ākāśa, 36, 104, 265  
 All-knowing, 275  
 All-potent, 275  
 Aloe-wood, 268  
 Anārtha, 106, 135  
 Ancestors, 192  
 Animal, 211  
 Anitya, 190  
 Ant-hill, 71  
 Anubhāva, 125  
 Apprehended, 84  
 Apprehender, 84  
 Apavarga, 213  
 Apūrva, 240  
 Arjuna, 232  
 Artha, 235  
 Aruṇa, 193  
 Āryas, 189  
 Āsvamedha, 186  
 Ātmahanana, 255  
 Ātmajñāna, 146  
 Ātman, 51, 52, 57, 60, 80, 102, 116, 121, 123, 143, 149, 150, 151, 159, 160, 244, 245, 246, 248, 251, 255, 269, 294, 296, 313, 314, 332  
 Ātman-cognition, 148  
 Ātman-entity, 149  
 Ātman-identity, 135, 138  
 Atoms, 217, 219, 267  
 Ātreya, 232  
 Attainment, 310  
 Attributes, 244, 260  
 Auspiciousness, 202  
 Author, 231

## A—Contd.

Authorship, 277  
 Auxiliaries, 94, 95, 96  
 Āvaraṇa, 105  
 Avidyā, 10, 11, 12, 35, 42, 47, 49, 53, 54, 67, 68, 104, 105, 107, 128, 136, 137, 141, 146, 328  
 Axe, 235

## B

Baby-son, 119  
 Bachelor, 211  
 Bādarāyaṇa, 116, 139, 217  
 Bath, 145, 168, 173  
 Bauddhas, 97, 168  
 Beatitude, 234, 257  
 Beginningless, 124, 126  
 Being, 216, 251, 275  
 Benediction, 5  
 Benefit, 231  
 Bhāṭṭa, 57, 102, 175  
 Bhrama, 38  
 Bhṛgu, 224, 275  
 Bile, 19  
 Bitter, 19  
 Bliss, 117, 159, 184, 255, 275  
 Blue-lotus, 285, 288  
 Body, 108, 112, 113, 114, 148, 255, 328, 332  
 Bodily aggregate, 126, 127  
 Bolus, 192  
 Bondage, 3  
 Boy, 200, 201, 290  
 Brahman, 1, 48, 127, 145, 221, 223, 225, 238, 243, 258, 265, 276, 288, 294, 296  
 Brahma-cognition, 136  
 Brahma-knowledge, 126, 140  
 Brahmaloṇa, 184, 208  
 Brahmanidya, 127  
 Brāhmaṇa, 188, 308, 324, 326  
 Breathing, 278  
 Brhaspatiasava, 186  
 Buddha, 168, 175  
 Buddhistic, 100, 168

## C

Caitya, 168  
 Calamity, 16  
 Canals, 156  
 Candra, 287  
 Caraka, 232, 234  
 Cārvāka, 76, 123, 250  
 Caste, 199, 200, 201  
 Cattle, 111  
 Cāturmāsyayāga, 218  
 Cause, 94, 95, 96, 272, 281  
 Cause-effect, 97

## C—Contd.

Cause-effect relation, 98  
 Causal efficiency, 92, 93  
 Chapter, 213  
 Child, 119  
 China-rose, 78  
 Class, 245  
 Clay, 231  
 Cognised, 57, 80, 81, 84  
 Cogniser, 2, 57, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84  
 Cognition, 29, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 83,  
 85, 90, 92, 98, 148, 157, 165, 214  
 Colour, 29, 150, 164, 246  
 Configuration, 245  
 Consciousness, 35, 36, 58, 59, 62, 63,  
 242  
 Consecution, 183, 202, 203  
 Contemplation, 138, 162, 296  
 Content, 152  
 Cooking, 23  
 Cow, 23, 132  
 Cravings, 208, 209  
 Creation, 267  
 Creator, 240  
 Crow's teeth, 183, 234  
 Crystal, 69, 70, 78, 79, 269  
 Curds, 25, 26

## D

Darvihomas, 210  
 Deafness, 13  
 Deaf persons, 8  
 Death, 262  
 Debts, 211  
 Deep-sleep, 64, 68  
 Definition, 258, 261, 263  
 Deity, 5, 131, 156, 198, 283, 300, 329  
 Delusion, 293  
 Desire, 209, 215, 225  
 Desired, 295  
 Detachment, 224  
 Destination, 318  
 Destruction, 61, 88, 258, 259, 260,  
 313  
 Devadatta, 72, 286, 307, 319  
 Devatā, 240  
 Devil, 307  
 Dharma, 115, 116, 142, 145, 167, 168,  
 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180,  
 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 211,  
 212, 213, 214, 220, 235, 244, 269,  
 270, 271, 296, 302, 322, 323, 327,  
 331  
 Dhyāna, 161  
 Discipline, 217, 219, 220, 226  
 Disease, 111  
 Dish, 265  
 Dissolution, 264  
 Doṣa, 20  
 Double-moon, 15, 270  
 Doubt, 142, 147, 176  
 Dream, 14, 33  
 Dream-objects, 35

## D—Contd.

Dumbness, 120  
 Duty, 172, 190, 197, 204, 213, 270

E

Earth, 275  
 Effect, 94  
 Effort, 146  
 Ego, 62  
 Ego-agency, 69  
 Ego-cognition, 50, 86  
 Ego-consciousness, 62, 63  
 Ego-notion, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 80, 120,  
 126, 149, 166, 247, 248, 251  
 Elements, 246, 264  
 Elephant, 35  
 Endless, 124  
 Enjoyment, 184, 216, 249, 250, 251  
 Entity, 128  
 Eradication, 132  
 Eternal Seer, 41  
 Ether, 265  
 Evil, 128, 132, 134, 135, 293  
 Evolution, 58  
 Existence, 260, 263, 267  
 Experience, 29, 52, 57, 63, 64, 94, 109  
 Exposition, 230  
 Eye, 164

## F

Father, 191, 193  
 Faggots, 208, 265  
 Falsity, 125  
 Fear, 137  
 Fields, 156  
 Fire, 189, 207, 208, 265, 268, 312  
 Flame, 250  
 Flour, 152, 153  
 Food, 218, 233  
 Fore-offerings, 235  
 Forest, 62  
 Forms, 262, 266  
 Freedom, 140, 216, 226, 243, 244  
 Fruit, 71  
 Future, 93

## G

Gamana, 234  
 Gautama, 272  
 Gifts, 189  
 Good, 293  
 Gotva, 60  
 Grain, 157  
 Grammar, 201, 232  
 Granthi, 70  
 Grinding, 234  
 Guṇās, 41

## H

Happiness, 64, 184, 219, 282, 296  
 Health, 119  
 Heaven, 114  
 Hell, 192  
 Hiraṇyagarbha, 266  
 Husk, 234



## I

Identity, 135, 305, 312, 327, 331  
 Identity of Brahman, 306  
 Identity of Self, 306  
 Ignorance, 136  
 Illusion, 38, 78, 122, 128  
 Illusoriness, 51, 87  
 Illusory, 5, 317, 318  
 Illusory cognition, 270  
 Illusory knowledge, 43  
 Immediate perception, 298  
 Imperishability, 219  
 Impression, 29, 85  
 Impurities, 210  
 Incompatibility, 89  
 Indigestion, 218  
 Individual self, 4, 139, 140  
 Individual soul, 47, 61, 76, 254, 288, 298, 305  
 Indra, 304  
 Inference, 51  
 Infinite, 242  
 Infinite-regress, 40  
 Inhibition, 37  
 Initiation, 196, 200  
 Injunction, 165, 166, 271, 297, 298, 331  
 Inquiry, 52, 150, 181, 187, 203, 204, 205, 206, 213, 216, 219, 221, 227, 229, 238, 256  
 Insentience, 58, 59  
 Instruction, 190, 192, 196  
 Íśvara, 46, 48, 90, 91, 252, 253, 254, 267, 268, 272, 311  
 Intellect, 123  
 Internal consciousness, 84  
 Invalidity, 110  
 Itihāsa, 67

## J

Jackal, 184  
 Jaimini, 115, 116, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 177, 180, 319, 322  
 Japākusuma, 69, 70  
 Jāti, 320  
 Jīva, 12, 48, 49, 54, 74, 76, 77, 91, 128, 134, 138, 139, 221, 254, 305, 310, 314  
 Jīvanmukta, 221  
 Jīvātman, 316  
 Jñāna, 111  
 Joy, 184  
 Jyotiṣtoma, 175, 176, 270, 302

## K

Kaṇāda, 268  
 Karma, 117, 173, 190, 191  
 Kārya, 152, 174  
 Kātyāyana, 323  
 Kinetic energy, 68  
 King, 119, 223  
 Knowership, 109  
 Knowledge, 18, 37, 165, 227, 228, 230, 269, 312, 331  
 Kriyā, 175  
 Kṣema, 111

## L

Lad, 198  
 Lake, 220  
 Landscape, 290  
 Learner, 289  
 Liberation, 5, 106, 107, 181, 184, 218, 273, 296, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, 308, 309, 329, 330  
 Life-cycle, 121, 149  
 Light, 265  
 Limit, 318  
 Lions, 153  
 Logic, 133  
 Logical proofs, 139  
 Loka, 9  
 Lokāyatikas, 246  
 Lord, 251, 253, 266, 268  
 Lotus, 73  
 Lotus-bud, 26

## M

Mādhyaṃika, 38  
 Magic, 14, 16  
 Mahāyānika, 83, 98, 99  
 Maitreya, 314  
 Mamatā, 125  
 Mandate, 146, 149, 152, 157, 158, 159, 161, 173, 174, 186, 189, 198, 292  
 Manhood, 120  
 Mansion, 207  
 Mantras, 156, 157, 308  
 Mart-silver, 32  
 Mat, 73, 145  
 Materialist, 246, 250  
 Maya, 30, 31, 36, 49, 76  
 Meaning, 187, 236, 240, 241, 244, 300  
 Medical science, 234  
 Medicine, 233  
 Meditation, 139, 144, 148, 167, 206, 209, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 305, 309, 311, 315  
 Memory, 20, 22, 27, 29  
 Memory-impressions, 45  
 Memory-like, 34  
 Memory-pictures, 34  
 Mental-impressions, 27, 34  
 Merit, 224, 303  
 Meru, 262  
 Milk, 25, 26  
 Milk-jar, 138  
 Mīmāṃsā, 167, 180, 181  
 Mīmāṃsaka, 202  
 Mind, 148  
 Mirror, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 100  
 Mokṣa, 140, 148, 167, 205, 218, 225  
 Momentary, 97  
 Momentariness, 86, 259  
 Moon, 72  
 Moon-stone, 265  
 Movement, 245  
 Mukti, 92, 139  
 Murder, 324, 326  
 Mutual dependence, 87

## N

Nacre, 38, 39, 74, 122, 129, 130, 317  
 Nairuktas, 263  
 Naiyāyikas, 38, 68, 250  
 Names, 262, 266  
 Nārada, 304  
 Negation, 8  
 Neophyte, 188  
 Nescience, 2, 15, 49, 117, 126, 128,  
 149, 298, 304, 311  
 Nigama, 241, 242  
 Nihilist, 40  
 Nirukta, 241  
 Nitya, 190  
 Niyoga, 145, 151, 153, 325, 326  
 Non-bliss, 276  
 Non-destruction, 61  
 Non-revelation, 59  
 Non-self, 7  
 Not-self, 112  
 Nyāya, 49, 168

## O

Object, 57, 58, 62, 63, 72, 82, 83, 84,  
 119, 122  
 Object-cognition, 66  
 Oblation, 198  
 Odana, 234  
 Omnipotence, 243, 268  
 Omnipotent, 263, 276, 280  
 Omniscience, 243, 268, 277, 278, 281,  
 283, 284, 323  
 Omniscient, 263, 276, 280  
 Oneness, 308  
 Origin, 171, 258  
 Origination, 259, 264, 267, 313  
 Out-castes, 189

## P

Paddy, 235  
 Pain, 295  
 Pāṇini, 323  
 Parameśvara, 67  
 Particular, 6  
 Past, 93  
 Perception, 29, 40, 51, 113, 146, 160  
 Performance, 164, 213  
 Permanency, 89  
 Permanent enjoyer, 112  
 Phala, 116  
 Phantom, 16  
 Picture, 282  
 Picture-illusion, 67  
 Plants, 121  
 Pleasures, 216, 295  
 Pollard, 271  
 Pot, 71, 265  
 Pounding, 234  
 Prabhākara, 57, 319  
 Prābhākara, 38, 58, 62, 102, 175, 188,  
 189, 326  
 Pradhāna, 68, 266, 267  
 Prajāpativrata, 324

## P—Contd.

Prakṛti, 49  
 Pramāṇa, 107, 108, 110, 146, 169  
 Pramātā, 108  
 Prameya, 108  
 Prāṇa, 139  
 Pratigraha, 189  
 Pratyabhijñā, 87  
 Prayāja, 163  
 Prayoga, 242  
 Prayojana, 141  
 Preceding-time, 89  
 Preceptor, 196, 197, 198  
 Preceptorship, 191, 193  
 Priest, 180  
 Primal nescience, 12  
 Prime cause, 264  
 Privileges, 189  
 Progeny, 191, 192  
 Prohibition, 271  
 Prosperity, 213  
 Proverb, 172  
 Pupil, 171, 194, 195, 196, 200, 201  
 Purāṇa, 67  
 Purification, 144, 145, 311  
 Purity, 204, 244  
 Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, 175, 205  
 Puruṣa, 49, 82, 317  
 Pūṣā, 321

## Q

Quality, 245  
 Quarter, 265

## R

Rājanya, 186  
 Rājaśūya, 186  
 Realisation, 273  
 Reality, 150, 151, 166, 178, 209, 293,  
 299  
 Reasoning, 133  
 Recognition, 29, 72  
 Recollection, 17, 22, 23, 29, 39, 40,  
 297  
 Reflection, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77  
 Regress, 93  
 Relation, 97  
 Release, 140, 310, 311  
 Remembrance, 43, 164  
 Removal, 124  
 Renunciation, 215  
 Resemblance, 271  
 Revelation, 150, 291  
 Reward, 208, 262  
 Rice, 157, 232  
 Ring, 293  
 Ritual, 180  
 Room, 6  
 Rope, 43, 79, 137, 327  
 Rope-serpent, 29, 78  
 Ruby, 69  
 Rūpa, 125

## S

Śabda, 47, 128, 130, 132, 146, 151, 157, 160, 165, 168, 190, 237, 290, 296, 297, 298, 301  
 Śabdabodha, 319, 322  
 Śabda-śakti, 318  
 Śabara, 115, 172, 173, 177, 180, 319, 322  
 Śabarasvāmin, 177  
 Sacrifice, 117, 118, 189, 194, 329  
 Sacrificer, 180, 194  
 Śakti, 319  
 Saktu, 147, 185  
 Saktu-homa, 144  
 Samit, 163  
 Sāmkhya, 41, 68, 250  
 Samnyāsa, 211  
 Samsāra, 135, 180, 213, 303  
 Samskāra, 137  
 Sanatkumāra, 304  
 Sapphire, 104  
 Śārīraka, 323  
 Satiation, 208  
 Satra, 186  
 Satisfaction, 184  
 Sāvitrī, 189  
 Scale-pan, 129  
 Scripture, 47, 269, 307  
 Seed, 40, 96  
 Seed-sprout, 78  
 Self, 1, 2, 7, 78, 112, 114, 148, 292, 309, 328, 332  
 Self-certainty, 133  
 Self-contradiction, 103  
 Self-hood, 123  
 Self-indulgence, 209  
 Self-luminous, 50, 104  
 Self-realisation, 306, 308  
 Self-restraint, 215  
 Self-revealing, 145  
 Self-validity, 206  
 Sense-activity, 64  
 Sense-contact, 27, 34  
 Sense-objects, 184  
 Sensory-knowledge, 45  
 Sequence, 163, 203  
 Serpent, 41, 42, 43, 137, 327  
 Sesamum, 249  
 Shell, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 39, 44, 129  
 Shell-silver, 15, 23, 25, 31, 32, 45, 74, 76, 271  
 Sight, 150, 164  
 Silver, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 74, 122, 129, 130, 317  
 Similarity, 87  
 Sin, 201, 202  
 Sleep, 65  
 Smoke, 207, 268  
 Smṛti, 49, 67  
 Solvent, 2, 3  
 Son, 191, 192, 193  
 Sorrow, 33, 282  
 Soul, 3, 46, 240, 255

## S—Contd.

Sovereignty, 208  
 Space, 163  
 Sprout, 40, 71, 96, 98, 235  
 Śruti, 47, 49, 67, 127, 240, 262, 267, 269, 311  
 Step, 207  
 Study, 228  
 Subject, 57, 58, 84, 119, 122  
 Sublation, 74  
 Subsequence, 207, 211, 217  
 Subsistence, 258  
 Substance, 131  
 Succeeding time, 89  
 Succession, 179, 213, 214  
 Sudra, 189  
 Suitors, 247  
 Sun, 75  
 Sun-spots, 16  
 Śūnyavāda, 267  
 Super-human power, 137  
 Superimposition, 1  
 Supreme, 136, 161, 219, 224  
 Supreme Bliss, 276  
 Supreme Ruler, 254  
 Supreme self, 140  
 Supreme spirit, 298  
 Suśruta, 232, 234  
 Sustention, 313  
 Sūtra, 279  
 Svarga, 116, 137, 167, 170, 187, 212, 235, 240, 262, 302, 309, 329  
 Śvetaketu, 193  
 Syllogisms, 269

## T

Tādātmya, 109  
 Tantra, 322  
 Tanūnapāi, 163  
 Tarka, 133, 134, 135  
 Teacher, 269  
 Teaching, 189  
 Therapeutics, 232  
 Thinker, 252  
 Thought-energy, 68  
 Time, 163, 265  
 Timira, 46  
 Transformation, 103  
 Tree, 19, 62, 231, 236

## U

Ultimate, 226, 237  
 Undesired, 295  
 Universe, 36, 41, 128, 150, 260, 281, 300  
 Universal, 6  
 Unknown, 230  
 Unreality, 29  
 Unseen, 217  
 Upadeśa, 181  
 Upanayana, 118, 189, 190, 191, 193, 196, 197, 200, 201

## U—Contd.

Upaniṣad, 116, 127, 150, 187, 205  
Upāsana, 137, 144, 148, 161, 314  
Uttara Mīmāṃsā, 178

## V—Contd.

Vyākaraṇa, 241  
Vyavahāra, 109  
Vyāsa, 210

## V

Vākya, 133  
Validity, 116  
Vāmadeva, 304  
Varuṇa, 224, 275  
Vāyu, 265  
Veda, 117, 151, 154, 161, 164, 166,  
167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175,  
176, 177, 178, 184, 185, 187, 189,  
193, 197, 204, 206, 217, 218, 221,  
278, 281, 291, 292, 296, 308, 316,  
318, 323, 330  
Vedārtha, 176, 177  
Vaiśeṣika, 268  
Vaiśyastoma, 186  
Vidhi, 149, 151, 160  
Vidyā, 42, 105, 132, 137  
Vijñāna, 98  
Vijñānavadin, 38, 61, 84, 99  
Vikṣepa, 105  
Village, 84, 145, 194, 195, 198, 262  
Viṇā, 202  
Virtues, 217  
Viśaya, 141  
Viśvajit, 153  
Viśvajidyāga, 187  
Viśvatomukha, 279  
Viśvadevas, 305

## W

Waking state, 35, 148  
Wealth, 190  
White cow, 319  
Will, 37, 295  
Wisdom, 244  
Woman, 272  
Word, 152, 186, 236, 237, 238, 240,  
244, 289, 290, 295, 300, 320, 323,  
330  
Work, 303  
World, 59, 93, 129, 139, 153, 165, 216,  
258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265,  
266, 267, 269, 272, 277, 288  
World-cause, 276, 280, 323, 327  
World-creation, 283  
World-cycle, 243  
World-negation, 166  
World-order, 277  
World-sovereign, 184

## Y

Yajña, 131  
Yājana, 189  
Yājñavalkya, 314  
Yāska, 264  
Yoga, 111  
Yogins, 252